

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_220865

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

Osmania University Library


Call No. 954.63
S77V

Accession No. 803

Author

Title

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.



VIGNETTES FROM THE HISTORY
OF THE WALAJAHI DYNASTY
OF THE CARNATIC
1744—1855

Parts I & II

Lectures delivered under the
auspices of the Osmania University


By

RAO BAHADUR
PROF. C. S. SRINIVASACHARI

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY
ANNAMALAINAGAR

PRINTED AT THE
OSMANIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
HYDERABAD-DECCAN

1947



VIGNETTES FROM THE HISTORY
OF THE WALAJAHI DYNASTY
OF THE CARNATIC
1744—1855

Parts I & II

Lectures delivered under the
auspices of the Osmania University

RAO BAHADUR
PROF. C. S. SRINIVASACHARI
ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY
ANNAMALAINAGAR

PRINTED AT THE
OSMANIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
HYDERABAD-DECCAN

1947

Dedicated to

H.E. COLONEL DR. HAFIZ SIR
MUHAMMAD AHMAD SAID KHAN BAHADUR,
NAWAB OF CHATTARI,
K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., M.B.E., LL.D.,

*President of the Executive Council
of
H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar
and Chancellor of the Osmania University,*

Foreword by

PROFESSOR H. K. SHERWANI, M.A. (Oxon), BAR-AT-LAW,
F.R. HIST. S.,

Professor of History, Osmania University.

Rao Bahadur C. S. Srinivasachari, Head of the Department of History, Annamalai University, is too well known in literary and historical circles to need much of an introduction. Besides being an author of some of the most authoritative works on South Indian History, one of which has been rendered into French, he has made vast contributions to our historical knowledge in the form of learned papers, which are always read and heard with a very great interest whenever they are expounded. Besides being one of the permanent members of the Indian Historical Records Commission, he has the rare distinction of being an ex-President of the Indian History Congress; and recently he presided over the deliberations of the Modern Section of the First Deccan History Conference held at Hyderabad.

The "Vignettes" which are being presented to the learned public, purport to be two Extension Lectures delivered in the Hyderabad Town Hall under the auspices of the Osmania University. Those who had the privilege of being present at these lectures would no doubt remember the lucid and facile manner in which the Rao Bahadur brought out his wealth of facts and conclusions in quick succession and left the audience spell-bound.

The subject of the Walajahi rule in the Carnatic is one which has not only a South Indian, but an All-India, appeal, for it was in the Carnatic where were fought the first battles which were to decide the destiny of the whole of India and which made the work of the English easy by the virtual elimination of their great rivals, the French. The subject has a special appeal for us of Hyderabad, for the Carnatic was originally a part of the Subah of the Deccan which became autonomous under the great Founder of the Asafjahi Dynasty. The glories of the City of Arcot may have passed away, and the palaces of the earlier Walajahis may have become but heaps of rubble and earth, but enough vestiges remain of their rule along the coast, in-

cluding Madras right up to Trichinopoly and beyond, to make their study both interesting and instructive.

Rao Bahadur Srinivasachari belongs to the front rank of our historians and it is hoped that he would further develop his thesis in the form of a comprehensive history of Walajahi Carnatic and Tamilnad, and thus bring us under a further debt of gratitude.

Hyderabad-Deccan,
20-5-1946.

H. K. SHERWANI.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

I am greatly indebted to the authorities of the Osmania University and to Prof. H. K. Sherwani, for having given me the opportunity of delivering the lectures on the Walajahi History under their auspices; and I am particularly indebted to the kindness and generous appreciation of Prof. H. K. Sherwani, which has made it possible for me to bring out the substance of the lectures in book form, with an appreciative foreword from him. I am also grateful to H.E. the Nawab of Chattari, President of the Executive Council of H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar, and Chancellor of the Osmania University, for his permission to dedicate the work to him. I am also greatly indebted to Prof. Dr. M. Nizamuddin, Ph.D. (Cantab)., Curator of the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Osmania University, for the uniform kindness and courtesy extended in the course of the printing and get-up of this book. The creeping in of small typographical errors is regretted.

31-8-1946.
CHIDAMBARAM.

C. S. S.

CONTENTS.

Vignettes from the History of the Walajahi Dynasty of the Carnatic.

PART I.

Pages No.

I. Rise of Nawab Anwaru'd-din ..	1— 7
II. The Rule of Nawab Anwaru'd-din in the Carnatic (1744-49) ..	8— 29
(a) The Death of the Sahibzada, Son of Safdar Ali	8- 12
(b) Anwaru'd-din's Difficulties	12- 15
(c) The First Anglo-French War	15- 18
(d) Further Troubles for Anwaru'd-din	18- 25
(e) The Descent of Chandā Sahib and the Battle of Ambur	25- 29
III. Nawab Muhammad Ali's Triumph over his Rival (1749-1752) ..	30— 69
(a) Events after Ambur	30- 33
(b) The English openly side with Muhammad Ali	33- 36
(c) Intrigues thicken in Nasir Jang's Camp	36- 41
(d) The French capture Gingee	41- 43
(e) Continued Inaction on both Sides—Further Intrigues	43- 45
(f) Muhammad Ali flees to Trichinopoly	46- 52
(g) Operations round Trichinopoly	53- 58
(h) The Capture of Arcot and its Sequel	58- 61
(i) Further Fighting at Trichinopoly	61- 66
(j) The End of Chanda Sahib	66- 69

PART II-A.

The Rule of Nawab Muhammad Ali and his Successors. .

[Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah (1749-1795)].

I. The Nawab's early difficulties	71—141
(a) Military Operations 1752-54	71- 86
(b) Preliminaries to and the Treaty of Pondicherry	87- 93
(c) Military Operations on behalf of the Nawab 1755-57	94-106
(d) The Marathas in the Carnatic	107-110
(e) Lally's Siege of Madras and Further Operations 1758-61	110-124
(f) Continued Troubles in Madura and Tinnevely—Yusuf Khan's Rule	125-130
(g) Yusuf Khan's Rebellion and End 1763-64 ..	139-141

	Pages No
II. The Growing Difficulties of the Nawab ..	142—158
(a) The Relations of the Nawab with Pigot and Orme	142 - 146
(b) The Tanjore Affair—Earlier Phase ..	146 - 153
(c) Lord Pigot and Tanjore ..	153 - 158
III. The Nawab's relations with the Madras Government ..	159—182
(d) The Nawab and the First Mysore War ..	159 - 162
(e) Sir John Lindsay on the Scene ..	162 - 164
(f) Further complications in Tanjore ..	164 - 168
(g) The Sequence of Events leading to the Arrest of Lord Pigot	168 - 177
(h) The Nawab, Hyder Ali and the Second Mysore War	177 - 182

PART II-B.

Rule of Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah—contd.	
His Later Career—His Successors (1795-1855). 183—276	
I. Muhammad Ali and the English—First Phase of their Relations	183 - 189
II. The Nawab's Debts and the Arcot Interest in Parliament and in British Politics	190 - 201
III. The Sequel of the Nawab's Debts ..	202 - 205
IV. The Nawab and the Madras Government (1781-1790)—His Relations with Macartney and Campbell	206 - 213
V. The Closing Years of the Nawab's Rule (1790-95)	214 - 220
VI. Nawab Umdatul Umara Bahadur, Walajah II, (1795-1801)	221 - 233
VII. The Seringapatam Correspondence and the Action of the British Government thereon	234 - 241
VIII. Tajul Umara set aside in favour of Azimu'd-Daula and the Annexation of the Carnatic (July 1801) by the British.	242 - 254
IX. The Final Phase—The Rule of the Titular Nawabs (1801-1855)	255 - 276

VIGNETTES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE WALAJAHI DYNASTY OF THE CARNATIC (1744-1855).

I

The Rise of Nawab Anwaru'd-din.

The historian Mark Wilks, Orme before him, and other writers after him, have attached great importance to the events that took place in the Carnatic on the eve of the outbreak of the first phase of the Anglo-French struggle, in 1746. The circumstances that led to the disappearance of the Nawayat family of Sa'adatullah Khan from the Nawabship of the Carnatic and the accession of Anwaru'd-din Khan had certainly a considerable effect on the respective fortunes of the English and the French on the Coromandel Coast; and again the attempt of Chanda Sahib (Husain Dost Khan) Nawayat to seize the Subah of Arcot in alliance with Muzaffar Jang, the rival of Nasir Jang, produced another and greater revolution in the Carnatic and rendered the Anglo-French struggle pregnant with consequences, both for the country-powers and for the fortunes of the European themselves.

Nawab Anwaru'd-din Khan first rose to prominence in the court of Aurangzib on his appointment as Peshkar to the Darogha of the Diwankhana of the Padshah. During the reign of Shah Alam, he got the title of Shahamat Jang and an increment in his *mansab*. In the reign of Muhammad Shah he attained to a high rank in the army, was granted the title of Siraju'd-daula and was appointed to the post of Deputy Vazir. He joined Nawab Asaf Jah, Nizamul-Mulk, in the Deccan in 1724 and was appointed to the charge of the Sarkars of Chicacole, Rajahmundry and Masulipatam, where the zamindars were disaffected and the prevailing disorder was of long standing and where "he slew Subna and Ramraz; two mischievous big zamindars." He had, as his deputy, the famous Rustam

Khan¹ who was governor of Rajahmundry in the years 1732-39 and who was known to local tradition as Hajji Husain. When Nuru'd-din, the son of Rustam Khan, killed his own father and usurped power, and rose along with other zamindars, Anwaru'd-din destroyed him and brought under his effective control the Sarkar of Rajahmundry.

When Nawab Asaf Jah proceeded on an expedition to the Carnatic which had been in an anarchical condition since the plundering invasion of Raghuji Bhonsle in 1740, and where the new Nawab Safdar Ali had been assassinated, Anwaru'd-din was entrusted by his master with the management of the Subah of Hyderabad, with the consent of the Padshah (1743-44). He tried hard to improve agriculture, administered strict justice and put down the

-
1. See the *Fifth Report*, Appendix No.B—13. James Grant's Survey of the Northern Sarkars of 1786. (Madras edition of Messrs. Higginbotham and Co.).

“At length the memorable battle of Shuckerked (A.D. 1724) gave a transient repose to the Deekan, and transferred in fact, though not in form, the sovereignty of this great limb of the Mogul Empire to Asuf Jah. Great were the benefits derived from the vigour and integrity of Rustum Khan, who, from 1732, for seven successive years, ruled, with the most ample delegated sway, Rajahmundry, with the other four more southerly provinces. There the Zemindars generally had availed themselves of the surrounding distractions on the death of Aurangzib to usurp the rights and feeble authority of their Mohammedan superintendents. To correct these dangerous abuses, and restore the necessary forms of interior administration, were the arduous tasks assigned to this new Zillahdar; and the conduct of the man so fully justified the Nizam's choice, that even to this day it is held up and considered by the inhabitants in general as an example worthy of imitation for necessary policy, considerate humanity, and rigid and universal justice. At the same time as the Zemindars defrauded the public treasury, they squeezed with the iron hand of oppression the industrious husbandmen and manufacturers. The first object, therefore, of Rustum Khan's government was the total extirpation of such merciless tyrants. Those who escaped the sword were proclaimed as traitors, and a reward being offered for their own, with their adherents' heads, a sufficient number was soon collected to erect two of those shocking pyramidal monuments, called Kulla-minar, near each of the provincial capitals, for one of which kind, though on a larger scale, the cruelty of Nadir is held in Europe so justly in abhorrence. The inhabitants in general feared and admired him, and the severe administration of Rustum Khan, which he now further distinguished by substituting ameens, or temporary collectors, in the room of the refractory Zemindars, was proverbial for exemplary excellence in the Northern Circars.”

Anwaru' d-din's administration of Rajahmundry and Chicacole was deemed to be vigorous and severe and his energy was actively seconded by Rustum Khan. According to Henry Morris: *A Descriptive and Historical Account of the Godavery District in the Presidency of Madras*; 1878, p. 223;—“The people, however, must have looked back with longing regret to the laxer, but milder, sway of their own Reddis, or of the undisciplined mercenary forces of the kings of Golconda, if a tithe of what is related of these new rulers is true.”

unruly retainers of Nasir Jang and his mother in the town of Begampura which had been founded by the latter. He had to encounter opposition from Nawab Nasir Jang and his mother, the Begam; she wrote a detailed complaint and despatched it to Nawab Asaf Jah, who was then in the Carnatic Payenghat and engaged in the siege of the fort of Nathamagar (Trichinopoly).² But Nawab Asaf Jah supported his lieutenant in the firm upholding of his authority.

Nawab Anwaru'd-din then fought with Bapu Nayak³ who had accompanied Raghuji Bhonsle on his Carnatic expedition and had obtained, through his interest, the right of collecting *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the territories between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra, in farm from Maharaja Sahu. The Nawab is said to have given battle to the Marathas at Andol (Hindoli), and defeated

-
2. Nawab Asaf Jah had returned to the Deccan from Delhi in the beginning of 1741 and contrived to put down the rebellion of Nasir Jang, who had been supported by Shah Nawaz Khan. After this, he went on an expedition into the Carnatic which was in a very confused condition, at the head of 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot, to establish his authority and to remove the abuses of the local administration. He first proceeded to Kurnool and thence went on to Arcot, where he put the young Nawabzada in charge of some of his trusted officers. He then laid siege to Trichinopoly and occupied that fortress on the morning of the 29th of August 1743. He left Khawaja Abdullah Khan in Trichinopoly to establish his authority in the neighbourhood and then returned to Arcot, whereabout he stayed till the end of 1744. "With his characteristic energy he set to restore peace and order and sent touring officers in the country side to reorganize the administration Through the instrumentality of Diwan Purnachand the revenues of the Carnatic were raised to 35, then to 40 lakhs and finally to 45 lakhs. Khawja Ni'amatullah Khan also contributed much in effecting the settlement of the revenues of the province" (Yusuf Husain Khan: 'Nizam 'l-Mulk Asaf Jah I, Founder of the Haiderabad State', p. 264).

Nawab Asaf Jah would not listen to any complaints against his trusted lieutenant, Anwaru'd-din, for whom he had great regard and whom he was to invest with the government of the Carnatic shortly. He thus replied to the complaint of his Begam: "In the religiousness, virtue, piety, and uprightness of Siraju'd-Dawla Bahadur, nobody has scope for interference. If you cannot get along with him, you may leave Hyderabad and find residence in Awrangabad. The arrival of this letter tied the complaining tongue, and commission of sins became impossible." (*Tuzak-i-Walajahi* of Burhan ibn Hasan—Translated into English by Dr. S. Muhammad Husayn Nainar, Part I, p. 43).

3. Bapu Nayak was one of the creditors of the Peshwa, Balaji Baji Rao, and was an ally of Raghuji Bhonsle who took him with him on his Carnatic expedition of 1740-41. Bapu Nayak had obtained by the interest of Raghuji Bhonsle the right of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the territory between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra, in farm from Raja Sahu, for the annual payment of seven lakhs of rupees. He encountered a number of difficulties and serious opposition and was ruined, according to Grant Duff, in a few years by the heavy charges of maintaining the troops.

and driven them away to Poona and compelled them "to forget their claims to the usual *chauth*."

Thereupon, the Peshwa collected a large army and descended on the Deccan. On hearing the news of the march of the enemy, Nawab Asaf Jah concluded peace with Murari Rao Ghorepade (a grand-nephew of the famous Santaji), who had been placed in charge of Trichinopoly by Raghuji Bhonsle and had taken part in the revolution that followed Safdar Ali's assassination. Nawab Asaf Jah secured from him the evacuation of Trichinopoly, entrusted the Subah of Arcot to Khwaja Abdulla Khan (as the son of Safdar Ali was a mere boy,) imprisoned and took away with him the leaders of the Nawayats who were deemed to have been the source of all mischief at Arcot.⁴

The Maratha army assembled at Satara in the early part of 1741 and advanced into the Deccan; and this caused considerable anxiety to the Nizam who was surrounded by them, as he was approaching Hyderabad. The Mughal camp was so closely blockaded that it was very difficult to get provisions or even water. Anwaru'd-din quickly came to his rescue, with his three younger sons, leaving Hazarat Ali (i.e., the future Nawab Muhammad Ali) to act in his place at Hyderabad. Nizamu'l-Mulk consulted his Diwans, Sayyid Lashkar Khan, Sayyid Sherif Khan, Khuda Bandah Khan, and Khwaja Abdullah Khan (who had accompanied him), and also Anwaru'd-din as to the course of action to be adopted in this emergency. The last named counsellor advised straight fight, but Shah Nawaz Khan who was not well disposed towards him, recommend-

4. The Subah of Arcot or Carnatic Payenghat was the creation of Nawab Zulfikar Khan Nusrat Jang, the general of Aurangzib in the long-drawn war against Gingee. He chose his camp on the bank of a river and the skirt of a forest; and in the course of years, the tents were replaced by houses of reed-coverings, and the latter by houses with tiled roofs; and the place came to be a great town. The Hindus called it Arcot (Arri River and Kadu Forest), because of the chance combination of river and forest. Hazarat Ala Muhammad' Ali gave it the names, Darun-Nur and Muhammadpur (after himself) even as he gave the name of Natharnagar to Trichinopoly after the saint, Hazarat Nathar Wali. Tanjore was likewise named by him Darul Zafar and Quadirnagar (after Sayyid Abdul Qadr whose tomb is at Nagore on the Coast). Ramnad and Sivaganga were named Walinagar and Husainpur, after Gulam Wali and Gulam Husain, the original names of Umdat-ul-Umara the eldest son of Hazarat Ala. See *Tuzak-i-Walajahi*; Part I: (p. 60).

ed a compromise with the enemy and the payment of the *chauth* demanded⁵.

Grant Duff merely says that the Maratha army was contemplated with anxiety by Nizamul-Mulk who soon found that he had nothing to apprehend from the army. Anwaru'd-din's bold attitude is said to have disheartened the Peshwa who "let the reins of firmness slip from his hands and sent messages of peace." He brought about a reconciliation between his master and the Peshwa, who personally met in an interview and exchanged greetings and presents. Nizamul-Mulk was greatly pleased with Anwaru'd-din's conduct and wrote an *arazdasht* to the Emperor, Muhammad Shah, praising his qualities and appreciating his distinguished services.

The Peshwa took leave of the Nawab and despatched his army towards Poona. Nawab Asaf Jah arranged a joyous function in honour of Anwaru'd-din Khan Bahadur; and he also gave a khilat of honour to Khwaja Abdullah Khan who was in his company and permitted him to go to the Nizamat of Arcot. Khwaja Abdullah Khan died suddenly the very next morning⁶ after he took leave of his

5. Shah Nawaz Khan was the Diwan of Berar; he had countenanced the revolt of Nasir Jang against his father, was disgraced and sent into retirement. He is said to have passed five years in seclusion when he composed the *Ma'asiru'l-Umara*. Dowson says (*History of India as told by its own Historians*, VIII, 187) that he was restored to favour shortly before Nizamul-Mulk's death and reinstated in the Diwani of Berar. According to Burhanu'd-din, he was again in favour at this time, i.e., a few years before, even in 1745. (See also Grant Duff's *History of the Mahattas*, 4th Edition, 1505, and Wilk's *Historical Sketches of South India*, 2nd Edn. 1. 158.).

"It is reported that Hirzullah Khan, who was a great friend of Shah Nawaz Khan, one of the adherents of Nasir Jang, addressed him thus on the battle-field: 'The son is going to his father's house and where are you going to? You have done your duty as a friend, now you better step aside from the precipice!' On hearing these words of his friend and well-wisher, Shah Nawaz Khan retired from the battle-field. For five years he dared not appear before Nizamul-Mulk and lived a life of complete seclusion, during which time he compiled his well-known biographical dictionary of Mughal peerage, *Ma'athiru'l-Umara*. Later he was pardoned and reinstated in his former office and titles." (Quoted from Hadiqatu'l-Alam, op. cit., p. 171, by Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan in his "Nizamul-Mulk Asaf Jah I"; pp. 242-243).

6. "In the gathering of the darkness of the night, Khwaja Abdullah Khan, adorned in the robes of his office, took leave of Nawab Asaf Jah, met his friends in the happy army, and then reached his tent. There he attended to his affairs, and rested for the night. He rose at dawn, attended to the calls of nature, and sat as usual on the chawki (a raised seat) to get ready for the early-morning prayer, and performed his ablutions. While he was doing these in the prescribed order, and reached to the washing of his left foot, the feet of his life slipped from the chair of firmness all on a sudden, and he fell on his face in eternal prostration. (*Tuzak-i-Walajahi* of Burhan ibn Hasan, translated into English by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, Part I., pp. 51-52).

master to take charge of his Subah; and the latter who had not even gone half a day's march from his meeting place with the Peshwa, held again a council of his four Diwans and Anwaru'd-din for the selection of a successor to Khwaja Abdullah Khan. Shah Nawaz Khan did not relish the suggestion made by Anwaru'd-din that he himself might be nominated to the place. But Khuda Bandah Khan supported him. The Nizam brushed aside the objection that he was old, found the *ishtikara* good and declared that, in appointing him to Arcot, he had "picked out the gem of your intelligence from the spring of our favours."

The newly appointed Nawab pleaded with his master for the release of the imprisoned Nawayats and enabled them to accompany him to Arcot. He also tried to effect a reconciliation between the aged Nizam and his son Nasir Jang who had been in disgrace. He, it is said in the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, even consented to support Nasir Jang as against his elder brother, Ghaziu'd-din Khan Fayroz Jang, after the death of the Nizam, in case the Padshah should give his approval for the accession of the former.⁷

7. "Nawab Asaf Jah sent him the *pandan* along with a message that he could meet Mir Ahmad. Receiving the *pandan* he turned back and went to Nawab Nizamud-Dawla Bahadur Nasir Jang, who at the end of the conversation caught hold of Nawwab Siraju'd-Dawla's hand, and said, "I desire a promise from you." He replied, "If it could be explained, and found to be practical, it shall certainly be obeyed." He said, "It is within the limits of possibility and there is no difficulty." Siraju'd-Dawla Bahadur submitted, "Let it be explained first, and then this faithful servant will give his word." Nasir Jang said, "I desire from you the promise of friendship." As soon as Siraju'd-Dawla Bahadur heard him speak thus, he snatched away his hand from him, and said "I cannot do it. So long as this old gentleman (Nawab Asaf Jah) is alive, it is impossible that I give up his friendship." Nasir Jang said, "My idea is only that after my father you should not support my brother Asaffu'd-Dawla Ghaziud-Din Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang, and that you must join hands with me." He replied, "This may be easy in case the Imperial Padshah approves." (*Tuzak-i-Walajahi* of Durhan ibn Hasan, Translated into English by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, Part I., p. 56).

The following is the account of Papaiya Brahmin the Younger, who was translator to the Council, at Madras and the son of Paupa Brahmany the Elder, who was the Chief Dubash at Madras. (This man prepared a manuscript history of the Carnatic upto 1749, which is preserved among the *Orme MSS.* (*India*, vol. i, 51). He was regarded as a veracious and trustworthy writer. The account given below is taken from the history of the Carnatic. "Soon after this man (Abdullah) returned to his house and was preparing to march away to Arcot, he was surprizingly dead by the pain in his Belly, which gave a different turn to the Affair next Morning; that some friend of Anwaradean Cawn—who have been the Nabob of Yelore and Raja Maheadrum Countrys for great many years, and who attended the Nizam's Person sometimes since for favour, and have been Ordered by him (at the time of his leaving Golconda) to overlook and

watch the city of Golconda in his absence—took advantage of that favourable Opportunity to intercede for him with Nizam; and upon agreeing to stand to all the Engagements which were agreed and promised by Coja Abdulla Cawn deceased they prevailed upon Nizam al Mulack to appoint Anwaradean Cawn in his Stead, which was granted accordingly by constituting Anwaradean Cawn Nabob of the Province of Arcot; Mahaphoose Cawn his Eldest Son, Deputy Nabob, and to succeed his Father in case of Death; Mahomud Ally Khan, the second Son, Vice Roy of Trichenopoly; and Lollah Sawpatrove, Diwan''. (quoted in H. D. Love: *Festiges of Old Madras*. Vol: II, p. 286).

Another account attributes his death to apoplexy, a cause which seems inconsistent with the symptoms.

A note says that "Anwar-ud-din, founder of the second Carnatic dynasty, was the son of Anwar, a commentator learned in ecclesiastical law, who, after making a pilgrimage to Mecca, was ennobled by Aurangzib. Anwar-ud-din, the son, after service at Surat under Ghazi-ud-din Khan, was appointed governor of Ellore and Rajahmundry in 1725 by the Nawab of the Carnatic." (Orme: *Military Transactions*).

The Tamil Chronicler, Narayanan, thus describes the accession of Anwar'd-din to the Nizamat of Arcot (in his account of the history of the Carnatic).

'On the arrival of the Nawab at Trichinopoly, Murari fled by the Salem road to proceed to Gooty. Asaf Jah took possession of the fortress and the region of Trichinopoly, appointed Sayid Ali Khan killedar, asked him to obey in everything the Faujdar and started for Hyderabad. On the way Kaja Abdulla Khan died in the year 1152 Fasli.

Finding the government of the Carnatic in escheat, the Nawab deemed that the most intelligent man to fill the office of Faujdar was Anwaru'd-din Khan, a prince of his family who was with him. He accordingly called Anwaru'd-din who was the son of Badusha Dassabikana Darogha Haji Anwar and told him, "the Foujdari of the Carnatic is without an incumbent. The son of Safdar Ali Khan is a minor. The country should be governed by you. It is your duty to occupy this office and send, by mutual consent with this boy, the tribute and land tax to the treasury of the Nawab." Suiting his action to the word, he handed over to him the parwana and the sannad to this effect. He carried with him, as hostage for his good conduct, his son Mohamed Ali Khan.

Anwar'd din Khan Bader proceeded to Arcot, sat in the kachehri of the Badusha, received the customary presents, confirmed the *killedars* of the forts, mansabdars, zamindars, palayagars and amaldars in their respective offices and gave them new sannads. All the officers obeyed the orders of Anwaru'd-din Khan and sent him their presents. Mohamed Ali Khan presented for himself a security (bail or pledge) to the Huzur and proceeded to Arcot; Mohamed Mahfuz Khan, the elder son, likewise went there. Anwaru'd-din Khan showed himself affectionate towards the son of Safdar Ali Khan and treated him with consideration. During the stay of Asaf Jah himself, Murtaza Ali Khan owed his liberation to money, obtained the sanad of his killa and took himself off to Velur. He obeyed all the orders of Anwaru'd-din Khan.'

According to the letter from the Fort St. George Council to the Company, dated 6th September 1744:—"Anwardee Cawn... came to Arcot the beginning of April, bringing with him Saib Judda, the late Nabob's Son The family and Relations of the late Nabob were very much chagrined at this Appointment, having been a long time amused with the repeated promises of Nizam that Saib Judda should have his Father's post; but all they could now obtain was that, when he had attain'd the age of Manhood, it should educate him, and that he should be in a particular manner recommended to his Care and patronage. This young Lad had lived with Nizam now upwards of a Year, who seem'd much delighted with him and express'd a concern at parting not usual with that Great Man...."

II

THE RULE OF NAWAB ANWARU'D-DIN IN THE CARNATIC 1744—49.

a —The Death of the Sahibzada, Son of Safdar Ali

Anwaru'd-din assumed his duties as Regent of the Carnatic in April 1744. He was always a very conscientious administrator and strove to do acts that would give the people comfort and peace. From Burhan ibn Hasan, we learn that he appointed his relatives to important posts and also gave patronage to his friends. Thus Muhammad Najib Khan, a resident of Ajmer, remained his close counsellor. Masihu'z-Zaman Khan, a fellow townsman of the Nawab, was the paymaster of the whole army. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who was a relative of the mother of Hadrat-i-A'la, was the *risaladar* of the horses. Muhammad Abrar Khan became the *sardar* of all the infantry. Sayyid Ali Khan was appointed secretary to the Nawab. Sayyid Nazir Ali Khan, who was an old companion of Anwaru'd-din, was entrusted with the charge of the *bandars*. Malik Aslam Khan, a very good man of the Nawayat community, was made the head of the record office. Muhammad Husain Khan Tahir was put in charge of the office of the Peshkash of the Jaghirdars. Rajah Sampat Rai, a Kayastha of Gopamau, who had considerable experience of revenue and other duties, was raised to the exalted position of Diwan of the Nizamat. Another Kayastha, Rai Manulal, who had served the Nawab at Hyderabad, became Mir Munshi. The Nawab's eldest son, Badru'l Islam Khan, was at Delhi, as his father's *naib*, at the court of the Emperor; the third son, Hazrat-i-A'la, who became later Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah, was at Hyderabad at the court of Nawab Asaf Jah, as representing his father. The Nawab's other sons, Mahfuz Khan (second), Abdul Wahab Khan (fourth) and Najibullah Khan (fifth), stayed on with the Nawab and helped him in the administration.

The Nawab was also accompanied by the Sahibzada the boy-prince, who had been specially recommended to

his care by Nawab Asaf Jah. The Nawab showed himself to be very affectionate towards the boy and treated him with every consideration. The Afghan mercenaries who had settled in Arcot during the rule of Nawab Daud Khan had always been very disorderly. Nawab Anwaru'd-din maintained strict order over them and expelled them altogether from Arcot and other towns of the Carnatic after they had disgraced themselves by bringing about the assassination of the boy prince⁸ in an open marriage assem-

8 A detailed account of the assassination is given by the Tamil Chronicler, Narayanan, in the following words:—

“A marriage was celebrated in the fortress in the house of one of the prince's relatives. To this marriage were invited all officers of Anwaru'd-din, his relative Hirasat Khan and associates, all the Amirs, Sampath Raya, Diwan of Anwaru'd-din and all the *Mutasaddis*. The marriage pandal was beautifully decorated with cloth of gold threads and velvet. Besides, the seats there were picked out according to rank and reserved for the different grades of invitees. As the son of Safdar Ali Khan too had been invited, Hirasat Khan of Satchar accompanied by his son, his nephew by his sister and ten of his relatives, entered in broad day light the wedding pandal, leading by the hand the son of Safdar Ali Khan. All these occupied the places reserved for them. Nawab Anwaru'd-din Khan was then coming with his *safari* to the assembly.

At this moment, Jamedar Abdul Khan and the Pathans, with the object of causing disturbance in the wedding pandal, incited by some unknown persons, came to seat themselves between Hirasat Khan and the son of Safdar Ali Khan. Hirasat Khan who was a nobleman and very intelligent, understood immediately that these Pathans who, though simple soldiers, had left the places indicated to them, and come to seat themselves with the Amirs, should have been incited by some unknown persons to behave rudely. So he addressed them kindly.

Notwithstanding this attitude, the Pathans, turning to Hirasat Khan, claimed the arrears of their salaries which they pretended were due to them for services rendered during the time of Safdar Ali Khan. ‘Here is his son. Pay us the salaries due and you can get up only after that’ Hirasat Khan replied to them:—‘As soon as we leave, we shall proceed to the Kacheri, we shall verify your accounts and then we shall reply.’ ‘No’, they replied to him, ‘we will not follow you. You should get our salaries brought here itself.’

Hirasat Khan was convinced of their evil desire and of their intention to cause some trouble. So he made a sign to his sons to go out. Four princes of his family went out under the pretext of easing themselves.

After getting water carried to purify himself, Hirasat Khan rose to go out, taking by the hand the son of Safdar Ali Khan. Abdul Khan seized the skirt of his robe, asking him; ‘Where do you go?’ Answer to us for our salaries and you can go there afterwards.’; and he made him resume his seat.

Counting on the strength of his arm and seeing the processsion of Anwaru'd-din Khan coming, the nephew of Hirasat Khan, a young man of 17 years, said to Abdul Khan, ‘Wretch, is it for you to make the Nawabs sit down drawing them by the skirt of their robes? Here comes the procession of the Nawab. He will have you beaten like dogs.’

In reply Abdul Khan gave him a blow with his sword. On receiving it, the nephew of Hirasat Khan stabbed him mortally. Within the twinkling of an eye they fought with and killed one another. Among the dead were counted seven members of the family of Hirasat Khan. He himself had forty wounds. The Jaghirdar of Kollalipet, Kosse Mohamed

bly within the fort at the capital. Burhanu'd-din is explicit in bringing home the guilt of the assassination to an Afghan, Yadul (Abdul?) Khan by name, at the instigation of Ahmad Khan Tahir, father of Muhammad Husain Khan Tahir.⁹

According to Burhanu'-din :—"There had been bitter enmity between the Tahirans and Nawab Safdar Ali Khan. Muhammad Hussain Khan Tahir was the jaghirdar of Amburgadh and was the diwan of Nawab Ali Khan. Nawab Safdar Ali removed him from his office and appointed in his place Mir Asadullah Khan, the jaghirdar of Chetpattu (in North Arcot district). Muhammad Hussain Khan was a Sunni and a Shafi and Mir Asad was a believer in the Twelve Imams. Murtaza Ali Khan, the husband of the sister of Nawab Safdar Ali and the son of Baqir Ali, the elder brother of Nawab Dost Ali, had been given the jaghir and fort of Vellore to the prejudice of

Reza, took Mohamed Sayyid Khan, son of Safdar Ali Khan and mounted him on the roof of the house. At that moment the child was stabbed by a Pathan and died.

Among the Pathans sixteen were killed. One of them fled, scaling the wall of the fortress, but he broke his leg while throwing himself from the coping. Finally the last was hidden by a friend.

Meantime, the procession of Anwaru'd-din neared the house of the wedding. Having learnt that in the wedding *pandal*, the carpet was covered with the mire of blood and strewn with corpses, he entered in a violent rage. He went to sit in the Kacheri and ordered the guards to enter into the houses of the Pathans, to drag from within all the inmates, even the women, beat them with old shoes and to drive them to the height of the valley. The guards executed from point to point the order given to them."

Narayanan however adds that the murder was attributed by some to the 'dark perfidy' of Anwaru'd-din Khan, by others to an unknown cause and by some others to the intrigues and treachery of Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore. Quite astonished by the fate of the boy prince, Anwaru'd-din related everything faithfully to Nawab Asaf Jah and for his part he fortified himself in the faujdari of the Carnatic.

Apprehending a like fate for the second son of Safdar Ali Khan, aged six years, Ghulam Taqi Khan, the killedar of Wandiwash and a brother-in-law of Safdar Ali Khan, took away this child and brought him up with care in the security of his fort.

9 Burhanu'd-din gives us the following account:—

"One day in the fort of Arcot in an assembly got up for the marriage ceremony of the daughter of Muhammad Husayn Khan Tahir, there were present members of the Nait community and other famous nobles of the day. An Afghan, Yadul Khan by name, suddenly came in, got a signal from Ahmad Khan Tahir known as 'Abid Khan Tahir' father of Muhammad Husayn Khan Tahir, and struck with a dagger, in broad day-light and in the open assembly, Sa'adatullah Khan, the ten-year-old son of Nawab Safdar Ali Khan Shahid, on the pretext of a dispute over the balance of monthly salary due to him from the days of his father, and thus made him a martyr." (Pp. 110-111 of *Tusak-i-Walajahi*, English Translation, by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, Part I).

his brother and against the advice of the diwan, Mir Asad. Hussain Khan Tahir and Murtaza Ali conspired together and brought about the assassination of Safdar Ali and the imprisonment of Mir Asad. Murtaza Ali sat on the *masnad* of Arcot only for six months. But the Tahirans became treacherous against him also, incited the sepoys against him and forced him to run away to Vellore in disguise." This took place just before the descent of Nizam-ul-Mulk into the Carnatic.

The view of Narayana Pillai, the indigenous historian, and the contemporary letter from the Fort St. George Council,¹⁰ both absolved Anwaru'din Khan from any share in the guilt of the assassination of the boy Nawab. Wilks says that Anwaru'd-din was suspected of having poisoned Khwaja Abdullah Khan, his predecessor in office and that public opinion also did not entirely exempt him from the imputation of being concerned in this murder and that Murtaza' Ali Khan of Vellore was palpably implicated in this affair; and among the common people, suspicion was mutually divided between Anwaru'd-din and Murtaza Ali. Orme says that Anwaru'd-din was jealous of the popularity of the boy prince, and Wilks says that Anwaru'd-din was tainted with the imputation of being concerned in this act also; and an old man who was a personal atten-

- 10 "Soon after, Moortas Alli Khan, the person through whose instigation the late Nabob was killed, hired fourteen persons of the Patan Cast to assassinate the Nabob, Saib Judda and some others, intending to seize upon the Government. To compass which design, they waited several days, but a slight indisposition kept the Nabob at home, and the days he was to have gone to the Mosque where they lay in wait for him, his time happened to be taken up in receiving the present we had sent him, so that he providentially escaped their hands. But the next day they had an opportunity of entering the Fort at Arcot and murdering the killedar, Saib Judda, and six more of his relations. Twelve of the assassins were instantly cut to pieces, and two others were taken, and in the Turband of one was found an obligatory note signed and sealed by Moortas Ali Khan for two hundred thousand rupees to be paid them on their executing this piece of wickedness. These were also put to death; and since then there has been another attempt on the Nabob's life which miscarried also.

"The death of this unfortunate young lad and the manner of it has greatly afflicted our Nabob, as he was sensible it would occasion Nizam's great displeasure for his not having taken more care of him; and had not his age and services pleaded strong in his favour, he certainly had lost his post. His negligence was interpreted at first by Nizam as a design in favour of his own son; but after he had read the note of Moortas Ali Khan in which the Nabob's name was mentioned as one they had marked out for a victim, it softened him a good deal; nevertheless he did not fail to reproach him severely in all his letters for his great negligence towards the lad, and upbraiding him with his not performing his promise when he committed him to his charge.

(Letter from the Fort St. George Council to the Company, dated 5th September 1744).

dant on the murdered prince and with whom Wilks had a conversation on the subject, said to him that general suspicion had fixed itself on Murtaza Ali Khan and Anwaru'd-din. According to the Madras letter, Anwaru'd-din's negligence irritated the Nizam and might have cost him his place; and it was interpreted as a scheme for settling the succession to the Nawabship in favour of his own son, Mahfuz Khan, who had been designated Deputy Nawab.

b—Anwaru'd-din's Difficulties

The new Nawab contrived to increase the revenues of the Carnatic still further. He maintained a dignified court and in order to remove any suspicion of guilt from himself and at the same time to display his own resentment of the murder of the boy, he removed all the Afghans from service in the city of Arcot and other places in Payanghat and dealt so vigorously with them that "in a short period, there was not even the name of Afghan in Payanghat. Further, the fear of the rule of Nawab Siraju'd-Dawla Bahadur took possession of the minds of all the mischief-makers." It was believed that his service and great age pleaded strongly with his master, Nawab Asaf Jah, who, after long reflection, was convinced that there was no other person available to whom he could safely entrust the administration of the Carnatic and therefore confirmed him in the Nawabship of that Subah, not caring to complicate the situation by recognising the claims of the surviving son of Nawab Safdar Ali.

The old Nawayat family now completely lost all hopes of regaining power in the Carnatic. Anwaru'd-din Khan was, unlike the previous Nawabs, a stranger to the Europeans of the coast and did not know the exact conditions prevailing in the European settlements on the Coromandal. He first effected the subjugation of Mir Asadulla Khan of Chetpat, who remained refractory for some time and recovered all arrears of tribute due from Rajah Pratap Singh of Tanjore. He entrusted to his second son, Mahfuz Khan, the administration of Conjeevaram and its dependencies. The third son, Muhammad Ali Khan, was granted the districts of Tiruvati and of Bhuvanagiri and their dependencies; and he governed these through his representative, Ananta Das. Abdul Wahab Khan got the administration of Nellore. The district of Villupuram was given over to Abdul Karim Khan. Khairu'd-din Khan,

one of the most trusted lieutenants of the Nawab was kept with him at head-quarters, though some districts were also assigned to him. The administration was not very efficient on account of the turbulence of the poligars, even in the immediate neighbourhood of Arcot. For illustration, the Bandari of Vettavanam, a jungle palayam in the Tiruvannamalai Taluk, by name Periya Ayya, took to devastating the villages belonging to the Sarkar, and though he was driven out and his fort was captured, he returned after six months with a body of 200 men, plundered the treasury of the katcheri of Tirukkoilur, got back to his fort of Vettavanam from where he ravaged the neighbourhood. Karimullah Khan, who had previously beaten him, had now to make a second attack. The difficulty of subjugating this chief was very great as detailed by the Chronicler Narayanan.¹¹

11 "Day by day, the Bandari increased the number of his men and harassed during the night the army of Karimullah Khan in murderous (bloody) skirmishes. Not able to support the sufferings thus caused to his men by the men of the Bandari, Karimullah Khan referred it to the Nawab who himself with his army descended from the side of the barrier of Avur. He had the forest of Vettavanam surrounded by men. On his side, the Bandari drove the men thus established, fortified his camp and the barriers, adding to his men, 500 Irulars whom he had recruited and harassed during night the army of the Nawab.

"For twenty days the Nawab exerted himself by means of spies to gain the men of the Bandari, made reconnaissances and advance manoeuvres and then had numerous soldiers press nearer the forest. Surrounded by 5,000 men and mounted on a palanquin, he forced at first the barrier of Avur in order to enter into the forest. Everything was ravaged and trampled down in his passage. Not only did he set fire to the barrier of Avur, but he reduced three other inner barriers and then proceeded to Vettavanam.

"All round the forest 2,000 men were posted to prevent the escape of the Bandari. He, seeing every egress closed, climbed the fortified hillock of Kalavai, which was reported by the spies. Then they surrounded this hillock and searched there. The Bandari was discovered and bound and rolled from the height of the rock. He did not die and they finished him off afterwards.

The Bandari's father, who had been arrested was taken to Gingee. He was circumcised. They chained him hand and foot and placed him in the great fort under a strong guard. After six months' imprisonment he gave news of himself secretly to his men, sent for 100 men with some horses who hid themselves in the forest at the foot and to the west of the fort. He then offered a banquet to the warders to whom he caused to be served plates of food seasoned with opium and narcotic drugs. Taking advantage of the moment when they were drowsy, he shook off his chains climbed the bastion and descended from there with the aid of a cable (rope). Then he joined his men and fled. This was in the year Rak-takshi, 1156 Fasli. Anwaru'd-din Khan placed the brother of the Bandari in possession of Nawab-palayam and retired to Arcot."

Paupaiya Brahman of Madras, whose *History of the Carnatic* has been noted above, held the rule of the Nawab in scanty estimation and wrote that 'Anwaru'd-din Khan, his sons and ministers, by their administration of the Government of the country proved to be most spiritless, covetous, severe and unjust people among all the late Governors of Carnatic,

We can get glimpses of the actual feudal organisation of the Carnatic and South India from two sources: (1) from Burhanu'd-din and (2) from a letter—order issued to Nawab Anwaru'd-din and the killedars and the poligars and other influential men in South India by Nasir Jang in 1746-47, after the Musulman authority knew that the French had to be openly resisted. Burhanu'd-din's account of the chiefs of Southern India is given in connection with the expedition undertaken by Anwaru'd-din, by order of Nawab Asaf Jah, to meet the advancing Marathas under Babu Nayak; he says that the Nayak who had advanced towards Trichinopoly was chased by the Nawab and defeated in the *maydan* of Baswapatan. In this connection the Nawab and his son, Muhammad Ali, (who had been ordered to march from Hyderabad at the head of a body of 8,000 horse) had command over forces which numbered 20,000 horse and they were joined by the contingents sent by the Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur and by the governors of Sira, Bednur, Mysore and Arni, whose total number was nearly 50,000 horse. The other source of information is more explicit and gives us a clearer idea of the distribution of political power among the chiefs, both Muslim and Hindu, in the Carnatic Subah. It was addressed to the following chiefs:—

“Besides Anwaru'd-din Khan, Meerassedulla Cawn, Kellydar of Chittapetta and Woldore, Mahomed Tuky Cawn, Kellydar of Wandesh, Moortezally Cawn, Kellydar of Satagudah, Vacantrow, Kelldar of Arney, Subdar Hossain Cawn, Kellydar of Culvary, Hossain Cawn Tayer, Kellydar of Wolgondah, Joinadally Cawn, Kellydar of Aumbore, Mahomedally Cawn, Kellydar of Trichinopoly, Pratap Sing, King (Rajah) of Tanjore, Woriar of Wariapollum, Ninary, Pollygar of Arialore, Bunday, Pollygar of Vantavolum, Damerlavancatapa Naigue, Bangar Yatchem Naigue, Nabob Abdul Nabee Cawn, Governor of Chettumberum etc. (Country Correspondence, 1748).” This does not take account of the chiefs in the Southern districts and also of the so-called Western Pollams.

The expedition of Nawab Anwaru'd-din against Babu Nayak resulted in the pursuit of the Nayak, after a few

that the whole body of superior, inferior and meaner rank of subjects in the province continually lamented for having so bad a Government over them.

days of inaction on both sides, upto Trichinopoly and from it back to Basavapatan in the Shimoga district of Mysore, in which the Muhammadans were completely successful. After despatching letters of congratulation on his success to Nawab Asaf Jah, Anwaru'd-din returned to Arcot. The Despatch of the Madras Council to the Company dated February 15, 1745, stated that in December of the previous year Anwaru'd-din marched to join the Nawab of Cuddapah.

c.—*The First Anglo-French War*

We learn from the Madras Despatches that a few days after intelligence of the declaration of war was received on the coast (1745), Anwaru'd-din arrived at Pondicherry, accompanied by his diwan, Sampat Rai, Bangaru Yachania Nayak (of Venkatagiri) and other chiefs. The tour was calculated in some measure to raise contributions from the European settlements. (See Dodwell's *Madras Despatches*, 1744-55, p. 19). The Nawab proceeded from Pondicherry to Fort St. David and thence to Udayarpalayam. He had previously written to the Madras Council forbidding hostilities with the French. He repeated his injunction in a second letter to the Madras Council which was received on July 14, 1745 (O.S.) The reply of Governor Morse, dated July 16, said that he would not be the first to disobey the Nawab's commands, provided there was the same deference paid to them by the French.

When La Bourdonnais captured Madras (September 1746), Anwaru'd-din was greatly displeased and sent his son, Mahfuz Khan, to expel the French garrison from the conquered town. But the French, "on the hint of the Nawayat nobles, had got rid of fear or courtesy for the Sarkar." In the battle of the Adyar River that ensued, Mahfuz Khan was defeated and put to flight. Dupleix seems to have written to the Nawab that Madras, when taken, would be certainly delivered to him: he informed La Bourdonnais that he had given such an assurance which was, most likely, insincere. After Mahfuz Khan's defeat at the battle of the Adyar (San Thome) River, Anwaru'd-din ordered his third son, Hazrat Aala Muhammad Ali, who had accompanied his father to Arcot from the encounter with the Marathas at Basavapatan, and was now on his way back to Hyderabad, to go to the aid of the English at Fort St. David.

Anwaru'd-din was then over seventy years of age and was unable to bear the strain of a personal conduct of the campaign. Muhammad Ali accordingly marched through Arni and Gingee and came to the neighbourhood of Fort St. David. He wrote a letter of expostulation to Dupleix who had already sent letters to Raghuji Bhonsle, to the Peshwa and to Maharaja Sahu, complaining of the misgovernment of the country by Anwaru'd-din, bewailing the disappearance of the Nawayat family (of Sadatullah Khan and Dost Ali) from rule and indirectly urging the release of Chanda Sahib from captivity, so that additional trouble might be fomented for the old Nawab. These letters were sent early in December 1746, along with a letter to Pohur Muhammad'Ali Khan, the elder brother of Chanda Sahib, and another from the latter's wife who was at Pondicherry, imploring him to advance against Arcot and imprison Anwaru'd-din with the help of French guns and sepoys, and the support of Murtaza'Ali Khan of Vellore.

Dupleix wrote letters to the Nizam informing him of the doings of Mahfuz Khan in (supposed) defiance of his father's orders, the defeats sustained by him in the two battles near Madras, the taking of Madras by the French under the (pretended) authority of Anwaru'd-din, the capture of French vessels by the English and their tricks, and the seizure of a ship, bearing the Emperor's flag. A like letter was written to Imam Sahib, a friend of the French at the Nizam's court, requesting him to explain the situation to the Nizam (substance of letters written from Pondicherry as entered by the Diarist for November 12).

To a conciliatory letter written by the rather friendly Hussain Sahib from Arcot requesting the delivering of Madras into the hands of Mahfuz Khan, with a veiled threat that a refusal would bring about a united attack on Madras both by land and sea—on land by the combined forces of the Subhadars of Cuddapah and other places, Yachama Nayak and other poligars; and on sea by the English with thirty ships—, the Governor sent a reply of adamant refusal (pp. 104-5 of vol. iii of the *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*). The Diarist also sent, by direction of Dupleix, a circular letter to the Poligars of Karunguzhi, Kaveripak, Arni, Gingee and other places, complaining of the unjustifiable conduct of Mahfuz Khan in having provoked the French into war and having impri-

soned their envoys and put them in chains. The elder brother of Chanda Sahib was glad at the turn of events, characterized the defeat of Mahfuz Khan as a judgement inflicted on him by Providence, and entreated Dupleix to take steps for the liberation of Chanda Sahib and to inflict further measures of punishment on Anwaru'd-din Khan's sons. Dupleix had always clearly perceived the necessity of winning over the goodwill of the Poligar chiefs who formed the feudal backbone of the Carnatic administration.

The killedars of the neighbourhood, so far as the ideas expressed by them in their replies to Dupleix's messages, are reflected by the Diarist, Ananda Ranga Pillai, were not annoyed at the defeat of Mahfuz Khan or at the sentiments expressed by the French Governor. The killedar of Timiri condemned the action of the Muhammadans in having imprisoned the three French envoys and declared that their proper course was to be friendly with the French so far as possible. Muhammad Miyan of Chidambaram expressed similar sentiments; and the chief of Karunguzhi wrote of his condemnation of the attitude of Mahfuz Khan.

When it was known at Pondicherry that the old Nawab was suffering from acute diarrhoea and that written instructions had been despatched both to Mahfuz Khan and to Muhammad Ali, not to move from their stations, Dupleix became more open. Mahfuz Khan's advance from Sriperumbudur further east and Husain Sahib's continued detention of the French prisoners at Arcot gave him further justification. He schemed boldly for the release of Chanda Sahib¹² from Maratha captivity and for the deposition of Anwaru'd-din and his two sons from rule.

12. In the first draft of the letter to be sent to the Marathas, it was written: 'If you send Chanda Sahib, I (Dupleix) will be responsible for the money payable by him.' The Diarist suggested that his master should not commit himself to the obligation of a ransom in that explicit way; and consequently the following words were substituted: 'As regards the amount for which Chanda Sahib holds himself liable, I (Dupleix) will endeavour to collect it, as your agent.' 'I will use all my influence to ensure that this money reaches you. Without my help he would not be able to collect a cash.' It appears from Ranga Pillai's *Diary* that Nawab Safdar Ali, shortly before his assassination, had promised his mother to ransom Abid Sahib, the son of Chanda Sahib, by paying five lakhs of rupees, and that his agent, Kasi Das Bukkanji, had been actually given that amount. These letters of Dupleix were sent on December 5, along with a letter to Muhammad Ali Khan, the elder brother of Chanda Sahib and another to the latter from the wife of Chanda Sahib, imploring him that this was the proper time for him to advance against Arcot and imprison Anwaru'd-din with the help of French guns and sepoys and the

According to the Tamil Chronicler, a curious explanation was the cause of the Nawab being induced to declare hostilities against the French. This might have been one of the contributory causes and is as follows:—"About the period, the *nattar* of Tindivanam, Muthumalla Reddy, had obtained from the government the lease of the taluk of Tindivanam. He possessed a flock of 4,000 oxen and cows. These animals grazed the crops in the country and he himself was of a violent character. As these animals had ravaged the crops in the *aldee* of Ananda Ranga Pillai of Pondicherry, he, on the complaint of some cultivators, had these taken to the pound of Pondicherry and refused to release them. Informed of this deed by the herdsmen, Muthumalla Reddy wrote an abusive letter to Ranga Pillai; out of his hatred, Muthumalla Reddy wrote to the Nawab: "if you come with your army to attack Pondicherry I shall give you 1000 pagodas per company for the expenses of the army and you will make the conquest of Pondicherry."

After the first French attack on Fort St. David (December 1746) which failed on account of the incapacity of their captain and of the indiscipline of their officers, Duplex was convinced that any open attempt on the English Fort would be futile so long as the Muhammadans were encamped in the vicinity; and he began a serious correspondence with the Nawab and his sons, persuading them to withdraw, particularly as Mahfuz Khan had joined Muhammad Ali.

The French were convinced that Fort St. David could be captured only if the Muhammadans retired or if the expected English fleet should be away from the scene. Mahfuz Khan was vacillating in his attitude; and Muhammad Ali was half inclined to make peace. The old Nawab is reported to have recommended terms of peace and the return of the troops to Arcot as the cuntry had been ruined owing to the failure of rains; and the collection of taxes had become very difficult in consequence.

d—Further Troubles for Anwaru'd-din

A series of circumstances contributed to weaken the resolution of the Nawab and his sons, if they had any at all, to continue firm against the French and to incline him

support of Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore. (See pp. 141-3 and pp.149-50 of the *Diary*, vol. iii).

more and more to an accommodation with them. After some negotiations, peace was made; Mahfuz Khan was invited to Pondicherry, and Muhammad Ali agreed to abide by the conditions that might be arranged by his brother.

After this, Anwarud-din resolved to divide the Carnatic *Subah* among his sons. He was anxious to keep his favourite son, Muhammad Ali, near him, and appointed him to the charge of Conjeevaram and the adjoining *talukas*; Mahfuz Khan was entrusted with Trichinopoly; and the *talukas* of Nellore and South Arcot were given to the two other younger sons of the Nawab, viz., Abdul Wahab Khan and Najibullah Khan, respectively. Mahfuz Khan went on a punitive expedition to Madura entrusting the Fort of Trichinopoly to his Naib, Muhammad Muniru'd-din Khan, a cousin of his father. Anwar'Ali Khan, a close relative of the family, being vexed with the refusal of Muniru'd-din Khan to entrust him with the charge of Tinnevely, raised a tumult in the Fort of Trichinopoly and seized the Daru'l Imara, while the Naib took shelter in the Tayuman Hill (*i.e.*, the Rock Fort). The old Nawab Anwaru'd-din prepared to start for Trichinopoly as soon as he had news of this, though the Diwan, Sampat Rai, tried to dissuade him from undertaking the journey, lest his *protege*, Mahfuz Khan, should be castigated for his negligence and incapacity to preserve order. On the Nawab's approach, Anwar 'Ali Khan fled to Madura which had been entrusted by Mahfuz Khan to a younger brother of the rebel. The old Nawab began to march towards Madura and met Mahfuz Khan at Manaparai, and was reconciled to him. The Nawab had also to put down, by force, the resistance of Muniru'd-din Khan who defiantly closed the gates of Trichinopoly, and turned his guns against him.¹³

After this, Anwaru'd-din Khan entrusted the Subah and dependencies of Trichinopoly to Hazarat Aala. This was not to the liking to the Diwan Sampat Rai who opposed

-
13. The Nawab immediately marched from Arcot, ordered Muhammad Ali, who was at Kanchi, to accompany him and soon reached Nathar Nagar. After putting down first the trouble from Anwar'Ali Khan and then the unnatural resistance of Muniru'd-din Khan against his entry into the fort, the aged Nawab stormed the fort at its southern gate and finally chose to forgive Muniru'd-din who had taken refuge in the rock citadel, Tayuman Hill. Muhammad Ali was now given charge of the district of Trichinopoly, along with the collection of *peshkash* from the Poligars and the Nawab returned to Arcot through Mansurpet.

it, but without success. The first care of Hazrat Aala was to appoint trustworthy men to the chief offices in the Subah. Thus Sayyid' Ali Khan, his uncle, was made the Naib at Arcot and Sayyid Nazir Ali Khan was made the killedar of that fort. Efficient men were appointed to collect the *peshkash* from the Poligars. Hazarat Aala proceeded to Tanjore, exacted tribute from its ruler and then marched on to Tinnevely through Ramnad and Sivaganga. He repaired the Fort of Trichinopoly and renamed it Nathar-nagar, after the holy saint, Hazarat Nathar Wali, over whose tomb he built an illuminated dome. He also built the mosque known as Masjid-i-Muhammadi, in the town.¹⁴

Meanwhile at Arcot, Sampat Rai contrived to send Mahfuz Khan, to the Deccan in order to secure letters of recommendation from Nizamu'l-Mulk. The prince returned with a letter from the aged Nizam recommending his appointment as Naib to the Nizamat of Arcot. The friends of Muhammad Ali however contrived to secure from the Nawab the exemption of the Subahs of Nathar-nagar and Nellore from the jurisdiction of the new Naib. The rule of Mahfuz Khan was so extravagant that the old Nawab did not care to stay in Arcot. He proceeded, after the situation became rapidly worse, with his retinue to Trichinopoly where he was respectfully received by Hazarat Aala and stayed on for some time.

-
14. "Hadrat-i-A'la with the sagacity characteristic of the family, consoled the troubled mind of Muhammad Muniru'd-Din Khan, sent him to the camp and fixed himself up in the fort, like ever-wakeful fortune. On that very day Raja Sampat Rai, the *diwan*, came from Arcot unexpectedly. He had news of the two princes, the dismissal of the one and the appointment of the other, quite contrary to his wishes; he had hastened to Muhammad Mahfuz Khan Bahadur, and made him realise the situation. He reproved him for disobedience to his famous father, for the incidents (that brought about the) differences, for the consequent loss of such a vast dominion " (When Diwan Sampat Rai endeavoured to dissuade the mind of the Nawab against Muhammad Ali and to give back Nathar Nagar into the charge of Mahfuz Khan, this was checkmated by the former, who contrived to satisfy his father with the payment of three lakhs of rupees as the advance of the dues from the Subah of Trichinopoly. The Nawab was overjoyed, returned the paper, offering the amount on be half of Mahfuz Khan back to Sampat Rai, confirmed Muhammad Ali in charge of Trichinopoly and himself departed for Arcot. Muhammad Ali's disposition of the affairs of the administration of Trichinopoly showed his desire to conciliate all the adherents of his house. Thus, in addition to the Naib and the Killedar, Muhammad Abrar Khan was appointed Bakshi to the army; Ghazanfar Ali Khan was made the Sirdar of the cavalry, troops; Sayyid Makhdum Ali Khan was made the commander of the Deccani *risala*; Mir Abutalib Khan was raised to be the Sirdar of the infantry; and Abdur Rahim Khan and Khairu'd-din who were the brothers-in-law of Muhammad Ali were appointed to collect *peshkash* from the Poligars.

A series of factors had weakened the Nawab's position very much. From stray references in the *Dairy of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, we find that the Nawab and his sons could not continue firm against the French as they first intended to do and inclined them more and more to accommodation with Dupleix. According to information gained from Muhammad Tavakkal, the resident agent of the Nawab at Pondicherry, the Nawab was overwhelmed with debts and thoroughly wearied. He wished to make peace with the French and withdraw his troops; and apparently the Nizam had also ordered the Nawab to withdraw from the struggle. Muhammad Tavakkal wrote letters to Husain Tahir and to Sampati Rai that the French Governor was not willing to pay anything to the Nawab, unless the latter asked for it, and that he was aware of the latter's difficulties with the Marathas and with the Nizam. To add to the complications of the situation, a letter arrived from Chanda Sahib, in which he said that the Nizam was angry with Anwaru'd-din for having suffered a shameful defeat at French hands and intended appointing his (Chanda Sahib's) son as Nawab; and in case 'Nawab Asaf Jah (the Nizam) objects to this, Sau Bhaji Rao is determined to take command of an army of 30,000 horsemen, with the view of expelling Anwaru'd-din Khan and installing Chanda Sahib, in his place' (Diarist's entry for January 24). Another letter from Arcot stated that the Nizam had issued a circular letter to all the chiefs of the southern country, directing them to proceed to the banks of the Krishna, that the troops at Arcot were preparing to do so, and that Anwaru'd-din had communicated the Nizam's command to his sons.

On the eve of the death of Nizamul-Mulk, confusion reigned in the Deccan and threatened to spread into the Carnatic. Anwaru'd-din had already heard that the old Nizam had ordered Nasir Jang, owing to the repeated English requests, to go down to the Carnatic. (See *Country Correspondence* 1748; No. 5, p. 2, which says that Nasir Jang negotiated with the English for recovering Madras for a stipulated payment. See also note on page 189 of Vol. IV of Ranga Pillai's *Diary*). He wrote to Mahfuz Khan to bring about a frustration of the intended expedition of Nasir Jang, saying that "what between French arrogance, English cowardice and the famine (prevailing),

the country was ruined and could not bear the expenses of his (Nasir Jang's) army." When Nasir Jang departed from the Balaghat after finishing his negotiations with Mysore, owing to a threatened Maratha invasion, headed by Sadasiva Rao the Bhao, the Nawab felt greatly relieved. As it was, though Nasir Jang did not come down into the Carnatic, Murari Rao Ghorepade and his Maratha horsemen began plundering the country round.

Now it was that the Emperor Muhammad Shah died at Delhi (April 1748) and Nizam'l-Mulk died at Hyderabad a few weeks later (June 2, according to Ananda Ranga Pillai). Anwaru'd-din was not on good terms with Mahfuz Khan whom he disliked; and it was feared that Murtaza Ali might attack Arcot and that Chanda Sahib the representative of the family of the Nawayat Nawabs, had secured his release from Maratha captivity and had reached the northern bank of the Krishna with a large body of Maratha horse.⁵¹

15

(For the circumstances of Chanda Sahib's release and his march to the Carnatic and for the different versions about it, see Orme Vol. I, 121; Wilks, Vol. I, 159-60: Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, pp. 32-37; and Cultru; for a summary of these refer to the *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. VIII. Notes on pages 154-56 by C. S. Srinivasachari. Orme and Wilks are not definite as to the exact date of Chanda Sahib's release. They give an account of his participation in the wars between the ruler of Chitaldrug and the Rani of Bednore in which he lost his eldest son, Abid Sahib (Cultru's surmise that he was released in 1745 without any sort of French intervention goes against the evidence of Pondicherry Council, and Ranga Pillai as to his captivity continuing in 1746 and 1747). Chanda Sahib did not actually reach the Carnatic till about a year after this time, i.e., the middle of 1748, which he probably spent in raising money for his new ally, Hidayat Muhiu'd-din Khan (Muzaffar Jang) of Bijapur and Adoni and his campaigns in Bednore and Chitaldrug.

Anwaru'd-din seems to have received a confirmation of his office from Nasir Jang, the new Nizam. He communicated this news to both the English and the French. Murtaza Ali Khan promised that if he became the Nawab he would give to Chanda Sahib the Trichinopoly country and to his son Abid Sahib, the Fort and the country of Gingee; while Polur Muhammad Ali Khan wished to seize Arni and Conjeevaram. Murtaza Ali actually began to proceed against Arcot; and Anwaru'd-din ordered Hazarat Ala who was in camp in Tinnevely to return to Trichinopoly, lay up provisions and strengthen the garrisons of the Trichinopoly and Madura Forts. Trouble was brewing in the Tanjore country and in the territories of the *Tondaiman* of Pudukotta and of the Marava (Chief of Rannad), while a local poligar the Bandari of Vettavanam, near Tiruvannamalai, captured old Gingee and defied the Nawab and Mahfuz Khan who had to personally conduct the campaign against his jungle stronghold. This poligar was named Periya Ayyan of Vettavanam. He was put down with great difficulty and confessed, before his execution, that he had been bribed by Mir Asadullah to resist the Nawab and get him assassinated. Mahfuz Khan could not help the English, but stayed on at Gingee. In fact, the administration of the Carnatic never seemed to have recovered from the effects of

Nasir Jang seems to have entered into, or at least begun negotiations for an agreement with the English that he would recover Madras for a sum (ten lakhs of pagodas according to the Diarist and three lakhs, according to the English records, Country Correspondence 1748, No. 5, p.2) and 3,000 pagodas for each day the army marched and 2,000 pagodas for each day he halted; (*vide* entry for October 25, 1747, and Mr. Dodwell's note on the subject of the amount, p. 189 of vol. iv of the Diary). Later, when this failed, the Fort St. David *wakils* with Nasir Jang made new proposals, by which the English were to have 1,000 horse under two jamadars, which Mahfuz Khan was persuaded by the French to frustrate. A letter to Pondicherry from Nasir Kuli Khan, the *diwan* of Mahfuz Khan, dated December 1747, says that Mahfuz Khan had contrived to stop the projected expedition.

Anwaru'd-din had meanwhile gone to Trichinopoly, as noticed above, to join his son, Muhammad Ali. He resolved to attack Tanjore and ordered Muhammad Ali to proceed against the poligars of the South. He was suffering greatly from want of money; and Dupleix suggested

the great Maratha raid in 1740-41. The succeeding years had been marked by murder and anarchy; and the death of Nizamu'l-Mulk released the other disruptive forces that had been held in check. [See pp. xvii-xviii of the Introduction, Vol. V of the *Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai...Ed. by Dodwell*]. Burhanu'd-din, a protagonist of Anwaru'd-din's family, portrays in vigorous language, the turbulence, insincerity and secret hostilities of the Nawayat leaders which contributed greatly to swell the forces of anarchy.

Varying dates are given for the death of the Nizam. Grant Duff dates it as having occurred on June 19, 1738. The Country Correspondence of the English at Madras gives it as May 21 June 1, as quoted by Dodwell. Burgess states (p. 188 of his *Chronology of Modern India*) thus 'June Jumada II, Asaf Jah, Nizamu'l-Mulk dies. The death of the Emperor Muhammad Shah, the astrological details of which are given by the Diarist, can be dated on this basis for April 17-28, but there is a day's difference according to another reckoning which puts it down as April 27; Rabi II, 27, H. 1161. The date given in Beale's *Oriental Biographical Dictionary* (revised by Keene, 1894) for the Nizam's death, is 22nd May, 1748 (old style) 4th Jumada II. A.H. 1161, i.e. 37 days after the death of Muhammad Shah. This date is confirmed by a letter of Imam Sahib to Pondicherry quoted by the Diarist in his entry for July 7, 1748. The news of the Nizam's death reached Arcot only sixteen days after its happening, which was fixed by the Diarist for June 2. A rumour was prevalent that the Nizam took poison and died as he heard that his eldest son Ghazi-ud-din Khan was ordered to be executed by the Emperor. Anwaru'd-din was in fear of an attack by Murtaza Ali of Vellore and there was confusion in Arcot (p. 75 of vol. V. of the *Diary*.) According to Dr. Yusuf Khan, "Nizamu'l-Mulk fell ill while he was at Burhanpur and passed away peacefully on the 4th of Jamadi II, 1164 Hegira (1748 A.D.) at the age of 78. The chronogram of his death is "Mutawajjih-i-Bahisht" which means 'turned towards paradise.'"

to Murtaza Ali Khan that it was now the time for him to seize Arcot (November 1748).'

Burhanu'd-din tells us that before Nasir Jang made his position steady, the Emperor Ahmad Shah had directed him to proceed urgently with an army to Delhi. In spite of the trouble created by Hidayat Muhiu'd-din Khan, Nasir Jang proceeded north with an army and a numerous retinue. The news of his march with excessive pomp and numerous followers disgusted Ahmad Shah; and the latter ordered his return to the Deccan. Nasir Jang stayed on at Aurangabad, as it was the rainy season.¹⁶ It was now that Hidayat Muhiu'd-din "poured the materials of mischief and revolution on the Fort of Chitaldrug and on Bednore" and was joined by Hussain Dost Khan who had been taken prisoner by the Marathas in their great raid on the Carnatic of 1740 and was now released. For some time Hidayat Muhiu'd-din Khan would not countenance the idea of an attack on Nawab Anwaru'd-din and of an invasion of the Carnatic. But Hussain Dost Khan pleaded that he would be supported by the Nawayat nobles and the French, and that Nasir Jang was encamped at Aurangabad and could not actively proceed against him. At last, Hidayat Muhiu'd-din consented to join him in marching on the Carnatic and wrote letters to the killedars of the Nawayat community for help.

Anwaru'd-din Khan who had meanwhile gone to Trichinopoly to join his son Muhammad Ali, resolved to attack Tanjore, as its tribute had been withheld and proceeded two stages on his way with a force of over 7,000 men. The Tondaiman of Pudukottai resolved to join the Nawab, while Muhammad Ali was to march against

16. "In the year 1158 Fasli, Nawab Asaf Jah died. Ghazu'd-din Khan, elder brother of Nawab Nasir Jang was the Vizier of the Badusha. Carried away against his Vizier, the Badusha had him put in prison. "Ghazu'd-din Khan advised his brother Nasir Jang to come to attack the Badusha with a powerful army. After ordering the Foujdars of the Deccan to look after the country, Nasir Jang set out with 50,000 horseman and 200,000 infantry and gunners to make war on the Badusha and advanced with his army as far as the Narumada.

Muttawassil Khan Rastam Jang, son-in-law of Asaf Jah, pretended that the Nawab had given to his wife the Carnatic and the Subah of Haiderabad. Delivering to his son, Hidayat Muhiuddin Khan the sanad, he told him:—"Your grand-father has given me the Subah of Haiderabad. Profit by this moment to go to take possession of the Carnatic. The man who knows well the situation of the country is Hussain Dost Khan, also called Chanda Sahib. He is now at Poona, a prisoner of the Marathas. I am writing to him."

(Narayana Pillai's Tamil Chronicle).

the unruly poligars of the south. Anwaru'd-din was greatly suffering from want of money, while the killedars and jamadars were giving much trouble. Dupleix thought that it was now time for Murtaza Ali Khan to seize the country of Arcot.

*e—The Descent of Chanda Sahib and the
Battle of Ambur.*

The information given in the French Company's *Memoir* which was prepared later against Dupleix, was that, towards the end of February 1749, an embassy from Chanda Sahib was received at Pondicherry and the arrangement that was arrived at was that Dupleix promised the assistance of a body of Europeans to place Chanda Sahib on the *masnad* of Arcot and the latter should at once take into his pay 2,000 French sepoys and grant them the area of Villiyannallur as jaghir which they had long been asking from Nazir Jang in exchange for Madras. We saw that our authorities like Cultru, Orme and Wilks are not definite as to the exact date of Chanda Sahib's release from the hands of the Marathas; and Orme and Wilks give us an account of his participation in the wars between the Poligar of Chitaldrug and the Rani of Bednore, in which he lost his eldest son, Abid Sahib. Cultru's theory that he was released from captivity in 1745 without any sort of French intervention is not borne out by the evidence of the Pondicherry Council and Ranga Pillai as to the fact of his continued captivity in 1746 and 1747. Chanda Sahib did not enter the Carnatic till about a year after this time (*i.e.*, when he was released from Maratha captivity in June 1748); and during this period, he should have engaged in his wars with Bednore, Chitaldrug, etc., reported by Orme and Wilks who, however, differ from each other. Mr. Dodwell thinks that, shortly after his release, Chanda Sahib joined Muzaffar Jang, the governor of Adoni and Bijapur, and was employed in raising money for his new master in the subah of Bijapur, out of which arose the Bednore and other affairs. Chanda Sahib's attempts to bring the Raja of Bednore into subjection to Muzaffar Jang was perhaps animated by 'the vague hope of doing there what he had almost accomplished at Trichinopoly (in 1736-40), and establishing himself in an independent position.'

Hearing of the rumours of Chanda Sahib's approaching descent into the Carnatic, Nawab Anwaru'd-din Khan

sent for the French *vakil* at Arcot and told him to write to Pondicherry, that his rival's son who was preparing to join his father, should not be allowed to remain at Pondicherry and said that he himself would be writing to Dupleix about it. And, as an usual consequence, the merchants at Arcot were removing their goods and valuables, for the sake of safety, to Vellore, Arni and elsewhere. Anwaru'd-din's letter also informed the French that Nasir Jang was marching with Sayyad Lashkar Khan, 10,000 horse, cannon and a powerful army and that Chanda Sahib, having lost his able son, Abid Sahib, had become, as it were, a "lame man."

Anwaru'd-din returned to Arcot through Gingee; he sent his family for safety to Trichinopoly fort, settled all arrears of pay due to his sepoys and horsemen and set out in a few days, with Mahfuz Khan, the Diwan, Sampati Rai and Husain Sahib Tahir, killedar of Amburgadh and encamped at Ranipet. While making these preparations, he endeavoured at the same time to keep the favour of Muzaffar Jang by writing to him a conciliatory letter. News reached Pondicherry on July 3, 1749, that Muzaffar Jang, having settled the Bednore affair, himself and Chanda Sahib were descending through the Anantapur district. It was planned by Chanda Sahib that he would settle with Hirasat Khan, the killedar of Arcot and his own son-in-law, for five lakhs of rupees, with Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore for 10 lakhs and with Mir Asad Khan Sahib and other killedars for 25 lakhs; and these settlements would be effected as soon as he should reach Satgadh, Vellore and Arcot. Panic increased at Arcot from which the *subah's* money-lenders like Kasi Das Bukkanji departed. It was declared by Raza Sahib that Muzaffar Jang had been invested by Ahmad Shah Padshah with a parwana for the six subahs of the Deccan and that he had actually received the sanad and dress of honour about the middle of June, and that in turn, Chanda Sahib, who joined Muzaffar Jang a few days later with about six to seven thousand horse, had been granted a sanad as the Nawab of Arcot, and with authority over Gingee, Tanjore, Trichinopoly and Madura and all their dependent territories and forts; this was supplemented by a new title and a new jaghir of three taluks. Both had already set out for Arcot with fourteen thousand horsemen and fourteen or fifteen thousand foot; and Chanda Sahib desired Raza Sahib to join

him at the foot of the passes (in the Eastern Ghats) with the Mussalman jamadars, Abdur Rahman and others, and with a body of 2,000 sepoy and 2,000 soldiers, and a large quantity of cannon, mortars, shell, shot, etc. Muzaffar Jang sent Dupleix a dress of honour and a letter, which the latter prepared to receive with all the pomp and grandeur with which he used to receive the Nizam's presents. The Diarist makes mention, in another place, of 4,000 sepoy besides 2,000 soldiers marching along with Raza Sahib. Only 300 European volunteers under d'Auteuil accompanied Raza Sahib. The impression that prevailed was that the old Nawab Anwaru'd-din longed to go to battle and that it would be a good thing if he, with all his years, should engage in another fight and die therein.

The French *vakil*, Subbayyan, was to go to Arcot with letters and *nazars* for Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib and also with copies of the *parwana* granted by the Emperor to the Governor of Pondicherry in Dumas' time for a *mansab* of 4,599 horse and *naubat* and of Raza Sahib's *parwana* for Villiyanallur. On July 26th, news reached Pondicherry that, while Anwaru'd-din was about 18 hours' journey to the south-ward of Arcot, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang were about the same distance to the north-ward of it. Three days later it was said that Chanda Sahib had certainly reached Pallikonda, which is half way between Ambur and Vellore, but it was not known whether Anwaru'd-din had departed from Singari Pass to the west of Chengama.

Chanda Sahib is said to have advanced through the Damalcheruvu Pass to the North-west of Chittore; the French and their allies effected a junction with him, routed Anwaru'd-din at Ambur and then occupied Arcot. Ambur did not lie on the road which would lead an invading army from Damalcheruvu to Arcot. Mr. Dodwell queries why Anwaru'd-din should have taken his post at Ambur and why Chanda Sahib should have turned aside from Arcot to meet him. Burhan-ud-din, in his *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, says that Husain Khan Tahir, the jaghirdar of Amburgadh, persuaded the Nawab to encamp before his fort, in the plain, with a treacherous motive; and he details the treachery of the Tahiran, as well as the way in which Muzaffar Jang was dissuaded out of his inclination to make peace with the old Nawab.

From Burhanu'd-din we learn that Anwaru'd-din vacillated between submission to Muzaffar Jang and his duty to Nasir Jang and finally resolved to risk a battle. He got some help from the English to make up his deficiency in artillery. He exhorted his son Hazarat Aala to defend Trichinopoly at all cost and go away to Delhi, if he could not feel safe in the Carnatic. When Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib were encamped at Pallikonda and, being reinforced by Raza Sahib, offered to give battle, the old Nawab sought advice from Muhammad Husain Khan Tahir, the jaghirdar of Ambur, who suggested that the *maidan* in front of the mountain-fort of Ambur was best suited for the struggle and that the army should fight with the shelter of the fort at its back. Anwaru'd-din did not suspect any treachery on the part on the Tahirans. But he sent one last message to Muzaffar Jang, promising to secure him forgiveness from Nasir Jang and pleading for peace. Muzaffar Jang at first agreed to the suggestion and arranged to meet Anwaru'd-din for a personal interview on the next day. But any approach to reconciliation was prevented by some mischievous counsellors of his who arranged that Chanda Sahib and the French should offer battle without the knowledge of Muzaffar Jang and without his authority. The old Nawab, expecting a speedy compromise, did not arrange his army in battle array. Mahfuz Khan commanded the advance guard of the Nawab's army, but was driven back by the fire of the French guns. Anwaru'd-din then ordered the right and left wings to advance and close in on the enemy, and help the staggering main body of the army. But Husain Khan Tahir turned his guns on Anwaru'd-din's troops which were thus exposed to a double fire both from the front and at the back. The aged Nawab saw the treachery of the Tahiran, who, however, was wounded fatally by a musket shot and thus paid for his unjustifiable murder of Nawab Safdar 'Ali Khan Shaheed, as well as for his present treachery.

The Nawab was wounded on the forehead and an arrow shot by Munawwar Khan, the Sipahdar at Kurnool, struck his chest and killed him. He died on the 16th day of Shaban 1162 A.H., when he was 77 years of age. His body was interred in the Jumma Masjid at Arcot and was later exhumed and taken to Hyderabad and buried by the side of the shrine of Murshid Shah Wali-Ullah. Mahfuz

Khan and Muhammad Najib-Ullah Khan were taken prisoners by the enemy. In the battle, Muhammad Husain Khan Tahir was unexpectedly wounded by a musket shot and thus atoned for his unjustifiable murder of Nawab Safdar Ali Khan.¹⁷

-
- 17 Burhanu'd-din claims that the Nawab went to war only with the idea of fighting the enemy to preserve his honour and vindicate his bravery. Even at the last moment he sought to wean Muzaffar Jang from the side of the enemy and wrote a letter to him that he would secure a pardon for him from Nawab Nasir Jang and even get new jaghirs in addition to the taluk of Adoni which had been previously granted to him by Nawab Asaf Jah. At first Muzaffar Jang agreed to submit to the conditions of the letter and to make peace with Anwaru'd-din and his uncle. But his mind was strengthened to battle by a "treacherous" Shaykh and by two brothers who were risaladars and who were the disciples of the former. They arranged that on the next morning Chanda Sahib and his French allies should march to battle without the knowledge of Muzaffar Jang and thus forced the fight upon him. Nawab Anwaru'd-din was expecting to avert a battle and to meet Muzaffar Jang and hence did not make the necessary preparations for an immediate fight. There was great disorder in the ranks of the army of the Nawab; and the killedar of Ambur turned his cannon on his master. Soon the forces of the Nawab were scattered and began to flee. But even at the last moment the Nawab would not abandon the field and when the elephant on which he was riding, got out of control on account of the noise of the cannon shots, the Nawab urged his mahout to "bind its legs with chains and try to keep it steady, saying "At his moment of our firm-footedness, try to keep it also firm."

The Nawab was stabbed on the forehead by an enemy mahout, Yusuf Khan, and wounded on the eye-brow and also shot through the bosom.

III

NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI'S TRIUMPH OVER HIS RIVAL (1749-1752).

a—Events after Ambur

After the battle of Ambur, Chanda Sahib easily secured the support of the Nawayat jaghirdars and also possession of the district of Nellore, from which Abdul Wahab Khan had fled away. Chanda Sahib generously liberated the prisoners whom he had taken in the battle and who included Mahfuz Khan and Najibullah Khan, the elder and younger brothers of Nawab Muhammad Ali, respectively, and his nephews, on payment of a ransom of three lakhs of rupees which Muhammad Ali contrived to pay (?). Chanda Sahib demanded from Muhammad Ali the immediate cession of Trichinopoly, to which, of course, a prompt refusal was given. Mahfuz Khan through whom the demand of Chanda Sahib was made and who was naturally suspected of secret enmity towards his brother, Nawab Muhammad Ali, was not allowed to enter Trichinopoly, but compelled to encamp at a distance from the fort. Chanda Sahib planned to raise a large body of horse and foot in order to march with Muzaffar Jang for the conquest of Trichinopoly, Tanjore and Mysore. He settled the affair of Mir Asad for three lakhs of rupees. When both Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang visited Dupleix at Pondicherry and conferred with him on the plan to be adopted, a number of days were spent in festivities; but the first difficulty to be surmounted was scarcity of money, which was very keenly felt and which even Dupleix, with all his resources, could not afford. We learn from the *Diary* of Ananda Ranga Pillai that, in spite of the brave show and high hopes indulged in by Chanda Sahib, he was nervous lest he should not have enough money and a sufficient body of French auxiliaries for the expedition. Muzaffar Jang himself was not to be greatly relied upon, in the words of the Diarist, 'like a child that will lie in any one's arms'; also he was very close-fisted about money and constantly dunned his ally for fresh supplies. Moreover, he was anxious to go north since he had heard that Murari Rao

was marching down on the Carnatic with several thousands of horsemen and Pindaris, turning everything upside down and planning to march on Arcot, while Nasir Jang himself had begun to march southward from Aurangabad with a body of 30,000 horse.

Chanda Sahib departed from Pondicherry on October 28, 1749; but the prevailing heavy rains prevented his rapid march, and for a few days he stayed on in the neighbourhood. He then camped in the vicinity of Fort St. David, in the hope of being able to raise money on the mortgage of some villages; and it seemed as if he and Muzaffar Jang who accompanied him, set out 'to replenish their purses, rather than to complete their conquests.' Almost even before they had proceeded far, Muzaffar Jang quarrelled with Chanda Sahib about money matters and threatened to return to his headquarters at Adoni. Chanda Sahib had to mollify him by promising to pay him two lakhs of rupees in ready money and to put him in possession of Nellore, Sarvepalle and other districts that were worth about ten lakhs a year in the opinion of the District. Muzaffar Jang promised to demand no more money for four months. There now arrived also news of Nasir Jang's rumoured advance to the bank of the Godavari from Aurangabad and of the advance of the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kandanur (Kurnool) to seize the fort and province of Adoni under instructions from the former. Muzaffar Jang got greatly frightened and ordered his troops to be ready to march back to Adoni; he said that as Chanda Sahib got the subah of Arcot with European help, he could manage affairs by himself, but that he himself should go to Nasir Jang and get reconciled to him to the latter somehow or other. It was with great difficulty that Chanda Sahib contrived to dissuade him from departing and to reassure him and finally to make him swear on the *Quran* that both should stand or fall together. The situation was complicated by the arrival at Pondicherry of letters written to the French chief of Masulipatam by the Nawab of Rajahmundry, Khwajah Namatullah Khan, son of Khwaja Abdullah Khan, who was for a short time *interim* Nawab of the Carnatic in 1743, under the orders of Nizamu'l-Mulk. Herein the French were advised to give up their alliance with Chanda Sahib, to join Nasir Jang and obey his orders; and they were told they could live at peace in Masulipatam if they should act as he wished.

Chanda Sahib failed to realise any money in the country round Fort St. David, extorted some little amount from the Poligar of Udayarpalayam (which was a considerable chiefship in the interior of the Trichinopoly district) and then joined Muzaffar Jang who was encamped at some distance from Tanjore. Things did not advance well in the camp. Miyan Ma'sud, the Diwan of Muzaffar Jang, actually had a quarrel with Chanda Sahib, behaved disrespectfully to him and even threatened, according to the Diarist Ranga Pillai, "that he (Chanda Sahib) should not continue to live." Dupleix received letters, early in December, both from Nasir Jang and from Muhammad Ali; that of Nasir Jang promised to forgive the French their past offences if they should separate from their allies and be faithful to the Nizam in the future; otherwise he would order that the French factories should be pulled down and would write to Bengal to the same effect; Muhammad Ali's letter solicited French friendship and asked Dupleix to make peace with Nasir Jang and offered twice as much gains as the French might secure from his enemies. It was also reported by the Diarist that the Nawab of Kurnool, Himayat Khan, had actually attacked and defeated a small force sent to him from Nasir Jang's army in the course of his march to the south. Throughout January and February 1750, the operations of Chanda Sahib against the Fort of Tanjore, mixed with negotiations for a peaceful realisation of money payments, continued. Dupleix was anxious that Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang should not make any agreement with the Rajah of Tanjore without his knowledge. Moro Pant and Khazi Dayem, the two emissaries sent by Nasir Jang, offered peace terms to Muzaffar Jang; and Dupleix suspected that Muzaffar Jang might purposely cause confusion in the camp. Nasir Jang reached the Changama Pass in March 1750; and Chanda Sahib and his ally became greatly alarmed and retreated from Tanjore to Pondicherry, being harassed on the way by a body of Maratha horse under Murari Rao. Safe under the shelter of Pondicherry and the French guns, the allies dunned Dupleix for money in order to pay off the arrears due to their troops, who manifested a spirit of mutiny and unrest. They refused to meet Nasir Jang in battle; and great uncertainty prevailed till about the beginning of April. This was worsened by a mutinous refusal of the French officers to continue in

camp and by the equally dangerous refusal of Muzaffar Jang to march back with his friend into Pondicherry. Nasir Jang, on entering the Carnatic, first summoned Muhammad Ali to join him from Trichinopoly, and wrote letters to Fort St. David, requesting the English to send him a body of European troops. He ordered his own army to concentrate under the hills of Gingee and the protection of its walls. Nasir Jang himself seems to have reached Gingee about the last week of March. Muhammad Ali joined him with about 6,000 horse at Valudavur, about 10 miles from Pondicherry; and the English detachment under Captain Cope which had been sent previously to Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali, accompanied him. Even now, an emissary from Nasir Jang arrived to treat for peace, to whom, in the presence of Bussy, Muzaffar Jang replied that there could be no talk of peace without the approval of Dupleix. The emissary offered to grant suitable jaghirs to both Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib and to repay the amounts they had borrowed from the French. Muzaffar Jang to whom the emissary came, sent for a French representative to be present during the conversations and his reply was given in the presence of Bussy.¹⁸ Dupleix wrote to Chanda that every negotiation should be conducted only through himself; otherwise, he was not for any compromise at all. Shortly afterwards, Nasir Jang's engagement took place, on account of which the English Captain Cope, and the French Commandant, d'Auteuil, exchanged 'mutual recriminations regarding the breach of peace between the two nations.' Lawrence, with an English embassy, was also present in Nasir Jang's camp; and he no doubt inspired Cope's recriminations with d'Auteuil. Thus the beginning was made of the direct conflict between the two Companies on the eve of the great revolution that was to see the fall of Nasir Jang and the triumph of the French.

b—The English openly side with Muhammad Ali

Nasir Jang halted at Valudavur after his triumph, where he received Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore to whom he gave Arcot in fief. Mir Asad was made the *diwan* of this phantom Nawab; and both agreed to pay the Nizam

18. The Diarist's entry for March 31—pp. 435-48 of Vol. vi This is an effective support of Chanda Sahib's opinion that Muzaffar Jang had no pre-conceived plan of making his own terms with and submitting to Nasir Jang and that Dupleix's estimate of him was not fully justified.

an annual tribute of 50 lakhs for the subah of the Carnatic. Wandewash was to be given over to Mir Asad who suggested that, if Pondicherry were blockaded, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang's mother who were there, would have to be given up and most of the sepoys would desert from the French side. Nasir Jang was advised by his nobles, like Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Sayyad Sharif Khan, that the besieging of Pondicherry would prove an arduous task and the English would not fight with the French, as there was peace between them; they were of the opinion that the subah of Arcot should be given to Muzaffar Jang and peace should be made with the French; otherwise Chanda Sahib would return with European aid and renew the struggle for the Nawabship of Arcot. This advice was all the more effective as Murari Rao, Janoji Nimbalkar, Chandra Sen and other Maratha sardars in the Nizam's camp were preparing to depart. In reply to communications received from Nasir Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan. Dupleix sent ambassadors, including two of his Council, Mm. du Basset and Delarche, to Nasir Jang's camp. Shah Nawaz Khan sympathised with the French; but apparently he was not able to persuade his master who demanded the surrender of Chanda Sahib and declined to give him the subah of Arcot. The envoys returned to Pondicherry with a letter from Shah Nawaz Khan explaining the situation, to which a veiled threat of war was sent as a reply. In fact, the envoys said that Shah Nawaz Khan and his *peshkar*, Ramdas Pandit, told them secretly that, if they departed without hesitation, marched again with troops and fell upon Nasir Jang's camp-guards by night, he would arrange to get Arcot for Chanda Sahib and restore his territory to Muzaffar Jang.

Ramdas Pandit is stated by the Diarist to have offered terms of peace by which Trichinopoly was to be given to Chanda Sahib, as well as a *mansab* of 5,000 horse, a *jaghir* in the Arcot subah and permission to seize and plunder Tanjore. It was also stated that Muhammad Ali had been promised Arcot and that the English had agreed to help him on receiving a *cowle* for Poonamallee and a part of the Devanampatnam country as *inam*. In the *darbar* of the Nizam, when the consent of the nobles was asked for the appointment of Muhammad Ali to the subah of Arcot, Shah Nawaz Khan said that the subah should be given to

Chanda Sahib who deserved favour. Sayyad Lashkar Khan said that he would very willingly consent to Muhammad Ali's appointment; but as the French were opposed to him, he thought it inadvisable. Muhammad Ali openly quarrelled with Sayyad Lashkar Khan for his remarks; and Nasir Jang dissolved the darbar without giving the intended dress of honour to the former.

Muzaffar Jang's captivity did not seem to have been harsh; and he contrived easily to maintain correspondence with his mother, Dupleix and others at Pondicherry. He entreated Dupleix to send his mother to him; but the latter refused to depart, saying it would be unseemly to go away without repaying the Governor what she owed him.¹⁹ She was hoping that if her debt was paid before Nasir Jang left the country there would be a good chance of her son being released and treated well.

Nasir Jang is said to have given an interview to Muzaffar Jang and to have relaxed the severity of his confinement, possibly as a result of the letter that the latter's mother wrote to him. On May 3rd, the Nizam held a *darbar* before marching, at which, besides Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and his other diwans, were also present Nawab Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah, Himayat Bahadur Khan of Kurnool and other nobles. They all advised him to forgive Muzaffar Jang; while Jamil Beg Khan, the subhadar of Berar, advised the Nizam to conciliate the French and win them over to his side; and Sayyad Lashkar Khan and others offered the same advice as to Muzaffar Jang.²⁰ Nasir Jang ordered his return march north; and the Diarist records that on May 5, he heard that Cope and Lawrence went to Nasir Jang's camp when he was about to commence his march, with the request that the Poonamallee, Mylapore and Devanampatnam countries should be given as

19 Muzaffar Jang's mother was the half-sister of Nasir Jang and his elder brother Ghazi-ud-din Khan who were the sons of Nizamu'l-Mulk's second wife. The latter's first wife was the daughter of a Pathan noble: and Muzaffar Jang's mother was her daughter. Nizamu'l-Mulk had six sons. There was no truth in the scandal recorded by the Diarist that Nasir Jang was the son of Nizamu'l-Mulk by a low woman.

20 Haji Fazil Khan, the steward of Muzaffar Jang's household, related these happenings, as he had seen them, to Dupleix. (Diarist's entry for May 4, 1750).

an *inam* to the English, in return for their services; but they had to return unsuccessfully²¹.

c—Intrigues thicken in Nasir Jang's camp

Now the material culled from the Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai enables the student to know how the wind of politics veered from day to day in the court of Nasir Jang concerning his respective attitudes towards the English and the French. The reception of the English by Nasir Jang was warm at first; but soon after their arrival, the English envoys complained that they had good reason to suspect that the French were tampering with some of the courtiers of the Nizam and their own native agent was betraying their letters and plans to the French. Therefore they refused to join Nasir Jang in the attack on Wandiwash and also in the proposed expedition to raise tribute in Tanjore. "Major Lawrence solicited Nasir Jang to confirm the grant, which Mahommed Ally, now esteemed Nabob of Arcot had made to the East India Company, of a piece of territory near Madras, in return for the assistance of their troops. He had often promised to comply with this request; but his minister, Shah Nawaz Khan, regarded such accession as inconsistent with the majesty of the Mogul empire and prevented the *phirmaund* or patent, from being issued from his office. Wearied with prevarication, Major Lawrence insisted on a peremptory answer, on which he was assured that he should be immediately satisfied, provided he would march with the battalion to Arcot. He did not think to prudent to comply with this proposal." (Orme's *History of Indostan*, Vol. I, Fourth Edition, pp. 145-6).

Ranga Pillai gives the following picture of the vacillating mind of Nasir Jang. "Conflicting news reached Pondicherry from Nasir Jang's camp. Shah Nawaz Khan wrote on May 11th that he would be remaining at Arcot for four months; and, if in the meantime Chanda

21 Dodwell says that the English ambassadors to Nasir Jang wrote on April 14, that a party was forming among the Nizam's ministers influencing him against them, at the instigation of the French; and they 'seem to intimate in their discourse that they hold the assistance we have given them in very little esteem.'

Sahib gave satisfaction, the Arcot subah would be given to him, while Trichinopoly and a *mansab* jaghir for Tanjore would be granted immediately. Dupleix insisted that the places mortgaged to the French by Chanda Sahib should be restored to their possession till the money was paid; and the French factories in the Northern Sarkars should not be interfered with. He even offered to guarantee that Muzaffar Jang did not draw the sword against his uncle, as the latter feared he might do, if he were released and joined the French, as was very likely. Nasir Jang, it was reported, could not easily make up his mind.

Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah urged Nasir Jang to release his nephew and give him his own country and Arcot, and then he would keep the French quiet and live at peace. Otherwise, he said, that if Muzaffar Jang should be carried away a prisoner, Nasir Jang should, for the sake of effecting perfect security, conquer the French, capture their fort, imprison Chanda Sahib and liberate Muzaffar Jang's family who were at Pondicherry. The other nobles also advised Nasir Jang to the same effect; but one or two poisoned his mind with the fear, that, if Muzaffar Jang were released, he would win over the nobles and the army and bring about great trouble to Nasir Jang himself.

Nasir Jang continued to stay on for some days near Wandewash, negotiating for the payment of a big sum of money to himself from Taqi Sahib who held the place and who was a son-in-law of Dost Ali. Once a storm of wind and rain beat down his tents; and in the confusion that ensued, a false rumour arose that Muzaffar Jang had escaped. The division of the Nizam's camp into two opposing parties, respectively supporting the causes of Nasir Jang and his nephew, is seen more and more clearly in the entries of the Diarist. The latter's partisans like Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Jamil Beg Khan and the Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur, are said to have resolved to overthrow Nasir Jang with their troops and to send Muzaffar Jang under a strong guard to Pondicherry for the sake of safety. Ramdas Pandit, whom Grant-Duff calls 'the traitor Ramdas', was secretly in favour of Muzaffar Jang's elevation, but cleverly pretended to seek Nasir Jang's interest alone and at the same time did all in his power to encourage Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Muzaffar

Jang's party, communicating to them all that passed with Nasir Jang. It was only Shah Nawaz Khan and his adherents that were opposed to Muzaffar Jang; all the others wished Nasir Jang to be overthrown. Dupleix even suggested that Muzaffar Jang might be helped to escape to Pondicherry by way of Alambarai where he would post some soldiers with boats and sloops, and from which he might go in a few hours to Kunimedu, Covelong or Pondicherry, whichever way the road should be clear, and arranged for some money being sent to him in pagodas as they would be easier to carry. The plot against Nasir Jang was expected to bear fruit in 15 or 20 days (May, 1750).

Meanwhile information was received that Shah Nawaz Khan had arranged that Trichinopoly and Tanjore should be leased out to Chanda Sahib, after being made over to Dupleix who could occupy them and then lease them to his *protege*. Arcot was to be under Shah Nawaz Khan; and if Chanda Sahib should act for four or five months as he desired, and should be pay the tribute due for Trichinopoly according to agreement, then he would receive Arcot. Muhammad Ali was hard pressed for money and unable to pay at once all the amount due for the Arcot subah; and his brother Mahfuz Khan (who had been made prisoner at Ambur, and subsequently released by promising to pay Muzaffar Jang 11 lakhs for the Trichinopoly country* and had later joined Nasir Jang's camp) was greatly depressed by the scant attention paid to him and threatened to turn *faqir* and go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and others now departed with their contingents; while the Pathan Nawabs also sent their troops in advance; thus Nasir Jang could not stay long and must soon depart. He agreed to appoint Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash at the Diwan of Muhammad Ali, after which he proceeded to Arcot. Taqi Sahib also agreed to make Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur (Chanda Sahib's brother) swear to be friends with his namesake and gave plenty of trouble to Chanda Sahib's wife who was at Wandiwash and whom he now turned out of the fort.

These ever revolving shifts and changing views of the nobles are monotonous to record; but they stress the un-

*Vide *supra*

certainties of the situation into which Nasir Jang found himself deeply involved. We read from the *Diary* that the three Pathan Nawabs refused to pay the *peshkash* to the Nizam, on the ground that they had not paid any even to his father and even absented themselves from the *dar bar*. Nasir Jang became very wroth and a collision occurred between his troops and the Pathans' followers; and Shah Nawaz Khan had to intervene in order to make peace. Muzaffar Jang made a second effort to escape from his prison. Chanda Sahib was advised by his brother Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur, not to go to Arcot for any interview, even though he should be promised safety by means of an oath on the Quran.

In the beginning of July, (1750) it was rumoured at Pondicherry that a number of nobles of the Nizam had resolved to release Muzaffar Jang, establish him as the *subhedar* of the Deccan and seize or slay Nasir Jang; and Muzaffar Jang's attempt to escape, noted above, was in reality done with their connivance; and when it failed, the latter took all the blame on himself and pretended madness. Chanda Sahib advised that agents should be employed to arrange matters secretly with the Pathan Nawabs for bringing about the deposition of Nasir Jang. Letters were written cautiously by Dupleix to Chanda Sahib's men at the Nizam's camp, couched in general terms; and the messengers were given specific instructions to arrange an interview between the discontented nobles and the Pathan Nawabs.

Concerning these troubles and the dissensions between the Pathan Nawabs and the Nizam, the Diarist made the following entry.—“The Arcot people and other killedars who expected much are discontented. All Nasir Jang's old friends have become his enemies. His commands are disregarded and he cannot prosper.” (June 1750).

While thus Dupleix was taking advantage of the situation in Nasir Jang's camp and preparing, both openly and insiduously, to make Chanda Sahib Nawab, Captain Cope was sent by the English, with a field-train and a body of 600 men, to join Muhammad Ali as he was advancing from Arcot towards Fort St. David. But the English withdrew after some little co-operation in a small skirmish with the enemy near Tiruvati; and Muhammad Ali himself

was, a month later, decisively defeated at the same place and forced to make his escape with great loss (1st Sept. 1750 n.s.) in the direction of Arcot. According to Burhanu'd-din, Muhammad Ali fled from the battle-field to Gingee, but wished once again to proceed to Tiruvati to engage with the enemy, when he was suddenly recalled by the Nizam to his presence. Burhanu'd-din further tells us that Muhammad Ali had secured the friendship of the English by giving them the hope of the grant of the jaghir of Poonamalle, that Nasir Jang was persuaded by the intriguing Pathan Nawabs and Ramdas Pandit to order Muhammad Ali to sever his relationship with the English, that he had ordered Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah and Himmat Khan of Kurnool to subjugate Fort St. David and Madras respectively, that Muhammad Ali contrived to give a large bribe to Ramdas Pandit through Raja Sampath Rai and Raja Bashan Das and to persuade them and Shah Nawaz Khan to see that the order for the expulsion of the English was withdrawn.

Nasir Jang continued to be indifferent to the state of affairs; and mutual recriminations were freely indulged in by his courtiers. Shah Nawaz Khan charged Mir Asad with treachery and with being in correspondence with the Pondicherry people; while Murtaza Ali Khan was told to attack Pondicherry with Mir Asad who was rebuked for having originally advised that Muhammad Ali was to be helped at all. Shah Nawaz himself is said to have boasted that, but for the Nizam's orders that he should return at once to Aurangabad, he himself would soon set out to attack the French.

Fearing that Muhammad Ali might take refuge in Trichinopoly, Chanda Sahib was advised by Dupleix to write to the *killedar* of that place, persuading him not to admit the refugee prince into his fort and promising him a valuable *jaghir* as reward. It was also reported that Muhammad Ali was afraid to halt at Gingee whither Nasir Jang had promised to send him reinforcements. Dupleix was also hopeful that, if French troops should advance in the direction of Arcot, the Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would, as they had formally promised, have a good chance of seizing the person of Nasir Jang.

Nasir Jang thus remained inactive, though the Diarist heard that he had boastfully recalled all the troops he had sent away, declaring that he would march in person against the enemy. The English were sulky with Muhammad Ali and were reduced to "an almost compulsory inaction." Orme says that Major Lawrence was much offended with the prevarications of Muhammad Ali who at first made excuses for non-payment and at last declared that he had no money and had emptied his treasury by giving 20 lakhs of rupees to Nasir Jang. There was no prospect of an immediate action and Lawrence recalled the troops to Fort St. David. (Despatch to the Company from Fort St. David dated October 24, 1750).

D—The French capture Gingee

Then came the brilliant capture of Gingee by Bussy, who carried the fortress by escalade on the 11th September 1750; and the loss of this place awakened Nasir Jang to the true peril of his situation. Dupleix had been of the opinion that the place could easily been taken; and he had stationed sometime before a small body of troops at that spot. He now resolved to take advantage of the inactivity on the part of Muhammad Ali; and a couple of days after the second battle of Tiruvati above noted, he ordered d'Auteuil to despatch Bussy with six or seven officers, two hundred soldiers, fifty Coffres and half the number of the troops and sepoy's, with orders to march against Arcot, *via* Villupuram and Gingee. This expedition was merely to force Nasir Jang to set free his nephew, Muzaffar Jang, whom he had held a prisoner ever since his retreat from Pondicherry.

Bussy was at Villupuram on the 5th of September; Dupleix did not at that time intend an attack on Gingee. First, Bussy and later, d'Auteuil and Latouche made Dupleix change his mind. Dupleix was sure that the place could easily be taken, that there were several breaches in the ramparts and there was no necessity for a regular siege. Bussy encamped near the place on the 11th September in the morning; meanwhile, Muhammad Ali had reached it from the west with a fairly imposing army of about 7,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry, 1,000 English sepoy's and 8 guns served by English gunners or European deserters. Bussy determined on an immediate attack, but the

enemy did not fall back at the first cannonade as they did in the previous battle. Soon French firing forced the troops of Muhammad Ali back to the walls of Gingee and into the town itself by nightfall, when the cannon from the heights seized firing. D'Auteuil and Bussy waited for darkness to follow the partial moonlit night and then attacked all the three hills of the place simultaneously. The gaunt towering peak of Rajagiri fell easily, because its gateway yielded to "a few crackers"; the military outpost at its base was captured and no further resistance was encountered along the whole course of the pathway leading to the top. Even to the principal officers who took part in the capture the achievement did not seem to be very considerable²².

Even this achievement was followed by an inexplicable inaction on the part of the French for more than two months till the beginning of December. D'Auteuil seemed to be "strangely resolved to rest on Bussy's laurels." Dupleix indeed wrote to him urging him to advance at once against Nasir Jang. Even before the capture of Gingee, he was anxious that the French troops should march towards Arcot, as then the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would have a good chance of seizing Nasir Jang, according to their promises. One of the Maratha mansabdars in Nasir Jang's camp, sent a message to Chanda Sahib and Dupleix that, if the French had marched on Arcot immediately after taking Gingee, the Nizam could easily have been seized, and urged that the time had now come for the French to move, in order to capture or slay Nasir Jang and establish Muzaffar Jang on the throne. It was also added that as the Pathan Nawabs and other sardars were secretly

22 The French had only eleven men wounded and ten killed; as for the losses of the enemy, they were not known. In a letter dated 15th, Dupl ix said that the enemy had two thousand men killed; but this figure seems much exaggerated.

On the next day Bussy whose initiative had won such a success, received the most hearty congratulations of Dupleix who wrote: "You deserve the highest rewards and I shall do all I can to have them bestowed on you."

(1) Notwithstanding this the Governor was not fully convinced of the worth of Gingee. In a letter to Engineer Sornay, Dupleix declared officially that he did not intend staying at Gingee, but would remain there only such time as would be necessary to force the Subah to conclude peace as he was convinced that the smartness and rapidity of that brilliant action would make a deep impression on the Subah. (*Bussy in the Deccan*, Being extracts from "Bussy and French India" by A. Martineau: Translated by Dr. Miss A. Cammiade, L.M. & S.: pp. 12-13).

working on the French side, French troops should have continued to advance.

e—Continued Inaction on both Sides—Further Intrigues

After Bussy's capture of Gingee, Nasir Jang did, in fact, become disposed to come to terms and sent peace proposals to Dupleix. On the side of the French, d'Auteuil seemed to be content with an attitude of inaction. Dupleix had already written to him to advance at once against Nasir Jang. As noted above, he had desired, even before Gingee was taken, that the French should proceed towards Arcot where the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would have a good chance of carryings out their treachery. One of the Maratta sardars in the Nizam's camp sent word that, if the French had marched on Arcot directly from Gingee, they could have easily seized the person of Nasir Jang and brought about the release of Muzaffar Jang. It was also added by the Diarist that as the Pathan Nawabs and numerous *sardars* were secretly working on the French side, French troops should have advanced beyond Chetpattu which they had reached, but from which d'Auteuil had hastily retired, on hearing that Nasir Jang's forces had reached Desur (twenty miles off) and justified his retreat by asserting that the Pathan Nawabs and others were only deceiving him with false promises. Dupleix tried to console himself as best he could, by saying that the French troops had not retired for any lack of confidence in themselves, but only on account of the constant rains and flooded rivers,

23 Diarist's entry for September 5, reporting a conversation he had with the Governor (p. 376 of vol. vii). According to Martineau, Dupleix wrote on the 7th October to d'Auteuil:—"I have their oath and their signatures. The plot comes from then and not from me."

24 The *Tuzak-i-Walajahi* of Burhan-u'd-din says that after the French had captured Gingee, Nasir Jang ordered Muhammad Ali to lay siege to the captured place and to prevent any succour to the besieged from Pondicherry; and accordingly the latter sent his Bakshi, Md. Abrar Khan, with an army to Gingee. But the conspirators persuaded Nasir Jang to transfer the forces of Muhammad Ali to protect Conjeevaram, which, they said, was threatened by the French troops at Chingleput; and thus Abrar Khan was recalled from Gingee and sent with augmented forces to Conjeevaram; thus, in the quaint words of Burhan-ud-din, 'the *maidan* of impudence became extensive for the French and for those corrupted by mischief.'

and they would advance as soon as the rains were over and the roads became passable. Things were much worse on Nasir Jang's side. In the beginning of October, his army was encamped on the north side of the Cheyyar river which was flooded; for want of fodder and from the rains, horses and bullocks were dying in numbers; the artillery could scarcely cover four miles in a day; the horsemen were unwilling to march; and Nasir Jang himself marched in the rear and not in the front of his army. The Diarist was told that many of the *sardars* had not marched with the troops, that Arcot was crowded with all sorts of people and rice was scarce and sold in camp at five *pucca* seers per rupee. In his opinion, d'Auteuil knew these facts well, but had retired ingloriously from Chetpattu and attempted nothing in spite of frequent encouraging letters from Dupleix. When Janoji Nimbalkar and Ramachandra Rao were ordered by Nasir Jang to march as an advance guard, they refused, pleading that it would be dangerous and they could do nothing and advised him that war should cease and peace be made. Shah Nawaz Khan was of the same opinion and advised his master not to fight, as the army was small and a favourable time would offer itself later. M. d'Auteuil demanded his recall from the field and pleaded sickness, the heavy rains and his men's reluctance to continue in camp in such weather; and 'Dupleix had much ado to prevent his marching his troops back to Pondicherry and forwarded to him every scrap of encouraging news that he received.' He then actually returned to Pondicherry on October 22; and Dupleix asked the Diarist to write to Muzaffar Khan, the *jamadar* of sepoys, to remain in the villages lying between Villupuram and Gingee and join the main body, if he should be directed by La Touche who had succeeded to the command, and not to send in the guns from Gingee.

Murtaza Ali Khan meanwhile sent a suggestion to Dupleix that he would secure Arcot from Nasir Jang, that he might be made the Nawab and that Chanda Sahib might get Trichinopoly, or, as an alternative, that he himself should be secured in his jaghir and be made Diwan to Chanda Sahib as Nawab. But Dupleix's main concern at this time was about the indecision and weakness displayed by d'Auteuil which had spoiled the whole situation for him and about the heavy rains which continued for

nearly a month and which prevented the French from the effective use of their muskets and artillery. Nasir Jang had at last to order his troops to march towards Gingee and himself joined the main body in the beginning of October. His army was considerably less numerous than when he entered the Carnatic; but he could still count, according to the authority of Orme, 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse, 700 elephants and 360 pieces of cannon. On the evening of the 24th October, a body of Nasir Jang's horse, about 4,000 in number, who were lying in ambush in several places round Gingee, were encountered by a few French dragoons and Muhammadan troopers. As it was heavily raining, the Muhammadan troopers could not fire and insisted on retreating to camp; the dragoons lost their way and many were killed. The French army marched the next day, but was obliged by the heavy rains, to retreat to Gingee where there were not sufficient provisions.

Dupleix continued his active intrigues with the nobles of Nasir Jang's court, where it was presently rumoured that Mir Asad and Murtaza Ali Khan were in high favour with the Nizam and urged him to immediately march against the French and Chanda Sahib; the Pathan Nawabs knew that they were suspected by the Nizam and were consequently on their guard. Nasir Jang let Dupleix know through Khazi Dayem (Mir Dayem Ali Khan) that he would be still prepared to negotiate, to which Dupleix replied that he on his side was not averse to a peace being brought about. This was the situation at the end of October. The events leading to the assassination of Nasir Jang are complicated and a summary of them, so far as can be gleaned, is given below.²⁵

25 There is a *hiatus* in the *Diary* of Ananda Ranga Pillai from the 29th October 1750 to April 1751 and our information lacks that basis. The events that brought about the assassination of Nasir Jang in the middle of December and a consequent revolution in the political situation are known to us only with some indefiniteness about their sequence and their actual timings. Nasir Jang is said to have started from Arcot in order to take possession of Gingee on the 4th of Shawwal, 1163 A.H. (Sunday 26th of August) and the French under d'Auteuil were then in Chetpat, from which they retreated to Gingee. The Nizam's lieutenant, Mir Najaf Ali Khan, took Arni and Kilpauk and reached Tiruvannamalai which he took on the 4th of Zilhijja, 1163 A.H., i.e., October 24th, 1750. By that time the Nizam had reached the neighbourhood of Gingee and encamped on the northern bank of the Chakravati river. There was some irregular firing indulged in for a few days. The Gingee river was in floods and was difficult to cross. But, on the other side, there was a large plain extending from Gingee to Vilupuram. Najaf Khan captured some forts on the other side of Gingee and

f—Muhammad Ali flies to Trichinopoly

After the death of Nasir, his army became scattered. Mahfuz Khan, Najibullah Khan and several other Amirs

cleared the way for supplies. But the enemy continued to receive supplies from Gingee through the efforts of Muzaffar Khan, the jamadar of sepoys who used to get almost daily supplies. Najaf Ali Khan prepared, in the first days of Mohurrum 1164 A.H., to scale the walls of Gingee on the south-western side where they were very low. But meanwhile the pathan Nawabs, Janoji Nimbalkar, Ramdas Pandit and Risaldar Muhammad Sayyid, who had turned conspirators, had successfully incited de La Touche, the new French commander, who was in the fort of Gingee to attack the Nizam's army. Rumour began, even on the night of the 13th of Mohurrum, A.H. 1164, i.e., December 1, 1750, of a French attack on the Nawab's forces. Three nights thus passed without the attack materialising. "On the fourth night again the cry of the enemy's approach arose, but the army ridiculed the news and slept soundly. At about one in the morning the Nawab was preparing for Namaz-e-Tahajjud, when sound of gun fire was heard from the direction of Janoji and the Afghan chiefs; thus there was confusion in the camp. The French passing the front line attacked the centre of the army; the Nawab's own gunners began to fire on his tents. During this confusion, the Nawab ordered his elephant to be brought out, and mounting it started from his camp with three thousand horsemen; and repelling the French, passing in their midst, he reached the Afghan troops who were quite silent in the front lines. Himmatt Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Kurnool, Abdul Nabi Khan, the Governor of Cuddapah, Abdul Hakim Khan, the Governor of Savanoor, all mounted on elephants, were also standing with their men."

"When the Nawab's elephant approached that of Himmatt Bahadur Khan, the Nawab first saluted him, and advised him to advance and drive away the rebels. But Himmatt Bahadur Khan without saluting and without a word, shot Nasir Jang in the chest with the "shirbacha" and the Nawab died the same instant. This event occurred on the 16th of Mohurrum, Wednesday, before sunrise, at dawn. (*From Rahat Afza*, written in 1171 A.H., at the request of Mir Najaf Ali Khan, and embodied in 'a Critical Note on the murder-site of Nawab Nasir Jang' by Hakeem Sayyid Shams-ullah Qadri and communicated to the writer by courtesy of Mon. A. Lehuraux).

According to Muhammadan calculation, the civil day begins at sunset and what we call Thursday evening, a Muslim will call Friday evening; and if a Muslim historian says that a certain event happened on the night of Safar 3, 1069 (October 31, 1658) it may have happened between sunset and midnight on October 30, or between midnight and dawn on October 31. The 16th of Mohurrum, 1164 A.H. corresponds to Tuesday 4th, December 1750 and according to the apparent visibility of the moon is the 17th Mohurrum, which is Wednesday. The murder occurred therefore on the early morning of Wednesday.

The same learned writer says that the Nizam's army was encamped on the Chakravati river so near the Gingee Fort that shots were exchangeable from the two opposing forces. The site of the Nawab's martyrdom was therefore on or near the banks of the Chakravati river, by the side of Gingee.

According to the *Tuzak-i-Walajahi*, Mir Dayem Ali Khan, the sardar of the advance guard of Nasir Jang's army, warned his master against the intended treachery of the Afghan Nawabs and the evil disposition of Raja Ramdas, on the very eve of his assassination. Nasir Jang was encamped on the maidan of Gingee, but the army was split into different encampments on account of heavy rains, rapid floods and ups and downs. Nawab

set out towards Hyderabad. In great secrecy Muhammad Ali escaped from the camp with Ghazanfar Ali Khan and

Muhammad Ali suggested that it would be better to shift the camp to the plain adjoining Villupuram, where the whole army could be concentrated in one place. The Nizam took the suggestion and fixed the next day for the manœuvre. It was a Wednesday. "But Khan Alam who was then present, said that Wednesday was inauspicious and suggested the auspicious Thursday. The day after the next was fixed upon by the Wazir accordingly. Mir Sayfullah, the agent of the ignoble traitors, had already gone to Husayn Dost Khan and the French to settle terms. He made sure of them by oath and covenant and returned by Thursday. Mir Dayim Ali Khan, the sardar of the advance guard of the army, learnt what had happened; that very night he appeared before the Wazir, and presented for consideration all the facts in detail, from the beginning". But Nasir Jang did not regard the caution. In that very night, at about 3 a.m., the French came out of the Gingee Fort and began to cannonade the Nizam's camp. It was then that Nasir Jang was prevented by the persuasions of Ramdas from executing Muzaffar Jang. Quickly the French troops advanced near his camp. The Nizam did not wear any armour or coat of mail and mounted his elephant. Part of his army was not aware of the French attack or was hindered by heavy floods. "Part were negligent or pretended ignorance. Thus the whole army became scattered." The Nizam was surrounded only by a few torch-bearers and *bandars*; and he rode, as the day dawned, towards the elephants of Abdul Nabi Khan and Himmat Bahadur Khan and salaamed to them. But they pretended ignorance of his presence: and he saluted them a second time with a loud voice; and he followed up with the words that it was incumbent on them, brothers of the same faith, to fight the stranger. Then Himmat Bahadur aimed with his musket at the Nawab and shot him through the heart. In the confusion that ensued, Muhammad Ali departed for Trichinopoly with only Ghazanfar Ali Khan and a single guide. He was joined by a dozen servants of his at Tiruvannamalai. At Ranjangudi, its jaghirdar, Mutabir Khan Tahir, pretended under cover of hospitality to receive him in the fort, with a view to get him secured. It was only by the presence of mind of Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who held the jaghirdar in firm grip that Muhammad Ali was enabled to escape; and the rescuer also quickly rejoined his master in safety." (*Tuzak-i-Walajahi, Part II*—Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, 1939, pp. 55 *et seq.*).

According to Martineau, the French Commander, La Touche, set out on the 15th of December 1750 and crossed the 16 miles which lay between the French camp and the enemy in a single night's march. The battle began at once, i.e. on the morning of the 16th. Nasir Jang had placed his artillery in the foreground and the infantry behind it, while the cavalry occupied the wings. La Touche made a similar disposition. The sepoys and the cavalry formed the wings and in the centre were planted the French soldiers under Villeon, with Bussy to the right and Kerjean to the left, while La Touche watched the whole proceedings. Martineau himself says that reports were conflicting about the end of Nasir Jang. "The commonest one says that Nasir Jang having heard that the Nawabs of Kurnool and Cudadah were keeping themselves in complete inactivity, had gone to bring them to a sense of their duty and had threatened them, having previously passed orders that Muzaffar Jang should be put to death. One or other of these two Nawabs replied impertinently to Nasir Jang and in the confusion which followed Nasir Jang was wounded and thrown off his elephant. His head was chopped off at once, and presented to Muzaffar Jang who was immediately hailed as the Suba." (*Bussy in the Deccan*—Being extracts from "Bussy and French India" by A. Martineau—Translated by Dr. Miss A. Cammiade, p. 14).

M. Wilks says that early on the morning of the 5th of December (O. S.), La Touche entered the straggling encampment of Nasir Jang, which

another guide and after considerable difficulty reached the taluk of Tiruvannamalai and then marched therefrom to Ranjangudi whose jaghirdar, Mutabir Khan Tahir, tried to get him into his possession, but was baulked of his purpose by the vigilance and care of Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who kept the jaghirdar in a close grip, threatening

he penetrated in firm and compact order, advancing slowly against reiterated but unskilful opposition. He says that the enemy troops were not sufficiently alert and thus continues:—"There is no positive evidence that any other plan had been concerted than that of open attack, until Nasir Jung, unsuspecting of treason, directed his elephant to that part of his army with the intention of giving orders. Approaching the elephant of the Nabob of Kurpa, he anticipated his salutation by first raising his hand; it was not yet clear day-light, and thinking the Nabob did not recognize him he raised himself up in the howda and repeated the salutation, when two carbine shots from the opposite elephant pierced his body, and he instantly expired. Wilks thus continues:—

"I take this part of the narrative almost verbally from the *Serv e Azad* (see p. 237). The author was in the tent of Nasir Jung when the alarm was given, and assisted him to dress for the field. He relates with simplicity and truth the irregular life of Nasir Jung at Arcot, his own respectful and repeated admonitions, and the vow which his patron made after his departure from that city, and kept, until the day of his death. This narrative discredits the published reports of Nasir Jung having deceived his nephew, who was allowed a degree of liberty, and treated with a consideration, against which the best friends of Nasir Jung strongly remonstrated, and advised his being put to death. The reason for for dissenting from this advice is not stated in the *Serv e Azad*, but is very generally known. When Nasir Jung several years before rebelled against his father and attempted to cut him off near Aurungabad, the father of Hedayat Mohy u Deen (Muzaffar Jung) was ordered to meet the elephant of Nasir Jung, who, after the battle was lost, rushed on in a fit of desperation against the standard of his father. Nasir Jung was wounded, and his opponent was about to transfix him with a spear, when Hedayat Mohy-u-Deen, then a boy, who was on the elephant with his father, seized his arm, crying "spare my uncle!" and he was accordingly saved. When Nasir Jung was afterwards pressed to put him to death, on suspicion of the intrigue with M. Dupleix, he answered, "I will never take the life of the man who saved mine." The character given of him in the *Serv e Azad* would justify the opinion of his being capable of such a sentiment." (Wilks: *History of South India*, II Edition, Vol. I, p. 166).

There is a discrepancy of day between Burhanu'd-din and the authority quoted by Mr. Qadri, i.e. the Rahat Afza. European writers are not agreed as to the individual person who assassinated Nasir Jang. Some of them say that it was the Nawab of Cuddapah, Abdul Nabi Khan, who killed Nasir Jang. But this too is not supported by indigenous historians. Ananda Ranga Pillai, indeed says in one place on hearsay evidence that La Touche killed Nasir Jang and gained victory. The first part of the statement is evidently not correct. Wilks says that the date of the action was the 5th of December (old style) and that is perhaps the 16th of December (new style) and that the French had adopted much earlier than the English. Mon. A. Lehueraux writes on the evidence of French records that the two armies were about four leagues distant. The *Rahat Afza* has given minute details regarding the actual location of the Nawab's army and of the dispositions of Nasir Jang's camp with its rear guard, advance guard, *qalb* and *saranjan* and notes that on one wing of the right Muhammad Ali was posted with a large body of horse, foot, guns, *rekla*, &c. Burhanu'd din should have had actual access to the information furnished by Muhammad Ali himself.

him with death, till his master was enabled to reach Valikandapuram. Burhanu'd-din says that Nawab Muhammad Ali covered the whole distance from Gingee to Trichinopoly in the course of a day and a night, while usually it took seven days.

At Trichinopoly Nawab Muhammad Ali completed his preparations for strengthening his position and sent for his brother, Abdul Wahab Khan, from Nellore and for Muhammad Abrar Khan from Conjeevaram. He wrote an account of what had happened in the Carnatic to the Emperor Ahmad Shah and also to Nawab Ghaziu'd-Din Khan Bahadur Firoz Jang, the elder brother of Nasir Jang, who was then at the imperial court and implored him to proceed to the Deccan.

Meanwhile Muzaffar Jang proceeded to Pondicherry where he bestowed on Chanda Sahib the Nizamat of the Carnatic Pavenghat and on Dupleix the title of Zafar Jang and the jaghirs of Gingee, Tiruvati and other places. Himmat Bahadur Khan was given the title of Rustam Jang and the jaghirs of Raichur and Adoni. Abdul Nabi Khan got the jaghirs of Gandikotta, Gooty and Gurrumkonda: and Abdul Karim Khan got Sira. Ramdas Pandit was elevated in rank, with the title of Raja Raghunath Das, and the French sepoy-captains, Muhammad Hassan and Abdul Rahman, were also given the titles of Khan.

While Muzaffar Jang departed for the Deccan and events quickly moved to another revolution ending in his assassination and in the enthronement of Salabat Jang, Muhammad Ali put in his claims for open English support, but also opened negotiations with the French, as it was the harvest season and as he did not want war to break out while he had any chances of collecting the revenue. He therefore contrived to prolong negotiations with Dupleix and Chanda Sahib for four months (December, 1750 to March 1751), and communicated regularly to the English all his discussions with them. Saunders, the English Governor, maintained that as Muhammad Ali had been appointed Nawab of Arcot by Nasir Jang, he continued to be the legitimate and rightful Nawab till another appointment was made from Delhi; the English having received farmans for the districts granted by Muhammad

Ali, a detachment was sent to Trichinopoly under Captain Cope to secure it from any attempts by Chanda Sahib; and another detachment was sent to assist the ruler of Tanjore in consideration of a farman that he granted to them for Devikottai and its bounds.

Chanda Sahib and the French moved out from Pondicherry only in March, 1751; and after reducing one or two forts, they proceeded to Arcot to receive the tribute of the killedars and other notables; and he prepared to advance against Trichinopoly only towards the end of May or later, by which time Saunders had sent a force under Captain de Gingens to oppose his march.

Chanda Sahib secured the fort of Chetpattu and the imprisonment of Mir Asad and his family. He also settled the Vellore affair with Murtaza Ali for six lakhs of rupees. Shaikh Hasan, the sepoy leader, who accompanied Chanda Sahib along with the French troops, was to have the fort and jahgir of Arni yielding two lakhs of rupees. Dupleix arranged with Titarappa Mudali of Tinnevely for the lease of the revenue of the Tinnevely country for a period of five years and stipulated that he was to pay ten lakhs of rupees to Chanda Sahib and one lakh to the French Governor. The poligar of Sivaganga and other chiefs were written to to give all possible help to the renter in occupying the country.²⁶ But rumour was rife that as Muhammad Ali was made strong at Trichinopoly by the English and as Chanda Sahib was not in actual possession of the country, Titarappa's chance of occupying Tinnevely was not great; while Kumarappa Mudali, the dubash of Governor Saunders at Fort St. David, sent word to Titarappa that he would arrange to get him the lease of the Tinnevely country from Muhammad Ali and the English Council would write about it to Mr. Cope who was with the latter. But the cause of Muhammad Ali was not yet to gain the upper hand. The Maravas and others attacked

26 Anvar Khan was *faujdar* and *amil* of the Tinnevely country in the time of Nawab Anwaru'd din: he was succeeded by Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan who jointly managed affairs till 1749. After the battle of Ambur, Chanda Sahib appointed, as *amil*, Alam Khan who managed the district on his master's behalf in 1750 and 1751. He was succeeded for a short time by Titarappa Mudali and Moodemiah, the agent of Chanda Sahib. (Extracted by Caldwell from the letter of Mr Lushington, Collector of Tinnevely, dated May 28, 1802; see p. 125 of *History of Tinnevely*).

the troops of Captain Cope and Muhammad Ali which had advanced to take the Madura fort, broke them up and captured 3 cannon and a large number of muskets from them. Cope himself escaped with two wounds, while about 100 English soldiers were said to have fallen.²⁷

Ranga Pillai noted in his entry for April 30, 1751, that Dupleix sent the old *cowle* from Salabat Jang to Muhammad Ali and wrote desiring him to accept it²⁸ and deliver the fort of Trichinopoly to Chanda Sahib's people; and to this the latter replied that he had already received from Ghazi-ud-din Khan at Delhi a copy of the *parwana* granting him the *subahs* of Payanghat and Balaghat (Carnatic) and directing him to take possession of them, along with a copy of the Mughal Emperor's letter to Ghazi-ud-din Khan. Dupleix was greatly irritated at this reply and sent urgent letters to Chanda Sahib urging him to settle the Arni matter without further delay and, without turning aside to Arcot, to proceed straight to Trichinopoly by way of Tiruvannamalai.

Having received the submission of the *killedars* of Vellore, Chetpattu, and Arni, Chanda Sahib deemed the Carnatic to be secure enough for him under the circumstances and began his march to Trichinopoly, reaching Tiruvannamalai about the 20th of May. Dupleix asked the Diarist to write letters to the Rajas of Tanjore and Mysore and to 'the 72 poligars of Trichinopoly', whose names are enumerated, beginning with Malavarayan of Ariyalur, the Greater Marava (of Ramnad), the Lesser Marava (of Sivaganga) and enumerating 72 poligars and the six divisions of the Kallars (the Collieries of Orme). The list that Ranga Pillai gives has 34 Poligars as belonging to the Trichinopoly country and 38 as belonging to the

27 - Alam Khan is said to have subsequently proceeded and subdued the Tinnevely country and appointed Nabi Khan at Tinnevely and Mantimiyā (Mundamiyah or Moodemiah) at Madura as his lieutenants and then joined Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoly, where he died soon after his arrival, struck by a cannon shot (*Saka*, 1674)—see p. 48 of vol. II of W. Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* (1835).

28 The *cowle* from Salabat Jang which was sent by Dupleix to Muhammad Ali, was not probably known to the Diarist, and is given as Appendix No. 1 in vol. III of the *Diary* by Mr. Dodwell. It is dated March 12, 1751, and granted the sarkars of Rajahmundry, Chicacole, Ellore, Maulipatam and Muzaffarnagar to Muhammad Ali along with two strong forts and a jaghir and also promising not to call him to account for the dues of his father and himself with respect to the Carnatic and Trichinopoly revenues,

south. The letter that was sent to these explained how Muzaffar Jang had given Dupleix the charge of all the country and the palayams between the Krishna River and Cape Comorin and how the grant had been confirmed by Salabat Jang. It then proceeded to state that Muhammad Ali was given a *cowle* from Muzaffar Jang and invited to act as Dupleix desired, and, instead of doing so, he had taken shelter in Trichinopoly and made frivolous excuses; and Chanda Sahib and the French forces had, therefore, orders to capture Trichinopoly and punish Muhammad Ali and the poligars should not help him on pain of losing their fiefs and being punished, but should help Chanda Sahib.

Chanda Sahib wrote shortly afterwards that he had to postpone his march to Trichinopoly, as the English under Gingens took Vriddachalam and hoisted their own flag there; Dupleix was so anxious that the place should be retaken and the English should be driven completely out of the neighbourhood that he arranged that Shaikh Hasan, the *jamadar* of sepoys, who had been sent to reduce the Chittore palayams, should be required to come and help to beat the English. Large sums of money were received by the French on Chanda Sahib's account and Papayya Pillai, one of the agents of Madame Dupleix, was now appointed *receveur general des finances du Carnatic* and acted very tyrannically. Dupleix ordered that all payments got other than the sums due from Mir Asad and Murtaza Ali Khan were to be received for and credited to himself and these two sums alone were to be paid to Chanda Sahib for the charge of his troops. It was now that the English openly joined Muhammad Ali as principals in the struggle.²⁹

29 After six weeks of waiting, Captain Gingens was joined about the middle of May, by 600 horse and about 1000 peons of Muhammad Ali. He then moved westwards and came in sight of Vriddachalam, whose fortified pagoda was garrisoned by 300 of Chanda Sahib's troops. The place was on the high road to Trichinopoly; and its reduction was deemed to be necessary for the preservation of Fort St. David. The pagoda surrendered after a slight assault and after leaving a small garrison there, the English continued their further march and were joined by about 100 Europeans detached by Captain Cope from Trichinopoly and about 4,000 troops of Muhammad Ali, both cavalry and foot, commanded by Abdul Wahab Khan, a younger brother of the latter. The exact place where the junction of the troops took place is not clear; according to Captain Dalton it was at Valikandapuram (the Volcondah of Orme and other historians).

g—Operations round Trichinopoly.

Gingens captured and burnt the village of Volcondah which formed the *pettah* of the adjoining rock-fort of Ranjangudi whose jaghirdar, Mutabir Khan, was a Tahir and therefore a hereditary enemy of Anwarud-din's family and had refused to open its gates to the English. There was an action between the English troops and those of Chanda Sahib encamped close by, from which the former fled for no apparent reason, though the officers including Clive, who was then a lieutenant, did all they could to stop the disgraceful flight (June 30).³⁰

The troops of Muhammad Ali behaved in this action better than ever they did afterwards and even reproached the English in the field of battle for their want of spirit.³¹

After this action, Chanda Sahib followed Gingens to Uttatur, situated about 25 miles from Trichinopoly, where the road passes between a hill and a ridge of rock which were described by Orme as "the streights of Uttatur", and by Dalton as "the barrier to the Trichinopoly Country." On the 20th July, some of the English and Nawab's troops were decoyed into an ambuscade from the "streights" where they were encamped. In this action, most of the sepoy were cut to pieces and Lieutenant Maskelyne was taken prisoner. This fresh disaster disheartened the English still further; and Dalton whom Chanda Sahib advanced to fight with, had to avoid an action and retired with some difficulty to the main camp. This attack

30. This battle of Volcondah was considered a disgraceful affair by both Wilks and Malcolm. Orme says that Abdul Wahab Khan's troops stood their ground; only the English battalion got so demoralised and broke up in panic. For details see Captain Dalton's *Memoir* (*Memoir of Captain Dalton—H. E. I. C. S.* (1886) pp. 92 *et seq*; Orme, Vol. I, pp. 172-4).

A Martineau's *Dupleix*; Vol. III p. 194 G. Forrest's *Life Lord Clive*: Vol. I, pp. 128-131, which says that some of Orme's statements are founded on a memorandum which Clive sent him in 1763; and S. C. Hill's *Catalogue of the Orme Collection of Mss. in the India Office* (1916) II. 6. p. 272.

31. See Clive's Memorandum given to Orme in 1763; and also the letter of Governor Saunders to the Company dated August 15/26, 1751, which says that "the Nawab's people and the Coffres behaved well, and our people ill. The unlucky action encouraged their people and depressed ours". Dalton's account of this battle says that "it was a scandalous affair on our side; and the French had nothing to boast of, for they behaved to the full as ill as we". Gingens, Dalton, Killpatrick and Clive tried to rally the men, but in vain.

of Chanda Sahib made Gingens resolve to abandon "the streights," as he was afraid that the enemy might post his cavalry between that place and Trichinopoly. He moved out the same night and, after a quick march for eighteen hours, encamped close to the northern bank of the Coleroon, occupying the fortified pagoda of Bikshandar Koil. Gingens then crossed the river, followed by the French and Chanda Sahib and took possession of the Srirangam Island and its Great Pagoda. Even here the English did not feel themselves secure; they crossed the Kaveri and took refuge under the walls of Trichinopoly (July 28th). The French also rapidly pushed on after them; and they and Chanda Sahib took possession of Srirangam, crossed the Kaveri and encamped on the plain to the east of Trichinopoly in the neighbourhood of what is now known as the French Rock, about a mile to the south-east of the Fort.³² On Chanda Sahib's side, the French officers stubbornly refused to cross the Coleroon after the engagements of Volcondah and Uttatur; and they lagged behind the sepoys of Shaikh Hasan who bore the brunt of the fighting in these places and in the capture of the island. Presumably Chanda Sahib crossed the Coleroon alone and occupied Srirangam as soon as the English had quitted it. Cope and his men got on only equally badly with Muhammad Ali.

Muhammad Ali himself sent a letter to Dupleix which was received on August 8, in which he pretended that he was ready to leave Trichinopoly under a safe conduct, according to the terms of Salabat Jang's *cowle* and willing to visit Pondicherry and discuss the whole situation. The

32. The enemy seemed to have got possession of Koiladi about the middle of August (O S.), according to Orme. Ananda Ranga Pillai writes in his entry for September 14, that he heard from a letter of Chanda Sahib to Pondicherry that he intended to cross the Coleroon and occupy Srirangam. Apparently he first crossed the Coleroon alone without the French and possibly withdrew when the latter refused to follow him (*Diary*, Vol. VIII. Note on p. 29). Ranga Pillai heard, on September 17, that he was about to cross the Coleroon into Srirangam. According to the *Tuzak-i-Walajahi*, "Chanda Sahib broke the pot of his honour" at the Maidan of the Nawab's Tank, adjoining Uttatur and then stayed at Samayavaram for 2 months and 21 days engaging himself in taking possession of the country. Ahsanu'd-din then marched with a French army, according to the instructions of his master, Chanda Sahib, and brought under his control the temples of Srirangam and Jamghir (Jambukeswaram) and "the vapour of his breath caused by the heat of his exertions to subdue the tract of land from the Cauvery upto the back of the hill of Dhobykonda (French Rock) went as far as the sky."

Diarist also heard that he had sent emissaries to Alam Khan at Madura and offered him profitable terms in return for his assistance; he suspected greatly that Muhammad Ali was already getting suspicious of the English and could be easily persuaded into believing that they would be ready to abandon him. So when Governor Saunders wrote to Chanda Sahib, taxing him with having unjustly seized the Trichinopoly country that had been mortgaged to the English by Muhammad Ali³³, a reply was sent, under Dupleix's instructions and according to his dictation and wording, that the country had been given by Salabat Jang to him and the English had no right at all to it.

The French failed to take the fort of Vriddhachalam. It was the only fort on this side of Trichinopoly, still in possession of the English and Muhammad Ali. Not only was this set-back a source of depression to Dupleix; but the news that the Tanjore people were inclined to the side of Muhammad Ali and the English and hailed with joy the news of Ghaziu'd-din Khan, the elder brother and a new rival of Salabat Jang, recognising the title of Muhammad Ali, put him out greatly. On the last day of August (1751) news was received that Governor Saunders had despatched to Trichinopoly from Devikottai a few soldiers with provisions, shot, powder and other munitions of war; that some of Chanda Sahib's troopers and the Tanjore army attempted to attack them when they got near Trichinopoly, but that they broke through and reached the fort safely.

Dupleix resolved, according to the Diarist, to despatch 200 soldiers and officers, who had lately arrived, to Trichinopoly, on the 1st of September and asked Raza Sahib to accompany them; the latter agreed to do so and begged for two lakhs of rupees at least, with which he could pay off his sepoys and horsemen who were heavily in arrears, but had to start only with half a lakh. Soon the news of Clive's diversion to Arcot came to be known.

33. Saunders wrote to the Company that he had a mortgage bond for Trichinopoly and had the English flag there and would protest against any right be committed there (letter dated Au-

g—The Genesis of Clive's Diversion on Arcot.

As early as the middle of March, 1751, Nawab Muhammad Ali had begun to write to the English that they should help him not merely to strengthen the Trichinopoly Fort, retake Madura and settle Tinnevely, but be also mindful of the affairs at Arcot. He urged that a small expedition be sent out against Arcot also. This he wrote on the 20th April 1751, to the English Governor: "We must therefore be mindful of both these affairs and to that end I think it requisite to send a part of my army with a detachment of your troops to Madura. . . . and the other part of the army shall be commanded by my brother Abdul Vahaba Khan who in conjunction with your troops are (sic) abroad upon the expedition to Arcot, shall watch the motions of the enemy and lay at Wootatore to resist and punish them as occasion may require."³⁴

Governor Saunders in his reply of the 30th of April, informed the Nawab that he had written to the Deputy Governor of Madras—the seat of the Presidency was then Fort St. David—to send a detachment to Vellore, but that affair had already been finished. He thus confirmed the wisdom of the Nawab's idea in the following words: "It is my opinion that if you don't attack Chanda Sahib in this province, he will attack you; if his forces come into your country they will blunder and ruin it, but if yours enter his, it will be the contrary. The friendship and regard I have for you induce me plainly to tell you what I think."

Muhammad Ali began to repeat the urgency of a diversion³⁶ on the Arcot country, the nearer Chanda Sahib

34. Letter No. 59 of Muhammad Ali to Fort St. David received 20th April 1751.

35. *Vide* para 4 of the Nawab's letter received at Madras on the 26th May, 6th June. (No. 74 of Country Correspondence 1751). Again, in his letter to Saunders received on the 27th June, 8th July 1751, the Nawab reiterated his advice in the following words:—"Be pleased also to send a proper assistance and a supply of warlike necessaries. Sometime ago I desired you by several letters to send a small force from Madras to assist my amaldars to take possession of the several districts lying that way. If this had been done, the enemy might have been deprived of the revenues of the country which in all likelihood would have obliged them to decline their march this way and then our troops would have fought them to their entire defeat in that country For instance I beg leave to mention that while Mr. Hinde was Governor, I marched with my forces to Fort St. David to protect it; at that time I had an engagement with the French and defeated them."

approached Trichinopoly. In his letter to Saunders received by the latter on the 29th July|9th August, he wrote at the end in his own hand thus: "Please to raise as great a disturbance as possible in Conjeevaram etc. countries." Nawab Muhammad Ali had all along been holding the view that if troops had been despatched from Madras, they could already have taken possession of several places in the Arcot country and the enemy might have been obliged to desist from marching to Trichinopoly. At first Governor Saunders and his Council thought that this might be effected by Captain Gingsens leaving a sufficient number of men in Trichinopoly and marching with a detachment into the Arcot country.

Rightly therefore did the almost contemporary analyst of the Carnatic, Burhanu'd-din, write in his *Tuzak-i-Walajahi* thus:—"When weakness overtook the beleaguered at Natharnagar, on account of the protraction of the siege and the stubbornness of the enemy, Hazarat Aala (Muhammad Ali) devised to divide the attention of the enemy and thus to remove the weariness of his own men and to clear the roads for the coming in of provisions. Accordingly Hazarat Aala despatched Muhammad Madinah Ali Khan and Mr. Clive, the Sirdar of the English army, with sepoys who bore hatred to the enemy to subdue the town and the fort of Arcot and thus to exhibit their courage."³⁶

Governor Saunders now began to appreciate the value of the Nawab's proposal. At first he was very hesitating. He wrote to the Nawab on the 23rd August thus: "As I judge a diversion in the Arcot country may be serviceable to your affairs, I have sent a party of men with good officers to Madras to be reinforced with more; these are to raise money for you whatever is got is entirely for you; but in case of hostilities the plunder is to be half yours; the other half to the officers and men, as soldiers who venture their lives ought to be rewarded."

On this, out of a good contrivance, they ordered their troops then in Madras to march into the Poonamallee, Conjeevaram, Tripassore etc., countries.... This obliged me to send part of my troops from Fort St. David to put a stop to their proceedings. I must repeat that my amaldars in Madras are very willing to execute my orders. I hope therefore that you will give them the necessary assistance."

36. Burhanu'd-din's '*Tuzak-i-Walajahi*'—(Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar.)—Part II: pp: 89 90.

The Nawab responded to this letter by writing to his Diwan, Sampat Rao, who was at Madras to send Wali Muhammad Khan or some other officer along with the English troops and also to write to Bommarazu and other poligars for help. He then envisaged the consequential happenings in the following words:—"As soon as our troops have begun (to make) incursions in the Arcot country it will hinder the enemy from receiving the revenues which will weaken them greatly; and they cannot divide their troops; in case they march with their whole army towards Arcot, my troops shall pursue them jointly with yours and those of Mysore and Tanjore. If it happens that the enemy retreat and our troops pursue them, I shall then be able to collect money from different parts which will be a means to gain our ends. You may in no ways neglect to disturb the Arcot country and take possession of the several districts. This may probably withdraw the enemy's troops from this (Trichinopoly) country." Muhammad Ali urged his view in the following words, in a subsequent letter, in reply to Governor Saunders, after Arcot had been actually taken, but when its full significance was not well perceived by the English, and Clive actually proposed to abandon Arcot and garrison himself in Timiri:—"It is highly necessary for us to take care of this place; it has pleased you to fortify the fort at Vriddhachalam. I cannot omit writing to you that Arcot is the metropolis of the Carnatic country so that the Fort will be of better use to us than Vriddhachalam; I must repeat you will take care to make it strong by demolishing all the buildings which may be destructive to it By the blessing of God the present success will procure you a great name in the Deccan and Hindustan countries and also in Europe Please . . . to make diversions in the several districts around your place."

h—The Capture of Arcot and its Sequel.

Governor Saunders wrote to Muhammad Ali, on August 15-16, that he had resolved to leave only three or four hundred men at Trichinopoly and make a diversion on the Arcot country with the rest, and join the Nawab's forces and raise contributions, consistently with the Nawab's desire. Subsequently he wrote to the Nawab (30th September|11th October) that he had actually ordered a

diversion into the Arcot country in order to draw off the enemy from Trichinopoly. Clive embarked with 130 men from Fort St. David for Madras on August 22|September 2. He got a reinforcement of 80 men at Madras and proceeded to Arcot on August 26|September 6, with a body of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys and 8 officers and 3 field-pieces. Passing on through Conjeevaram, the force reached the neighbourhood of Arcot on August 31st|September 11; and they took possession of the Fort the next day, hoisting both the English colours and Muhammad Ali's flag.

Actually, the English capture of Arcot did not make any great impression on the country; nor did it much disturb the minds of the Pondicherry people. News of the English march to Arcot did not reach Dupleix for a week; and Polur Muhammad Ali Khan, brother of Chanda Sahib, who was the killedar at Arcot and had evacuated it after a little resistance not worth the name, was promised reinforcements from Pondicherry where the crafty Madame Dupleix gave out as her advice that it would not be advisable to recall Chanda Sahib's or the French troops from before Trichinopoly. The two sons of Bangaru Yachama Nayak of Venkatagiri whose vakils were at Pondicherry soliciting Dupleix's favour, were written to immediately to send troops to the help of Polur Muhammad Ali Khan. The latter wrote to Dupleix to say that when the English troops at Arcot marched against the neighbouring fort of Timiri, he sent a small body of men belonging to Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore and repulsed them; and that with reinforcements he could easily drive the enemy out of the Arcot killa. Murtaza Ali Khan was of the same opinion and demanded reinforcements before the enemy could strengthen himself. It was, however, Dupleix alone that immediately realised the seriousness of the event; he became greatly put out and urgently wrote to Chanda Sahib who had already despatched 1,000 horsemen, that he should write to his son, Saza Sahib, to march at once to Arcot with another body of horsemen and that Chanda Sahib himself should immediately cross the Kaveri and deliver an assault on Trichinopoly.

Nawab Muhammad Ali rightly cautioned Governor Saunders to urge Clive and Muhammad Hamid to fortify

Arcot and endeavour to get in provisions and also to send reinforcements to Arcot from Madras and Fort St. David. The English and the Nawab's troops were very deficient in cavalry; their sallies could not be effective, nor protracted, and Clive's assault on Timiri was unsuccessful (17th September). A week later, the reinforced enemy took up a stand within 3 miles of Arcot, and even then Clive could only make a feeble attack upon him. The latter seized the big pagoda of Conjeevaram; and Clive had to use great skill in conveying safely the two eighteen pounders that were sent to him from Madras. Raza Sahib finally began the famous siege of Arcot which lasted from the 4th October to the 25th November.

Even when the siege was raised after the failure of a final attack, Governor Saunders did not seem to value much the undisturbed possession of Arcot and the neighbouring forts of Timiri and Kaveripak, as in his opinion "it will only weaken our small force greatly to leave men in them." *36a

Thus it will be seen that the credit for the initiative of the idea of diversion to Arcot should go in a very large measure to Nawab Muhammad Ali whose repeated urgings opened Governor Saunders' eyes to the possibilities of success attendant on the plan, while Clive eagerly took advantage of the opening offered by it and persuaded Saunders that he could do it, when Gingens doubted his own capacity for the task.

The alleged repulse of the English before Timiri fort reported by Polur Muhammad Ali and written by the Diarist in his entry for September 18, 1751, had probably a reference to Clive's first movement against Timiri on September 15th, when the English, according to Orme (vol. I, p. 184) marched out to meet the fugitive Arcot garrison of 600 horse and 500 foot drawn up near Timiri and forced them to retreat to the hills in their rear. Dupleix urged that Raza Sahib should immediately proceed to Arcot; but the latter asked for 2 lakhs of rupees towards the charges of his 3,000 horsemen, as otherwise, they might retire from

36a. Clive had not more than a month's provisions and had to send captain Killpatrick to relieve him. But before his arrival the enemy had made two breaches and attempted to storm the fort. They were beaten off with great loss and retreated on the next day when Killpatrick and 2,000 Marathas appeared.

Volcondah to which they had advanced, to Gingee and refuse to accompany him. (Diarist's entry for the 24th of September.)

Meanwhile, Clive's troops had sallied out on Timiri (a fort situated about 7 miles south of Arcot, on the Arni road) on the 17th, but could not secure its surrender. On the night of the 25th September, when the reinforced enemy took up a stand within 3 miles of Arcot, Clive made a surprise attack and returned with some plunder. When the latter seized the great Conjeevaram pagoda, Clive sent a small body to dislodge him and convoyed safely the 2 eighteen-pounders that were sent to him from Madras and beat back the enemy who advanced to attack the fort (27th September). When Raza Sahib finally reached Arcot and took possession of the town and the palace, the famous siege began (4th October). Clive's sortie on the besiegers (5th October), the failure of a reinforcement under Lieutenant Innes to reach the besieged, the securing by Raza Sahib of battering cannon from Pondicherry and of Murtaza Ali whocame with 2,000 men, the latter's trick of pretending to quarrel with Raza Sahib and inviting Clive to join in attacking him, the decision of Murari Rao to throw in his lot with the brave besieged, Raza Sahib's offer of a proposal to Clive to surrender, the final attack of the besiegers on the 24th November, their failure and departure on the next day—most of these incidents are not noted by Ananda Ranga Pillai, the Diarist; and he only records in a matter-of-fact manner, how Raza Sahib was driven from Arni to Chetpattu by the English and the Marathas (entry for the 17th December) and how Clive marched on Conjeevaram which had meanwhile been taken by the French, reduced it and compelled the garrison to flee to Chingleput (entry for the 31st December).

I—Further Fighting at Trichinopoly

The operations round Trichinopoly dragged on their weary length towards the *debacle* of Chanda Sahib; but they were necessarily very slow. It was only about the middle of October that Chanda Sahib's troops had definitely encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly. On the 8th of November, Ananda Ranga Pillai wrote that Chanda Sahib had sent on Salabat Jang's *takid parwana* to Muhammad

Ali and was expecting news of its effect. Dupleix urged that Chanda Sahib should make every kind of effort possible, day and night, to capture the fort without delay. There were a few engagements between the English and Shaik Hasan of which the most notable was that fought in the end of December and as a consequence Chanda Sahib and the French were forced to abandon the battery which they had occupied.³⁷

Meanwhile, the troops of Raza Sahib which had to flee to Chettupattu, plundered, in February, the region of Poonamallee, Mylapore, the Great (St. Thomas') and Little Mounts, Saidapet and Kunnattur which were all of them large and prosperous villages. The Indian merchants of Madras were reported to have run for shelter with their goods to Sadras and Pulicat; and the Diarist regretted that they did not go to Covelong which was in French occupation. "Raza Sahib made a rally at Chettupattu after his defeat at Arni, and later at Covelong, with a design to attack San Thome; but he was not in a condition to do it (Despatch of Fort St. David to the Company, dated January 25, 1752). From a subsequent despatch of Thomas Saunders, dated February 15, 1752, we learn that Raza Sahib plundered and burnt some villages near Poonamallee and carried off to Pondicherry the furniture of the houses at St. Thomas Mount and Marmalong (Mambalam-Saidapet). The Pondicherry Council repudiated

37 M. d'Auteuil had been succeeded by Law, the nephew of the famous financier, who was obstinate, if anything, and resolved against Dupleix's advice that the city should be reduced not by storm, but by sap and mine. The English thought at first that Chanda Sahib would merely blockade the place and not even besiege it (Saunders' letter to the Company of September 30 | October 11). The French established themselves at Sarkarpalayam (Chuklepalayam of Orme) on the south bank of the Kaveri about 1½ miles north-east of the city, and their principal battery was raised a little to the south of the north-east angle of the fort. They also mounted guns on the French Rock and in the Srirangam Island and on the rock of Erumbesvaram.

(For a plan of the dispositions and operations see Hemingway's *Trichinopoly District Gazetteer*—map between pp. 330 and 331; Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, Vol. I. map facing p. 60 and Orme, vol. III. (ed. of 1862), Maps and Plans: and Martineau's *Dupleix*, vol. III, the map facing p. 206). The first fight took place when the French surprised the English entrenchments opposite the French Rock. Their guns were not effective and Law would not change their position. When a party of Mysore horsemen arrived about the middle of October, they accompanied a body of English troops under Dalton who put a large part of Chanda Sahib's cavalry to flight. There were a few other engagements in December in which Chanda Sahib's cavalry fared badly. The incident of the ambush is probably that narrated by Orme in pp. 204-5 of his first volume (1862 ed.).

the English claim to these places; and the latter were unable to check these ravages for want of cavalry and their force at Madras was insufficient to defend even the Black Town (George Town) and the Pettahs; and Muhammad Ali had not sent the detachment of cavalry for which he had been so often pressed.³⁸

The operations round Trichinopoly, Clive's victory at Kaveripak, the arrival of Major Stringer Lawrence from England and his assumption of the command of the English forces, Chanda Sahib's retreat into Srirangam, the English blockade of that Island, the retreat of d'Auteuil to Uttatur, and Clive's march on that place—had all taken place before April 1752. The English, along with the Mysoreans and the troops of Muhammad Ali, planned an attack on d'Auteuil at Uttatur whereupon the latter retired to Valikandapuram. Law, Chanda Sahib and the troops who were all subjected to the blockade in Srirangam were suffering much from want of food and money. The sepoys and troopers had not received any pay at all for the last three months. Many of them deserted to the English side. The latter had occupied Koiladi at the eastern end of the island of Srirangam.

Lawrence had landed at Fort St. David in the middle of March and thence proceeded to Trichinopoly with a small body of men, whom Clive had just brought from Arcot through the Tanjore country. About the middle of April Lawrence had advanced to within 10 miles of Trichinopoly. At Erumbeswaram there was a severe fight in which Chanda Sahib's cavalry kept its ground for some time and sustained the cannonade, "with much more firmness than had ever been observed in the troops of India" till it became demoralised by the death of the commander, Alam Khan and retreated.³⁹ Lawrence reached Trichi-

38. Madras Council's Consultation, dated February 3, 1752—pp. 1-2 of Records of Fort St. George, Diary and Consultation Book of 1752).

39 "The success on this day might have been much greater had the confederate troops acted together in union instead of remaining at a distance as idle spectators; nor could they be prevailed upon to make a single charge, even when the enemy's cavalry retreated. This inaction proceeded not from want of bravery, but from the treachery of Murari Rao, who being at this time in treaty with Chanda Sahib, was unwilling to bring his Mahrattas into action and the opinion entertained of their courage was such that the rest of the allies would not venture to fight without them."

(Burhanu'd-din's 'Tuzak-i-Walajahi' Part II—Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, p. 107).

nopoly on the evening of the 30th March and conferred the next day with the Nawab and other generals as to the plan of operations. Chanda Sahib felt desperate on account of the death of Alam Khan. He thought it imprudent to continue in camp near Trichinopoly and took shelter in the temple of Srirangam, while his companions stayed on in the temple of Jambukeswaram.

To go back upon our narrative, Law, the French commander, fell into a state of indecision and became afraid of being beaten. He insisted upon retreating into the island of Srirangam, so that he might have the Kaveri between himself and the enemy. Clive proposed that Lawrence should be in charge of a part of the army south of the Kaveri, while he himself should take a post north of the Coleroon. On the 15th April 1752, Clive set out with a body of 400 Europeans, 3000 horse and 1200 sepoys and established himself at Samayavaram. He captured from the French the fort of Lalgudi which contained a large quantity of grain and the loss of which seriously affected the position of M. Law. But Clive was in danger of an attack by M. Law from Srirangam and by the force coming from Pondicherry under d'Auteuil. Lawrence did not send him additional reinforcements across the river; but Clive heard that the French party was conveying 7 lakhs of rupees and had reached Uttatur. He made a sudden march on the night of April 26; but as the French had withdrawn, having heard of his coming, he returned hot-foot to Samayavaram, lest M. Law should attack and occupy it in his absence. While Clive was supposed to be absent from his camp, M. Law arranged to surprise it.⁴⁰

40. He however made the attempt with very small party of about 80 Europeans, half of whom were English deserters. They reached Samayavaram after Clive approached the pettah and pretended that they had been sent by Lawrence to reinforce Clive. Having thus deceived the sentinels, they continued their march through a part of the Mahratta camp and were only challenged near a choultry to the north of the pagoda. In this choultry Clive lay asleep. The enemy put a volley of fire in each place and immediately entered the pagoda. Clive started out of his sleep, and ran to the upper pagoda where the greater number of his Europeans were quartered. He ordered them to arm themselves, returned to the choultry and found the sepoys firing at random. He mistook the enemy troops for his own, ordered them to cease firing and went alone amongst them. When he was discovered, he told the French soldiers with great presence of mind that he had come to make terms with them and if any resistance was made, they would be put to the sword by his whole army which surrounded the pagoda. This made such an impression that Clive secured easily the submission of the French. He however took the precaution to storm the pagoda, because he suspected that the enemy must have been hiding there in large numbers.

After this triumph at Samayavaram which was followed by the complete destruction of the forces of Hasan-uddin, the enemy troops fled in confusion towards Srirangam following the way of their leader, Law. Muhammad Ab-rar Khan was the principal hero among the Indian fighters in this struggle.

Soon after the incident at Samayavaram, Clive urged Lawrence to move his troops into the island of Sri-rangam, so that he could come to his assistance, should M. Law cross the Coleroon. But Lawrence refused to leave his position, saying that M. Law would cross the Kaveri from the island and escape unchecked to Karikal. He however detached a party under Dalton to attack D'Auteuil who had retreated to Uttatur. Dalton encountered the French near Uttatur and attacked them with such vigour that the latter abandoned the fort. Dalton took immediate possession of it. Lawrence then recalled Dalton; but as the Coleroon was in floods, Dalton left his troops under the command of Clive for the siege of Bikshandarkoil which was then the only post held by the French on the northern bank of the Coleroon. Clive took Bikshandarkoil on May 20th; and for this service, Muhammad Ali bestowed on him the title of Zabit Jang Bahadur. Bikshandarkoil was a fortified pagoda on the northern bank of the Coleroon, a little to the east of Srirangam. After it was captured, Clive left a strong garrison and set out on the 27th of May to meet d'Auteuil's force. He also took precautions to conceal his plan from M. Law. Clive hid himself for some time within the fort of Uttatur, hoping that d'Auteuil would come unsuspectingly near that place. D'Auteuil marched from Volkondah and reached as far as the 7th mile from Uttatur. But on account of some rumour or suspicion, he returned in great haste to Volkondah. Clive set out in pursuit of him and ordered the Mahrattas to harass him: but d'Auteuil retreated, forming his men in a column and with two field-pieces in

The next morning, 27th April, Clive himself narrowly escaped the shot aimed at him by an officer, one of the English deserters in the ranks of the enemy. The ball missed Clive by a little margin but went through the bodies of the sergeants on whom he was leaning, and they were mortally wounded. The enemy contrived to escape from the camp as easily as they had entered it, but they were pursued by Yunus Khan and the Mahratta troops who fired and injured many of them. The escape of Clive from being shot in the early morning is held to be unbelievable. See Orme, Vol. I, pp. 222-6; Sir John Malcolm: *Life of Clive*, Vol. I, p. 116 and Hill's *Orme Collection*, India Office, p. 273.

front. When he drew up his forces between the mud wall of the pettah and the River Vellar, he was attacked by a large body of English sepoys and the Mahrattas. D'Auteuil retired into the *pettah*, but its governor who had been won over to the English side, shut up the gates. In spite of this, the French contrived to get into the fort in an unguarded part, when the governor threatened to fire. In these circumstances d'Auteuil agreed to surrender with his force of 100 Europeans, 400 sepoys and 340 horse. The treasure was mostly hidden away and only a small part of it was taken possession of by the English.

After the victory at Valikandapuram and Ranjan-gudi, d'Auteuil and other prisoners were sent over to Trichinopoly at the request of the Nawab. Clive's capture of Bikshandarkoil and the taking of Koiladi by Lawrence shut Law completely within the island. Curiously enough he made no attempt to cross the Kaveri on the south and to prevent Clive and Dalton coming to the rescue; but he distrusted Chanda Sahib's troops and also seemed to have lost all energy and will. Many of Chanda Sahib's sepoys deserted him, after d'Auteuil's surrender of Volkondah. Thus M. Law was brought to the last stage of desperation. He offered to give up half his heavy guns and to march off to Pondicherry; but Muhammad Ali insisted that he must surrender at discretion. On June 13, M. Law obtained an interview with Lawrence who promised to release the officers with their arms and baggage on parole; the next morning an English detachment marched into the pagoda and the French laid down their arms. The surrender of M. Law was of great importance.

J—The End of Chanda Sahib.

The following is the account of the end of Chanda Sahib as known in Pondicherry. When Chanda Sahib, Shaikh Hasan, Law and others were surrounded in the Strangam temple, Chanda Sahib offered in despair to pay a certain sum of money to Manoji Appa, the general of Tanjore and to Murari Rao, on condition that he was to be escorted in safety beyond Tanjore and sent to Karikal, disguised as a fakir. But when he was being escorted by Murari Rao, Muhammad Ali's people found him out and

declared that they would take him to the fort of Trichinopoly; Murari Rao and the Tanjore folk protested that they had given a safe conduct to Chanda Sahib and carried him off in haste. Later he was detained at the Dalavay Mantapam and sent on to Manoji Appa's tent. When Chanda Sahib was saying his prayers in Manoji's camp, his head was cut off. Dupleix found fault with Law for giving up Chanda Sahib to Manoji without insisting on getting a Maratha noble as hostage and being merely satisfied with an oath taken by the Tanjore general by proxy.

Chanda Sahib remained two nights and three days in the camp of Manoji, to whom Nawab Muhammad Ali sent a demand for the person of the prisoner in return for a grant of the jaghir of Kolladi to the general and a reduction of the annual *peshkash* due from Tanjore. Manoji was greatly worried, because both Karachuri Nandaraj, the Mysore Dalavay and Murari Rao claimed the right of possession. On Wednesday the 1st of Shaban 1165 A.H. according to Burhan'd-din, *i.e.*, 3rd June (O.S.) 1752 at noon, Chanda Sahib was killed in his tent by one Ashur Beg and another, a Rajput, by order of Manoji. The head was taken to the presence of Nawab Muhammad Ali and was hung at the gate of the fort. It was later taken to the Mysore Dalavay and Murari Rao. The body was buried in the *dargha* of Hazrat Nathar Wali. When the head was brought back after some time of wandering and the grave and coffin were opened, they could not find the body and therefore buried the head without it.⁴¹

41. *Opinions on the End of Chanda Sahib.*

Wilks wrote that Law was "justified by the fairest considerations of the natural interests committed to his charge, in recommending Chanda Sahib to incur any risk, rather than surrender to the English; and he unhappily trusted to the desperate faith of a Mahratta." According to Orme, Chanda Sahib knew that the Tanjore general Manoji was at open variance with his prime minister and might be inclined to safeguard him, following only his personal interests, and he followed the overture with so much interest and seeming compliance, that both Law and Chanda Sahib thought that they had gained him over to their interest. When Law demanded a hostage, the Tanjorean answered that a hostage would be no real check on intended treachery, and that, by giving one, the secret would be divulged and the escape, rendered impracticable; and he promised, under an oath taken on his sabre and poniard, that he would send away Chanda Sahib with an escort of horse to Karikal. As soon as the victim entered his quarters, Manoji had him imprisoned in a tent and put in irons. The next morning (1st June O.S.) there was a conference in Major Lawrence's tent between the Major, Muhammad Ali, Manoji and the Mysore general, when the proposal that the English should have the custody of the prisoner was

The Nawab sent a nazzar of 1,121 *ashrafis* to the Emperor Ahmad Shah and a congratulatory letter to Nawab Ghaziud'din Khan Bahadur.

violently opposed by the other three parties. To Manoji the Mysorean promised money, the Nawab threatened resentment and Murari Rao held out the fear of an attack; and he saw no method of saving the situation except by putting an end to the life of his prisoner. On the morning when Law surrendered at Srirangam, he had a conference with Lawrence that convinced him that the English were resolved not to interfere and father in the dispute. The executioner was a Pathan, one of the Tanjore general's retinue. (Vol. I. pp. 236-42, 4th ed.).

Burhan-ud-din's *Tuzak-i-Walajahi*, written in the interests of Muhammad Ali, naturally gloats over the fate of Chanda Sahib, as being the visible manifestation of divine vengeance that he was treacherously murdered in the same choultry, the Dalavay Mantapam, in which, 16 years before, he had profaned the holy Quran by a false and treacherous oath of protection that he gave to the distressed Rani Minakshi. Wilks says that his death was looked upon in this light by all Mussalman writers; but he had a manuscript which stated that Chanda Sahib was murdered "at the instigation of Muhammad Ali." He however believes that the Maratha general, Manoji, would not have thus disposed of his prisoner and incurred the disgrace of open perfidy, had it not been for his fear of getting involved in further disputes. He thinks that, in the mock conference held before Major Lawrence, the native chiefs were secretly agreed and that the Major was to be deterred from interfering by showing that he would thereby incur the resentment of all the confederates. ((Vol. I, p. 177).

Malleson is of the opinion that "it is clear from Orme's version that Lawrence had it in his power to have saved Chanda Sahib and connived at the death of the unfortunate man." (History of French in India, p. 328, note).

Wilson only justifies the conduct of Lawrence by maintaining that the English were at that time not so well assured of their power as to pretend to dictate to the native princes. (Note on page 87 of Mill's *History of British India* (Vol. III)—1858).

Venkasami Rao says that Manoji, the famous general of Raja Pratap Singh, who undertook a successful expedition against the Maravas, shortly afterwards made himself "infamous by faithlessly and inhumanly disposing of Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoly." Pratap Singh's chief minister, Sakhoji, was a great enemy of Manoji. (*The Tanjore Manual*, pp. 733 and 789).

The Madras Council Consultation of Monday, the 15th June, 1752, merely records a letter from Major Lawrence "advising that the Allies not agreeing who should have Chanda, to prevent disputes, his head was cut off and carried into Trichinopoly; that Shaik Hasan is a prisoner in Syringham to whom he had promised protection."

Dodwell points out (in note 3, p. 66 of his *Dupleix and Clive*) that, according to Saunders' letter to Dupleix of August 22, 1752, Lawrence seems to deny that any conference was held; he adds that he does not attach much value to this, as he expressly says the opposite in his arrative (Cambridge, p. 28).

"The successful result of these operations was," says Malcolm, "the capture and death of Chanda Sahib and the surrender of the French troops. Chunda Sahib's fate was unhappy. When M. Law, reduced to distress in the pagoda of Seringham, told him he could no longer afford him protection. Chunda Sahib listened to a deceitful offer of Monackjee, the general of the Tanjore forces, who, instead of that kindness with which he had sworn to treat him, placed him in confinement, and hastened to inform those

with whom he was co-operating (the English, the Nabob Mahomedally, the Mysoreans, and the Mahrattas) of the noble prize he had decoyed into his toils; but Monackjee, instead of that applause and profit he anticipated from his treachery, soon found that, while all resolved he should not retain his prisoner, each party was desirous of having him under their own charge. On seeing that they were on the point of quarrelling with his prince, and amongst each other, for the possession of Chunda Saheb's person, he determined, with a cruelty equal to his perfidy, to put that chief to death. The purpose was no sooner formed than executed; and the head of Chunda Saheb was sent to his rival and enemy, Mahomedally."

Again, we have this:—"However, repulsive this conduct may seem, it must be remembered that the actors in it were ignorant heathens; and the conduct of Muhammad Ali was much more excusable than that of His Most Christian Majesty Charles the Second, who ordered the body of his enemy cromwell, to be disinterred, and hung in chains, besides heaping every possible indignity on the Corpses and his other enemies." (p. 144 of *Memoirs of Captain Dalton, Defender of Trichinopoly 1752-53*).

PART II

VIGNETTES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE
WALAJAHI DYNASTY OF THE CARNATIC.

THE RULE OF NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI

WALAJAHI—1749—95.

I.—The Nawab's Early Difficulties.

a—*Military Operations* 1752—54.

In July 1752, Nawab Muhammad Ali fell out with the Mysoreans¹. Major Lawrence and Clive both reported about the dispute that had arisen between Muhammad Ali and the Mysoreans, as the former would not give up Trichinopoly and its dependencies to the latter as the price of their help. The Mysoreans and the Marathas refused to march out from camp, and the Nawab could not join Lawrence in the proposed expedition to reduce Gingee, Chettupattu, Chingleput and Vellore. The Madras Council resolved, on the 29th June, O.S., that the English should not commit themselves to any precipitate action in the dispute which was “an affair of the utmost consequence,” but should request the Dalavai to send his wakil to Madras for negotiating for a settlement. Captain Dalton reported subsequently that Srirangam was, by agreement, delivered to the Mysoreans who were outwardly reconciled to the Nawab and that Murari Rao was not definitely on the English side, as he had a wakil at Pondicherry and frequently received letters from thence, and one of his captains had privately offered to desert to the English side, the moment his master joined the French. Dalton wrote later that Murari Rao was only designing to protract the war and to draw large sums from the Nawab as well as from the Mysoreans who suspected that the Nawab and the Maratha were both endeavouring to ruin them; and Murari Rao even threatened to join the Mysore general and to send a letter to Dupleix, promising to abide by any agreement that he should make with him (Consultation Minutes of 13th July). Dalton later on discovered a plot of the Mysoreans to get possession of the Trichinopoly fort by arming the French prisoners and even getting rid of him (Consultation Minutes of June 20th O.S.).

(1) They claimed that Muhammad Ali had agreed to cede the fort and country of Trichinopoly to them, as soon as Chanda Sahib should be finished.

On the 6th of April 1752, the seat of the Government of the Presidency was transferred to Madras. The most absorbing feature of the Madras administration was naturally the eventful struggle going on round Trichinopoly. For some time Muhammad Ali had naturally to humour the Mysoreans. Dupleix was fully alive to the critical situation that arose out of the surrender of Law and the death of Chanda Sahib. Even before these calamities occurred, he had written to Saunders stating that he had been authorised by Salabat Jang to settle the affairs of the Carnatic by giving Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali. Saunders waited for a day and wrote, after Chanda Sahib was dead, that "Indeed, as Chanda Sahib is dead, I can see no reason why it may not be easily accomplished." But now Dupleix demanded the release of all political prisoners, "as a preliminary to discussing terms," and Saunders declined; and hence the negotiations broke down. Dupleix was stiffened by the knowledge that he was to receive reinforcements from Europe.²

Burhanu'd-din writes that Dupleix wrote an *arzdasht*, saying that if Nawab Muhammad Ali should grant the jaghir of Gingee to the French as it had already been bestowed on them by the Nizam, he would hand over other jaghirs to the Sarkar and be peaceful. Nawab Muhammad

(2) (Dodwell: p. 69; and Madras Consultation of August, 17, 1752.) The *Centaur* landed troops and chests of silver; and 300 soldiers were expected—Diarist's entries for July 13th and 14th, pp. 138 and 141 of the *Diary*, Vol. VIII).

(3) (1) Riza Ali Khan under Dupleix's protection is lying in wait with the claim of authority over the Carnatic.

(2) We have friendly relations with Nawab Asafu'd-Dawla Ghaziu'd-Din Khan Bahadur and our acceptance of the request of the French would create a suspicion that we are in league with Salabat Jang. This will cause 'disturbance in the building of confidence.'

(3) It will become evident that we are going against the command of the Sultan enjoining on us to expel the French.

(4) The covenant of M. Dupleix cannot be relied upon, for on a former occasion he wrote a peace treaty seeking reconciliation, but, later, he joined with Hidayat Muhiyyu'd-Din Khan and broke the promise.

(5) He claims equality with the English who are our old friends. He also hopes to get the grant of the jaghir of the taluk of Chenji, just like the grant of jaghirs to the English. But my father had enjoined on me to help the English, to promote their interest and to exterminate the French. In these circumstances how could the requests

Ali deemed that this would involve several difficult issues³ and replied that he could not consent to such conditions.^{3a}

Early in August rumours reached Pondicherry of a difference between Muhammad Ali and the English about his refusal to give Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans and his demand for moneys which the English were reluctant to advance further. A Madras Consultation of 10th August 1752 contained a resolution of the Council not to give the Mysoreans and Marathas any hopes of English assistance; but a previous consultation had resolved that "we shall rather persuade him to it than object . . . to prevent the Mysore King's being disgusted, it be hinted to him that when the Nabob is once settled in the Province, if he can be prevailed upon . . . we shall have no objection."

Muhammad Ali left Trichinopoly in charge of his brother-in-law, Khayru'd-Din Khan, and some English troops under Dalton, and started secretly to join Lawrence. When Lawrence proceeded to Madras, Major Kinneer who wanted to emulate the feats of Clive, resolved to besiege Gingee with the approval of Saunders, but against the advice of Lawrence. Kinneer started with about 200 Europeans and some sepoys, found the assault impossible, suffered severe loss at the hands of a body of French troops under Kerjean who had been despatched by Dupleix, and retreated in haste. This defeat of the English at Vikravandi and the Nawab's flight to Tiruvannamalai roused the spirit of M. Dupleix. Lawrence wanted to redeem this misfortune; but Nawab Muhammad Ali was in a very bad situation. The sepoys were troubling him for their pay, the English would not advance him sufficient money, and the Mysore agent, Birkv Venka Rao, vigorously pressed him for the cession of Trichinopoly to his master.

of the wicked people be accepted? how could wisdom and intelligence be lost relying on his duplicity?"

(Taken from Burhan's "*Tuzak-i-Walajahi*, Part II—pp. 131-132 Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar).

- (3a) According to Ranga Pillai, Muhammad Ali was informed by Mr. Starke, the new Governor of Fort St. David, that strict orders had come from Europe not to interfere with the French and that he could do nothing for the Nawab who should write to Saunders at Madras. The Madras Council minutes of August 17, 1752, inform us that "the President acquaints the Board that the Nawab, by his vakil, had made overtures of peace to Dupleix who refused to hearken to any terms until the French prisoners are delivered up,"

In addition to all these there was a misunderstanding between the Nawab and his junior brother. In August, two nobles of Muhammad Ali came to Pondicherry (with the consent of the English) to negotiate with M. Dupleix, under his *cowle* of security and shown round its fortifications. But M. Dupleix refused to talk of peace until the French prisoners were released. Then Lawrence marched against the French on August 28; but they retired to Pondicherry and contented themselves with guarding their forts at Valudavur and Gingee. He then fell back on Bahur. Kerjean, the French commander, followed him. When he came very close to the English on the morning of September 6th, Lawrence fell upon the French camp and captured the commander. Muhammad Ali was elated by this victory which reduced the French to military inactivity for the next six months. But he wrote another letter to M. Dupleix in smooth words, requesting his friendship. M. Dupleix replied pressing his original demand for the release of the prisoners. But Muhammad Ali would not consent. Only Kerjean who was badly wounded was allowed to return to Pondicherry.

Muhammad Ali would not at all release the prisoners, nor even return the palanquins and *dhoolies* sent to fetch them, but continued to protest through his messengers his readiness to be friends with Dupleix.

All that Dupleix could do now was to make a great show of the *parwana* from the Emperor that was alleged to have been sent to him. According to Ananda Ranga Pillai, who gives a translation of the *parwana*, Dupleix was addressed therein as the Captain and Governor-General Bahadur Zafar Jang and exhorted to continue "to regard Salabat Jang as a friend dear as your own life and afford him all the help of which you are capable"⁴

(4) A Madras Council Consultation (Tuesday, 19th Sept. 1752) mentions a letter from Dupleix, enclosing a copy of the alleged 'Padshah's *farman*' approving of whatever he had done in favour of Salabat Jang and directing him to continue his assistance. Dupleix further offered to allow the English to compare the copy with the original. The Council resolved that they were of the opinion that the *farman* was spurious, "because the advices they lately received from Bombay and other parts are so contrary," and also because "it is extremely different from the form and stile in which papers of this kind are usually worded."

When Muhammad Ali was encamped at Villupuram, he received a letter from Nawab Salabat Jang in which he was congratulated for his continuous success, for the death of Chanda Sahib and for the dispersion of the "family of Nawayat who claimed the Nizamat". He was also held to have put Dupleix to shame in all his fights and to have done a great service to Nawab Asafu'd-Daula Bahadur. All the while Dupleix could do nothing from the military point of view, though he sent out Europeans and sepoys as well as cannon and ammunition to the French troops which escaped to Ariyankuppam from the enemy. He was eagerly expecting reinforcements from the Isle of France in order that he might begin operations again.

Muhammad Ali now arranged that Clive should proceed with his own general, Mir Mansur Ali Khan, to subdue the places still in possession of the enemy on the coast. After hard fighting for three days the French garrison at Covelong, (which had opened fire upon the troops of Clive and forced them to flee beyond the backwater, where they stood in fear of an attack from the French garrison at Chingleput) had to deliver up the fort to the English, while Saint Germain who advanced from Chingleput, not knowing that the fort had meanwhile surrendered to the English, was attacked and forced to flee.⁵

Clive's next achievement was the capture of Chingleput which was then held to be a very strong fort. His advance on that fort, his raising a battery and sending for mortars from Covelong to fire shells into the fort, which, according to Ananda Ranga Pillai, had sufficient provisions, powder and shot for a whole year, and the subsequent surrender of St. Germain, its commandant, constituted a most remarkable achievement. The historian Orme who was at Madras at that time and who had already

(5) On their first attack on Covelong (Sadat Bandar) the English troops were repulsed and fled precipitately from a garden near the fort. They had to be brought back by Clive who was advancing with the rest of his force and who "obliged them, not without difficulty and even with violence, to rally and return with him to the garden. This fort had been built by Nawab Anwaru'd-din Khan near the ruins of another fort that belonged to the Ostend Company; and the French had got possession of it in the beginning of 1750 by a stratagem.

Ranga Pillai quoted a letter from one, Krishna Pillai of Covelong, regarding the first flight of the English troops and the final surrender of M. Le Blanc and his bullying and extortion (entry for Sep. 20, 1752).

begun to gather material for his great work, received from Clive a personal account of the operations round Covelong and Chingleput, which the historian in his usual manner "extended, embellished and incorporated in his work." The original letter of Clive found among the *Orme Manuscripts* in the India Office and printed by Sir George Forrest in his 'Life of Lord Clive', (Vol. I, pp. 214-15) is comparatively modest and terse and does not do him full justice according to Forrest⁶.

Muhammad Ali planned to march to Arcot after making another attempt on Gingee and now demanded from Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash obedience and the payment of *peshkash*. Dupleix revived his negotiations with the Mysore *Dalavay* and with Murari Rao. The conditions were that they should march together with their army and attack and slay Muhammad Ali; Murari Rao was to receive two lakhs of rupees and an equal sum when Muhammad Ali should have been disposed of. The Mysoreans were to receive Trichinopoly, in return for which they were to pay 30 lakhs of rupees. The French intrigues with these two had been going on for some time and were known to the English side.⁷ The immediate consequence

- (6) "As in his former campaigns, he had been foremost in the charge and fought in the thickest press. He had at Covelong converted disaster into victory by the hardihood with which he rallied his broken troops, and with 'even violence' compelled the cowards to return to the fight." (Forrest: 'The Life of Lord Clive', Vol. I, pp. 215-16).

Burhanu'd-din thus says: "Mir Mansur Ali Khan and Clive exerted themselves in the work appointed to them and by the grace of the One Great Opener they opened, that is, they brought under the control of the Nawab, one after another Sa'adatbandar, Chingleput and other places which had been under the authority of the French and their allies. The good endeavours of Mir Madina Ali Khan, the *na'ib* of the suba of Arcot, brightened the mirror of administration with the polish of success and subjugation of all the districts and places, and the collection of *peshkash*." (Vol. II, page 138).

Ananda Ranga Pillai says that Dupleix by letter ordered the garrison at Chingleput to surrender the fort to the English as there were only Carnatic sepoys who could not continue to resist for long. See also Fort St. George Letter to the Directors dated 3rd November, 1752, para 3, (in Forrest's *Bengal and Madras Papers*, Vol. II (1688-1757)).

- (7) The letter of Captain Dalton from Trichinopoly, recorded in the Council Consultation of 17th August, shows that he had a suspicion that the ruler of Mysore was carrying on a secret negotiation with Dupleix. A later letter of Dalton's, quoted in the Council Consultation minutes of 24th August 1752, informs that the behaviour of the Mysore general and Murari Rao was so inconsistent and various, that it was evidently calculated to conceal their real intentions.

was that Murari Rao replied that he had given orders to the commander of the Maratha troops with Muhammad Ali Khan not to allow his horsemen to plunder the villages of Pondicherry, but to help the French people. Muhammad Ali broke up his camp near Wandiwash and marched back to Tiruvati, because, the Diarist wrote, the Mysoreans, Murari Rao and the Maravar were surrounding Trichinopoly in the hope of taking it.^{7a}

In October 1752, since Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash continued to be recalcitrant, his fort was attacked by Major Lawrence and the Nawab's troops and could have been easily reduced; but as the Nawab was badly in need of money, he accepted the offer of Taqi Sahib to pay a ransom. A small accident produced brisk firing for some time between the English and the garrison in the fort. But the mistake was explained, the troops were recalled, and Taqi Sahib paid down three lakhs of rupees the same day. Major Lawrence returned from Wandiwash to Tiruvati about the 10th of November; but the troops could not be cantoned there on account of the heavy monsoon, and had to retire from that place to Fort St. David. Nawab Muhammad Ali resided for some time at Tiruvati whose climate he found agreeable. Taqi Sahib delayed in paying the covenanted sum, though he was excused and permitted to continue in his jaghir. The Nawab was anxious that Chettupattu should also be reduced; but though it was reported to be weakly held, Lawrence declined to attack it and returned to Tiruvati.

One important by-path of developments that affected the fortunes of the Carnatic was the march of Ghaziu'd-din, Khan, the eldest son of Nizamu'l-Mulk, to Aurangabad and even some distance to the south of it in November. The situation of Salabat Jang was fairly critical and Bussy's anxiety was very great. According to Ranga Pillai, we learn that when Ghaziu'd-din had advanced 35 kos on this side of the Narmada, Sayyad Lashkar Khan was sent to Poona to treat with the Peshwa; Bussy was appointed to the charge of the killa at Hyderabad and urgent requisitions were sent to Pondicherry for soldiers, powder

(7a) Ranga Pillai sententiously remarks that the Nawab's recent successes, were but "the last flicker of the candle; and he must "suffer for his treachery even as Chanda Sahib did" (Entry for October 10, 1752).

and shot. On the eve of the poisoning of Ghaziu'd-din, Bussy regarded his situation as all but desperate.^{7b} News was received at Pondicherry on the 10th of November that Ghaziu'd-din Khan had been poisoned by his own cooks. Dupleix was overjoyed at this, but wanted to make sure of the fact from letters from Bussy and persons in the camp of Salabat Jang.

According to Kasi Das Bukkanji's *gomastahs* who sent word to Cuddalore, we learn that when Salabat Jang heard of the death of his brother, he wrote to Muhammad Ali, confirming him in the subah of Arcot and promised him a parwana of confirmation and other honours and also gave him the title of Anwaru'd-din Khan Bahadur.⁸

Rumours of all sorts of plans on the part of the Peshwa were rife at Pondicherry. It was also said that Balaji Rao, the Peshwa, insisted that Ghaziu'd-din Khan had granted him the Carnatic and desired that Salabat Jang should

(7b) Dodwell quoting from Hamont and the *Memoire* of Bussy.

(8) Ghaziu'd-din reached Burhanpur towards the end of August 1752, accompanied by Mulhar Rao Holkar and a few Maratha sardars. He received the support of the bulk of the Mughal nobility at Burhanpur and Aurangabad and met the Peshwa at the latter place. He then marched from Aurangabad and Salabat Jang proceeded some distance from Hyderabad towards Bidar.

According to Burhanu'd-din, Salabat Jang sent his own mother to Aurangabad where she was kindly received by her step-son, Ghaziu'd-din Khan. One day, she offered to prepare, with her own hands, a salad of cucumber pickled in curds, for him and brought to him the salad mixed with poison, which he took in unhesitatingly. The date of his death was the 16th October 1752. Kasi Das Bukkanji's *gomastahs* sent word to Cuddalore that he fell sick on tasting the food and died on the third day. Kincaid and Parasnis say, in their *History of the Maratha People* (Vol. III. p. 16), that it was the mother of Nizam Ali that poisoned Ghaziu'd-din who died on the 16th October. He was "an extremely reserved and godly man who spent his days in the company of theologians and his nights in vigil." He was the father of the notorious Inad-ul-Mulk.

When Salabat Jang had to fight with the Peshwa after the death of Ghaziu'd-din, we learn of the victory secured by the Peshwa from a letter of Visvas Rao Ballal dated 8-12-1752 (*Selections from the Peshwa Daftar*, No. 20 'The *Bhonsles of Nagpur 1717-1774*', Nos. 148 *et seq.*). The Peshwa himself informed Nawab Muhammad Ali in a letter received by the latter in January 1753 of his victory, of the starvation of the enemy camp and of the conclusion of peace through Bussy's mediation. Ranga Pillai reports that there were two battles between the Peshwa and Salabat Jang. Balaji Rao's letter to Nawab Muhammad Ali (received on 5th January, 1753) says that one of the terms of his victory at Bhalki was that both parties were to march jointly to take possession of the Carnatic and dispose of it as they should think fit (Records of Fort St. George—Country Correspondence of 1753—Military Department—No. 2).

confirm the grant, proposing that he himself would be proceeding to settle it and that his younger brother, Raghunath Rao, and his cousin, Sadasiva Rao, were at Bidar with 30,000 horse on their way to the Carnatic. The Peshwa was also said to have written a letter to Pratap Singh of Tanjore that he had acted wrongly in joining Muhammad Ali Khan and destroying Chanda Sahib and he should now make peace with Dupleix and try to "take off the head of Muhammad Ali Khan, the causer of the disturbances." The months of January and February 1753, were full of rumours of the expected advance of the Peshwa to the Carnatic; it was feared by Dupleix that he might possibly intend to help the English and Muhammad Ali.

The French came to an agreement with Murari Rao in 1752 by which Dupleix agreed to pay him a very large sum every month. Dupleix asked Murari Rao to attack Mutabir Khan, the killedar of Ranjangudi who had betrayed the French, giving him the promise of fifty per cent of the booty that might be got out of the engagement. Murari Rao reached Pondicherry by the middle of January 1753, with a body of 4,000 men and thence marched together with 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoy, to attack Tiruvati where Lawrence and the Nawab had encamped. The French and Murari Rao assailed Muhammad Ali's army, and besieged the small party left in Tiruvati fort. Lawrence had to retreat with 100 slain. This skirmish of 20th of January was, according to Martineau (*Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, Vol. III, p. 317), neither a victory nor a defeat for either party.

Dupleix was also planning in the summer of 1753, to get from Salabat Jang a lease of the Carnatic at the rate paid to the Nizam in Nawab Sadatullah's time; i.e., at 12 lakhs, besides 2 lakhs for darbar expenses, 3 lakhs for the Marathas and separate *peshkash* amounts for Trichinopoly and Tanjore.^{8a} He had pressed Bussy to go to Hyderabad when it was rumoured that Salabat Jang would grant a *sanad* to Muhammad Ali (Ranga Pallai's entry for June 21, 1753). The anti-French Sayyid Lashkar Khan entered into a vigorous correspondence with Governor Saunders; and a letter from him received at Madras on 10th July 1753, tells us that the Nizam was

(8a) Anwaru'd-din had paid the Nizam 35 lakhs of rupees.

determined to settle the affair of the Carnatic and to "extirpate the enemy"; "a scheme was on foot whereby they will meet their deserts"; and "in regard to the President's hint concerning assistance to be given to the lawful person (Muhammad Ali), Salabat Jang has the same thing in view, exhorting us to continue firm in his interest, as we have already given instances of our duty."^{8b} The English agent at the Nizam's court, Vasudeva Pandit, reported in August that the confidence which the Mughals placed in the French had now ceased. There were two subsequent engagements on the 8th and 16th of February. Throughout the month of March the French operations round Tiruvati were dull. But Murari Rao contrived to capture Tiruvendipuram, three miles west of Tiruppapuliur, towards the end of the month.

Dupleix had also been pursuing secret negotiations with Nanja Raja, of which Captain Dalton had written to Madras. The discontent of the Mysore troops with Mohammad Ali was also fomented by Dupleix. The Mysoreans conspired with some of the Nawab's captains and made a surprise attack on Trichinopoly in December when there were already 700 of their own men in the garrison of the fort. But they retired as soon as their camp was attacked in the night by Dalton. The English and the Nawab turned out the Mysoreans who were in the Trichinopoly fort and detained as a hostage Gopal Raj, the junior brother of Nanja Raja, who commanded the troops.

The situation in Trichinopoly was not at all satisfactory throughout 1753. Throughout March the French operations were dull, as noticed above. Muhammad Ali was in great difficulty for money and provisions and therefore proceeded to Cuddalore having put in a garrison at Tiruvati. On the 1st of April, Murari Rao and his brother, Bhujanga Rao, advanced against Muhammad Ali and the English who were marching from Fort St. David, towards Tiruvati taking provisions with them. The Maratha horsemen made a dashing charge, threw the enemy into confusion and took their guns and provisions. Muhammad Ali and his Bakshi, Muhammad Abrar, were

(8b) "Records of Fort St. George—Diary and Consultation Book—Military Department, 1753"—p. 117.

wounded; but Bhujanga Rao was killed; while Murari Rao had his horse shot under him.⁹

Muhammad Ali was unable to pay his troops and had to go to Trichinopoly as its garrison was disaffected and inclined to the side of the Mysoreans. When he advanced

- (9) The Diarist thus, remarks:—"Others of Murari Rao's people were killed; but the enemy lost more. Although our army retreated the Marathas fought gloriously. They showed two or three times as much courage as they usually do, and our people disappointed them." This was the opinion of Dupleix who ordered a dress of honour and presents to be sent to Murari Rao. It was hoped that the Marathas would cut off completely all communication with Fort St. David. Murari Rao complained of the failure of the French soldiers in camp to assist him and of their refusal to fight the enemy. He required guns, shot and powder of which a small quantity was sent. News came of continuous skirmishing near Tiruvati to which Muhammad Ali Khan had retired. Dupleix was so anxious to hear the news of his death, that the Diarist remarks, in his entry for 8th April 1753, that he promised to give 1,000 pagodas and an elephant to any one who would bring him the news of Muhammad Ali Khan's death. But Murari Rao's troops remained unpaid for two months; and no money was coming in, while Pondicherry had to pay three lakhs every month. The chief disease, more serious than that of military inefficiency, was that of financial ruin.

Orme testifies to the vigour of the charge of the Maratha cavalry on the English convoy which they followed from the vicinity of Fort St. David. He says that Bazin Row (Bhujanga Rao) was Murari Rao's nephew, the same who came to Clive's assistance after the siege of Arcot. The day ended with Lawrence assaulting the French near Tiruvati, but giving up the attempt owing to the strength of the French works.

The first three months of 1753 were ineffectually employed by Lawrence in bringing the enemy to a decisive engagement. His failure to do so convinced him of the necessity of changing his plans. Dupleix's plan was to approach Tiruvati and to expose it to two fires, from the west and the north, while communications should be interrupted from the side of Cuddalore; while other troops should operate on the south in the direction of Chidambaram and Bhuvanagiri. But Maissin, the new commander, though possessed of talent, would not listen to the suggestions of Dupleix. In the month of February, he did not accomplish anything to injure the enemy. In March the situation was not modified either. Dupleix asked, in vain, Murari Rao and Maissin to co-operate. The English situation also became desperate owing to difficulties of revictualling; and they were reduced to severe distress towards the end of March. In the action that took place on the 1st of April, Lawrence was assailed by the French army, three miles from Tiruvati and lost a part of his convoy. Murari Rao lost his brother. The English lost 53 soldiers. But Tiruvati continued to resist; and the English were holding the country with their mobile detachments. Maissin and Murari Rao were far from agreeing with each other; and there was even a talk of abandoning everything and retreating to Valudavur. Lawrence left Tiruvati for Trichinopoly on the 22nd. Astruc was instructed to follow Lawrence while Maissin should attack the English in their limits of Cuddalore and raze the town and destroy the garden at Manjakuppam. Dupleix thus hoped to compel Lawrence to retrace his march and leave Trichinopoly to Nanja Raja (*Martineau*, III, ch. 13).

to Chidambaram he was attacked by a body of Murari Rao's horsemen, who dispersed his troops. There was some misunderstanding, according to the report of the Pondicherry Diarist, between Governor Saunders and the Deputy Governor of Fort St. David who was blamed for having allowed Shaikh Hasan, (who was a sepoy-captain on the French side and had taken a prominent part in the capture of Madras and of the Tiruvati fort in July 1750 and had fallen a prisoner into English hands during the first siege of Trichinopoly) to make good his escape from Fort St. David. The Diarist narrates, at great length, the story of Shaikh Hasan's escape by concealing himself in a box in which his food was usually conveyed to him.

His brother, Abdur Rahman, who had risen high in the service of the Nizam (and later went over to the Peshwa) got the latter to write to Muhammad Ali urging his release.¹⁰ Sheikh Hasan had ambitions of his own and asked from Dupleix for the grant of the Arcot subah to himself instead of to Murtaza Ali Khan and was permitted to seize possession of Chettupattu which had been assigned to him. In May Murari Rao beat a body of English troops that sallied out of Tiruvati and soon afterwards, being joined by Shaikh Hasan, succeeded in capturing the fort, which was ordered to be demolished. After this capture the French control over the Gingee country became effective. The Chidambaram pagoda was seized from Mudamiah, as well as the neighbouring killas. Muttahir Khan of Ranjangudi seized Eravasanallur and several other places; but the English and Muhammad Ali did their bit of work. Their troops captured Tirupati and slew its Amaldar, Muhammad Kamal, who was upholding French influence; and Murtaza Ali could not take the Tiruvannamalai fort; and on more than one occasion the troops had to retreat to Gingee.

To go back to the operations round Trichinopoly:—The Mysore army had borne no part in the operations when the surrender and subsequent murder of Chanda Sahib occurred. His head was sent up as a trophy to Seringapatam and hung up over the Mysore gate. Nanja Raja claimed Trichinopoly as we have seen; and Muhammad

(10) Records of Fort St. George—Country Correspondence, Military Department, 1753, pp. 38-39.

Ali was no longer able to conceal from the English his illegally formed agreement; but he coolly declared that he had never intended to observe the compact. At the same time he tried to deceive the Dalavay with fresh promises that he would deliver up the town in two months and made over to him the revenues of the island of Srirangam and the adjacent region. The result was that the Mysorean intercepted supplies to the Nawab's garrison and the English troops, opened negotiations with Dupleix and tried his best to gain the fort by treachery.^{10a} But all his attempts were frustrated by the cleverness of Major Lawrence.

Even in the previous October, Nanja Raja, the Mysore Dalavay, had recalled his paymaster from the camp of Muhammad Ali. In December the Madras Council thought that it was now time to declare the Mysorean to be an open enemy. Captain Dalton made an assault on the Mysore camp under the north wall of Srirangam, but could not force an entry into the fortress temple; and he retreated before an attack of the Mysore cavalry under Hari Singh. By the middle of February Nanja Raja wrote that as the Peshwa's troops had begun to advance against Mysore and as Devaraja, the chief Dalavay, had ordered him to return to his state, he intended to march towards Mysore immediately and desired that the French and Murari should combine to prevent the Peshwa from further advancing into the Mysore country and promised the French the subah of Arcot, retaining for himself Trichinopoly if he should succeed¹¹.

(10a) The English victory at Bahur checked the resolution of Nanja Raja of declaring openly for the French. (Orme: I, pp. 257—58).

(11) For a summary of the negotiations between Dupleix and Nanja Raja, see Martinneau, III, pp. 310 et seq. The quasi-rupture between Nanja Raja and Murari Rao on one side and the English and Muhammad Ali on the other, which began on the day after the capitulation of Law persisted. Lawrence had agreed, by a compromise, to allow Nanja Raja to remain under the walls of Trichinopoly, without participating in the military operations on this side. Perhaps the Mysoreans had been conciliatory only with the idea of entering the place with a strong force when the English should have gone away. Lawrence left Dalton with a force sufficiently strong to repel an attack. But Nanja Raja did not attack. A plan that he devised, to enter the town by a treason, opened the eyes of the English to the disposition of their former allies. Lawrence wanted to profit by the uncertainty that still prevailed among them; the Council of Madras was of another opinion. Having at last learnt for certain that he would have neither Trichinopoly nor "indemnité en tenant lieu." Nanja Raja

In March there were no vigorous movements on the part of the Mysoreans. But, on the other side, there was no co-operation between Captain Dalton, the commander of the garrison and Khairu'd-din Khan, the killedar of the fort; and provisions were becoming scarce. In April Muhammad Ali was prevented from advancing south of the Coleroon, by a body of Murari Rao's horse. A little later we hear that Muhammad Ali was pursued into the Tanjore country and that Murari Rao sent reinforcements to the Mysore camp. It was only towards the end of May that Muhammad Ali reached Trichinopoly by a stratagem and inflicted a defeat on Nanja Raja's troops. Meanwhile, French troops had captured Chidambaram, Vriddhachalam and Kallakurichi and were enabled to control the entire region to the north of the Coleroon.

In the middle of June the French were attacked and surprised in a night attack on their entrenchment at the French Rock. Nanja Raja was greatly irritated at this mishap, which is not referred to by Orme, and "must have been a very minor affair" according to Dodwell. Some days later, the French troops carried Khaludaimalai, about three miles from Trichinopoly; and they were thereupon attacked by Lawrence and the Nawab's troops and had to flee to Nanja Raja's camp, abandoning all their cannon. In July Nawab Muhammad Ali and Lawrence proceeded to Tanjore from whose ruler they obtained about 1,000 horse, 5,000 foot and a lakh of rupees. They also made an alliance with the Tondaiman of Pudukottah, the Marava chief of Ramnad and others. Both Dupleix and Nanja Raja intrigued with Raja Pratap Singh of Tanjore and made him vacillate in his alliance with the English. They threatened that his country would be laid waste by Murari Rao's horse and bribed the Raja's chief minister, Sakkoji, who succeeded in procuring the dismissal of

declared himself at the same time against the English and Muhammad Ali and made a brisk attack on them in Srirangam (20th December). He could not maintain himself there, but two days afterwards, he attacked another English party commanded by Dalton himself, to the east of Trichinopoly, on the bank of the Kaveri. The English were forced, panic-stricken and with appreciable loss, to the gates of Trichinopoly.

Nanja Raja, however, did not want to treat with Dupleix before knowing as to how he should act towards Muhammad Ali. On the 7th December Dupleix announced to the Mysore wakil that his master could have his friendship whenever he wanted it.

Manoji who was of service to the English and the Nawab. Pratap Singh of Tanjore was on the point of signing a treaty of alliance with the French when a signal defeat of the latter induced him to return back to his old alliance. In February 1753, Pratap Singh recalled his cavalry from joining the English at Tiruvati. In May-June he was dissuaded by the Mysoreans from supplying the English army at Trichinopoly with provisions. In July Mr. Palk, who was deputed to Tanjore, prevailed on him to declare himself openly and to order his troops to join the English under Lawrence who proceeded to Tanjore from Kunnandarkoil to which he had marched.

The French commander, Astruc, quarrelled with Nanja Raja and re-crossed the Coleroon under pretence of Dupleix having recalled him. He was superseded by Brenier who fared no better than himself. Early in August Nanja Raja's troops captured some horses and cannon of Muhammad Ali. Nanja Raja wrote to Dupleix for reinforcements to encounter the combined forces of Muhammad Ali, Manoji and others. Dupleix was also seriously disconcerted by lack of money. On September 21, Lawrence got a noteworthy triumph over the French between the French Rock and the Sugar Loaf Rock. Lawrence, in a letter to the Madras Council written on the day of the victory, said that the French were superior in numbers both in foot and horse and were entrenched in their position and fortified with strong breastworks. Astruc was taken prisoner and Lawrence himself was wounded in the arm. Lawrence expected that the Mysore Dalavay would now certainly give up the French cause. The French without the Dalavay counted as nothing. The enemy crossed over to the island of Srirangam and were expected to retire soon beyond the Coleroon. The Dalavay was expected to give up the French cause soon.

In November, a party of the French under Mainville attempted a secret escalade upon the fort, with the possible connivance of the imprisoned Astruc. The attempt was made without the knowledge of Nanja Raja or Murari Rao; but when the French troops entered the gate after overcoming the pretended resistance of the sentries who had been bribed, they posted no troops, but overturned the guns on the rampart into the ditch. The gate was not

properly secured and the English contrived to have it shut and to seize the powder and shot of the French party and fired against the men on the ramparts. About 400 men were captured including 9 French officers. It was believed that the English and Muhammad Ali must have laid a trap for the French; but the attempt proved to being very near a success.¹² When the news of the disaster reached Dupleix, he was "drowned in the ocean of sorrow"; and Pondicherry came to be "unlike itself and wrapped in darkness." The year 1753 thus closed with the deepest gloom prevailing in Pondicherry and in the mind of Dupleix.

It was also openly felt in Pondicherry that the situation was very bad. European protests against the high-handedness of Dupleix increased. On the other hand, at Madras the complaint was frequently heard that the Nawab and the poligars were very dilatory in provisioning Trichinopoly. The Nawab was not able to collect enough revenues to fulfil his contract and to pay the expenses of the English troops which amounted to nearly a lakh of rupees per month. It was feared that if the English did not bear all these burdens, the French would get hold of the Carnatic, though their troops behaved but ill in most of the engagements. Murari Rao's men were among the best. The Nawab's troops and the Mysoreans "took up much room but did nothing." The Nawab was advised to make peace with all the country powers. The Mysore wakil told the Governor that his master could not treat openly for an understanding with the English for fear of offending the French, while the Nawab insisted that he could also do nothing in camp and even empowered the Governor in Council to treat with the Mysore wakil.¹³

(12) *Orme Mss.* India, III, 26, contains a copy of letter from Lt. J. Harrison, dated 13th December, 1753, and containing a short account of the attempted escalade of the 27th Nov., with the number of prisoners, killed etc., *The Orme Collection of Mss.*, p. 285. Burhanu'd-din attributes the initial treachery to an officer of Muhammad Ali and the credit of the victory to Khairu'd-din Khan. He says that "the lamentations of 472 Frangs served as the musical instrument for their happy rejoicing."

(13) "The King of Mysore demands Trichinopoly; the Nawab will agree to anything but that. The Nawab certainly has no right to cede Trichinopoly, and it should not be done except of absolute necessity. The King would give very advantageous terms, including the repayment of the Nawab's debt to the Company. Will do everything possible to find a middle course, although the cession of Trichinopoly would probably not affect the Company's investment at Salem, as

b—*Preliminaries to and the Treaty of Pondicherry.*

The English feared that even if peace could be made with the country powers, the reckoning with the French would certainly be very difficult. The Nawab had empowered the Council to treat with Dupleix and the Council had proposed that the basis of peace should be the recognition of Muhammad Ali as the Nawab and also the security of the ruler of Tanjore. Dupleix replied to this that it would give all the advantages to the English and put forward a proposal for holding a conference. The Madras Council were doubtful of the sincerity of Dupleix's wishes for peace, suspected that the suggested conference was probably intended to create suspicion among the allies of the Nawab and inquired of the French Governor in return as to what his alternative proposals were. The English were, however, certain that Dupleix assuredly had managed to strengthen his position in spite of great odds, particularly in finance. They thus described what they considered to be the source of Dupleix's attitude: "For the last three years Dupleix has been repeatedly brought very low, but has preferred any alternative to entering into a Treaty; the recruits he receives from Europe are doubled by the drafts he takes out of the French shipping. Six months ago his expenditure was believed to have amounted to 120 lakhs; and this seems to indicate that he is receiving support from the State, and not merely from the Company. Moreover when he is grasping at the government of the country from Cape Comorin to Point Palmyras, how can he be content to share in a free commerce with other nations? On the contrary, once he has secured the Carnatic, he will proceed to the conquest of other parts of India." (Separate Despatch from Thomas Saunders etc., to the Company. Fort St. George, October 29, 1753, p. 212).

that would make the King as firm a friend to the English as an Eastern Prince can be". (Dodwell: *The Madras Despatches 1744—55*: p. 212) See 'The Idea of a treaty for India, drawn at the request of Lord Holderness in Jan'y., 1754' (Orme *Mss. India* II, 28) in which Orme insists on 4 points for a stable peace.

We do not have any details of Nawab Muhammad Ali's movements for 1754, except that Nanja Raja and Murari Rao were disheartened on account of successive defeats and were preparing to depart for their respective homes. Negotiations took place at Madras in January 1754 between the English and the French. But the Conference had to break up. Ananda Ranga Pillai's *Diary* shows an extensive gap from December 8, 1753 to September 8, 1754, due presumably to the entire disappearance of one volume of the original Mss. We are driven to rely upon the information contained in the records of the English and the French with respect to the projects for mutual accommodation. In the Project of an Agreement between the English and French East India Companies, delivered to Duvelaer, dated November 8, 1753,¹⁴ we find the following:—

1. Muhammad Ali Khan shall be recognised as the Nawab of Arcot by both the Companies. The French shall never support the cause of any rival either directly or indirectly. Chanda Sahib's family must not be allowed to remain at Pondicherry or in any other French settlement. The Nawab shall protect the Companies in the possession of their territories.

2. The Viceroy of the Deccan, the Nawab of Arcot and the King of Tanjore shall be invited to accede to this agreement; and on the Nawab's doing so, all places in the province of Arcot in the possession of either Company shall be restored to him, except their ancient possessions and the Poonamallee country, Villiyanallur and Valudavur (See article 4).

3. The Bahur fort shall be pulled down and its territory restored to the Moors.

4. The French shall hold Pondicherry with its ancient territories and the districts of Villiyanallur and Valudavur and the English shall extend their territories in the Poonamallee country to the same degree as the French theirs round Pondicherry.

(14) Public Despatches from England, Vol. 57, pp.303-308 (Copy 6 pp.); also Military Despatches from England Vol. I, pp. 71-77 (Copy 7 pp.).

It is also interesting to note here the Memorial of Observations on the English Project by the French Company, Paris. February 4, 1754.¹⁵

“The French Company are willing to make sacrifices to secure peace on the Coromandel Coast, but cannot agree to the English project as it contains provisions which injure the dignity of the French. They have been obliged therefore to draw up a new project. This memorial is intended to show the defects of the English project. The stipulation in the English project, article 1, that neither Company should interfere in Moorish disputes, should form the basis of the agreement. Under articles 1 and 2 of the English project, the Nawab of Arcot could prevent the Company’s forces being withdrawn into their territories merely by refusing to accede; and as the English control the Nawab they would remain masters of peace or war in defiance of the treaty. The other stipulation in the articles that troops shall withdraw into their respective territories, is a very inconvenient course in as much as it involves an instantaneous surrender of all conquests without any assurance from the Moorish Princes that they will accede to the treaty. The stipulation in article 3 causes much offence. Why should the French alone be asked to surrender their conquests to the Nawab, while the Nawab is not bound to surrender the prisoners and guns taken from them? This is an unheard of stipulation, and the French will certainly neither cease hostilities nor give up Gingee until the return of their prisoners and artillery is agreed to. The stipulations regarding the use of good offices by the English are unbecoming. As to article 5, regarding recognition of Muhammad Ali Khan as the Nawab of Arcot, this is directly contrary to the principle of non-interference. It is the Viceroy of the Deccan or the Mughal Emperor, and not the Companies, who should determine which Indian Prince is the lawful Nawab of Arcot. Whatever the right may be possession is a clear matter. So the only Nawab which Companies as traders should recognize is the reigning Nawab. Consequently so long as Muhammad Ali Khan continues as Nawab the French will not attempt to revenge their wrongs upon him. But in case he should be dispossessed, neither Company

(15) *Public Despatches from England*, Vol. 57, pp. 325-339. (Copy of translation. 15 pp.); translation also in *Military Despatches from England*, Vol. I, pp. 87-101.

shall attempt to reinstate him. If the English insist on a continuance of war, the French would rather continue to fight Muhammad Ali Khan than any other prince on his behalf. If Muhammad Ali Khan were dispossessed, it would no doubt be advantageous to the French, but the English would find their advantage in escaping from a war which otherwise they would have to carry on against the French and all the Country Powers. The French Company mean Muhammad Ali by the Nawab of Arcot, but his name should not occur in a treaty that is to be communicated to other Country Powers. Similarly the name of Chanda Sahib should also be omitted. As a strong proof of their good disposition towards Muhammad Ali they have agreed to surrender Gingee etc., and they cannot make any more concessions. As regards the 10th article of the English project, how far the French are anxious for peace may be clearly seen from the sacrifice they are ready to make in surrendering such important places as Masulipatam and Divi Island to the Moors, in exclusion of all other European nations. But the French cannot admit the English claim to the Divi Island. No titles have ever been produced and the French hold a letter from the Governor of Madras to the Subahdar of the Deccan applying for a grant of it. The terms used regarding Masulipatam in the English project are too obscure to pass. The French can make no further concessions for peace than the surrender of these two places."

The following is the project of a convention between the English and the French East India Companies received from Duvelaer:¹⁶ (February 12, 1754).

1. The Country Powers should be invited to ratify the convention.

2. Both the Companies should renounce both now and in future any Moorish or Indian dignity which might give its officers authority over the possessions of the Country Powers.

3. The Nawab of the Carnatic should consent to treat the Companies impartially.

4. Both the Companies should retain an equal extent of possessions.

5. There was a secret and separate article attached to this proposal that in no case Gingee should be evacuated till all French prisoners and guns taken should have been given up. The English protested against the claim to the Northern Sarkars and against the omission of the names of Muhammad Ali and Chanda Sahib.

The English observations on this project tell us that they could not admit the French proposal to retain a large territory round Masulipatam whose revenues would enable them to crush their rivals, and also that the recession of Masulipatam alone would be nothing so long as the French held the country around. Unless the French are willing to confine themselves to their ancient limits, the war might as well go on. Moreover, the intentional omission of the names of Muhammad Ali and Chanda Sahib throughout the project was explained in a *frivolous* manner in the project.

To go back to the military movements:—The French relations with the country powers were not satisfactory for the greater part of the year 1754. Their negotiations with Mysore were specially so. When they advised Nanja Raja, the Mysore Dalavay, to return to his own state, he said that he would never leave Srirangam till he should have got hold of Trichinopoly. Godeheu was in a delicate situation. The Mysore Dalavay protested that Godeheu had agreed, without his knowledge, on the three months' truce with the English and with Muhammad Ali, that the English troops were being gathered at Trichinopoly daily while the French troops were being recalled. Godeheu assured him that the English could do him no injury during the truce¹⁷.

The truce was to have originally commenced from the 11th October 1754. Major Lawrence wrote from his camp on October 6, that Salabat Jang had written to Muhammad Ali, assuring him that he would be confirmed as the Nawab of the Carnatic and had also sent another letter to the Mysore Dalavay with orders that he should return home and

(17) The provisional treaty, according to a Madras letter of October 26, 1755, saved the English from being cut off from Trichinopoly and the South by the French.

not disturb the Nawab. Ranga Pillai, the Diarist of Pondicherry, lamented that when Raza Sahib came to offer congratulations to Godeheu on his name-day, November 4, 1754, he was received with a salute of 21 guns, an honour that implied that the Nawabs were still the rulers of the country and the French were only their servants. He wrote that ever since 1749-50, the French had been the virtual masters and the Arcot people had been under them, and now by treating Raza Sahib as though he was still Nawab and Master, Godeheu had cast away half the glory that the French had acquired.

As for Nawab Muhammad Ali, he had, first of all, great trouble from Murari Rao. A Fort St. George Despatch of November 10, 1754, says that the Nawab and the Rajah of Tanjore had made an agreement with Murari Rao that he should leave the French and go home for which Tanjore would pay him 3 lakhs and the Nawab would give him certain grants. The agreement was made some time back; but Murari Rao was very dilatory in his retirement, marching only very slowly and raising contributions on the way. He was, on the date of the Despatch, at Polur; and it was doubtful whether he would continue his further retirement. Murari Rao had offered to join the English for 1½ lakhs a month; but this was more than they could afford. However, as the French owed him 9 lakhs and unless the Mysoreans should find the money, the Maratha would not get reconciled with the French people. Murari wished that the English would guarantee his treaty with Muhammad Ali; but "as Eastern princes make such terms in adversity as they never mean to observe in prosperity", the Presidency held that they should try to avoid doing so.

Murari Rao harried the villages on his march and carried off the cattle. Abdul Wahab Khan, a brother of Muhammad Ali, who was in charge of Arcot and the neighbouring country, was powerless to check the Maratha. Murari Rao complained to Godeheu that he had ordered his men not to touch French territory at all and had trusted in Dupleix's words about the stipulated sum due to him.

Nanja Raja himself advised Godeheu that he should have the Dutch and the Danes as mediators, when discussing peace terms with the English and that he should produce the *parwanas* given by Muzaffar Jang, Salabat Jang

and Chanda Sahib, as against the grants to the English made by Nasir Jang and Ghaziu'd-din Khan, adding that "if you treat with the English without mediators, the matter will not be settled for centuries." The despatch from Governor Saunders to the English Company, dated January 12, 1755, says that at first Godeheu declined to conclude any provisional treaty, saying he had advice from France, of April 10, that Lord Holdernessee had told the Duke of Mirepoix that no treaty could be negotiated in India and that the Companies were issuing orders to that effect. Later, in order to bring matters to a crisis, Saunders proposed a truce (dependent on a provisional treaty) to continue till orders were received from Europe; and Palk and Vansittart were sent in a private capacity to furnish any necessary explanations and to require a positive answer in three days. The proposals were accepted, and when digested into regular form, were signed. The truce was proclaimed on the 1st of January 1755. "The main considerations for making a truce are the infinite superiority of the French forces, their great influence with the country powers, and the impossibility of a mere trading company to bear all expenses of war. If war had continued, the French, by means of their cavalry, could have protected their own territories and raided ours also; whereas we might have lost our own districts in attempting to seize theirs. Further the revenues remaining in the Nawab's power will probably enable him to reduce his debt." The conclusion of the truce was expected to revive the investments at Madras, Fort St. David and Salem and to increase the demand for imports from Europe. All troops except the necessary garrisons in the country forts could be called in and their batta stopped; and the sepoys could be quartered in the Nawab's territories at his expense.¹⁸

(18) Dodwell—*Calendar of the Madras Despatches 1744-55*: (pp. 252-3). See also the Consultation of the Madras Council, dated 6th December, 1754; the letters of Messrs. Palk and Vansittart to Saunders, dated 14th and 16th December, and the Consultation of the Council of the 22nd December (Diary and Consultation Book of 1754, Military Department).

The more stable did the position of Muhammad Ali become, the more marked were the honours that were paid by the Pondicherry authorities to Chanda Sahib's son. Godeheu wanted to treat the French Nawab as if he were a real power; and we learn from the *Diarist* that the Commission of the three Councillors, with Barthelemy at their head, to whom the Governor's powers were entrusted in the five weeks of interregnum between Godeheu's departure and the arrival of Duval de Leyrit, the new Governor, continued to pay honours to Raja Sahib which Ranga Pillai would not at all countenance.

Letters received at Pondicherry in the previous week, *i.e.*, about the 18th of March, reported the capture of Madura by Muhammad Ali and his intention to march his troops against the Setupati with the aid of the Raja of Tanjore and the Tondaiman of Pudukottah, and the flight of Mandumiyān (or Mantimiyan—Mayana?) to the Setupati and the imprisonment of his wife and family in the Madura fort. Madura was plundered by Muhammad Ali Khan's people; and when Dusaussaye remonstrated with the English at the Trichinopoly fort that they should not help Muhammad Ali Khan to capture Madura and Tinnevely or to attack the Setupati, they agreed to withdraw their troops within a week, but quietly ordered their advance to Tinnevely, as soon as they had sent the French commandant back to Srirangam. The Setupati now offered to submit to the Nawab and apologised for his conduct during the war in siding with Chanda Sahib and even offered to cede two settlements on the sea-coast of his country opposite to Ceylon, which would greatly facilitate the English communications with the Tinnevely country; and Colonel Heron attacked the representative of Alam Khan the lieutenant of Chanda Sahib in the Madura country, in the fortress of Koilgudi, a strong pagoda situated about 8 miles to the east of Madura, to which he fled for protection. Mir Sahib, the killedar of Eravasanallur (Elavanasur), negotiated secretly with Muhammad Ali for the lease of his fort, as from him, for a period of 10 or 12 years.

Nanja Raja, the Mysore Dalavay, persisted in his blundering endeavours to obtain possession of Trichinopoly till about the middle of April, when he left for Serinapatam by the positive injunction of his elder brother, Deva Raja, on account of a very serious domestic danger. When he departed, he left the French in possession of the island of Srirangam, the revenues of which had been formally given up by Nawab Muhammad Ali to the Mysorean.

An expedition had, in the meanwhile, been undertaken under the command of Col. Heron into the Madura and Tinnevely countries, to collect the dues from the poligars. Heron was helped by the Marava chief of Ramnad with a body of 3,000 men and several pieces of cannon under his brother and with a free passage through his country. He promised to use his influence with the other poligars and pressed the English to build settlements in his dominions. This roused the hostility of the rulers of Tanjore and Pudukottah; and Manoji, the Tanjore general, who had been personally affronted by the Marava, raised forces and threatened to march into the latter's country. Under these circumstances, the English had to pacify the Tanjore Raja and the Tondaiman, to break off all negotiations with the Marava chief and to insist that he should return all the districts that he had taken illegally from the Raja of Tanjore and from the Nawab.

Heron's expedition to the south was questioned by the new French Governor, De Leyrit, who had succeeded Godeheu, in the last week of March, because it was held to be a breach of the truce made with Godeheu, by which the southern districts were claimed by the French in virtue of various rights derived from Chanda Sahib and from the Dalavay of Mysore. The Mysoreans were even suspected to aim at the rendering of active assistance to the rebellious poligars against the English. So, early in April, Heron was ordered to return to Trichinopoly without any delay, from which he was to send soon afterwards, two detachments to compel the poligars of that district to settle their accounts. Even when Heron had received the orders to return to Trichinopoly, he had turned aside, at the request of Mahfuz Khan, to attack Puli Tevar in his fort, as that poligar was the only one who had not yet submitted. But finding that he could not take that place even with the help

of heavy guns, Heron returned to Madura, and subsequently to Trichinopoly, in June 1755, having lost a part of his baggage in a surprise attack by the Kallars in the Nattam Pass. An official inquiry was held on Heron's conduct. He was suspended from his seat on the Council and tried by a court martial.¹⁹

The Nawab, Muhammad Ali, entered Arcot in triumph with English troops as his escort, about the end of August; but as the Arcot poligars were in heavy arrears of tribute to him, he requested the English Government for military assistance and was urged, in return, to transfer the management of certain countries to the Company. The Nawab objected to this course on the ground of the loss of dignity that he would incur thereby. The Madras Select Committee finally agreed to accept Ponneri and Pedipattu, where the Company's fine cloths were woven and which were worth about 30,000 pagodas a year, on the same terms as Chingleput, in addition to orders for eight lakhs of rupees on the renters of the Arcot countries, payable in two instalments. The Nawab also promised to settle the Company's share of the rent before he gave any *cowle* to the renters, many of whom were expected to be selected from the principal inhabitants of Madras, and therefore amenable to the pressure of the English officials. The Nawab also promised to give the English half the revenues of Madura and Tinnevely, though nothing could be expected from them immediately on account of the cost of the troops that were still in the field against the poligars of those regions; while the other half of the amount of the tributes paid by all the poligars under him was to go to him. An English agent and Member of the Secret Committee, William Percival, was to accompany the Nawab and be present at all his transactions with the poligars and their vakils and to receive the Company's half of the tribute. The Nawab's government was in an unsettled condition. Half the province was in French hands and several prominent kiledars claimed independence of the Nawab on one ground or another, the most notable among them being Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore.

(19) Pigot showed much personal spite in the condemnation of Heron (Orme Mss, O. V, 28 I (1)).

About Murtaza Ali Khan, Governor Saunders wrote to the Company that he had "the address to murder two Nawabs and go unpunished, and was an artful dangerous man who could not be trusted, but should not be made into an enemy." The Nawab's condition was very distressing his debts were great and the English were his only help. For the sake of the Nawab's revenues the English troops had to keep the field longer than was originally intended. The Southern Poligars who used to pay considerable sums as *peshkash* to Trichinopoly, first refused to pay their tributes, though they acknowledged that they held their fiefs by virtue of the Nawab's *farmans*. The English were careful to arrange that the tributes should be paid to Colonel Heron and to the Nawab's representative jointly and should be applied to the payment of his debts to the Company.

The poligars of the Arcot country were indebted to the English Government and similar measures were needed to be taken with them. Abdul Wahab Khan, a brother of Muhammad Ali, who was in charge of the Arcot country, applied for help in the collection of *peshkash* from the feudatories of his charge. But as he was suspected of applying his collections for his own private use, Governor Pigot, who had succeeded Saunders in the middle of January, resolved not to send him any help till the Nawab should come up from the south; and that would be only after the Madura expedition should be over.

In addition to these troubles, there were frequent disputes owing to complaints made both by the French and by the Nawab, of villages having been seized illegally by both sides after the suspension of arms. Saunders and Godeheu had agreed to appoint commissaries for the purpose of arbitrating as to the disputed villages. The latter met early in February 1756, but the inquiry was protracted and the English suspected that the French seemed disposed to protract matters in order to keep possession, as long as possible, of villages that they had no right to. Soon afterwards, the Nawab proceeded towards Arcot escorted by English troops under Captain Polier and made a grand entry into his capital on August 21. A week later he arrived at Madras, while a part of the British troops stayed on behind at Arcot. He requested military assistance to

enforce his claims on the Arcot poligars; and Major Killpatrick was sent with a force to assist him. Even then Governor Pigot urged the Nawab to transfer the management of certain districts to the Company. The Nawab vigorously objected to this proposal, on the score of the loss of dignity that would ensue to him. But he agreed to retrench his expenses in order to pay off the Company's debt²⁰.

One remarkable feature about Muhammad Ali's march to Arcot is noticed by Ranga Pallai. The Nawab's troops never resorted to plunder on their march. Wherever they halted, they sent word of assurance to the local amaldar that they would not plunder the inhabitants, nor tread down their crops so that no complaint might afterwards be made; and "the people thereabout are saying that they have never before seen troops march so quietly and they are astonished at it. These troops are under complete discipline" (entry for Aug. 11, 1755.)

Ranga Pillai also notes the respect shown to Muhammad Ali at Madras, his stay in Louis Madeiros' Garden

(20) An agreement was now arrived at to the following effect: "The Committee finally agreed to accept the countries of Poneri and Pedipatoo (where the Company's fine cloths are made) which are worth about 30,000 pagodas a year on the same terms as Chingleput, with orders for 8 lakhs of rupees on the renters of the Arcot countries, payable half in May and half in September, 1756; the rents of Poneri and Pedipatoo for the current year are to go to the Nawab. In order to secure for the Company a proportionate share of the rents at which the Arcot countries may in future be let out, the Nawab has promised to report when any countries are about to be leased, so that the Company's share may be settled before the cowle is given; and, as much of the Arcot countries is leased by the principal inhabitants of Madras, by whom a great part of the 8 lakhs is to be paid, expect to get orders for a larger sum next year." "The Nawab has also promised:—half the revenues of Madura and Tinnevely (but he expects nothing at present owing to the cost of troops to subdue the rebels), and half the tribute paid by all the poligars under him. In order to make sure of accurate information about the settlements made with the Arcot poligars, have appointed William Percival (a member of the Committee) to accompany the Nawab and be present at all transactions with the poligars or their vakils, and to receive the Company's half of their tribute. He will also control the expenditure involved in the expedition. (Despatch from Pigot to the Secret Committee, dated Fort St. George October 27, 1755).

From this Despatch we further learn that the government of the Nawab was very unsettled, for at least half the province of Arcot was in French hands and this fact diminished both his credit and revenue; while several kiledars claimed to be independent of his control, the chief of them being, of course, Murtaza Ali Khan.

(the present Government House Garden in Mount Road), and a display of fireworks and other entertainments in his honour. The Diarist also says that Muhammad Ali was to be given an allowance and desired to remain at Madras, and that he was much dejected, as his amaldars had been directed not to do any act of authority without orders from the English who had sent their own people to Arcot and other places. The Diarist heard at Pondicherry that Muhammad Ali had agreed to accept Rs. 240,000 from Yachama Nayak of Venkatagiri, two lakhs from the Damarla Poligar of Kalahasti, inclusive of *darbar* expenses, and a lakh and a half from the Raja of Karveti (or Bommarajapalayam)—all these sums having to be paid at Madras by the sowcars. Also Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore had agreed to pay a lakh of rupees, and supply 500 troopers and 200 horse. The killedar of Satghar had settled for Rs. 50,000. Muhammad Ali was able to collect or settle these sums, without any complaint; nobody could question his title; and on December 7, the English flag at Arcot was replaced by that of the Nawab. The Fort was named Muhammad Nur (Muhammadpur); and the Nawab himself was to be henceforth called Umdat-ul-Mulk, Siraj-ud-Daula Bahadur Dilawar Jang (entries for December 6th and 19th). Ranga Pillai expressed a doubt whether the countries of the poligars were worth the amounts stipulated for them; but he admired the Nawab as "one who behaves calmly and discreetly, without precipitation,"; and he attributed this assurance on the part of Muhammad Ali to the great power of the Marathas, to the Peshwa's victory over Salabat Jang and Murari Rao's over-running the country of Adoni, as these factors helped much to strengthen the position of the Nawab.

Thus the year 1755 closed with Muhammad Ali triumphantly and securely settled at Arcot and his flag flying in the place of the English flag not only at Arcot but even over the forts of Kaveripakkam and Timiri; though he himself was prostrated by a severe illness, as a consequence of eating betel sent to him by the widow of Safdar Ali Khan of Vellore, according to the rumour recorded by the Diarist. Killpatrick finished the business of forcing Bangaru Yachama Naik to obedience within a month and also the Raja of Karveti within an equally short time. The English army returned to Arcot in January 1756; and the reduction of the minor poligars was left to the Nawab's

country troops. Now Killpatrick marched on Vellore towards the end of January. Governor Pigot who had sent him additional troops, now got a letter of remonstrance from De Leyrit, disputing the Nawab's claim of suzerainty over Vellore and threatening to oppose the English Company's intervention in its affairs. The English captain was even informed by the Select Committee at Madras that, if the French should march to the help of Murtaza Ali—information having been received that 300 French and 300 sepoys had left Pondicherry in the course of January 1756—he might summon them to retire and if they refused, might proceed to attack them. Murtaza Ali's vakil made overtures with the English at Madras for an accommodation; and Robert Orme was sent to negotiate with him on account of his knowledge of the Muhammadan language. The faujdar (Murtaza Ali) now agreed to pay one lakh of pagodas if the English troops should retire; and the Select Committee at once ratified and returned the agreement to him. Meanwhile, Orme's arrival induced the faujdar to hope that better terms could be had and he thereupon refused to fulfil his agreement and refused to treat with anyone but Orme.²¹ The faujdar would not listen to all to Orme's remonstrances; and the latter had to return to Madras without having effected an understanding; and all the while, a body of 700 Frenchmen and 1,500 sepoys lay threateningly between Gingee and Chettupattu, some 35 miles from Vellore.

In the Southern Carnatic, Mahfuz Khan who was the Nawab's deputy, delayed the payment of his balance of over a lakh and a quarter of rupees on the pretext of very heavy expenses incurred by him in defending the country against the poligars.

Murtaza Ali of Vellore, Nazir Muhammad Khan of Chettupattu and Abdul Rahman, Mir Sahib, of Elavanasur were the only chiefs who remained practically independent of Nawab Muhammad Ali. Mir Sahib threatened to call in the French, if any troops should be sent against him. The English felt that it was not safe to attempt to reduce these chiefs so long as a French army was in their

(21) A letter of Orme, dated March 1st, 1756, describes how Murtaza Ali was tricked out of more than 3 lakhs of rupees by Duplax and how his own mission to Vellore failed. (*Orme Mss. O. V. 17* (1104).

neighbourhood. They advised the Nawab to make a general defensive alliance offered by the Nawab of Cuddapah. The English claimed that, under the provisional treaty of 1754, they were entitled to assist Muhammad Ali to collect the tributes due from the poligars dependent on the Nizam (subah) of Arcot. The French contended that only the Nizam, Salabat Jang, could say properly who was the Nawab of Arcot. The French correspondence on the subject is contained in the Military Sundry Books of the Madras Records. De Leyrit contended further that the truce of Godeheu was confined only to the Carnatic and that, while the French were at liberty to help Salabat Jang in the Deccan, the English might not, naturally in their turn, help Muhammad Ali in the south. The English naturally said that this argument would justify their immediate interference in the Deccan as against Bussy. On this point hung the plans projected by the Madras Council in consultation with the Bombay Committee for an expedition into the Deccan to destroy French influence at Salabat Jang's court.²²

The Nawab realised more than he spent in the matter of the *peshkash* of the Arcot poligars. He consented to make advances of money for repairs to the country forts and hence the Company was freed from such expenses. The Arcot country remained quiet for the time and the Nawab planned to send the newly entertained horse and foot to Madura and Tinnevely where the situation was still troublesome. For the current year 1755-56, the Nawab gave these two districts to the Company as he was not able to discharge his promises in full. Tinnevely was rented to Titarappa Mudali for 3 years at an average of 12 lakhs of pagodas, half of which was to be paid to Company.

In May and June 1756 while the Company were trying to let out the Madura country also, news came of the request of Salabat Jang who had dismissed Bussy, for assistance from the English. Subsequently news arrived of the revolution in Bengal. Killpatrick was sent over to

(22) The French based all their pretensions on Salabat Jang's right to the *subahdari* of the Deccan, but he was supported by nothing but French arms. This right was not admissible, as the English held, in the face of the fact that, on Nasir Jang's death the Mughal emperor had appointed Ghaziu'd-din Khan and then his son, Shahabu'd-din Khan as the *subahdar*.

Bengal about the middle of July; while the French sent a body of troops under Law, by way of Masulipatam, to join Bussy at Hyderabad where he was resisting Salabat Jang.

The greater part of the English troops remained at Arcot until the Bengal expedition was prepared. The French army likewise retired from the neighbourhood of Arcot to Gingee and Pondicherry. Mahfuz Khan complained that the poligars of Tinnevely were becoming rebellious and a body of sepoys under the redoubtable Sepoy-Captain, Yusuf Khan, was sent to assist him. Yusuf Khan was successful, but could not be recalled owing to the suspicious conduct of Mahfuz Khan, who stopped at Madura, turned out the Company's sepoys from its fort and admitted a partisan of its old governor Mayana. Mahfuz Khan put forward some pretext justifying his action; and Captain Caillaud the British Commandant at Trichinopoly, was authorised to pay 2 lakhs towards the arrears of his discharged troops and to see that the fort of Madura was given into the charge of Yusuf Khan and that Mahfuz Khan accompanied these troops to Trichinopoly.

A Despatch from the Madras Council to the Select Committee of the Directors informs us that the countries mortgaged in the Arcot Province were let out for rent by the Company and comprehended Chinglepet, Covelong, Manimangalam and the Seven Maganams. It was feared that the amount payable by Titarappa Mudali would be swallowed up by the half share to be paid to the Nawab and by the payment of the sepoys under Mahfuz Khan and Yusuf Khan. Madura could not as yet be rented owing to the disturbed condition that prevailed in it, consequent on the rowdiness of the discharged troops of Mahfuz Khan. The English could not do anything openly against Mahfuz, "out of consideration for the Nawab."

The above Despatch gives us a clear view of the extent of the Nawab's indebtedness to the Company at the end of April 1756 and a survey of the debt situation.²³

23) *A Note on the Nawab's Debts* On April 30, 1756, the Nawab's debt amounted to 13,71,906 Pags.; subsequent receipts have reduced it to Pag. 12,10,728. This is only 30,000 less than what it was on April 1754. "On the average of the last six months, the expenses charged to the Nawab's account amount to 2,00,000 Pags. per annum. The receipts from the mortgaged countries, the Tirupati rents, and the 5

The Nawab did not stir out of Arcot during the greater part of the year 1756. Murtaza Ali Khan desired that the

lakhs assignment from the Arcot countries will amount to 3,50,000 Pags. Thus the Nawab's debt will be reduced by 1,50,000 Paga. every year, provided that no army has to take the field. The Committee will do their best to secure the most speedy repayment to the Company of the Nawab's debt."

But by April 1757, the Nawab's debt had fallen only by a small margin to a little less than 12 lakhs of pagodas. Even this small decrease was possible by his paying assignment in full, by the full receipt of the rents of Tirupati and of the mortgaged countries of Covelong, Manimangalam, Chingleput and the Seven Maganams, by a remittance from Titarappa Mudai and by the absence of troops from the field.

The year 1757-58 (Fasli) was expected to be worse, as the Nellore revenues had been lost and the second half of the Nawab's assignment was reduced by the payment of 2½ lakhs to the Marathas. Nearly two lakhs had to be paid to Mahfuz Khan's people at Madura. Yusuf Khan at Madura was to collect as much revenue as would pay off the debt and maintain his troops.

On account of these factors, the Nawab's debts had increased over the previous year, by nearly 77,000 pagodas; and it stood at 1268,462 pagodas on 30th April 1758. The increase was due to the cost of maintaining garrisons and to Adlerson's campaign. There was no appreciable diminution of the Nawab's Assignment of 8 lakhs which fetched only below 7 lakhs. The Nawab proposed in April 1758 to provide about 2 lakhs of rupees by orders on the renters and over a lakh in grain at Trichinopoly. His amaldars could only pay about Rs. 40,000; they declared that the Nawab had already borrowed 2 lakhs from them in return for orders on them.

The situation was as follows:—

Rents of the countries mortgaged by the Nawab ..	7,00,004
Rents of the countries in the Nawab's hands ..	12,71,712
Rents of the countries, not possessed by the French, ..	
but so unsettled as to produce an excess of ex-	
penses over revenues	Rs. 16,60,676
Total ..	36,32,392

The Nawab represented that when he promised 8 lakhs to the Company three years back, his revenues were 17 lakhs, and now that they were reduced to about 12 lakhs, he could not pay more than 3 lakhs. He had been, however, persuaded to assign 5 lakhs out of the Arcot revenues and to proceed to Trichinopoly and take over the management of the southern districts, from the revenues of which he promised a reasonable assignment. Mahfuz Khan in Tinnevely and Najibu'llah Khan in Nellore were the two troublesome factors, besides the poligars.

The field expenses of the campaigns since the beginning of 1758 were placed to the Nawab's account, because "although occasioned by the war between England and France," they were to be considered as "incurred for the defence of the Carnatic" and "therefore the Carnatic should be responsible," and it was reported to the Directors, was "the true meaning of the Nabob's account on your books."

The Nawab's debts stood, in July 1759 after the siege of Madras was over, higher than ever. "The march of Yusuf Khan with all his Indian troops, including some of the Tanjore and the Tondaiman forces, and Caillaud's march with the other party of Tanjore horse increased our expenditure; but their services, when joined by Preston

English Company should get him and his successors permanently exempted from all tributes to the Nawab and recognised in his independent status. Though the Madras Council felt that his demands were unreasonable, they did not care to rouse unrest among the poligars, but remained in ostensible friendship with Murtaza Ali and also with the refractory killedars of Chettupattu and Elavanasur. All the bills furnished by Murtaza Ali could realise only a lakh of rupees. The Mysoreans were approached for the recovery of the Company's debts, but no public advances could be made to them for fear of alarming the Nawab.

The further operations of 1756 and the situation at the end of that year are briefly summarised below: The English established an alliance with Balaji Rao Peshwa who was then engaged in his Karnatak expedition and promised to send a detachment to his camp to be maintained at his expense. No reply was received from Balaji Rao till September. Then he wrote that as he had settled the affair of Savanur, he did not need the British troops at once, but he would visit the Carnatic after the monsoon, when he desired that the required body of troops should be ready to join him. At the same time, the Madras Council attempted to negotiate a treaty with the King of Mysore for the recovery of the Company's debts. But Mysore had been bled twice by the Marathas and once by Salabat Jang and was moreover torn by civil war. A correspondence was however kept up with it through Orme. A friendly correspondence was also kept up with the Nawab of Cuddapah.

The disputes between the English and the French over the taluk of Karunguzhi and the villages of the neighbourhood continued. De Leyrit, however suspended

from the Chingleput garrison, were so essential in distracting the enemy from the siege (of Madras) that the cost was fully justified" (Madras Despatch of July 28, 1759).

Madura and Tinnevely were rented to Yusuf Khan for one year from July 1759 for 5 lakhs of rupees. With reduction of the poligars these two districts would be worth twice much. Other districts were worth nearly 14½ lakhs, of which Tirupati would fetch 2½ lakhs, Tiruppassur 2 lakhs, Conjeevaram 1½ lakhs, Chingleput 1 lakh, and Nellore, a little over 1 lakh. Any increase of revenues was dependent on the expulsion of the French from the forts and districts under their occupation.

the fortifying of Porto Novo and Villiyanallur on receiving the English complaint; but he would not demolish what had already been built.

On November 12, 1756, news was received of the declaration of war with France and it was immediately communicated to all the garrisons in Bengal. The Madras Government, when it sent Clive to Bengal, had reserved the power to recall him in the event of a war with France. This was necessary in view of the danger of the English situation in the Presidency. At the end of the year 1756, it was felt that the northern settlements were under the grave risk of being lost and the possessions in Arcot were barely defensible. Madura was actually possessed and Tinnevely was threatened by the rebels. Towards the end of October, Bussy and Law went to the Northern Circars; but the English factory at Vizagapatam was then protected by a warship in the roads and it was thought that the French might not attack the northern settlements at all, lest the English should attempt reprisals and prevent them from collecting their revenues as usual. The Nawab again wanted that the English should attack the killedars of Chettupattu, Elavanasur, etc. But nothing was done lest the French might come into the field with equal forces. Mahfuz Khan was again troublesome and Caillaud was ordered to march to Madura to under take the *Sisyphean* task of bringing him round; while Orme's secret negotiations with Mysore did not produce any results. Meanwhile, the strengthening of the walls and bastions of Fort St. George went on. Colonel Forde, with about 100 Europeans and 300 sepoy, went to assist the Nawab's army to expel Najibu'l-lah Khan, a brother of the Nawab and the renter of Nellore who had refused to pay his rents.

News came that a body of Frenchmen were advancing to attack the killedar of Elavanasur, because of his devastation of French territory. The killedar was killed in action subsequently, and his brother abandoned the fort into the hands of the French. The Madras Council were warned that the French disputes over Elavanasur, Udayarpalayam etc., were only to be utilised as a justification for a sudden attack on Trichinopoly and they ordered Caillaud to return immediately from Madura to his head-quarters at Trichinopoly. About the middle of May, 1757, the French

Captain, D'Auteuil, secured a sum of money from the poligar of Udayarpalayam and suddenly moved on Trichinopoly, and took his post at Worriyur. It was rumoured that about 300 of the French troops with him were planning to join the rebels at Madura. The English thereupon determined to send every available reinforcement to Trichinopoly and to engage them anywhere. Caillaud failed to secure Madura by an attempt at escalade that he made on it. Forde who had been in occupation of Nellore, joined Adlercorn who was sent to reduce the French strongholds to the south, with the help of the troops of the Nawab and of the *killedar* of Chettupattu.

(d) *The Marathas in the Carnatic*

In the beginning of April 1756, the Peshwa was encamped with a large army near Seringapatam and had taken possession of the country as far as Kolar and also seized the fort of Sira. The Marathas now demanded *chauth* from the Nawab of Cuddapah and when he resisted them, they attacked his fort, slew him and occupied his country. Balwant Rao Mehendale was reported by Ananda Ranga Pillai to have advanced to the Kadappanattam forest near Vellore, about 35 miles to the south-west of Chittoor and at the head of the Talapolla Ghat. Balwant Rao was in general charge of the Maratha operations over all the country from Cuddapah to Bednore. He was assisted by Murari Rao and opposed by all the Pathan Nawabs who proposed that all of them should combine in an alliance with the English, with the Nawab of Arcot and with the Mysoreans, not only to oppose the Marathas at this crisis, but to prevent all Maratha incursions to the south of the Krishna, in the future. In this Murari Rao now took the lead; and both he and the Nawab of Cuddapah now offered to march against Balwant Rao at Kadappanattam if the English troops would join them at that place. But the Madras Government could spare no troops and, according to the Diarist, was in reality as much afraid of them, as they were of the Marathas entering the Province.

Arcot was stuck with consternation by the arrival of the Marathas at Kadappanattam. Nawab Muhammad Ali, apprehending the incursions of some of the parties into its neighbourhood, sent the women and children of his family to Madras for safety. The Nawab of Cuddapah who marched against Balwant Rao with five or six thousand horse, could not do anything. According to Orme, Cuddapah surrendered to the Marathas after a struggle, on the 15th of July 1757; while a strong detachment of their troops invested Ambur from which they levied con-

tributions, and scoured the valley of Vaniyambadi, quite upto the gates of Vellore.

Balaji Rao Peshwa at first demanded four lakhs from the Nawab and finally reduced his demand to $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs, half of which was to be paid at once and the other half in a month. Amrit Rao, the Maratha agent, negotiated with the Nawab and was invited to Madras accompanied by the latter. The Maratha agent said that the French had offered 4 lakhs for their assistance. But it was not likely Amrit Rao saw that the English merely wanted to gain time till news from Europe should reach them as to the outbreak of war with France and strongly protested against the evasion and procrastination. Finally, it was agreed that 3,000 Maratha horse should join the English at Conjeevaram and proceeded with them to attack the French army. Murtaza Ali Khan also received Amrit Rao before the latter went to Arcot. Amrit Rao proceeded to Madras whose merchants became greatly afraid that the disaster of 1746 would befall them again and consequently sent away their goods to Pulicat and other places for safety. At that time the French controlled the whole coast from Ganjam to Masulipatam, and they seemed likely to succeed in getting control over Nellore also, as they were in alliance with Najibullah Khan, its governor. The English were very much afraid because the Khan had already given the French the trading ports of Ramapatnam and Krishnapatnam on his coast. The whole situation was now so uncertain that Ranga Pillai, the Diarist, thus remarked on the plight of Muhammad Ali: "I conclude from this agreement of Muhammad Ali Khan with Amrit Rao and his departure that he is like a betel-nut in a nut-cutter, for about 15,000 of the Nana's (Peshwa's) horse are at Satghar, Amrit Rao is near at hand with 1,000 more, and the French army is close by, engaging the English, He therefore, thinking that there would be danger in resistance, sent his wives and family to Madras and Mylapore, and himself entered into this agreement in order to escape. I do not think that he is sincere."

The English Council at Madras felt that the best method of checking the French progress would be an alliance with the Marathas, according to the Company's plan of 1755. Pondicherry became stronger by at least

1,000 men from the arrival of a French squadron, early in October; and the French had now nearly 3,000 European troops as against the 1,700 of the English, exclusive of Bussy's forces. This superiority of the French compelled the English to recall their troops to Madras and to concentrate on Trichinopoly in the south. The Madras fortifications were now pushed apace; and those of Fort St. David were also vigorously finished, while Devikottai was strengthened. The other strongholds, Arcot, Chingleput and Karunguzhi were in a good condition.

The arrival of the Chevalier de Soupire at Pondicherry, with the Regiment of Lorraine and a company of artillery, in September 1757, started preparations for a new campaign. The Nawab's position was, however, very difficult. The Pondicherry Diarist tells us that Diwan Sampat Rai who was not a *persona grata* with his master, was seized and imprisoned by the English at Madras and sent to Arcot on the ground of his intrigues with Mahfuz Khan and Najibullah Khan. Orme informs us that the Nawab left the government of Arcot, when the French troops approached it in September, in the hands of his brother Abdul Wahab who was to be assisted by Sampat Rai and Abrar Khan, the Bakshi. The confusion in Arcot was then so great that almost everybody was suspected of treason; and even Abdul Wahab was not immune from suspicions of disloyalty; and a party of sepoys seized actually Sampat Rai and put him in confinement. It was not until a few days had passed that the English could at all restore to Muhammad Ali his peace of mind; but Abdul Wahab Khan, who had retired to Chittoor in like fear of injury to himself from the other disloyal chiefs, refused to return, began to enlist troops and corresponded with the Marathas.

The situation in the south was equally bad. Caillaud evacuated Madura, leaving Yusuf Khan there; and it was feared that Mahfuz Khan and Haidar Ali with whom he had been intriguing might get forcible possession of Madura. The French began the campaign with an advance against Chettupattu, which they captured only after great loss. At the end of 1757, the situation was fairly bright for the French who occupied Tiruvannamalai and who eagerly expected the arrival of a big armament under

Count de Lally. But, in reality, there was no cooperation between Soupire and the French Governor, De Leyrit.

In February 1758, an attempt was made by the French at a demonstration against Fort St. David. But shortly before this incident there had occurred a set-back to the fortunes of the Marathas. The new Nawab of Cuddapah, who succeeded after the death of his predecessor in battle and who was also, by name, Abdul Nabi Khan, entrenched himself at Siddhout and defied Balwant Rao, who had to send a wakil to negotiate with him. Though Balwant Rao had harried the estates of the poligars of Kalahasti and Venkatagiri and himself appeared before Nellore, he had to come to an agreement with Abdul Nabi Khan, and to be content only with a share of the Cuddapah Nawabship. Murtaza Ali was helped by the troops of Abdul Wahab and by the Marathas under Amrit Rao. But in an assault on Tiruppattur, Amrit Rao was killed and this was a great misfortune for the Marathas. Abdul Wahab Khan claimed that he had received a grant of the Arcot subah for himself, and that he would be able to capture Arcot with French help and wrote to that effect to Pondicherry; he further said that he desired to receive the same treatment as had been given to Chanda Sahib formerly. But the French were expecting Lally's reinforcements and King Louis XV's orders that Raza Sahib should be appointed to the subah of Arcot and did not pay any heed to his letters.

(e)—*Lally's Siege of Madras and Further Operations 1758—61.*

The fortification works at Fort St. George were pushed on with renewed effort; and the English were eagerly expecting the arrival of Admiral Pocock on the coast. Count Lally reached Pondicherry towards the end of April 1758 and immediately afterwards ordered Soupire to help him in an attack on Fort St. David. The details of the French capture of that Fort are given by Orme and Martineau. On the 2nd of June, the fort capitulated; but very little treasure was got therefrom. Two days later, Devikottai surrendered to the French, as also the fort of Palaiyamkottai to the west of Chidambaram. Lally made a triumphant entry into Pondicherry, on the evening of the 9th June, and proceeded to a magnificent *Te Deum* and a very sumptuous entertainment. The subsequent oper-

ations of Lally against Tanjore are interesting, but cannot be detailed here. One point that has got to be noted is this. Lally in attempting to carry the advance on Tanjore, hurt the people by the cruel treatment that he meted out to them on his march from Karikal. The Dutch at Negapatam declined to grant him a loan that he wanted. Batteries were erected against the Tanjore fort early in August. But just on the morning of the day when the decisive attack was to take place, news was received that the French Admiral D'Ache had been attacked and beaten by the English ships and the latter were threatening Karikal which was the base of his operations. Though his officers were eager to make the assault, Lally suddenly made up his mind to retreat to Karikal. On the following night, he spiked his heavy guns and began the retreat. Raza Sahib who, by virtue of his father's action, had inherited a claim for 55 lakhs of rupees on the Raja of Tanjore, had accompanied Lally from Karikal to Tiruvalur. The English ordered Caillaud at Trichinopoly to join the ruler of Tanjore with all the troops that he could spare. Lawrence was asked to march from Madras to prevent assistance being sent from Pondicherry to Lally; and Admiral Pocock was to cruise off Karikal and Negapatam. Lally returned to Pondicherry in great confusion (August 28) and D'Ache was preparing to return to the Isle of France, because he had suffered severely in the recent naval action and a powerful English squadron was approaching Bombay.

Robert Palk of the Madras Council and Major General Stringer Lawrence felt that there was no particular danger to Madras at that time. Bussy had orders from Lally to join him and this was regarded as indicating a desire on the part of the French to attack Madras as soon as Pocock should leave the coast. Anyhow, since Lally's arrival the necessity of assembling all the available English forces on the Madras coast was frequently urged by the Select Committee of Fort St. George on the Councils of Bombay and Calcutta.

The fort at Madras had been stored with provisions for 5,000 men for three months, and an artillery company arrived from Bombay along with Steevens. In September 1758, Lally left Pondicherry for Wandiwash. The French soon took the forts of Chingleput, Karunguzhi and Chettupattu as well as Tiruvannamalai, Chengamma etc.

Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash submitted to Lally and made friends with him. Lally assured the Nawab's renters and others that they need not render accounts of the rents paid, or the balances due from them, to any one but himself and they might raise horse and seize all the country they could lay hands on.

The detailed events of the siege of Madras as it progressed, are recorded in the *Madras Public Department Sundry Book*, Vol. XIII, 1758-59, entitled 'Journal of Transactions during the Siege of Fort St. George'. The volume was compiled by the Secretary to Government, Josiah du Pre. It contains 461 folios, of which 161 constitute the journal proper, the remainder consisting of tabular statements and returns, and copies of letters despatched and received during the siege. A Journal maintained by Mr. John Call, the Engineer, was published in 1761 in Cambridge's '*Account of the War in India*'. There is a plan of Fort St. George and the Black Town of Madras as it was when the French siege began in December 1758. The Pondicherry Archives contain three coloured drawings of the Fort executed in 1758-59.

The French force was estimated at 3,000 Europeans, horse and foot, 500 native cavalry and 3,000 sepoys. The British garrison consisted of about 1,750 Europeans and 2,200 sepoys. The French had reached Vandalur on the 6th of December; Lawrence fell back from St. Thomas' Mount to the Choultry Plain (a suburb of Madras) on the 10th December; on the 12th, Lally cannonaded the Choultry Plain and drove in the detachments; Lawrence retreated to the Island and from it to the Fort, leaving small bodies to guard the approaches to the Black Town on the North. Captain Preston had a body of troops at Chingleput and Major Caillaud was ordered to join him from Tanjore and to operate against the enemy's line of communications.²⁴

The French forces occupied the Black Town on the 14th December. Early in the morning on the 17th February 1759 they abandoned their trenches and batteries and retreated.

(24) The Nawab was sent from Madras by sea to Negapatam, *en route* to Trichinopoly. Pigot desired to get rid of his numerous and unruly attendants. The Nawab sailed on Dec. 20, 1758.

The siege lasted 67 days; and for 46 days the defenders sustained a vigorous bombardment. The French left behind them 52 guns. The chief actions during the siege were; (1) Draper's action in Peddanaickenpetta, in the Black Town, on the 14th December; and (2) Caillaud's action near St. Thomas' Mount on the 9th February. (See Orme: Vol. II, pp. 384 *et seq.*, Book X; Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, Ch. XL; and Cambridge: *The War in India 1761*).

The French opened three batteries from the Black Town to operate on the northern face of the Fort. Further batteries that they made were not effective. The English fire was always superior to the enemy's. Throughout the siege Lally had been harassed by the detachment at the Mount under Captain Preston and Muhammad Yusuf Khan which constantly threatened his communications. Lally resolved, early in February, to attack the Mount in force and sent a detachment of 800 cavalry and 1,800 infantry, one-third of the number being Europeans, under his relative Colonel Lally, with orders to annihilate Preston. But two days before this, Caillaud who had returned from a mission to Tanjore in search of mercenaries, reached the Mount and took over the command as the senior officer. The native contingents were commanded by Muhammad Yusuf and Abdul Wahab, the Nawab's younger brother, on whom, however, little reliance could be placed. Abdul Wahab's horsemen were repulsed easily by the French cavalry and fled to Chingleput. The French put up a hot fire and their infantry repeatedly attacked the English advanced post and captured it. They, however, did not assault the main position and drew off to the Adyar river in the evening. Caillaud remained firm on his ground till 8 p.m. Caillaud's replies to queries regarding the details of this action are found in the *Orme Mss.* in the India Office—Vol. LXII. (S. C. Hill's *Catalogue of the Orme Collection*: (1916)—Orme Mss. O.V. 62 (14). In a letter, dated 28th June, 1778, Caillaud wrote to Orme that "the European cavalry had no chance with the black cavalry, *a l'arme blanche*"—which accounts for the French cavalry halting and firing with their carbines, instead of charging with the sword."

Generally it has been held that Lally's retreat from Madras was caused by the arrival of the English squadron on the coast. Six English ships were described to the

northward on February 16th; and early on the 17th, Lally abandoned his trenches and batteries and retreated. A letter from Lally to De Leyrit, dated 14th February 1759, and intercepted by Caillaud, shows that the resolution to raise the siege had been taken two days at least before the appearance of the English ships. Even in January he had received news of the approach of the English fleet and had written to Leyrit that he had no more than a month at the farthest to complete his enterprise (Leyrit's *Memoire*, p. 281). "Their opportune arrival, however hastened the enemy's retreat and doubtless saved Black Town from destruction." Lally's letter showed that he had already despaired of success and had resolved to burn the Black Town. In his hasty retreat he destroyed the powder-mills in Egmore, but left the Black Town intact. English fire had destroyed no less than 33 of the enemy's cannon and left them but few serviceable guns.

The Marathas who were invited by the English to help them in this crisis plundered Conjeevaram and other places unchecked. Pondicherry itself was now threatened by English vessels. Captain Brereton, who commanded the English troops from Madura, scaled the walls of the Conjeevaram fort, *i.e.*, its big temple. Masulipatam was lost to the French about the middle of April. Lally's conduct at Wandiwash to which he betook himself after his retreat from Madras was outrageous in many respects. He punished Raza Sahib who ran away from Wandiwash to Pondicherry without telling anybody, by giving the Arcot subah to be managed by one, Ramalinga Pillai, a petty clerk. He then advanced on Conjeevaram and attacked the English troops in occupation of it the banks of the Sarvathirtham Tank. There were about equal losses on both sides.

Lally himself was expected to return to Pondicherry; and when he did reach it, he quarrelled more outrageously than ever with De Leyrit, the Governor. His object was somehow to get money urgently for paying the troops before Wandiwash. In June the situation became worse. The sufferings of the people in Pondicherry are described in harrowing detail by Ranga Pillai. Lally tried to enlist the help of Murari Rao and hoped to secure his alliance through the influence of Father Noronha, a noted priest. The English ships were cruising on the Tanjore

coast and the alliance of the Raja of Tanjore was eagerly sought after. It was thought that Lally intended that De Leyrit should be removed from his office. Even at this moment Lally presumed to raise Raza Sahib to the *subah* of Arcot and resolved to recognise him as the Nawab. To this arrangement, De Leyrit and Desvaux would not give their consent; and Lally said that he did not care. The Diarist was surprised that the French to whom the *subah* was given by Muzaffar Jang and Salabat Jang, should themselves appoint another master to lord it over the country. Neither Lally nor his successors could enjoy the management of the country as disorder prevailed intensively

The Muhammadan management had also failed and there was no prospect of agreement. Raza Sahib was to enjoy a jaghir and also the revenue from all the country except Trichinopoly and Tanjore, as well as the *peshkash* due from the poligars and the killedars. The Diarist also heard that Basalat Jang, the younger brother of Nizam Salabat Jang, had claimed the Arcot *subah* and the country south of the Krishna as they had been given to him and that he was coming down with a body of 10,000 horse and 6,000 foot by way of Cuddapah and Nellore.²⁵

Lally proceeded with his recognition of Raza Sahib, as the Nawab; he gave the *parwana* for Tyagadrug to the son of Imam Sahib; and he held the function of the installation of Raza Sahib at a *darbar*, at which De Leyrit was also present. Unfortunately the rope of the flag-staff broke in the middle in the process of the flag-hoisting; and Ranga Pillai immediately prognosticated evil, saying that, in the people's opinion, the breaking of the flag-staff rope signified his (the Nawab's) death within a few days. Raza Sahib soon became a refugee in Ceylon.

Murari Rao agreed to send a body of 1,000 horse to help Lally. In the beginning of August 1759, some English ships appeared in the Pondicherry roads and caused great alarm. The English troops marched against Kavripakam, but were beaten twice in their attempt to advance

(25)

Burhanu'd-din tells us that Bussy met Basalat Jang at Adoni, and persuaded him to proceed to Arcot; but on Nawab Muhammad Ali sending him a letter of remonstrance, he returned to Adoni, and sent a body of 6 or 7 thousand horse belonging to him and to the Maratha jaghirdars under him, along with Bussy, under one, Dhul-faqar Jang, who was slain in the battle of Wandiwash.

on Arcot. They were driven from Tirupati by the Marathas and retired towards Arcot, intending first to take Kaveripakam and Timiri. But being fore-warned of this, the French had made careful preparations and repulsed them twice, compelling them to retreat to Conjeevaram. The English themselves were in great want of money. The net result was that, after months of manœuvring, the French cantoned their troops at Wandiwash and Chettupattu and withdrew the rest to Pondicherry; while the English troops were cantoned at Conjeevaram and Chingleput; and the only fruit of the campaign for the English seems to have been the recovery of the Conjeevaram and Tiruppassur countries. Thus there was a temporary stalemate in the situation in the Carnatic for the time being.

In September 1759 the French fleet under D'Ache landed at Pondicherry about 1,000 soldiers and 1,00 coffres; but after having quarrelled with Lally he recalled a portion of his men and went away. Bussy was ordered to proceed to Wandiwash, where there was a mutiny among the French soldiers. This was in October. In November the English threatened and surrounded Wandiwash; and on the 1st of December Lally received the news of the English capture of the place. Col. Coote, the new Commander of the Carnatic Army of the English, who had arrived at Conjeevaram towards the end of November, achieved his first victory in the capture of Wandiwash. Brereton captured its pettah by assault and being then joined by Coote, he opened batteries against the fort (29th November); and the next day Taqi Sahib, its killedar, surrendered, offering to deliver up the French garrison. The French troops also surrendered at discretion. Taqi Sahib was confined at Madras and Nawab Muhammad Ali insisted that he should be made to pay 10 lakhs of rupees, being the arrears due to himself and that he should not be released on any account.

Coote attacked Karunguzhi next, whose French garrison surrendered, while the sepoys were disarmed and set free. The loss of Karunguzhi and of Wandiwash Fort taught Lally the necessity of concentrating his forces at one place; and he consequently assembled his army at Arcot by calling in all detachments. Early in January 1760, Coote also arrived in the neighbourhood of Arcot; and both sides were busy for some days out-bidding each other for the services of Murari Rao and the body of horsemen

that he commanded. These latter were ravaging the whole country, as noted by the Pondicherry Diarist; and they did it with such success that cattle were sold at the time at the rate of 7 or 8 per rupee. At last, the Marathas, to the number of 3,000, joined the French; and thereupon Lally moved about the 10th of January from Arcot to Tiruvattur and made a feigned dash on Conjeevaram. His aim was to divert the attention of Coote, with a part of his army, while he attempted to capture Wandiwash with the remainder. Coote, in his turn, planned to wait until Lally should become fully engaged in the siege operations, which he began, and to either attack the besieging army or give battle to the covering force of Bussy. Batteries were opened against the French position at Wandiwash on the 20th of January. Next day, Coote marched from Uttaramerur; and on the 22nd, the issue was fought out. Orme tells us that when the cannonade once commenced, the brunt of the fighting fell entirely on the Europeans in both the armies; and the sardars of the sepoys of the English side complimented Coote on his victory, and "thanked him for the sight of such a battle as they had never seen." The English took 24 pieces of cannon, besides large quantities of ammunition and stores. The French lost 200 Europeans besides 160 taken prisoners, among whom was the great Bussy himself, who was permitted by Coote to proceed to Pondicherry on *parole*. In Madras, the victory caused "joy almost equal to that of Calcutta on the victory of Plassey."²⁶ The French troops fled to Chettupattu and thence to Gingee and shortly afterwards retreated towards Pondicherry. Coote secured the surrender of Chettupattu on the 29th of January; and a week later, he began the siege of Arcot which fell after a resistance of five days. On the last day of February, Tiruvannamalai surrendered to a detachment of English troops under Captain Smith; and Coote marched to Perumukkal which finally submitted on the 4th of March, though the first assault made on it was unsuccessful. This brought Coote within striking distance of Pondicherry (March, 1760).

Lally made desperate preparations for the defence of Pondicherry from which an exodus of citizens speedily

(26) The sepoys under Yusuf Khan and the cavalry under Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Abrar Khan and Abdul Wahab Khan took part in the battle.

began. A party of the English troops from before Perumukkal attacked the French and drove them to the Perumbai hill and even to the Valudavur Gate (March 1760). Bussy who had been *paroled* after Wandiwash, was asked by Coote to surrender himself, and when Lally offered to ransom him, the English General declined the ransom. So Bussy had to surrender himself and departed for Madras. Pigot said that his arrival as a prisoner in Madras would have a great effect on Indian opinion. The English captured the fort of Alamparva and proceeded against Valudavur. Early in April, Coote raised batteries against that fort; and on the 16th he took the place by escalade. The English also seized the Villiyanallur country and tied *toranams*, as a token of their occupation, right up to the bound-hedge of Pondicherry. They defeated the French troops at the Perumbai hill and tied *toranams* of occupation in Ariyankuppam also, towards the south of Pondicherry. Thus the month of April ended with the English indulging in almost daily sallies from Valudavur and with 10 or 12 of their ships cruising in the Cuddalore roads; while the Maratha general, Balwant Rao, had approached Cuddapah with a large body of horse. Lally and the Pondicherry Council were desperately trying to secure the help of Haidar Ali. At that time, Haidar Ali realised his danger from the minister, Khande Rao, who was plotting against him, and cast about to get some place of refuge immediately for his own treasures, and consequently for his own person. He preferred Tyagadrug, a strong hill-fort in the Carnatic, about 8 miles east of Kallakurichi, by reason of the difficulty of access to it from Mysore, and the impregnable nature of its fortifications.

About this time a French emissary, styling himself as the Bishop of Halicarnassus, arrived at Trichinopoly with proposals to Haidar to join the French in expelling the English from Arcot. He further told Haidar that the convention agreed upon between the English and the French in 1755 was a mere truce; and both proposed to themselves separate advantages from acceding to it. This emissary was Antonio de Noronha (1720-76) who was appointed by Chanda Sahib as governor of San Thome in 1749 and subsequently arrested by Admiral Boscawen. He later went to Europe and got the titular Bishopric of Halicarnassus. He was a pseudo-nephew of Madame Duplex.

Haidar was to send a body of 2,000 horse and 3,000 sepoys with artillery; and on their arrival at Tyagadurg, he was to be given charge of that fort as well as the neighbouring fort of Elavanasur; also he was to be paid one lakh of rupees a month for the maintenance of his troops and furnished with ammunition for use. After the Carnatic should be cleared of the English, the French were to assist him in conquering Madura and Tinnevely. If he was supplied with additional horse and sepoys, he was to receive half of the countries which would be recovered in the Carnatic, except the French Company's immediate possessions of Villiyannallur, Valudavur, Bahur and Alamparva, and Vellore which belonged to Murtaza Ali, and the district of Tiruvannamalai, which had been granted as an appanage to Raza Sahib (Orme; Vol. II, pp. 637-38). In the beginning of June, the first division of the Mysore troops under Makhdum Ali reached Tyagadurg. About the same time the Mysore forces at Dindigul commenced hostilities against the poligars dependent on Trichinopoly and wanted to seize the Nattam Pass and thus cut off connection between Trichinopoly and Madura. And the Nawab immediately sent a detachment to Madura to oppose them.²⁷

Coote had by this time captured every French fort of importance belonging to the French except Tyagadurg and Gingee. There were a number of skirmishes between the English forces and the Mysore troops. The English lost an engagement near Tiruvati and Coote tried to make up for it by demonstrations before Pondicherry. Perumbai was occupied and the Villiyannallur fort was captured in spite of some attempted relief. Makhdum Ali was received by Lally with great honour. But the Mysore troops could not save Pondicherry from its sad state. They merely worsened the famine conditions prevailing and Makhdum Ali threatened to depart to Gingee and Villupuram, if his people were not supplied with enough provisions. In August, the situation became very desperate. There were only a few days' provisions in Pondicherry. The Mysoreans marched away to Gingee and the English raised batteries to capture the Ariyankuppam fort.

(27) • The Nawab was then at Trichinopoly; he stationed a large body of troops to the north of the fort, got possession of Srirangam and issued orders to rebuild it and fortify it (*Tuzak-i-Walajah*; Part II: p. 240).

Pigot soon arrived at Valudavur with a body of 1,000 sepoys and 200 horse. In September there was increased activity from the English batteries and Lally himself despaired that since some English reinforcements had landed at Cuddalore, there would be no possibility of holding the place for more than a fortnight. The English maintained a strict blockade by land and prevented provisions from reaching Pondicherry. However, a large body of Balaji Rao's horse appeared from Mysore in the upper Carnatic. The French made large offers to persuade the Marathas to enter the Carnatic plain and compel the English to raise the siege; but the Nawab was induced to send his wakil with powers to treat and so saved the English from that danger. Karikal had been meanwhile demolished; and the Nawab had been invited to go to Madras as it was thought that the army would be better supplied with provisions and other requirements would be complied with more readily if he should be at the Presidency. He joined the camp before Pondicherry.

By the middle of December, Steevens reached Pondicherry with five ships and two others arrived from Trincomali. There were already five ships in the roads to help the blockade and to shut out all supplies by sea. But on January 1, 1761, a violent gale arose in which three ships foundered and three others were driven ashore and one was not at all heard of. But the French could take no advantage of this set back. A week later Cornish joined Steevens with 7 more vessels. The damaged ships were repaired and made ready for an action with the enemy's squadron if it should appear. Pigot proceeded to the scene in order to vindicate the Company's rights (9th January). The next day a heavy battery opened fire on the north-west bastion. On the 15th an advanced battery was opened within 500 yards of the walls. The same evening Lally sent out envoys with offers to surrender the fort. On the morning of the 16th Coote's Grenadiers took possession of the Villiayanallur Gate and on the 17th the fort and the citadel were delivered up to the victors and the English flag was hoisted. Coote would not subscribe on his own authority to the articles presented by the enemy. He took possession of Pondicherry in the name of the King; but Pigot claimed its delivery into the hands of the Company. There was some acrimonious discussion over

this dispute. A special council consisting of Coote and Steevens and the officers of the army and the navy sat to discuss this issue. Governor Pigot of Madras insisted on the Company's right of possession of the place²⁸, maintained that it should be given up to the Presidency and threatened to stop supplies to the troops unless delivery was made over to him. Pigot received the place into his possession on the 24th January and immediately issued orders for the demolition of all its fortifications; and he appointed six commissaries to take charge of the booty, of whom three represented the King's naval and military forces and three those of the Company. By the end of February, the English Engineer Call who was in charge of the demolition of the works wrote:—"Though the circumference of the Fortifications, exclusive of the Citadel, is less than four miles in brick work, yet I hope such diligence will be used that the Bastions, Curtains and all public buildings of the French Company will be ruined in three months." By October of that year the Madras Council reported that "Pondicherry is entirely destroyed as are all its neighbouring Forts and Places."²⁹

The siege of Pondicherry cost the English 11 lakhs of pagodas. The Nawab had returned to Arcot after the siege of Madras was over and laboured hard to repopulate it. Burhanu'd-din says, that the Nawab left Mir Asadullah Khan as his *naib* in Arcot and came to the camp of Coote. Later, he was present during some of the operations of the army before Pondicherry and offered to give Raza

(28) Pigot claimed that he demanded the cession under the King's Patent of January, 14, 1758.

(29) Pigot had advocated an even more thorough destruction of Pondicherry; and according to the Minutes of Consultations, Vol. XVI, Madras, 13th April 1761, he strenuously urged in the Council that the circumstances of Lally's behaviour during the siege operations of Madras were "sufficient by the Laws of Retaliation, to justify the utter demolition of Pondicherry."

After Lally's siege of Madras was raised, Muhammad Ali paid for the cost of its defence, "because it was the residence of his friends." After Coote's capture of Pondicherry, he was asked to pay for its siege on the ground that it was the residence of his enemies. The Nawab agreed to pay, but wanted the stores of Pondicherry to be given over to him. But the Court of Directors sent orders to cancel the sum thus credited. For the destruction effected see M. V. Labernadie: *Histoire de Une Ville Colonial Francaise* (1936); and H. de Clossets D'Errey: *Precis Chronologique de l. Histoire de L'Inde Francaise* (1664-1816).

Sahib a jaghir. Raza Sahib, however, escaped in one of the several boats that sailed away from Pondicherry in the days of the great storm referred to above. He is said to have escaped first to Negapatam and thence to Ceylon. Burhanu'd-din says that on Friday the 16th January, 1761, immediately after the early morning prayer, the Nawab got upon his elephant known as 'Fatah-Lashkar' and which he had been using since the days of his help to the English at Fort St. David in 1748, and reaching the surrendered gateway of Pondicherry, he got the keys from the French Sardars, and installed the Walajahi banner. (*Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, II Part. Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar. pp. 269-70.)

The Nawab is further held to have himself begun the dismantling of the Pondicherry Fort and taken away two bricks from it, one of which he threw into the sea and the other he sent away to Trichinopoly; and he addressed the English sardars thus: "In former days I obeyed the commands of my father and preserved Dewnampattan (Fort St. David) and freed Channapattan (Madras) from the treacherous hands of the French, but now I have captured the fort of Phulcheri as a punishment for the subjugation of Chennapattan and I have destroyed it as a reparation for their attack on Dewnampattan. I have thus done my duty to the English. I grant this fort of Phulcheri to the English Company so that they may prosper in business."

So much for the boasting of the Nawab who conveyed the news of the capture of Pondicherry and his own share therein to the Emperor Shah Alam with a costly *nazar*. This however happened only in 1765.

The supplies of money from Bengal during the siege operations of Pondicherry enabled the English to keep the army in the field. The Nawab's wakil had to promise the Marathas 10 lakhs of rupees in order to wean them away from accepting the French offer. In their Despatch to the Company of 2nd October 1761, the Madras Government declared that they required of the Nawab payments amounting to 50 lakhs for the year 1761-62, which was "more than would have been demanded but for the financial situation". They however feared that so large a demand might lead the Nawab to oppress the country. But

if it should be paid and no abnormal expenditure be incurred, his balance would be reduced.

The British troops had, however, again to take the field to assist the Nawab in collecting tributes from the poligars. The resistance of Vellore was the first obstacle. Its killeddar made a gallant defence, but surrendered towards the end of 1761. The army next marched against Nellore, where Najibullah Khan, its killeddar and the half-brother of the Nawab, had been giving trouble for a number of years. When his own fort was taken, he took refuge with the poligar of Udayagiri; but the latter delivered him up on being threatened with destruction. This put an end to the disturbances in the Nellore country. As usual, the poligars of Venkatagiri, of Kalahasti and of Karveti, quickly compromised for their payments. In this campaign the expenses of the army were not defrayed before the disbursement of the collections took place. The Nawab agreed to pay for the Vellore *jaghir*, 180,000 rupees for the current year. He put forward huge demands on the Ruler of Tanjore, and the Company felt that as the Tanjore country was protected by the English successes, it must contribute towards the cost of the war. The Madras Council advised the Nawab to negotiate with the Raja and offered themselves as mediators and to guarantee the terms settled. The Raja's pleading of inability was "as exaggerated as the Nawab's claims".

Arni was reduced because its jaghirdar, Tirumal Rao, was refractory. The army was cantoned at Chidambaram on the Tanjore frontier partly as a threat held out to the Raja of Tanjore. Du Pre, one of the Madras Council, was sent to Tanjore to negotiate between the Raja and the Nawab. According to the terms which were guaranteed by the Company, the Rajah was to pay 22 lakhs of rupees in full payment of all arrears, and 4 lakhs per annum as subsidy. The Rajah subsequently agreed to pay 5 lakhs more as presents, of which 4 lakhs were to go to the Nawab. The terms included that the killeddar of Arni should be restored to his jaghir. The Nawab wanted to oust the killeddar of Satgadh, a fort about 35 miles west of Vellore, for the better security of the Carnatic. Of course the killeddar surrendered before a threatened attack by the British troops. This was in the beginning of 1763. By this time the Treaty

of Paris had been concluded which ended the war. But the troubles from Yusuf Khan at Madura began a new chapter in the book of troubles for the Nawab and English.

(f) *Continued Troubles in Madura and Tinnevelly
Yusuf Khan's Rule.*

It was already seen that there had been a continuous state of rebellion among the Madura renters and poligars even before 1754 when Nawab Muhammad Ali came into a fairly secure possession of Trichinopoly. Madura and Tinnevelly had been lately in the hands of Alam Khan, an adherent of Chanda Sahib and, after his death, under his partisan, one Mohiu'd-din Miana, known to Orme as Moodemiah.³⁰ The Nawab persuaded the Madras Government to send Col. Heron to subdue and pacify the country (February 1755). Heron was associated with Mahfuz Khan and strengthened by a force sent by the Tondaiman Raja of Pudukottah. Heron went beyond the terms of his commission and allied himself with the Setupati of Ramnad, which was not to the liking of the rulers of Pudukottah and Tanjore, both of whom were then very friendly with the English Company. Consequently Governor Pigot who was anxious not to give offence to these rulers, refused to ratify the alliance with Ramnad, recalled Heron

(30) The Mianas were an Afghan clan; and according to Sir J. N. Sarkar, (*vide*, his '*House of Shivaji*,' Chap. IV) entered Mughal service under Jahangir, who took into his favour Bahlol Khan Miana. Bahlol made a name in the Deccan as a soldier of fortune, fighting now on the side of Vijayanagar, defending Vellore against the Adil Shahis in 1647 and subsequently entering Bijapur service. His two sons succeeded one after another to the title of Bahlol Khan, as numbers 2 and 3. The son of the younger brother (*i.e.* Bahlol Khan III) came to be known as Bahlol IV who was wazir of Bijapur from 1675-77. A younger son of Bahlol Khan III got the fief of Cuddapah and he was called Abdul Nabi Khan. This Abdul Nabi's grandson was slain by the Marathas and the latter's son lost half of his estate to the Marathas and finally the whole of it to Hyder Ali. Bahlol Khan IV had two sons, one of whom became a Moghal mansabdar with the title of Dilir Khan and subsequently the faujdar of Savanur and Bankapur. Dilir Khan's brother succeeded to the title and his son Abdul Majid was given the title of Sitwat Jang by Nasir Jang, and he had a son by name Abdul Hakim Khan.

A relation of Bahlol Khan III, by name Husain Miana, became the faujdar of Kopbal and took a prominent part in the wars between the Mughals and the Marathas. The Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah, Savanur—Bankapur and Kurnool were thus closely related together.

Perhaps Moodemiah *i.e.* Muhu'd-din Miana was one of the clan of the well-known Mianas. Moodemiah is spelt Mantimiya; he was closely associated with Nabi Khan, perhaps another of the Miana clan. Mantimiya was in charge of Madura, while Nabi Khan was in charge of the Tinnevelly country. (See page 48 of W. Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts*, Vol. II).

and charged him with breach of orders and misappropriation of funds. Heron sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the Kallars in the Nattam Pass; and Mahfuz Khan was appointed by the Nawab as the renter of Madura and Tinnevely, as he had shown indications of military ability.

Mahfuz Khan's administration was, however, a failure. The poligars were turbulent and the adherents of Alam Khan organised a regular confederacy of resistance, while disturbances broke out in Tinnevely. Consequently, the Madras Government sent Yusuf Khan as the commandant of a sepoy army, along with a Kallar force from Pudukottah. Yusuf Khan who was deemed to be the ablest of the Indian soldiers who fought in the Carnatic Wars, had early entered the service of the Nawab and risen to be a subhadar in his army. Orme had fully dealt with his services to the English in the wars of 1752-58 and in the siege of Madras in the years 1758-59, as well as in the subsequent work that he did in the south country down to his death in 1764.

When Yusuf Khan was sent to Madura in the beginning of 1756, he succeeded in subduing many of the poligars and in persuading Mahfuz Khan to return to Madura from Tinnevely. But as Mahfuz Khan possibly connived at the rebellious conduct of his troops in Madura which turned out the Company's sepoys from the fort, the English had to act promptly; and they got from the Nawab the right to collect rents from Madura and Tinnevely for a period of three years and appointed Titarappa Mudali, as renter of Madura in supersession of Mahfuz Khan. In January 1757, Captain Caillaud marched to Madura to help the new renter to take possession of the districts; but he failed in both his attempts to storm the fort of Madura and it was only by negotiating with the jamadars of Mahfuz Khan who were in occupation and promising them their arrears of pay, that he succeeded in occupying the town. For some time the Council at Madras even thought of abandoning the two districts altogether, because they deemed that the necessity of protecting the Carnatic against the French menace would compel them to withdraw both Yusuf Khan and Caillaud. Troubles continued in one form or another throughout the years 1756 and 1757. Yusuf Khan was, indeed, quite successful with the Wes-

tern Poligars of Tinnevely; but there was no good understanding between him and the renter; and Mahfuz Khan was all that time engaged in plundering the district of Tinnevely and in negotiating with the ruler of Travancore for an alliance.³¹ He endeavoured to secure by treachery the fort of Palamcottah and sought to strengthen himself at Madura and to induce Haidar Ali Khan and Nizam Ali Khan, brother of the Nizam Salabat Jung, to give him support.

Nawab Muhammad Ali grew anxious at this increasing truculence of Mahfuz Khan and authorised Yusuf Khan to march to Madura and set things right there. Yusuf got possession of the fort of Madura without bloodshed and Mahfuz Khan abandoned Palamcottah and Tinnevely and took shelter in the west country with the powerful Puli Tevar of Nelkattumsevel. After capturing Puli Tevar and putting him to death, Yusuf Khan contrived to have Mahfuz Khan interned in the fort of Palamcottah. Governor Pigot realised that Mahfuz Khan should leave the Tinnevely country and he was persuaded to do so by the Tondaiman of Pudukottah, while the Nawab pardoned Mahfuz Khan for his past misconduct and received him with favour at Trichinopoly. The surrender of Madura by the rebels to Yusuf Khan was very significant, because on the very same day French reinforcements under Soupire landed at Pondicherry and to meet the new danger the troops in Madura could be set free. The necessity of reorganising the administration of Madura and Tinnevely became acute. Titarappa's period of tenure was drawing near its end. He could not agree with Yusuf Khan who alone could collect the revenue from the turbulent poligars. Orme recommended that Yusuf Khan should be given almost autocratic power on condition of his paying a small but fixed revenue. Caillaud stressed on his honesty and

(31) Mahfuz Khan was in the plot of the jamadars to force from the Nawab their alleged arrears of pay and was suspected of having induced them to double their demand. He had also imprisoned the officers of the Company's sepoys till he had turned their men out of the fort. Yusuf Khan now marched from Tinnevely to quell the mutiny and watched the course of events from Sikandarmalai. It was only with great difficulty that Caillaud could persuade Mahfuz Khan and Barkatulla, the governor of Madura, to agree to terms. There was also a dispute between the Renter and Yusuf Khan as to the payment of his troops. Even then Yusuf Khan was suspected of fomenting troubles, in secret league with Mahfuz Khan; while the revolt was caused by Yusuf's disrespectful behaviour to his women-folk. (Country Correspondence, 1757 Fort St. George Records).

energy and on his capacity to manage the situation.³² After some negotiations during which Yusuf Khan was asked to take both Madura and Tinnevely and the Nawab came to feel himself slighted by Yusuf, the latter was called away to Madras in the last quarter of 1758 for helping in the impending siege. The Nawab was naturally anxious to make Yusuf Khan dependent on and answerable only to himself. But Pigot and the English Council thought otherwise and the Nawab was vexed over the whole affair which was marred by a series of misunderstandings.³³

It was after the seige of Madras by Lally (in the course of which the Khan greatly distinguished himself, particularly in Caillaud's engagement with the French near St. Thomas' Mount on February 9, 1759) and his subsequent charge of the Madura country (1759—64) that the Khan came to be alienated from and openly hostile to the Nawab and the English.

The Khan proceeded to Trichinopoly after Lally's siege of Madras was over; and he now planned to complete his unfinished work of subjugating the Madura and Tinnevely countries of which he had been in charge from 1756, consequent on the failure of Mahfuz Khan, the elder brother of Nawab Muhammad Ali, to govern them effectively. He had also now approached the end of the triennium for which the charge of the districts had been got by the Madras Council from the Nawab. The Council had informed

(32) Caillaud wrote to the Madras Council on 16-12-1756—"But certainly if we are obliged to recall Yusuf Khan, the country is lost. He wrote again, on 4-8-1756, after the capture of Madura from the rebels that "Yusuf Khan is the proper man to command in that place (Madura) and rent the country round it."

(33) "From a letter from the Nawab it would appear that Yusuf Khan had boasted that he would obtain the Rentership for himself if he could only get the consent of Mr. Pigot; upon which account the Nawab begged Mr. Pigot to make him understand that, if he got the Rentership at all, it would be by the permission of the Nawab, and that he would have to comply with the Nawab's wishes. A little later when Yusuf Khan was recalled to take his part in the defence of Madras against Lally, he was ordered to leave the collection of revenue in the hands of his agents. Thus a final decision was again postponed, the Nawab nominating one man as Renter and Yusuf Khan proposing another, their mutual relations not being improved by the process or by the exhortations of Mr. Pigot to the Nawab to accept Yusuf Khan as the only man capable of filling the post, or by his reminders to Yusuf Khan that the country belonged to the Nawab and that proper respect was due to him as its ruler." (S. C. Hill: *Yusuf Khan—The Rebel Commandant*, (1914) p. 17).

the Nawab that he was not entitled to any arrears of rent from these districts, as the cost of their administration had greatly exceeded the revenue realised from them. Yusuf Khan now proposed to rent them for four years, at five lakhs for the first year and six for the remaining three, and offered to maintain at his own charge the troops necessary for maintaining their internal security, stipulating, however, that he should be reimbursed for such expenses as might have to be incurred for their defence against any external attack. He now came to realise that the new officers of the English Government were coming to be influenced by the insinuations and charges of his enemies. He was the nominee of the Madras Council and ruling over territories that legally belonged to the Nawab and contrary to his wish. His governorship was naturally vigorous and he reduced all the turbulent poligars, without an exception, to obedience, though it proved a very difficult task, even for him, to subdue Puli Tevar. Mon. Marchand,³⁴ a gallant young Frenchman, who served under Yusuf Khan during his governorship of Madura, has given in his 'Precis Historique', details of the Khan's methods of administration and army organisation. But his tenure of the governorship—rather rentership as it should be technically termed—was contrary to and despite the wishes of the Nawab; and even the Madras Council which was then quite favourable to him, did not care to grant it for more than one year at a time in the face of the expressed wishes of the Nawab. Pigot had to write to the Nawab on one occasion (June 1760) that "Yusuf" is as good a man as Mr. Smith (Captain Joseph Smith), I will answer for it, and if he wants arms, they are to defend your country and add to your honour. If I can procure him any, he shall have them, and I will answer for his being a good servant to you." On his own part, Yusuf Khan feared that when Pigot should leave for England, he would have no friends at all on whom he could rely for support; and he was naturally anxious to have his affairs settled in good time as otherwise he would be ruined. The Nawab had to give way to Pigot's persistence and to allow Yusuf Khan to continue in his post just for another year (1761-62). Difficulties soon

(34) He had previously served under Law and Bussy, then commanded the French troops with the Rajah of Tanjore and rose to be second in command to the Khan.

cropped up over the payment of the revenue which the Nawab desired should be sent directly to his representatives at Trichinopoly. He also complained that Yusuf Khan was building a fort south of the Nattam Pass, which would block the direct southern road from Trichinopoly; but the Madras Military Consultations of 24th December 1760, apparently acquiesced in the Khan's measure, because of a report made to the Council that the pass was blocked owing to private quarrels between the local poligars; and it therefore condoned Yusuf Khan's proceeding as being only a necessary measure of precaution.

(g) *Yusuf Khan's Rebellion and End 1763—64.*

Even before the fall of Pondicherry in January 1761, Yusuf, was allowed to entertain 30 French prisoners in his own service, an engagement which Orme considered was not likely to bring them into conflict with their own countrymen. As early as June 1761, Pigot had ordered Yusuf Khan to pay his rent direct to the Nawab and to hoist the flag of the latter, instead of that of the Company, on the forts of Madura and Palamecottah. In August, Pigot again wrote, this time to the Nawab, asking him to confirm Yusuf Khan in the rentership and asking Messrs. Bouchier and Du Pre, who were at the Nawab's court as deputies from his Council on this affair to press him to accept those terms. The Nawab, however, demanded a much higher rent than was offered. The Madras Council resolved, on the 8th of October, as follows: "With regard to the letting out of the Tinnevelly and Madura countries Yusuf Khan hath ever proved himself a faithful servant to the Company and has on frequent occasions manifested his attachment to their interest. Such a person the Board would wish to hold the management of these countries at least until the Nawab has somewhat reduced his debt to the Company. It is therefore agreed that he be recommended in the strongest terms to the Nawab as the properest person to be continued in Madura and Tinnevelly, and at the same time to remind him that much is owing to the conduct and good management of Yusuf Khan in bringing these countries to the state they are now in. We do not mean that they should be let for less than their real value; at the same time we think it necessary to desire the Nawab not to insist on such terms as Yusuf Khan must be obliged to reject." Pigot wrote to his deputies that the peace of the country was entirely due to the Khan.

The English Council finally recommended that the Nawab should give the rentership to Yusuf Khan for the current year (1761-62) although Titarappa Mudali had offered a higher sum. Pigot however insisted that Yusuf Khan should be prepared to receive English garrisons at Madura and at Palamcottah in order "to humour the Nawab and to show some attention to his repeated assertions of Yusuf Khan's intention to make himself independent."³⁵ In January 1762, the Council definitely informed Yusuf Khan that the rents should be paid to the Nawab and not to the English officer commanding the garrison at Trichinopoly. It was from now that Yusuf Khan began his preparations for a positive rebellion though, for some months more, he kept his counsels to himself.

It is possible that Mr. Robert Palk (Governor of Madras, November 1763—January 1767) to whom Sir John Malcolm ascribes the distinct change of attitude on the part of the Madras Council towards Yusuf Khan, was responsible for this sudden transformation of the attitude of the Council in a manner that should have been very astonishing to the soldier. Palk, though he did not succeed to the Governorship, actually, until the end of 1763, had been wielding great influence in the Council even in the last two years of Pigot's administration. He was believed to have exercised some mastery over Pigot who was very indolent and easy-going and was commonly reputed to dislike the dominance of the military element in the administration.

Suspicious of Yusuf's attitude were entertained by the English Council even when Pigot was in office. A Despatch of the Council, dated November 9, 1762, recorded that the troops which had recently arrived in a ship at Tellicherry and which were afraid of proceeding further by sea, because of French squadron sighted off Galle in Ceylon, and were first asked to march overland, were now ordered not to do so on account of the suspicions entertained of Yusuf Khan's defection.³⁶ By May 1763, i.e.,

(35) This was the first public expression of the English mistrust of him and it was naturally very annoying to him. He had paid the rent amount only to the English officer at Trichinopoly.

(36) Maudave, who had a commission from the Council of Mauritius to represent the French cause in India and was negotiating with the Indian princes, sent Flacourt who treated with the Khan in June, 1762,

some months before Mr. Palk became Governor it was well known at Madras that the suspicions entertained of Yusuf Khan's intended treachery and rebellion were all of them real, as he had then definitely thrown off his allegiance to the English and was endeavouring to achieve his independence. Every means had been tried before this to induce him to go to Madras in order to settle matters with the Nawab regarding his arrears, but in vain. The Madras Council was, however, unaware of his actual negotiations with Maudave; but he was not sure of their ignorance. The Council had ordered stores and ammunition to be collected at Trichinopoly and the troops to proceed to that place. Yusuf Khan now hoisted French colours and openly declared himself to be their friend and ally. He plundered part of the Travancore country and forced its ruler to come to terms, though the latter had practically promised the Madras Council to assist them when the Company's troops should take the field.³⁷

-
- (37) Letter, written on Yusuf Khan's writing to him on hearing of his intended departure for England thus:—"I beg you, Honourable Sir, to settle my affairs in good time, for I am quite ruined and have no other friends at all." (I.O. Records, Home Miscellaneous, No. 103)—Lindsay's *Narrative of Transactions since 1759 between the Nawab of Arcot etc.* See also I.O. Records, H. Misc.:—Extracts prepared by A. G. Gardew from the Madras Records relating to Yusuf Khan, from June 1759 to October 1764; and a Tamil ballad, entitled "War of Khan Sahib" extracts from which were supplied to Mr. S. C. Hill by Mr. Ranganaswami Naidu, and an abstract of which by J. V. S. Pope was brought out in 1911. These picture the Khan's relations with the English and the services that he rendered to them before his rebellion: Also S. C. Hill—*Yusuf Khan, the Rebel commandant* (1914).

Sir John Malcolm, in writing of the change in the English Council's attitude towards Yusuf Khan, says that "this gallant soldier, no doubt became a rebel to the prince he served, but he may be deemed in some respects the victim of those disputes for power which ran so high, at this period, between the English and the Nabob. Mr. Pigot according to Muhammad Ali, had forced Muhammad Esoof upon him as the manager of the countries of Madura and Tinnevely and by his support and countenance, encouraged him in acts of contumacy and disobedience. Educated the Vellore Subadar had been, and knowing that the real power was vested in the English, he appears to have looked exclusively to them, and to have paid little attention to one he considered as having no more than a nominal authority. But the departure for England of his friend, Mr. Pigot, and the succession of Mr. Palk, whose policy conceded to the Nabob the real dominion of his country, left Muhammad Esoof without hope; and, in the desperate struggle he made for his life, the former faithful soldier of the English not only corresponded with their enemies, the French, against whom he so often and so gallantly fought, but declared himself the subject, and displayed in his fort and country the banners of that nation. This last act of his life has not deprived his memory of the honours that belong to it, as the bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India."

When M. Maudave who had served as a colonel under Lally returned from Europe with a commission from the Council of Mauritius "to represent France in India, to make an effort to resuscitate the French party among the Indian Princes and to give the English as much trouble as possible," and got some little success with the Rajah of Tanjore who had already in his service a small body of Frenchmen, Marchand offered his services to him and was appointed to take command of the troops there. Maudave started an extensive correspondence with Haidar Ali, the Nizam, the Portuguese at Goa and the Malabar chiefs. He was asked by the Rajah of Tanjore to open negotiations with Yusuf Khan whose inimical feelings towards the Nawab were well known and whose friendship with the English was waning. He sent first Mallet and then Flacourt to Madura; the treaty with Yusuf Khan was negotiated by Flacourt after Mallet had been despatched to Mysore with money from Yusuf Khan to extricate Hugel, as Haidar Ali had become disgusted with the unfulfilled promises of the French adventurer. The date of the treaty with Yusuf Khan is given as July 1762. It is certain that, perhaps, Yusuf Khan obtained a promise of French assistance at that date; but Mr. S.C. Hill doubts whether he ever acknowledged allegiance to France then. Marchand arrived at Yusuf Khan's camp in January 1763; from his *Precis*,³⁸ we learn that Khan Sahib felt that he was not strong enough single-handed to oppose Muhammad Ali and the English. he tried therefore to draw the French to his side by convincing them that it was the sole method by which they could reestablish themselves in the Peninsula."

Maudave asked Marchand to demand that the Khan Sahib should "do homage for the kingdom of Madura to the French, who would be its actual sovereigns and of whom he would be the viceroy, explaining to him that it was under this ægis only that he could be sheltered from the blows which Muhammad Ali and the English would

Sunka Rama, the dubash of Orme, writing to the latter (in London) in November 1763, stresses on "the forgetfulness of the Madras Council in regard to the meritorious services of Muhammad Yusuf against whom they have sent an army, by the persuasion of the Nabob."

(38) *Precis Historique des Deux Sicques de la Ville de Madure* (Paris 1771.)

not fail to deal him." When Yusuf Khan heard this proposal mooted by Marchand, he flew into a rage and "poured forth a thousand imprecations upon me and all my nation" and even had him shut up in prison for a time.

Maudave had been planning an elaborate combination of forces hostile to English dominance. He intended to write to Mauritius for reinforcements and a fleet, to induce Yusuf Khan to supply the necessary funds and to collect all the available Frenchmen scattered throughout South India, in Madura. He wrote to the Mauritius Council that it would be enough if they were to send him 500 European troops. His idea was that all these Frenchmen should combine with Yusuf Khan's army and march towards Trichinopoly so as to draw the whole of the English forces towards that place; while the fleet which was to be sent from Mauritius was to make a sudden dash on Madras, which he expected would be absolutely defenceless, and the rulers of Tanjore and Mysore would be at least passive spectators, if not active helpers. The plan looked feasible enough and even realisable to some extent. Yusuf Khan's army was composed of the two strong garrisons stationed in Madura and Palamecottah, besides a flying or moving force and including the troops scattered about the country, probably numbered about 10,000 sepoys, 2,000 Moor horsemen, 400 to 600 European troops including a small body of cavalymen, Topasses and Coffres and a small park of artillery. He could also command an indefinite number of Kallar fighters, as well as a full supply of labourers numbering several thousands for pushing on his fortifications, while the country people were obviously in his favour; and even if he could not face the English troops effectively in the field, he could contrive to prolong operations and secure favourable terms in the end for himself.

Mr. Hill thinks that Yusuf Khan could have marched on Trichinopoly, even if he had got only the Tanjore contingent of Maudave; but the latter was not prepared to take such a risk. Nawab Muhammad Ali sensed very early that Trichinopoly was in great danger of attack both from Yusuf Khan and from Haidar Ali; but the Madras Council first advised him to come and stay in Madras itself and merely warned Preston, the commander at Trichinopoly, to be on the watch for the emissaries of Maudave whom they suspected of wishing to join Haidar Ali. Yusuf Khan knew that his friends at Madras were few in

number; and he was afraid of the Nawab's great influence which was exercised against him; moreover, he was dissuaded by the wily Tanjore ruler from adopting such an attitude. While Murtaza Ali, who had been recently deprived of Vellore and was being detained as a prisoner at Arcot, also wrote to the same effect, saying that the term of office of his friend, Mr. Pigot, was very nearly over and that he would do well to seek the protection of his successor Mr. Palk, who had abandoned the profession of Chaplain for that of Governor and who, he insinuated, might be accessible to bribes. Of course, Yusuf Khan knew how little his chances of reconciliation with the Madras Council had become and wrote to Mr. Pigot a long letter, in which he recounted his services, described his present difficulties, declared that the first moneys that he could get, he would pay towards the arrears of his troops and very cleverly hinted at the possibility of his being unable to go to Madras owing to these difficulties and humbly begged to be excused in such a case, which, however, would be most disagreeable to himself. The letter was dated 20th of September 1762. The Council was already aware of Yusuf's rebellious plans. In January 1763, as we saw, he was joined by Marchand with the contingent from Tanjore. In the following month the Raja of Travancore made an agreement with Yusuf Khan, promised an asylum to his wife and exchanged valuable presents, offering to send a body of troops with horse and ammunition into the Madura country, in case he was attacked by the English. The Rajah confessed that he had been compelled to make an agreement with Yusuf Khan and tried to convince the Madras Council that they could expect nothing from him, though the latter tried to persuade him to make a diversion by attacking Tinnevely. The Rajah of Tanjore maintained, in a letter of March 1763, that on the conclusion, in the previous year, of the treaty between himself and the Nawab, he had disbanded some of his sepoys and having had as yet no suspicion of Yusuf Khan's intended treachery, he had allowed them to go to him, but would not send any more assistance to him, but he was not going to give any active assistance to the Nawab either³⁹.

(39) Lawrence who had taken up the management of the operations from Trichinopoly, wrote in April 1763 that "by the daily reinforcements he receives from the French at Tranquebar and Negapatam and Haidar Naik's army, he should become too powerful for us to subdue, and like another Chanda Sahib lay the foundations of a ten

The progress of the preparations for Yusuf Khan's rebellion was marked by the defection of the Maravars from his side and the abandonment of the Nattam Pass which controlled the approaches to Madura from the north. The two sieges of Madura which resulted have been well described by Mr. Hill and Mr. Nelson, the latter basing his account on the *memoir* furnished by Ponnuswami Thevan and another by a Muhammadan gentleman. The final fall of Madura is furnished in the *Journal* of the second siege of Madura, written by Colonel Charles Campbell and in Marchand's *Precis Historique* which is an elaborate apology for and justification of his own share in the rebellion. The first siege of Madura began on the 15th of September 1763 and was raised after 52 days of open trenches, on the night of 6-7 November 1763. The besiegers withdrew to their winter camp; several fights followed in the open country in the next six months, during which the English received reinforcements from Bombay and Bengal. The trenches were reopened and the siege operations began again on the 1st May 1764. The English delivered an assault on the 26th June; and Major Preston was mortally wounded in assault.

Yusuf Khan was able to stand the blockade for several months, and though he was willing to capitulate, he did not really expect any honourable treatment himself. Campbell's *Journal* contains a full account of the negotiations and of Yusuf Khan's letters to Madras. Marchand held that the adamant attitude of the Madras Council in demanding from Yusuf Khan a complete surrender at discretion should be ascribed wholly to the persuasions of Nawab Muhammad Ali, who averred that in money alone the rebellion has cost a crore of rupees and that so long as the Khan was alive, there would always be disturbances in the country. It was feared that Yusuf Khan might secretly cut his way out of the the fort, although a man of his nature would not care to do so. Marchand, who was insulted in public on one occasion by Yusuf Khan openly striking him with his riding whip, helped in fomenting a conspiracy among Yusuf Khan's native officers, by

years' war, which will not only immediately stop the Nawab's payments towards clearing his debt, but entail again the whole burden of expense upon the Company." He concluded with this remarkable warning:—"I regard the Company's possessions on this Coast in more imminent danger than they have long been exposed to, and unless the Gentlemen at Bombay make a speedy effort to reinforce us I see not how the misfortunes we have to apprehend can be avoided.

which he was to be prevented from escaping and handed over to the Nawab. In this the chief leader was Srinivasa Rao, who was Yusuf's Diwan or chief adviser and who was later on deprived of his eye-sight by order of the victorious Nawab. On the 13th of October 1764, the conspirators, headed by Srinivasa Rao and Baba Sahib and Marchand, forcibly captured the person of Yusuf Khan, bound him with his own turban, though he begged them to kill him rather than hand him over to the Nawab. Marchand now communicated with the English camp the fact of the Khan's imprisonment; and his surrender to the Nawab was soon effected. The Nawab wrote that on the 15th of October "the rebel was hung at 5 o'clock in the evening on a large mango tree on the Dindigul road." His body was dismembered and exposed in parts in Tanjore, Palamcottah and Tinnevely, and his head, like that of Chanda Sahib, was sent to Trichinopoly. His death closed for long all higher service in the British army to all Indian soldiers, and specially to natives of Madras.

Thus the miserable episode of Yusuf Khan's rebellion ended. The Nawab had been deemed to be the principal enemy of the Khan; and Lawrence, the English Commander, was only an ally. When Lawrence, issued a proclamation from Trichinopoly, dated 8th July, 1763, that the Europeans in the service of Yusuf Khan would be treated as rebels, Maudave pointed out that Frenchmen were not English subjects and that, whether the English and the French were at peace or war, such a declaration was unjustifiable. Lawrence had been given a free hand by the Madras Council and objected to Yusuf Khan being sent, if captured, to Madras; and he declared that he ought to be made over to the Nawab whose dominions he had usurped. The Council agreed, in its Consultations of the 1st of August, 1763, that they thought he would be "a dangerous man to be entrusted in the hands of the Nawab, if his intentions are to make him a state prisoner; but if it be agreeable to you to order the commanding officer to execute him upon the first tree in the sight of the army, it will be quite satisfactory to us."

On the 19th August 1763, news reached the Presidency of the signing of the definitive Treaty of Paris on the 10th February preceding. Maudave represented to the Mad-

ras Council that "their preparations against Madura appeared opposed to the spirit of the peace happily concluded in Europe." He further contended that he had no power to hand over Madura to the English, nor ask the French detachment to leave Madura, contrary to the wish of Yusuf Khan, "as the least sign of any desire on their part to do so would have been the signal of a dreadful massacre". He further pleaded though he made war on the English after the announcement of the peace, it was "only in the strict observance of a legitimate defence and after having exhausted all means of persuading them to make use of the path of gentleness and conciliation."

On their side the English argued that the treaty put an end to all engagements into which Maudave had entered with Yusuf Khan, and their preparations against the Fort of Madura were in no way opposed to the spirit of the treaty, and they were not bound to await the arrival of the Commissaries of the two Crowns to reduce Yusuf Khan to his loyalty. Mr. Hill holds that, had the Khan definitely become the ally of the French, before the date of the peace, he could not have been touched by the English and history would have shaped itself differently in Southern India.

Let us now study the opinion of the rebel held by the Nawab, according to his partisans. Thus we have a passage from the *Life of Nawab Wallajah* by an Indian, regarding Muhammad Yusuf Khan, taken from an appendix to W. J. Wilson's 'History of the Madras Army' (Vol. I, 1882). It gives us the account of an episode about Yusuf Khan's attempt to draw his sword on the Nawab at an audience and his dropping the sword when he saw General Smith by the side of the Nawab observing his action. The Nawab on that day was not attended by his usual guard. This account is not however credited as being true. The narrative also tells us that attempts were made to hang Yusuf Khan three times and that every time the rope broke and not until his thigh was opened and a magic ball deposited therein was cast out, could he be killed.⁴⁰

Burhanu'd-din tells us that the rebel was captured and put in a hook; and he thus sums up his previous wicked

(40) For the different legends current about Yusuf Khan's charmed life, see S. C. Hill—*Yusuf Khan etc.*—pp. 228-9.

career: "He allied himself with mischief-makers who formerly supported Muhammad Mahfuz Khan Bahadur, sought the support of Haidar Ali Khan, brought together five hundred French who ran away after the fall of Phulcheri (Pondicherry), got ready innumerable guns, gunpowder, flint-stone and cannon from Chennapattan (Madras) Sadurangapattan (Sadras), Nagapattan (Negapatam) and other ports that belonged to the Frang communities; carried correspondence with the Nazim of the Decan by sending presents and gifts with a view to obtain from him titles and mansabs, established friendship with the zamindar of Maliwar (Travancore) by promising him five lakhs of rupees from the collections of the *sarkar*, and made a pact with the two divisions of Kallars in the east and west of Madura; thus he found himself a great sardar. He imagined that the kingdom was his own and forgot the past.

"He murdered the servants of the *sarkar*, oppressed the poor and the rich and tyrannised the zamindars. One day he shot down seven hundred men. Thus he squeezed the kingdom to a very great extent."

The Nawab, in a letter to the Madras Council, dated the 12th February 1763, thus⁴¹ enumerated all the crimes of Yusuf Khan against him.

-
- (41) (a) "That Yusuf Khan has been busy in repairing the fort of Madura &c. for this long time without my or your orders:
- (b) that he maintained an union and correspondence of letters with the King of Tanjore &c.
- (c) that he sent an advance of 60,000 rupees and sent for the French, Dutch and Danes from Negapatam, Wacamnad (?) and Tuticorin to join him:
- (d) that he sent money and sent for lead, gunpowder, guns &c.:
- (e) that he built a new house:
- (f) that he began a war with the Maleavars (Travancore) contrary to your orders:
- (g) that he sent one *Zanialuddin vakil* two years ago to Nizam Ali to persuade him and to demand a *sanad* for the Carnatic Country with an offer of a large sum of money and to desire him to negotiate the affairs of his Court with the English through his means, and further to request him to disturb and lay waste the country in some measure, promising that he would in some measure then undertake to make it up with the English: (According to Maudave, Nizam Ali Khan actually gave Yusuf Khan a *sanad* for Madura and Tinnevely and was actually thinking of giving him another *sanad* for the *Nawabi* of Arcot, in the place of Muhammad Ali (S.C. Hill *ibid*,—p. 279. Note 1.)

Thus the last great trouble for the Nawab was over in 1764. But he was held to owe to the Company still about 12 lakhs of pagodas, and it was hoped that the conquest of Madura would enable him to pay it off in the course of Fasli 1174, *i.e.*, 1765-66. Palamecottah, which was not proceeded against during the operations against Madura, was soon afterwards captured by Major Campbell. The Raja of Tanjore paid all his *kists* due under the treaty with the Nawab, except 4 lakhs of rupees and promised, incidentally, to relinquish the annual tribute of 1,100 pagodas due from the English for Devikottah. In return for the Nawab's total grant of the Jaghir District (effected shortly before Pigot sailed for Europe) which extended southward as far as the Markanam river and westward as far as Damarla and northward as far as Arumugam, including the two Conjeevarams, and estimated by Sunka Rama, the Dubash of Orme, as yielding about 20 lakhs of rupees, the Company recommended a present of a couple of rich gold brocade dresses, some carpets and orrery, a pair of globes, spying glasses and a handsome light roomy landau with eight harnesses for six horses be sent to the Nawab. This Jaghir District was nearly co-terminous with the present Chingleput district. It then gave a revenue to the English of $3\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas. The Mughal Emperor granted a farman for this jaghir (1765) and there arose at a later date a doubt whether the *inam* rights conferred did not convey *zamindari* rights of civil and criminal jurisdiction as well.

The King of Travancore, finding the several forts of the Kalakad district to be weakly garrisoned at the time of the Khan's rebellion, seized them one after another. But on the approach of Campbell, he abandoned them all. The reduction of the Ariyahur and Udayarpalayam poligars increased the Nawab's revenues and also secured an open communication between Madras and Trichinopoly. The Nawab did not invade Travancore after the

-
- (h) that he moreover entered into a union with Haider Naik and sent one Ghulam Hussain to him:
 - (i) that he placed tappies from Tinnevely as far as Mysore:
 - (j) that he sent messages with offers of alliance to Basalat Jang:
 - (k) that he sent to different parts to invite troops into his service, and
 - (l) that he shed innocent blood of men of distinction as well as the poor."

destruction of Yusuf Khan, only on the intercession of the English. The Madras Council induced him to give up his claim for Kalakad and the ruler of Travancore voluntarily evacuated it. Reference will be made later to the treaty between the Nawab and the ruler of Travancore. The troublesome poligars north of Nellore were all subdued by the end of June 1765. Throughout the Nawab's jurisdiction from the Gundalakama river to Cape Comorin, peace was secured; and this peace according to the despatch of Palk, dated March 27, 1765, was not likely to be disturbed "unless the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Haidar Ali join together and make demands on the Nawab. But this will not happen so long as he has the English support, unless some other European power joins them."

Colonel Charles Campbell's *Journal*, (from the 6th April 1765 to 31st March 1766) describes the chase of Nizam Ali Khan's troops, his return to Madras and his taking of some palayams near Tiruppassur. After this, in the boastful words of Campbell, "there was not then a single man who durst call himself the Nabob's Enemy in the whole Carnatick". The same writer's *Journal* from February 1764 to February 1765, treats of the second siege of Madura against Yusuf Khan, and of the subsequent operations in Madura and Tinnevely up to his return to Cuddalore.⁴²

(42) Campbell says that John Call kept a journal (missing) of the siege of Pondicherry, the second siege of Madura and the negotiation with the King of Travancore, but his *Journal* gives many details of his campaigns which were omitted in Call's account. Campbell boasts that he was "the first and only officer that commanded the army in one march from Cape Comorin to the River Krishna and obliging every Rajah, Palegar or Faujdar in that march of upwards 600 miles to settle with the Nabob." (*Orme Mss. O. V. 72-14.*)

II.—The Growing Difficulties of the Nawab.

(a) *The Relations of the Nawab with Pigot and Orme*

Nawab Muhammad Ali became a familiar figure in Madras from 1755, when he first came to the city after seating himself on the masnad at Arcot. Two years later, on the occasion of the threatened irruption of the Marathas, the Nawab sent his family to Madras and himself followed, accompanied by the agent of the Peshwa. Even as early as that date, *i.e.*, August 1757, the Governor proposed to the Nawab that he might remain at Madras and make over his dominions to the Company. According to the proceedings of the Select Committee, the Nawab refused to comply with the proposal, saying that as soon as it should come to be known, "he would be looked on universally in the same light as Chanda Sahib's son at Pondicherry is; not one of his subjects would pay him the least allegiance". Seeing that the Nawab was firm in his refusal, the Governor asked that he might make some further assignment to the Company for the amount of $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs that was agreed to be paid to the Marathas out of the sum of 4 lakhs due to the English that month. The Nawab said he would make up the deduction by an order for the same amount payable out of half of the revenue of the Tinnevely country due to him. (Madras Consultations, dated 1st September 1757).

A residence was assigned to the Nawab within the Fort and he was allowed to lay in the necessary stock of provisions therein; but he was asked to reduce the number of his attendants. Shortly before Lally's siege of Madras began, the Nawab was accommodated at the Government Garden House; on the approach of the French he retired into the Fort. Subsequently he was conveyed in a neutral vessel to Negapatam. The Nawab's financial embarrassments had already become chronic, and his dealings with some of the European residents at Madras over money matters had become complicated. For illustration, John Call, the Engineer, had amassed 25,000 pounds, which sum had been lent to the Nawab at 25 per cent per annum, (*vide* his letter to Captain Richard Smith dated 18th January 1764—in the Orme Mss. O.V.) The same person in another letter preserved among the Orme Manuscripts O.V. (37-8) says thus about the Nawab's debts to private individuals who

had been ordered by the Company to be satisfied with 12½ per cent and who had consequently recalled their money and compel the Nawab to refuse payment: "He is indebted more to individuals than ever was the amount of his debt to the Company. This is a cruel and an infamous Order, for his non-payment plainly evinces the Risk we run in lending the money, and therefore the premium ought to be adequate. Assignments are made over to the trustees of certain lands, but it is supposed it will be near three years before this debt is discharged—a comfortable prospect for me, and to receive it in driblets. And after that no mode of remittance to Europe'. Where will the Company drive to at last?"

The Nawab was on intimate terms with Mr. Pigot, the Governor (1755-63). To General Lawrence the Nawab was equally generous. When the French destroyed his garden house and property at St. Thomas' Mount, the Nawab presented him with a lakh of rupees which the Company at his request allowed him to accept. When he retired in 1766, the grateful Nawab bestowed on him an annuity of 3,750 pagodas. Governor Pigot was appointed, after his retirement from his first Governorship, as the Agent of the Nawab in England. But he was dissatisfied when the remittances which made the place of Agent desirable, did not regularly reach him. General Lawrence presented his own house to the Nawab on his retirement. A letter from Sunka Rama to Orme dated 6th November 1763, reports that Pigot received a present of £40,000 before his departure for England.

Robert Orme who was on the Madras Council became unpopular with his colleagues and other European residents, because he agreed to supply John Payne, Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the Company, with private reports on the conduct and character of his colleagues at Madras; and his consequent acting as a spy upon his colleagues was the real reason of Pigot's rooted enmity to him which brought about his early retirement from the Company's service in India. Orme's services to Payne brought him a marked retribution very soon. He cherished hopes of succeeding Pigot as Governor, but his indiscretion and espionage having leaked out, he was ostracised socially by Pigot, Lawrence and others.

The retribution was swift. Soon after the Company's Despatch arrived at Madras, which nominated Orme to be successor to the Governorship after Pigot (Sept. 1758), the latter preferred two charges against him in the Council:—(1) His preparation to remit his fortune to England in Dutch bills and to take his passage for Europe in the *Grantham*, shortly before the expected siege of Madras was a weakness of character on which his friends like Clive looked with dismay as it was openly described as cowardice by his enemies. (2) A more serious charge was that soon after the news of his succession to the Governorship after Pigot's retirement reached Madras, Orme addressed a letter to the Nawab on his new dignity. He sent for the Nawab's wakil several times, stressed on the services he had rendered to the Nawab and said he expected to be rewarded generously, or else he would put the management of the greatest part of the Nawab's territories into hands that would gratify him.

Pigot made a statement in the Council that Orme mentioned in his letter to the Nawab his prospective accession to the Governorship; and that "in whatever light he (the Nabob) might look upon the Governor, Colonel Lawrence and the other Gentlemen, he only was his particular friend; that it was he who had espous'd his cause and prevented the management of his affairs going into other hands than his (the Nabob's); that he could have had sixty thousand pagodas from Teterapah Moodilly, if he would have farm'd out to him the countries to the southward of Trichinopoly, and that Issoff Cawn would have given him forty thousand pagodas to have rented from him the countries of Seringham and Trichinopoly. But that, notwithstanding it was in his power, by the sway he had in the Council, to put this in execution, his desire of rendering the Nabob service made him decline it, not in the least doubting but that the Nabob would make him a suitable acknowledgement:" (Madras Consultations of 25th September 1758).

To this remonstrance the Nawab replied that his purse was at that time depleted. But he hoped in a year or two to be able to meet Mr. Orme's wishes. Thereupon Orme became irritated and left the Nawab abruptly, declaring that he would take the necessary measures for putting the management of the country into other hands, if the sum he demanded was not immediately paid down. The Nawab

felt insulted at this beyond measure and told Orme that his visit had been long enough and he was free to do as he pleased.⁴³

When these two charges were brought against him, Orme replied that with regard to the first charge, his health was the main consideration for determining his departure,, but the motive was not dishonourable, though it might have been deemed culpable at the time. He however totally denied the allegation of the Nawab that he had made any stipulation, directly or indirectly, for any reward from him. The letter which he is said to have written to the Nawab was an absolute forgery. But rather than suffer under such imputations, he would resign the service of the Company. (Fort St. George Consultations, 25th September 1758).

Three days later, an inquiry was made concerning the letter that Orme was alleged to have written to the Nawab. The Nawab confirmed the statement of Pigot and added that Orme demanded 20,000 pagodas and categorically said that he would not take even a jot less. He was accompanied by his vakil, Antaji Pantulu, and said that Orme's note was delivered to him by Sunka Rama, his Dubash. Sunka Rama denied at first all knowledge of the note, but when he was confronted with Antaji Pantulu, he admitted that he drafted and delivered the document without the knowledge of his master. The Madras Council decided that Orme's taking his passage for Europe on the eve of the French siege was "an ill-timed step and unbecoming the station he bore in the Company's service". With regard to his alleged note to the Nawab, though there was no actual proof, it was extraordinary and unaccountable that Sunka Rama should have without his knowledge written it and delivered it to the Nawab, along with an oral communication.

As to the other charge, viz., Orme's demand of a large sum from the Nawab's vakil and the Nawab himself, the testimony of the Nawab and his vakil appeared strong and

(43) The Nawab felt that it would be better to forego the protection of the English than "to be subject to such Affrontive Treatment in the face of his Durbar."

clear and the Board had the greatest reason to believe that part of the charge at least was just and true.⁴⁴

The Directors decided, in November 1759, that Orme was a very unfit person to continue in their service. But since the ship in which he sailed was captured by the French near the Cape of Good Hope, all the documents that she conveyed were lost and never reached the Company. Though the Directors then expressed themselves assured that Orme had extracted large sums from the Nawab, after a few years, his behaviour at Madras was condoned and he was appointed as the official Historiographer to the Company.

Mr. S. C. Hill thus sums up what he deems a just verdict on Orme's conduct: "It is to be regretted that no further information is to be found in connection with the charge of corruption brought against him by Pigot, more especially as the Court of Directors resolved that he had extorted large sums of money from the Nawab. Still the decision of the Court is not sufficient to convince one of Orme's guilt, when one remembers his comparative poverty at the time of his retirement, the unscrupulous character of the Nawab, the submission of the charges against Orme through and by his enemies in the Madras Council, and, finally, the fact that the Court took no action on its own resolution." (Page xxi, Introduction, to Vol. II, Part I, *Orme Collection* (by S.C. Hill, 1916)—*Catalogue of the European Manuscripts in the Indian Office Library*.)

(b) *The Tanjore Affair—Earlier Phase.*

With regard to the Nawab's relations with Tanjore, events rapidly led to the climax of 1773-76. Both the Nawab and the Madras Council had been looking for long with a covetous eye on the riches of the ruler of Tanjore. In the war with Haidar (1767-69) the Raja contributed much less than was expected of him, and he was suspected of having corresponded with the enemy. In the Treaty of Madras of 1769 the Company insisted upon including, in its protection, Murari Rao whose territory would have

(44) As early as 1755, July, a letter from Fort St. David mentions a rumour that Mr. Orme's mouth had been stopped by a bribe of 4,000 pagodas from one, Linga Chetty, in the matter of the debasement of coin by Saunders (Orme Mss. O. V. 280 (25)).

formed a convenient conquest for Haidar. But he refused to accept the condition, unless the *Rajah* of Tanjore was similarly admitted to the protection of the treaty. But the English regarded the Raja as their own partisan and included him in the treaty specifically as their ally, so that he might not owe his safety to the inter-position of Haidar.

The Directors, writing to the Select Committee at Fort St. George in March 1769, said, that it was unreasonable that the Raja should not contribute to the defence of the Carnatic and that the Nawab should be supported in his claims, and that "if the Raja refuses to contribute a just proportion to the expense of the war, you are then to pursue such measures as the Nabob may think consistent with the justice and dignity of his government. Whatever sums may, in consequence of the above orders, be obtained from the Raja of Tanjore, we expect, shall be applied to the discharge of the Nabob's debt to the Company; and if more than sufficient for that purpose, to the discharge of his debts to individuals."

To this, the Select Committee of Madras replied that the treaty of 1762 had defined the Raja's obligations to the Nawab; but it might not be politic to undertake the execution of the proposal just then, as an attack on Tanjore might involve them in a war with Haidar Ali. The *Rajah* had objected to the payment of his annual *peshkash* on the ground that he had maintained a great body of troops sent to join the army. But the Nawab held that it was contrary to the custom of the country for tributary princes to make any demands for the maintenance of troops furnished to the power to which they were tributary, while they were employed within the territories of the latter. It was added that if the Raja should persist in demanding a diminution of his *peshkash*, it might furnish the Government with a just pretext to accuse him of a breach of his engagements. But the Select Committee thought that, in view of the doubtful intentions of the Marathas and of the uncertain and unfathomable designs of the Nawab and the possibility of the ruler of Tanjore calling upon Haidar Ali for aid, the undertaking at this juncture would be "in-politic and unwarrantable". The Raja prayed for a remission of the tribute or at least for a delay in its payment.

Early in 1771 news reached Madras that the Raja of Tanjore had sent a force against the Setupati of Ramnad; and the President thereupon wrote to the Raja that as Ramnad belonged to the Nawab and was a dependency of the Carnatic, any attack on it was contrary to the treaty between the Raja and the Nawab to which the English Government had made themselves guarantors (*vide* the last paragraph of the treaty of 1762, p. 72 of Aitchison's *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. 10, Madras, 1909). The Raja replied that he wanted merely to take back Hanumantagudi which did really belong to him, and was actually in his possession at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1762 and also that the Poligar of Sivaganga had seized elephants destined for him and the Tondaiman of Pudukottah had injured his country. The Madras Governor urged that the Rajah had taken on himself the arbitration of a cause which he ought to have reserved for decision to themselves; and the latter's reply was that he did not undertake to do anything "contrary to the hereditary custom observed".

The Nawab was at that time greatly encouraged by Sir John Lindsay, the King's Envoy, who was at Madras. He called upon the Madras Government "with unusual force and boldness of importunity to make war upon the Raja". Lindsay urged the same view and maintained that the Madras Government would be only betraying the Nawab and violating their duty, even if they should make any delay in rendering the assistance which he required. The Madras Government was in an unfortunate dilemma. They dared not displease Lindsay who was the representative of the Ministers. They were not sure that the Nawab would help them with funds for the expedition and they were afraid of the probability of an attack on the Northern Sarkars by the Nizam, of a likely war with the Marathas who were allied with Tanjore and of troubles also from Haidar Ali. They pretended to make an inquiry into the dependence of Ramnad and to find that the rulers of Trichinopoly, *i.e.*, the Nayaks of Madura, had received more submissions from the Setupatis than the Rajas of Tanjore; and therefore since Trichinopoly had been absorbed in the government of the Carnatic, the Nawab had naturally succeeded to the claims of the Nayaks. In June 1771, when Trichinopoly was sufficiently supplied with

stores for defence, the Nawab suddenly dissuaded the Government from any further preparations for war, alleging that the Marathas would never give them any respite. The Madras Government held the view that the Nawab's motive for urging the expedition at first, was to force them into an alliance with the Marathas. But now, because the alliance was not possible, he did not wish to give the Marathas any pretext to overrun his dominions. The Select Committee at Madras resolved to negotiate with the Raja who said that he would never trust the Nawab without the security of the English. After some negotiation the Nawab proposed to send his two sons to Trichinopoly, the elder, Omdatu'l-Umara, to conduct the negotiations and the younger Madaru'l-Mulk Amiru'l-Umara⁴⁵; to manage the supplies of the army. The Nawab was suspicious lest the Company might conquer Tanjore for themselves. He was prepared to make any arrangement with the Raja rather than incur such a risk. He offered to give the Company ten lakhs of pagodas, if after conquering Tanjore, they should deliver it "in full dominion" to him. The Madras Council wished to refer the question to the Directors, but the Nawab would not consent. They saw that since the Raja knew of the designs of themselves and of the Nawab against his kingdom, it was highly dangerous to leave him in possession of power which he could lend to the French or to any other enemy; and as they could not proceed to war except with the consent of the Nawab, it was therefore best to comply with his terms.

Early in September 1771, Omdatu'l-Umara reported to General Smith, the Commander of the English troops at Trichinopoly, that nothing but compulsion by force would bring the Raja to submission. After getting sufficient provisions, the army arrived before the fort of Vallam, one of the great bulwarks of Tanjore City. On the 21st September, the Vallam garrison stole out of the fort. The army next encamped before Tanjore, but the operations were slow, mainly because of lack of provisions. On the 28th, Omdatu'l-Umara signed a peace with the Raja, by which he was to pay 8 lakhs of rupees for arrears of

(45) This prince was very ambitious and scheming and enjoyed great power controlling a large body of disciplined troops (letter to the Directors of 4-7-1775).

peshkash and 32½ lakhs for the expenses of the expedition. He was to restore whatever he had taken from the two Maravar poligars, and to aid with his troops in all the wars of the Nawab. Vallam was to be restored to the Raja but to be demolished if the Nawab so chose. The Nawab was to get the jaghir district of Arni.

A disagreeable correspondence took place about the plunder of the fort of Tanjore, when it should be taken, between the Nawab's son and the English troops. The Madras Government was not satisfied with the terms offered, as they were obviously inadequate and provided no security for their execution. On this account they held it necessary to keep the troops before Tanjore, prepared as for immediate war. When the Raja did not deliver, on the stipulated day, the money and jewels he had agreed to resign, this was taken to be a breach of the treaty; a renewal of hostilities was threatened, and the helpless Raja had to submit.

General Smith pleaded that he had no control over the negotiations and as he was instructed to desist from hostilities the moment the Nawab desired peace, he was forced to act as he did and consent to the peace proposals of Omdatu'l-Umara.

Omdatu'l-Umara claimed that he took no step without consulting Smith, that he stated to him the terms to which the Raja had yielded, declaring that he would not accept them, if the fall of the fort was assured by the general, and that the General had told him that if the siege came to be unsuccessful, the Raja would not give anything. Smith was then asked if he would guarantee equivalent terms of advantage, if the siege should miscarry. He repelled the proposal of any guarantee; and he approved of the treaty saying "it was well; it was at the Nawab's option".

The Nawab now applied for the reduction of the two Maravar poligars by the Company's forces. The Governor and Council of Madras pointed out that the Nawab was till then ostensibly the friend of the Maravars against the Raja of Tanjore who was their enemy, and now that the Raja was humbled, they became immediately dangerous to the Nawab's government and had to be reduced! But notwithstanding this contribution so obvious in the pleadings of Nawab, they consented to undertake the expedition

on the simple pretext that the Maravars had not sent troops to help against Tanjore, as they should have done. After some delay, an English force proceeded against Ramnad which was carried after an assault. The Nawab's son who accompanied the forces bargained for the plunder by a sum of money for the troops. Kalayarkoil in which the poligar of Sivaganga had taken refuge was taken and likewise plundered.

Mill thus remarks on the plight of the Madras Government: "The Governor and Council alleged that they were led on by that friend and ally from one step to another, without knowing where to stop, and without being able to make those reservations in favour of the Company which the interests of the Company appeared to require; in this manner had Tanjore been humbled and fleeced; in this manner the two Maravars had been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion to the Nabob. It must be allowed, that except for a little time when he first demanded the attack on Tanjore, the Presidency had shown themselves abundantly forward to second, or rather to excite the Nabob's ardour for conquest of the minor states. The Nabob had only one scruple, the fear of their conquering for themselves. The declarations however, of the Presidency, of the Directors, and the King's minister plenipotentiary, the interpretations of the treaty of Paris and especially the recent example in the surrender of the Maravars, raised up a hope in his Highness that the time was at last arrived when the long-desired possession of Tanjore might be fully acquired." (*History of British India*—Vol. IV, pp: 130-4).

In June 1773, the Nawab complained that the Raja of Tanjore owed him 10 lakhs of rupees and that he had applied to the Marathas and to Haidar Ali for a supply of troops and had encouraged the Kallars to ravage portions of the Carnatic; and he intimated his resolve to subdue him; and a little later he promised the English 10 lakhs of pagodas in case of success. The Marathas, he complained, would never become his friends, as they expected him to get them the assistance of the English and whether he reduced Tanjore or not they would still invade the Carnatic if possible. The Select Committee of Madras held that the treaty of 1771 left the Raja completely at the mercy of the Nawab

and he was bound in self-preservation to seek for protection from every quarter; and his application for help to the Marathas and Haidar Ali was confirmed by other evidence. The Madras Government therefore resolved that they should root out his power—a resolution which, it may be held, was more accommodating and casuistic than any other politic expedient. The gist of it is as follows, in Mill's words: "We have done the Raja great injury: we have no intention to do him right. This constitutes a full and sufficient reason for going on to his destruction. Such is the doctrine; the practical improvement is obvious. Do you wish a good reason for effecting any body's destruction? First do him an injury sufficiently great, and then if you destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence, an ample justification!" (*History of British India, Vol. IV*, p. 108).

The English desired that the Nawab should advance funds for the expenses of the expedition and provide all necessaries except military stores and pay for 10,000 sepoys. The Nawab now began to vacillate, but was stiffened up into resolution by the Madras Council. No peace was to be concluded with the Raja unless it should be found to be absolutely impossible to effect his destruction. The Nawab, as usual, bargained with the troops, before hand, by a sum of money for the plunder of Tanjore, if the place should be taken by storm. The expedition was undertaken on the 3rd of August. The Raja protested that he had sent bills for the balance of the *peshkash* due to the Nawab and that he had not deviated in his conduct from the tenour of his undertakings. After a few days of operations a breach was effected and the troops entered with scarcely any resistance or loss; and the Raja and his family and his general, Manoji, were taken prisoners. The English felt no scruple in joining with the Nawab to seize Nagore. The Nawab wanted that Tanjore should be garrisoned with his own troops. Intelligence of these transactions reached London in March 1774. No immediate action was taken by the Directors. Then came the events leading to the catastrophe of Pigot's proceedings against Tanjore (1775-76).

The Government of the Presidency had declared that the Raja of Tanjore "held his lands of the Nabob in fee",

which had been all along the claim on that kingdom put forward by Nawab Muhammad Ali. The reason of the Madras Government's action is clearly seen from its resolution dated 22nd June 1773, that "it was dangerous, in the present system, to have such a power as the Raja of Tanjore in the heart of the Carnatic"; and that it was "expedient, for the safety of the Carnatic and the Company's possessions, that the Raja of Tanjore should be reduced". The Select Committee at the Presidency held that the measure was in fact founded on the law and principle of self-defence. They upheld the claim of Nawab Muhammad Ali that the 'Zamindar of Tanjore', as he was called, was a mere vassal of the Carnatic and held his country by certain tenures, which he had avowedly and repeatedly broken and violated; and that, in consequence of such breaches and violations, his feudal lord was authorised by the law of nations and every principle of justice to dispossess him. But then the question would naturally follow, if the Nabob was authorised to dispossess him, "by what law or what justice did the Court of Directors taken upon them to send orders to restore him, in breach of a solemn treaty made by the King (George III) and approved of by the Parliament of Great Britain?" and "whether it was prudent, for a few Directors in Leadenhall Street, to violate, by means of their orders, the "engagements of the Nation?"

The Madras Council informed the Court of Directors of their seizure of Tanjore (in 1773) and of their being assured, paradoxically enough, by letters from the Raja and his mother to the Nawab that they were treated "with much attention and humanity in their confinement". No observations on this subject proceeded from the Court of Directors for some months after the news reached them.

(c) *Lord Pigot and Tanjore*

Early in 1775, the Court of Directors appointed Mr. Rumbold, by a small majority, to the Governorship of Madras which was to fall vacant shortly. But a Court of Proprietors, which was summoned to review the appointment, reversed the previous decision by another equally small majority and appointed Lord Pigot, who, since he retired from the Madras Governorship in 1763, had contrived to become a Baronet and an Irish Peer. He enjoyed great influence with the Directors; and we learn from

James Mill that he desired "to rival the glory of Clive by introducing the same reforms under the Presidency of Madras, as that illustrious Governor had introduced in Bengal".⁴⁶ Pigot was decided in his mind from the time of his appointment, that he should effect the restoration of the Raja of Tanjore as he had, during his former Governorship, in 1762, assured him of his possession of the throne. However, Mill would not exonerate him completely from animation by unworthy motives in such a desire. Pigot's favourite Dubash, Manali Muthukrishna Mudali, who had rebuilt the Madras Town Temple and become its warden, and for whom he continued to experience a partiality, had rented a considerable area of land from the Tanjore Raj; moreover, Pigot had been offended with Nawab Muhammad Ali, who had first appointed him his agent in England but "failed in those remittances which made the place of agent desirable". Again, there existed at the time an active bid between the Nawab and the Raja for securing the favour of the most influential servants of the Company. No wonder, therefore, that Pigot persuaded the Directors to declare their decision on the business of Tanjore shortly before the Proprietors met to choose the new Directors.

Curiously enough, the retiring Directors, in the preamble to their resolution, used much ambiguous language and decided, at the end of it, that the expedition of 1773 was founded upon pretences which were totally false, that the Raja was not proved to have committed any offence and that the destruction of his power had only increased the danger to the Company; and at the end of their despatch, they declared their order to be as follows:—"The Presidency were first to provide security, by a proper guard, for the persons of him and his family; and next, but under certain conditions, to restore him to his dominions, as they existed in 1762. The conditions were, that he should receive a garrison of the Company's troops into the Fort of Tanjore; assign lands for their maintenance; pay to the Nabob the peshkash of 1762: assist him with such troops alone as the Presidency shall join in requiring; form no treaty with foreign powers, except in concurrence

with the English rulers; and neither directly nor indirectly furnish any assistance to their enemies."

Pigot, after he assumed charge of the Governorship of Madras in December 1775, declared that the injunctions of the Directors were to proceed immediately to the restoration of the Raja of Tanjore, but that this order should be communicated to the Nawab with all possible delicacy.⁴⁷ The Council first made use of the offer made by the Nawab that he would consent to admit an English garrison into the Tanjore fort, as it would enable the Presidency at once to set the Raja at liberty and to guard his person.

In a conference that the Nawab had with Pigot on the 12th January 1776, the former received such treatment from the latter as brought upon him a severe indisposition. The next conference, which took place four days later, had therefore to be negotiated only with his sons, Omdat-ul-Umara and Amir-ul-Umara; and the result was that the Nawab wrote a letter to the Governor "hoping, perhaps, from the profusion of his Lordship's tears, at the conference of the 16th, that he would relent, and listen to his proposals, as well as have some regard to his rights".⁴⁸

It was even contended on behalf of the Nawab that the Court of Directors, at the date of the final signing of their despatch, were not a regular court as that day happened to be the day of the election of a new Court by the Proprietors; and this was a matter which courts of law alone could decide. Of course this contention was not then communicated either to Pigot or to the Court.

Pigot wrote very stiffly to the Nawab on the 23rd of February, asking for definite information, as to what and how many orders had been given by the Nawab for the payment of money on the Tanjore country. He fixed that the 9th of February should be the date for commencing his receipt of the revenues of Tanjore and when the officers of

(47) Ironically enough, the words "agreeably to that I have consented" contained in the Nawab's letter to Pigot of 22nd January 1776, were not according to his wish, as held by his vakil.

(48) Original Papers relative to Tanjore, containing all letters—conference—p. 14. These papers were transmitted to London, by a special messenger through a French ship.

the Nawab should relinquish all manner of authority. January-February is the general season in South India for the harvesting of the rice crop; and by the middle of February practically the entire harvest will be completed. Naturally, the question could be asked why the Governor, who had positive orders for giving back Tanjore to the Raja should have delayed for over two months from his arrival in the first week of December; and whether his negotiations at Madras took up all his time, as was commonly believed. It was suggested by the Nawab's people, in scarcely subdued tones, that the Governor's Dubash, who had claims on the Tanjore revenues, could, if he pleased, answer this question. It was also pleaded that a remarkable fact was for Pigot to have sanctioned that the Company's Commanding Officer at Tanjore considered the Raja to be a prisoner even after the Nawab had delivered up the fort to the English garrison; and it was suggested pointedly that Raja Tulajaji would not remember the favour of his release by Pigot's efforts, if he had been set at liberty before the arrival of Lord Pigot himself at Tanjore.⁴⁹

As the Nawab strenuously adhered to his rights, Pigot came to confer with him on the day after the receipt of his pleading; and in the reported conference between His Highness and His Lordship, dated the 20th March 1776, is revealed what is alleged to be the true motive for his return to India.

The Nawab, finally perceiving that Lord Pigot was adamant in his resolution about the restoration of Tanjore to the Raja, submitted a last alternative proposal, namely, that after discharging the debt which he had contracted on account of the Tanjore country and deducting the expenses that he had been at on account of that country and on account of the English garrison which he received into the fort, he would "keep the revenues in his own possession without expending one shilling of them till the further order of the Company arrives." He further added these significant and appealing words: "The difference between

(49) Pigot also desired that the Nawab should write to him that the Raja would be always disobedient and his nature was like that—from a letter of Pigot to the Nawab, received 1190 A.H. 29th Mohurram.

Your Lordship's intention and mine is this: Your Lordship wishes to do this business by force, and without my consent, and I want to delay it, till the Company's letter arrives from England. Do me the favour to attend to this representation of your old friend."

Pigot now despaired of the possibility of ever inducing the Nawab to relinquish his rights and finally left Madras on the 29th of March—30th is the date mentioned by Mill. Even after Pigot had marched beyond Cuddalore, the Nawab wrote to him thus: "I should have been glad if Your Lordship had returned to me from Cuddalore instead of proceeding from thence."

The Madras Council, during these negotiations, was divided into two sections and violently agitated by both internal and external influences. In January 1776, it became possessed of a document headed "A Short Memorial of Services to His Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, Walaujau, etc. by-, whom he was sent upon a secret Commission to His Majesty's first Minister of State 1767." It set forth the proceedings of Mr. John Macpherson in England and his negotiations on behalf of the Nawab; and it alleged that the anonymous author had published pamphlets extolling the virtues of the Nawab and really had the notice and portrait of Wallajah published in Major Alexander Dow's 'History of Hindostan', 2nd edition, 1770. Macpherson was summoned before the Council and declined to give a definite answer whether he was the author of the paper, but represented that the transactions mentioned therein related to a time anterior to the date when he became a servant of the Company. Macpherson was dismissed from the Company's service by a Consultation of 23rd January 1776. Of the two members of the Council who dissented, one was Sir Robert Fletcher who claimed that, as the principal military officer of the Presidency, he should be the person by whom the act of the restoration of the Raja should be done. Even then the Council resolved by a unanimous vote that the President should proceed on the business and that as the crops were ready for harvesting, no time should be lost in giving possession of the country to the Raja. Fletcher was, indeed, a party to the unanimous resolution; but he now proposed to send, along with Pigot, two other Members under express and particular instructions of the Board, "declaring that without

this condition he would not have assented to the vote in favour of the President; that the Board were not justified in the delegation of undefined and unlimited powers, except in a case of extreme necessity; and that, if this measure were drawn into a precedent, the effect would be to serve the corrupt interests of individuals at the expense of the public."

The proposal was rejected by a majority of the Council; but Pigot took with him two Members of his own choice, including the second person who had voted for the deputation. The result shows how there had been an amount of obvious disingenuousness on the part of Pigot that bade fair to rival that of the Nawab and how from a close study of the correspondence that passed between him and the Nawab, his attitude does not come out unscathed. We even learn from this correspondence that Pigot made a motion in the Council that it should be recommended to the Nawab to remove to Arcot and only lost the proposal on a division of seven to four.⁵⁰

Thus Pigot hastened on the circumstances leading to his own arrest and deposition by the majority of his Council. The Tanjore episode played a great part in affecting the position and pretensions of the Nawab and creating a reaction which was not at all healthy, in the relations that he maintained with the English power.

More of these relations will be described in the sequel.

(50)* Benfield, about whom there has been a lot of shade, accompanied Pigot to Tanjore to explain his claim for over half a million pagodas on the Nawab, and secured to him by the latter by assignments on the Tanjore revenues, as well as recognised by him as just. When Pigot moved in Council that Benfield's claims were private and not public concerns, the Council negatived the motion by a majority (14th June). This was the immediate starting point of the hostility of the majority that led to Pigot's arrest (23rd August, 1776).

III.—The Nawab's relations with the Madras Government.

(d) *The Nawab and the First Mysore War*

The First Mysore War with Haidar Ali is generally attributed to the treaty of Hyderabad, particularly the article relating to British assistance for the Nizam which implied military support against Mysore. But the English quickly found themselves that they were left alone, instead of being one of the three confederates against the Mysore ruler, and compelled to act against two allied powers, *viz.*, the Nizam and Haidar. These latter entered the Carnatic in August 1767, but were defeated by the British in the battles of Changamah and of Tiruvannamalai. Bands of their cavalry troops plundered the country and Tipu raided Madras itself in September 1767. It was only towards the beginning of the next year that the Nizam was compelled to sue for peace when his dominions were threatened by a combined body of British troops from the Circars and from Bengal under Col. Peach; and he sent his minister, Rukn-ud-Daula, to Madras to negotiate for peace. A treaty was signed on the 23rd February 1768, according to which the English got an indemnity from the Nizam and a reduction in the amount of the annual tribute due from them for the Circars.

The rest of the year 1768 was occupied with British operations against Haidar. The British army was established in two divisions, one under Col. Joseph Smith at Kolar, and the other under Col. Wood in the Baramahal. Neither was very successful. The new Governor, Charles Bouchier who had succeeded Robert Palk, summoned Smith to his Council, while Wood was recalled for incapacity in December and subsequently tried by a court martial. Thereupon Haidar penetrated into the Baramahal and took fort after fort. After the failure of the first

negotiations for peace that were made early in 1769, Haidar penetrated further into the Carnatic which he laid waste with fire and sword. Smith had resumed command but was unable to bring Haidar to decisive action. He lacked cavalry troops in sufficient numbers to enable him to take the initiative, but contrived to pursue Haidar wherever he went and keep him in suspense. The latter however reached St. Thomas' Mount by forced marches and intimated to the Madras Council his willingness to begin negotiations, provided that Smith who was close behind him was ordered to halt.

Du Pre, the Second Member of Council, was sent to conduct the negotiations with Haidar at the Mount. The treaty was concluded on the 3rd of April, but Haidar refused to recognise Muhammad Ali as a party to it, while the latter refused to assent to its terms at all..

It is commonly believed, even by historians, that Haidar dictated the terms of the Treaty of Madras at the gates of Fort St. George. But he did not stipulate for anything more than the nomination of the negotiating envoy, and he was far more afraid of an attack by Smith than the English were of the safety of Fort St. George and Black Town from Haidar, who would have retreated if Smith had been permitted to advance.

The war originated in the inveterate hatred which Haidar bore towards Muhammad Ali and consequently towards the English as the firm allies of the latter.*

Tipu's raid on Madras in September 1767 is thus described by two Indian residents at the Presidency; viz., Mooperala Kistnaiya, who hold the monopoly for the sale

"Haidar's hostility was disclosed by his correspondence with the rebel Yusuf Khan, which fell into English hands after the capture of Madura in 1764; by his sowing disaffection among the poligars of Tinnevely; and his overtures to the Nizam in 1765, when the latter was unfriendly to Fort St. George. Haidar was at that time flushed with successes over the Marathas, and he repelled the advances which Palk made. The Governor resolved to obtain the alliance of the Nizam, and the treaty of 1766 was arranged, which gave to the Company the peaceable possession of the Circars. It was then expected that a combined expedition would quickly secure the passes into the Carnatic and confine Haidar to Mysore. The scheme eventually developed, however, into a design for his complete overthrow." (*Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, (1922) Introduction, pp. xiv-xv).

of betel and tobacco and Ramakrishna, his uncle, in their letter to Robert Palk, dated Fort St. George November 4, 1767. The raid took place on the 28th and 29th of September by about 3000 of the enemy cavalry who rode upto the Governor's Garden House (the present Government House) burning and destroying all that came in their way. All the European civilians as well as the Portuguese and Armenian residents were armed for the defence of the Fort and Black Town. The letter thus reads:— "Number(s) of poor innocent people from St. Thome, the Mount, Conjeveram and other places were killed, wounded and carried into captivity without one soul going to their defence, which has occasioned such a general consternation in our Black Town that most of the inhabitants have sent out their families to places of security, which is a great hinderance to all trade and business. God send us peace and quietness, for otherwise the poor country will be entirely ruined."

The Nawab wrote plaintively to his old friend, General Stringer Lawrence, on November 5, that the house and furniture that the latter had left him at the Mount were plundered by the enemy; particularly "the cot you used to sleep upon and the diamond-cut globe were entirely destroyed." Governor Bouchier thus wrote of the circumstances in which the peace was made, in his letter to Robert Palk, dated June 29th, 1769:—"In the extremities we were reduced to we gladly embraced the opportunity of opening the Conference again; for the country being entirely at his mercy; our army being incapable of protecting it or bringing him to a decisive action, and daily diminishing by sickness and fatigue; the promised succours of horse by the Nabob and Mora Row not arrived, nor likely to be for some months, and our distress for money great; our whole dependence being on the Nabob, who though he promised largely we had doubts of his performing; and it being also the Company's positive orders to make peace, we were under the necessity of doing it almost at all events."

Among the terms of the treaty is an article by which Nawab Walajah was obliged to consent that all members of the Nawayat community who were in the Carnatic

should be permitted to leave it, if they should choose to do so. Some of these who were considered disloyal to the house of Anwaruddin, had been detained by Muhammad Ali, to be left out of the written treaty.

Bourchier says that it was extraordinary that the Nawab opposed the peace and would not consent to have his name inserted as a contracting power in the treaty. But he promised to authorise the Governor to act for him in bringing about peace for the Carnatic by a letter, though he would not give such an authority in his own name directly.

At that time the Company were creditors to the Nawab to the tune of $12\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas, besides the expenses of the war which amounted to $14\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs more. The Nawab was desperate about the discharge of this huge sum. though, on a few occasions he promised to clear off his debt to the Company in the course of three years if peace should subsist.

(e) *Sir John Lindsay on the Scene*

Bourchier handed over charge of the Governorship to Du Pre who ruled for three uneasy years (1770—73). He was assisted by Warren Hastings who was the Third of Council from Sept. 1769 to Feby. 1772. It was in Du Pre's time that the Directors, who were alarmed at the Ministry's attitude of interference in Indian affairs, resolved to anticipate the reforms and appointed a commission of three, viz., Henry Vansittart, Luke Sraffton and Col. Forde, to go to India and report on the situation. But the ship in which the Commissioners sailed was wrecked off the coast of Madagascar and was not heard of again. The Ministry appointed Sir John Lindsay, a young Admiral of the Royal Navy, as Naval Commander-in-Chief in India and Plenipotentiary at the court of Nawab Walajah, with power to treat with other Indian rulers. He made extraordinary demands of control over the Madras Government and attached himself to the Nawab in a manner that raised the hopes of the latter very high. General Eyre Coote, who came out at the same time as Commander-in-Chief for India, claimed the right to issue orders to the

Madras Army without submitting them to Government, and he also said that his position was superior to that of the Governor, who was commissioned by the Company as the Commander-in-Chief at Madras. The Madras Council decided against Coote; and thereupon the latter refused to serve and left for Europe. Lindsay stayed on because the Nawab acknowledged his position and made much of him. Du Pre held that the situation was very bad, because both Lindsay and Coote were bound to appeal to their respective masters. He wrote to Palk thus:—"Taken all in all our situation is critical indeed. The Council, I think, were never so responsible for their conduct as at this juncture; the Nabob doing everything to thwart them; a Government spy picking holes in their coat on every occasion, and the Commander of the Army bellowing out vengeance, because he cannot be supreme." An extract from the letter of Mr. Goodlad to Mr. Robert Palk, dated October 12, 1770, also informs us that every action and every letter from the Nawab breathed independence with respect to the Company and reliance for support on the Crown. The Nawab became totally changed in his attitude to the Madras Council and was prepared "to do everything in his power to represent the servants of the Company in the worst colours." As an illustration, knowing that the Directors had ordered that no servant of the Company could lend money at more than 10 per cent, the Nawab wrote a letter to the Council declaring that Charles Smith, Edward Monckton and others had lent money in the Jaghir District, at the accumulating interest of 54 per annum, which "he to preserve the Company's possessions from utter ruin, has made good to them at his own immediate expense". This money was absolutely lent with the Nawab's consent and there was strong proof that it was actually borrowed by himself. The letter adds that an accusation like this is "nuts to Lindsay and a good bone for the Ministry."

Nawab Walajah, being strongly supported by Lindsay, urged an alliance with the Peshwa against Haidar Ali when he was defeated in March 1771 near Seringapatam and narrowly escaped capture at the hands of the Marathas. Du Pre however remained neutral and firm in his neutrality, though the Marathas demanded British aid on the one side, and Haidar claimed it on the other, by virtue of the treaty of 1769. When the Marathas actually cros-

sed the borders of the Carnatic, the Governor prepared for resistance, but the Nawab contrived to make the invaders withdraw without plundering the land, on receiving a payment, because he saw that no argument from him or from the Plenipotentiary could succeed in changing the attitude of the Council. There was, indeed, a suspicion that the Nawab was acting in collusion with the Marathas and had been actually promised by them Seringapatam and the province of Baramahal, if Haidar should be overthrown with British help which he was to secure. According to a contemporary letter from Madras, the Nawab seemed to have paid the Marathas four lakhs of rupees, being the balance due of the sum promised in 1760. "The ease with which the Nabob settled this business, and that too at a season of the year the most favourable for the Marathas to lay waste the country, confirmed the suspicions we had long entertained that the Marathas had been encouraged, if not invited, by the Nabob himself to threaten this Province in order to frighten or compell us into an alliance with them. And indeed a circumstance came to light in the course of the correspondence which afforded further cause for our suspicions. It appeared that the Nabob had obtained from the Marathas a promise of the cession of the Barhamall country and of the fort of Syringapatam in case he could prevail on us to assist in reducing Hyder Ally; and although he could not be ignorant how little dependance was to be placed on such promise from the Marathas, it had certainly great weight with him in his political system." These words from a letter of J. M. Stone, Secretary in the Military Department, to Robert Palk, dated April 1772, received confirmation from the fact that the Nawab would not consent that the army which had returned from the Tanjore expedition to Trichinopoly, should move to a more central position. When, in June 1772, a treaty was concluded between Haidar and the Marathas by which the latter got 60 lakhs of rupees and also the districts of Sira and Kolar, the frontiers of the Carnatic became co-terminus with those of the Marathas along the lines of the passes leading down from the Balaghat into the Payenghat.

(f) *Further Complications in Tanjore*

Early in 1771 the Maratha Rajah of Tanjore attacked the Great Marava of Ramnad and penetrated to his capi-

tal. The Marava owed allegiance to the Nawab, who vigorously urged reprisals upon Tanjore and was as usual supported by Lindsay. By the treaty of 1762 made between the Company and Tanjore, the Governor was bound to support the Nawab. But still the moment was considered unpropitious for any firm action, particularly because there was the threat of a Maratha invasion of the Carnatic. As pointed out elsewhere, when the Directors wrote that the Rajah of Tanjore ought to contribute to the cost of the late war with Haidar, Du Pre and his Council resolved to support the Nawab in his demand and to provide for help in its enforcement, an auxiliary force—"which was however the finest that the Company ever had in the field,"—and which was to go along with the main army of the Nawab commanded by his eldest son who had full powers to negotiate or to proceed to hostilities. The fort of Vallam, S. W. of Tanjore was reduced in September 1771; and by the end of October, a practicable breach was effected in the walls of the city; but on the eve of the day of the assault, Omdat'ul-Umara, the Nawabzada, accepted peace on the basis of an indemnity and the payment of arrears of tribute. Thus a peace was made just when the breach was practicable. The motives of the Nawab in granting such a peace are obscure; but perhaps among them were the fear of the Marathas and a jealousy of the Company's growing power. According to Du Pre, "after the Nabob had irritated the Rajah into unjustifiable acts, it was necessary to call him to an account, and if we had the power of doing justice, it might have been done without firing a gun. As we had not, and consequently the Rajah could not rely on us, it was necessary to put it out of his power to be dangerous, and a war once begun, it seemed best to get as much power by it as we could: arrangements might afterwards have been made as should seem best. We were obliged—for a thousand reasons which a volume would not suffice to explain—to give the lead to the Nabob. Oh, what a falling off from the days of yore! The Nabob blames the General, and the General (blames) the Nabob. A peace was made just when the breach was practicable. I will not take upon me to say whether it is better so, or worse than if the place had been taken, for that must depend on the ideas and measures at home. I know this, that either the Rajah must be so supported in his government as that he may have confidence in the Company, or he must be re-

duced. To leave him in continual fear of the Nabob will ensure his enmity whenever it may be dangerous to us and when we shall most need his friendship."

Under Lindsay's encouragement the Nawab entertained hopes of attaining open independence of the Company with the help of the Crown. After his departure, Sir Robert Harland, the new Plenipotentiary, who arrived in September 1771, declared that his instructions were to give effect to the Treaty of Paris of 1763 and to receive and transmit complaints from the Nawab, who, by the 11th Article of that treaty, was deemed to be an Ally of the Crown and as such entitled to the protection and friendship of King George III. The situation thus created was a peculiar one. In the first place, Nawab Walajah could claim under that treaty to be independent of both the Great Moghal and the Nizam. Secondly, while the object of the Treaty of Paris was only to make it impossible for the French to set up the son of Chanda Sahib or any other person to the rule of the Carnatic in opposition to Walajah, according to the present interpretation it might be urged logically that the Nawab was equally an ally of France as well as of Great Britain, because both the realms were equally bound by the treaty to acknowledge him as Nawab. Consequently it was "incumbent on England and France to support him against all the world, even against the Mogul and the Soubah, to whom, by the custom of the Empire and his own acknowledgement, he is subject."

The situation became positively absurd for the Company and the Madras Council; and it was a marked source of embarrassment in all the relations between the Council and the Nawab. Du Pre wrote that the Nawab no longer looked up to the Company as his friends and supporters, but placed his entire confidence in the aid of the Crown which he believed he could secure as against them. "His drift seems to be to play off one against the other by which means he hopes to free himself from any dependence on the Company; and when he has gained sufficient strength, he flatters himself with the idea of entire independency". Harland went even further than Lindsay and threatened to engage the Crown directly in an alliance with the Marathas, asking whether in those circumstances the Company would assist the Nawab and the Marathas

with their troops. But even to this demand the Council returned a flat refusal. It was only the arrival of revised instructions for Harland from Home that made him stop in his path and send an implied disavowal of his former conduct. According to Stone, (*vide p. 164*) it was only this changed attitude of Harland that compelled the Nawab to begin persuading the Marathas not to ravage the Carnatic.

Alexander Wynch, who was a member of Pigot's Council even as early as 1765, became provisional Governor from February 1773 (when Du Pre departed), till December 1775, when Pigot arrived to take charge of the Governorship for a second time. The principal event of Wynch's Governorship was the conquest of Tanjore for Nawab Walajah on the ground that its ruler had not rendered any tribute. The Council, urged by Harland, sent a contingent under General Joseph Smith to assist the Nawab. British and Carnatic troops began the siege of the fort of Tanjore in August 1773 and captured the place on the 17th September following. It was made over to the Nawab who occupied the kingdom and imprisoned the Rajah. The fort of Vallam, a few miles from Tanjore, was garrisoned by the Company's troops. The Nawab claimed British help in recovering from the Dutch the port of Nagore and made a bargain with a committee of British officers about the sum of money to be paid to them in lieu of their share of the plunder. There were afloat rumours to the effect that the British officers might refuse to fight the Dutch on the ground that such service was not covered by their agreement with the Nawab. Nawab Walajah had probably designed to make his second and favourite son, Amiru'l-Umara, the ruler of Tanjore. Wynch and the majority of the Council opposed the proposition which was, however, supported by General Smith and two other members; and the matter had therefore to be referred to the Bengal Council (July 1775). Chockappa Chetty, a good friend and regular correspondent of Governor Palk, and Manali Muthukrishna Mudali who was for long the Company's Chief Merchant, have both furnished material evidence about the doings of the Nawab's people at Tanjore, during their military occupation of the place.

When Pigot at last arrived at Madras in December 1775 with orders from the Directors to effect the restora-

lion of the Rajah of Tanjore, an extraordinary chapter began in the history of the Presidency. Pigot is held by Col. Love to have been very considerate to the Nawab, persuading him very mildly to agree to the restoration of Tanjore; and after nearly two months of argument and persuasion, the Nawab consented to release the Rajah and to receive a British garrison in the city and fort of Tanjore. But he would not give up possession of the kingdom and held that the two expeditions that he had made for its conquest had cost him over three crores of rupees. Col. Harper marched from Trichinopoly and took possession of the fort of Tanjore. Meanwhile the Nawab had begun his representations to the Directors through Col. Maclean, his Agent in England. When Pigot was arguing with the Nawab, John Macpherson of whom a note has been given above, and who had already ingratiated himself with the Nawab and had secured a writership at Madras from the Directors, now intervened. Early in 1776, he was surreptitiously visiting the Nawab at night in order to claim recognition of his former services. But the latter having been depressed by the British occupation of Tanjore handed Macpherson's memorial to Lord Pigot. Pigot summoned Macpherson before the Council and, after inquiry, dismissed him from the service for conduct prejudicial to the Company and ordered him to go to Europe. Further pressure by Lord Pigot to persuade the Nawab to agree to the reinstatement of the Rajah produced only friction. The Nawab complained that Pigot's firm resolve was to disgrace him and to hurt his honour and authority.

(g) *The Sequence of Events leading to the Arrest of Lord Pigot*

For three months following Pigot's return from Tanjore, disputes continued in Council. Among the subjects of disputes Benfield's claim was very prominent. Benfield came out to Madras in 1764 as Civil Architect and Engineer, and was employed on the works of Fort St. George with the rank of lieutenant, though his name was also borne on the civil list. In 1769 he resigned his appointment as Engineer to become contractor for the erection of a rampart $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length for the defence of Black Town. Dismissed from the service in 1770 for factious conduct, he was reinstated, but

was suspended for disobedience in 1772. He subsequently contracted for new works at Fort St. George, and was engaged on them until 1776. Out of the profits of his contracts he lent large sums to the Nawab. Chokappa writes in 1774 (No. 230), "Mr. Benfield is Banker and Soukar to his Highness the Nabob: all drafts and bills for the payment of the kists to the Company are sent to him, and he discharges it."

Benfield was supported by George Stratton, Sir Robert Fletcher, Henry Brooke, Charles Floyer, Archlale Palmer, Francis Jourdan and George Mackay; while the minority in Council consisted of Lord Pigot, Claud Russell, Alexander Dalrymple and J. M. Stone. The crisis came in August. All the letters of the period are full of the events which followed. The best accounts are those by George Banker (No. 293) and John d'Fries (No. 310) (of the Palk Correspondence). The point at immediate issue was the representation of British interests at Tanjore. Russell had been nominated Resident, but the Majority proposed to cancel the appointment and send Russell on tour with the Committee of Circuit (in the Circars) and despatch Colonel James Stuart to command the troops in the province and incidentally recover the Nawab's assignments from the Raja. Orders for Stuart were drawn up, but the President refused to sign them unless Russel also went as Resident to watch over the Raja's interests. On the 23rd August the Majority directed the Secretary, Richard Joseph Sullivan, to sign the orders on behalf of the President, Sullivan required a written instruction which was accordingly drafted and passed round for signature. After Stratton and Brooke had signed, Pigot intercepted the paper, charged the two signatories with inciting the Secretary to do an unlawful act, and moved their suspension. Sir Robert Fletcher (the Commander-in-Chief) being absent through sickness, the motion was carried

"The Majority assembled the same evening at Benfield's house, where, according to Chokappa (No. 295), they consulted with Macpherson, Benfield and the Nabob's two sons. They met again early next morning at Fletcher's residence, resolved that the suspensions were illegal and determined to assume the powers of Government. They sent out notices to that effect. On the same day, the 23rd

Lord Pigot summoned to the Board Richard Lathom, Chief of Cuddalore, who had come up to join the Committee of Circuit, and the Minority thus augmented suspended the remaining members of the Majority, ordered Fletcher into arrest, and offered the command of the army to Stuart. On Saturday, the 24th, Stuart breakfasted with Lord Pigot, and the Council sat intermittently throughout the day at the Fort House. When they rose the Governor invited Stuart to supper at the Company's Gardens and offered him a seat in his chaise. They started after dark, Pigot himself driving a pair of spirited horses. The road lay across the Island through a double avenue of banyan trees. When the carriage was midway between the bridges, two officers, Lieut-Colonel Edington, Adjutant-General, and Captain Lysaght stepped into the road and signed to it to stop. They were supported by an armed party of sepoy concealed in the shadow of the trees. Lord Pigot reined in. Lysaght shouted, "You are my prisoner," and Stuart ordered the Governor to get out. Pigot was hustled into a closed carriage belonging to Benfield, which was waiting at the spot. Lysaght, pistol in hand, followed; an orderly sergeant mounted behind, and the carriage with drawn blinds was driven rapidly to the Mount, where Lord Pigot was delivered into the custody of Major Matthew Horne, commanding the Artillery.

"Stuart, who had framed the whole plan in collusion with Fletcher, returned from the scene of arrest to the Fort House, where the Majority were already assembled. All slept in the Council Chamber that night. On the morning of Sunday the 25th, having suspended Russell, Dalrymple, Stone and Lathom, they summoned the civil and military servants and the inhabitants to hear a proclamation announcing their assumption of Government with George Stratton as President. The military officers had already received their orders from Stuart. Among the civil servants there was some hesitation, and 38 of them ultimately refused to acknowledge the new Government (No. 297). On the 27th, at midnight, Colonel Edington presented himself at the Mount with an order to Major Horne for the removal of Lord Pigot to an unspecified place of detention. Pigot refused to go, and when Horne summoned the garrison troops, the ex-Governor harangued them to such effect that they tacitly refused to exercise force. Edington re-

turned to Madras, his mission unfulfilled. Meanwhile Russell, who was with Lord Pigot, hurried to Sir Edward Hughes at San Thome to demand his protection, and Hughes left his bed for the Fort. The Majority refused to yield the person of Lord Pigot to the Admiral, but engaged that no further attempt should be made to remove his lordship from the Mount. Hughes himself says (No. 303) that, both parties having appealed to him for support, he determined to afford it to the section which possessed power to carry on the government.

“The Nawab protests (No. 301) entire innocence of complicity in Lord Pigot’s arrest, and assures Palk of his own unalterable attachment to the Company. In a subsequent letter (No. 308) he recalls his disapproval of the Treaty with Tanjore of 1762, and says that Pigot at that time forced him to sign the instrument. George Smith, although a *tanka*-holder on Tanjore revenues for about Pags. 30,000, denounces (No. 297) the revolution, and asserts that the charges against Pigot of despotism, venality and attempts to subvert the constitution are unfounded. D’Fries, who mentions the sudden death of another *tanka*-holder, Reynold Adams, reports (No. 299) that the revolution has affected the Company’s prestige with the natives. He believes that the Nawab’s selection of Madras as his place of residence, though tending to develop intrigue, is on the whole advantageous, since he can be better watched when under the eye of Government, while his presence has undoubtedly conduced to the prosperity of the capital, the population of which has increased by one-third during the last ten years. Sir Edward Hughes is of opinion (No. 303) that the Tanjore province ought to be held by the Nawab, a British garrison occupying the city. He thinks that the orders for rendition would not have been issued if Colonel Maclean had reached England earlier; and he regrets that no written treaty has ever been concluded between the Company and the Nawab”.

Charles Floyer, a member of the Majority, explains (No. 302) the motives of his action in the revolution, and conjures up a farrago of surmises. He holds that Lord Pigot intended to extract a large sum from the Raja as the reward of rendition, and fears that Benfield’s unsupported charges of venality will prove to be only too true. He draws dark inferences from the nomination of Russell to

Tanjore, seeing that the prospective Resident is about to marry Leonora Pigot. He points out that the suspension of Stratton and Brooke would make Russell Second of Council, and suggests that Pigot contemplated resignation of the Government to his son-in-law. He makes the point that the revolution was bloodless, and contends that it would certainly have been otherwise if the Majority had limited themselves to suspending the Governor, instead of arresting him. Benfield went to Tanjore (No. 307) to press his claims on the Raja and secure proofs of Lord Pigot's venality. He came back unsatisfied on both heads. (Col. Davison Love: *Report on the Palk Manuscripts*, 1922 (Historical Mss. Commission) Introduction. pp. xl-xliii).

Pigot proceeded to Tanjore with a retinue and with due authorisation by the Council and on the 11th of April restored the kingdom to its ruler. The Nawab had assigned the Tanjore revenues due from the February crop, to Europeans and others to the amount of 15 or 16 lakhs of pagodas; and Benfield had the largest *tankah*; the *tankah*-holders had partially cut and received the grain into their keeping. But the Rajah's people with support of English troops forcibly took possession of the grain stores. The Madras Council was divided on this question but the majority was of the view that the *tankah* holders should be paid.

The Nawab applied to Sir Edward Hughes for protection of his rights. Hughes had already expressed himself as sympathetic to the Nawab who, he wrote, "certainly merits every attention from the English, being in my opinion their most sincere friend in this country." While at Tanjore, Pigot had required the Nawab's manager to produce all the accounts of the revenues of the province, and as the manager had fled, he caused him to be pursued by a military force into the Carnatic territory and arrested. This proceeding of Pigot caused great indignation to the Nawab.

Now another incident intensified the indignation against Pigot. Kumara who was Dubash to Benfield in sowcar business, was ordered to go whipped by Pigot, because he had informed the Rajah secretly that he would like to have the management of the country and would

advance what money he wanted. Kumara had set off for Tanjore even before Pigot, who had specifically desired him to stay at Madras till he himself went up. This corporal punishment of Kumara inflicted in a public manner added fuel to the flame. The arrest of the Nawab's manager within the limits of the Carnatic furnished a very specious pretext, and also a just one, for the Nawab's complaint, which was forwarded both to the Madras Council and to the Supreme Council at Calcutta, in terms of strong resentment. Benfield had made use of Kumara, perhaps in conjunction with Wynch, and probably countenanced also by the Nawab. The Nawab had borrowed of Benfield 670,000 pagodas for prosecuting the siege of Tanjore and paying the prize money after it was taken, and for its repayment he had assigned the produce of certain districts of that kingdom; and Kumara was employed by Benfield to collect it. The grain belong to his tankah-villages had been cut and stacked and was marked by Benfield's chop (seal). When the Rajah was restored, this grain was demanded of Lord Pigot by Benfield. But the Rajah had used it for his own purpose; and Benfield declared the act to be a violent seizure of British property by Lord Pigot, who should be made by law accountable for the same. Pigot held that the whole thing was a transaction of the Rajah and he had nothing to say to it. Benfield and the Councillors who supported him, contended that the grain assigned to his creditors by the Nawab should have gone to discharge his debt; but as it did not, the Rajah ought to be made to pay it. Pigot and his supporters held that the Nawab should produce his entire accounts of the revenues etc., the Tanjore country and if the Nawab should prove on their scrutiny, that any amount remained unpaid, then the Rajah should be made to pay it. But if the Nawab did not produce his accounts, the whole matter should be referred for orders to the Directors. The sequel in the Madras Council leading to an open rupture between the Majority and the Minority and to Lord Pigot's arrest is found in the foregoing summary.

The Supreme Government of Bengal *i.e.*, the Calcutta Majority, had been nursed by the Madras Majority and had expressed its disapproval of Pigot's attitude towards the Nawab and also of his action towards and in Tanjore, particularly with reference to the arrest of his manager. Sir Robert Flet-

cher had been in intimate correspondence with General Sir John Clavering, and even before the arrest of Pigot the proceedings and disputes of the Madras Board had been communicated to the Supreme Council, while no private representations had been made on behalf of Lord Pigot's party. Commander George Baker, writing to Sir Robert Palk, on August 30th, thus informs us: "Answers to the whole detail of what was sent previous to the Revolution have been received from the Supreme (Government) condemning in general Lord Pigot's measures, more especially those at Tanjore, and particularly his seizure of the Nabob's agent within the confines of the Carnatic. No answers are yet received to the accounts sent of the Revolution. They cannot well be expected till towards the end of this month."

"On the 6th instant the Administration here received public letters from the Supreme Council at Calcutta, acknowledging the receipt of the letter containing the account of the late Revolution here: of which they show their full approbation, and promise to support them in their government. Thus this matter now stands."

After the death of Lord Pigot in confinement in May 1777, an inquest was held and the Grand Jury brought in a verdict of wilful murder against Stratton and the Majority and also the military officers concerned. The verdict was delivered in July nearly two months after the death which happened on the 11th May 1777. But it was not published until September. On the last day of August, John Whitehill arrived from England with despatches from the Directors addressed to "Lord Pigot, our President and Governor of Fort St. George", Thomas Rumbold, Major General Hector Munro, John Whitehill and others. The Directors denounced the usurpation of the Majority, ordered the reinstatement of Lord Pigot, but directed his immediate return to England by the first ship. Thomas Rumbold was to be his successor; Stratton and the Majority, and also Benfield were summoned home, being suspended.

In the absence of Rumbold and Hector Munro, John Whitehill was the Senior Councillor and the only one present in Madras. He summoned Sadlier and Crauford to assist him and assumed office as provisional Governor.

Stratton and the Majority against whom the jury had given a verdict of wilful murder, were committed for trial at the Quarter Sessions. Advice was sought for from the Supreme Court at Calcutta which declared that the inquest afforded insufficient evidence for the indictment and therefore the proceedings had to be quashed. Stratton and others left for England, where they were fined; and Stuart remained under suspension, was tried by Court Martial for mutiny in arresting Lord Pigot, but was acquitted on a technical ground that he effected the arrest outside the limits of Fort St. George and therefore beyond the sphere of the Governor's military command.

The Nawab had always maintained that he was innocent of any share in the plot. He vigorously protested against Pigot's rooted hostility towards him, saying that he endeavoured by every means "to disgrace me, thinking to provoke me to some measure that would have given him a pretence to destroy me and my family. But depending on the Company's friendship and justice I gave him no opposition". (Autograph Cipher from the Nawab to Robert Palk, dated September 25th 1776). In his letter to Governor Stratton written on the 29th of August within a few days after the usurpation, the Nawab who was highly complimented by the Majority contented himself with an assurance of his general loyalty to the Company. "As to the conduct of Lord Pigot and those gentlemen who supported him, it is unnecessary for me to say any more. The situation into which his Lordship has fallen in consequence of his own conduct awakens my remembrance of his former services and makes me forget much of what has lately past. It is sufficient that I made my representations to him and to the Governor-General."

Chockappa, the native correspondent of Palk, mentions several details which are too trivial to be included here. Muthukrishna Mudali who was Pigot's man naturally had very black things to say of the Nawab and of the Governor, Stratton, who would not restore him to his office and would not give any consideration to the claims for employment of his son Solayappa. Muthukrishna*

*Muthukrishna Mudali succeeded 'Paupa Braminy, June in 1749 as Company's Interpreter. In 1754 he accompanied Palk and Vansittart to Sadras as Translator to their Mission, and detected a fraud

had long been the Company's chief merchant and a prominent citizen of Black Town. The Nawab and his favourite son, Aniru'l-Umara, Madaru'l-Mulk, suspected him of being "the cause of the rendition of Tanjore. All the rest of the Indians who were suspended from service by Stratton were restored by Rumbold, but Muthukrishna was not; and he bitterly complained to Palk that his reputation was injured thereby, as well as the prospects of his son.

Sir Edward Hughes, the Admiral on the coast, was pro-Nawab in his views. He was of the opinion that, with a Company's garrison in the fort of Tanjore and the kingdom itself in the hands of the Nawab, everything would have been quiet and the Nawab himself would have remained the fast friend of the English, "notwithstanding the many distresses daily, I may say, imposed on him". His views require to be noticed *verbatim* as appears from his letter to Palk dated 26th September 1776. "It is much to be lamented that no express or written treaty has ever been concluded between the Nabob and the Company. It has been recommended in the letters of last year from Bengal to the Court of Directors, but it is doubted whether it can be properly effected by that Government without their authority. But he will be firmly supported in his just rights, and effectually, till their orders can be received for the application of a lasting treaty. I see no fault to be found in giving up Tanjore to the Nabob. The servants of the Company, should, in my opinion, have insisted on a Company's garrison, . . . though I believe nothing of his aiming at independancy; on the contrary, that it is the farthest from his thoughts."

A curious rumour is communicated by Chockappa in his letter to Palk, dated 1st October 1776, saying that he heard that Captain Randall, an officer in the Nawab's service, had declared on oath before the Madras Mayor, that Madaru'l-Mulk, the Nawab's second son, instigated him to murder Lord Pigot by poison or otherwise and promised

in connexion with the grants which Dupleix alleged had been made to him by the Subahdar of the Deccan. Muthukrishna was Governor's Dubash to Mr. Pigot and his successors, and in 1766 founded and endowed the Town Temple of Madras which replaced 'the great Jentue Pagoda' of 1646. In 1771 he drew up a report of the history of the Maravars from 1500 A.D. He died in 1792."

(Report on the Palk Manuscripts, p. 97).

him the aid of Kurnara, the dubash of Benfield. Madaru'l-Mulk was intended to be put in charge of Tanjore and he was much of an intriguer, according to the opinion of many of the English residents. It appears from the correspondence of John De Fries that there were two affidavits, besides Randall's declaration, by Lieutenant Mills and Edward Monckton. De Fries however adds that Randall's affidavit was intended to injure his character which had already become bad. Randall himself was a bad man and little credit was, according to De Fries, given to his information in Madras. Randall who was an *aide-de-camp* to the Prince also deposed that the latter had pressed him to go to England and expose the character of his elder brother, Umdatul-Umara, with a view to secure that the succession devolved on himself. It was this Amiru'l-Umara's son that was later made the titular Nawab in 1801 in supersession of the claims of Taju'l-Umara, the son and heir of Nawab Umdatul-Umara.

(h) *The Nawab, Haidar Ali and the Second Mysore War*

Rumbold and General Munro arrived at Madras early in February 1778; and the former succeeded Whitehill in the Governorship. Both Rumbold and Munro had long been in India; and Rumbold had been early trained in the Madras service. In July 1778, Madras received instructions to attack Pondicherry because war had been declared with France in March. After a short siege, Pondicherry capitulated in October. For this Munro was knighted and Rumbold was created a Baronet; and the fortifications of Pondicherry was demolished in the course of the next year. Mahe was next attacked and an expedition sent to it under Col. Braithwaite. Haidar was greatly incensed thereby. He had made two attempts at a definite alliance with the English, once in 1771 and again after the conquest of Tanjore in 1773; but on both occasions, his offer was rejected mainly because of Nawab Wallajah's unbending attitude of hostility to him. In 1775 he made a definite alliance with the French; and now he announced that he would join them in defending Mahe, through which he got his military supplies. In November 1779, several months after Mahe was reduced by the English, the Madras Council sent Mr. George Gray to Haidar's court to promote an alliance with him and secure the release of some English

prisoners. Gray found that he made his proposals too late. The march of a British contingent to help Basalat Jung at Adoni was barred by Haidar through whose territory it had to proceed; and this gave an additional grievance to Haidar. The Nizam had already been exasperated by Rumbold negotiating with him for the transfer of Guntur to the English and the result was that Basalat Jung's French (or Swiss) party went over to the Nizam and ultimately to Haidar. The Guntur *sarkar* was intended to be sold to the Nawab and it was rented to him by the Governor. The Nizam was exasperated when John Holland was sent to him to claim the abolition of the tribute payable for the Northern Sarkars under the treaty of 1768. Holland reported this attitude of the Nizam to Warren Hastings who forthwith directed him to withdraw the demand. He was thereupon suspended by Rumbold for disobedience, but reinstated by Hastings and his Council with credentials from themselves.

The Jaghir district, constituting roughly the present Chingleput district, was advertised to be let out to the highest bidder; but the letting out did not take place because the Nawab paid handsomely for it. But in spite of all these concessions to the Nawab made by the Government, his dominions were in a wretched condition. Since the fall of Pondicherry the Nawab had several times promised to make a dividend to his creditors, who applied to the Governor and Select Committee and also to the Court of Directors for measures by which they could be insured some payment, because the failure of payments from the Nawab had thrown "the whole settlement in to the greatest distress imaginable and unless some measure be taken by the Government to procure satisfaction and relief to the creditors who constitute the greatest part of British subjects in this place and the other Settlements in India, it must end in the total ruin." The European community urged in a most vigorous manner that attention should be paid to the question of the settlement of the Nawab's debts and pressure was put upon Anglo-Indians settled in England to see that something was done in the matter by the Directors or the Proprietors, because many of the latter themselves would be seriously affected if the interest on their bonds in the Carnatic was not regularly realised. In another letter of January 1718, the same writer, De'Fries,

says that the affairs of the Nawab could hardly be worse than they were at present, because the drain on him was continual and the sources of his income were lessening every day. "The divided interest in his family continued as great as ever, notwithstanding the death of Mahfuz Khan which happened some months ago". The divided interest of course refers to the hostility between Omdatu'l-Umara and Amiru'l-Umara.

Rumbold departed from Madras in April 1780, delivering charge of the Government to the Senior Councillor John Whitehill; and within three months Haidar descended through the pass of Changama at the head of 90,000 men. An advance party of his seized Porto Novo, while another party of the Mysore cavalry raided San Thome and the neighbourhood of Madras. For 50 miles round Madras and for 15 miles round Vellore the enemy devastated the entire country. The British army was assembled at Conjeevaram under Hector Munro who had directed Col. Baillie to join him with a force from Guntur. Baillie's detachment was annihilated by Tipu who intercepted him at Palur, just as he came near Conjeevaram; and Munro had to beat a hasty retreat to Madras, being harrassed by the enemy all the way. Stephen Sullivan, the son of Lawrence Sullivan, who played a prominent part in the Company's administration in London, had come out to Madras about 1778 as Secretary and Persian Translator. He was now deputed by the Madras Council to go to Calcutta and entreat Warren Hastings for help. Hastings immediately sent Sir Eyre Coote to take the command at Madras and despatched a force under Col. Pearse to march down to the Carnatic through Ganjam. Along with Coote, Warren Hastings sent orders for the suspension of Governor Whitehill for disobedience of his instructions in failing to restore Guntur; thereupon Charles Smith, the Senior Councillor, became provisional Governor.

Coote reached Fort St. George in November 1780, took the field in January 1781, relieved Wandiwash, and after several indecisive operations, defeated Haidar in person decisively at Porto Novo on the 1st of July. Joined by Pearse, he again inflicted a defeat on the enemy at Palur, the scene of Baillie's disaster in the previous August; he gained a further victory at Sholinghur and also relieved

Vellore which was bravely defended by Col. Lang. Lord Macartney came over to Madras in June 1781 as Governor; and since he brought news of the outbreak of war between England and Holland, Hector Munro captured the Dutch settlement of Negapatam with the help of the squadron of Sir Edward Hughes (October 1781). The other Dutch settlements on the coast, *viz.*, Sadras, Pulicat, Bimlipatam and Tuticorin, were all easily taken. The Dutch harbour of Tricomali in Ceylon was secured by Hughes early in 1782; but it had to be surrendered to a French force six months later. The year 1782 was not so favourable. Coote suffered from a stroke of apoplexy, but still continued to command. Subsequently the English suffered a severe reverse in Tanjore; a French fleet under Admiral Suffren appeared on the coast and engaged in several indecisive encounters the squadron of Hughes. But it contrived to land in March a substantial body of French troops at Porto Novo. Tipu who was left in charge of the operations in the Carnatic, captured Cuddalore with the help of the French troops. He also got from Suffren all the British crews of the prizeships he had taken.

After peace was made with the Marathas at Salbai in May 1782, Haidar had no allies but the French; but the English were equally exhausted. Hector Munro resigned his command and sailed for England. Coote was worn out by disease and returned to Bengal in September. The Bombay forces had reduced Calicut while the Madras troops operating in Malabar, took Honavar. In December 1782 Haidar died of carbuncle at Chittoor; and in January 1783, the English captured Bednore and followed it up with that of Mangalore a little later. Alarmed by these successes of the English on the West, Tipu abandoned the Carnatic, invested Bednur with his whole army and secured its surrender early in May 1783, when he sent all the captured garrison, contrary to the terms of surrender to Seringapatam for strict confinement. He then proceeded to invest Mangalore.

Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Madras for retaking the command but died three days after he landed. General Stuart, the new commander of the English on the Coast, made an unsuccessful attack on Cuddalore which was defended by the famous Bussy. Suddenly hostilities with

the French ended on the 2nd of July, because news was received of the conclusion of peace in Europe with France.

General Stuart, the English Commander, was dismissed from service for insubordination and arrested and forcibly deported by Lord Macartney. It was this Stuart that had been made by Pigot, at the crisis, Commander in the place of Fletcher dismissed. 'This deportation of Stuart led Prince Amiru'l-Umara to make his well-known *mot*. "once General Stuart catch one Lord, now one Lord catch General Stuart"'.

When Col. Fullarton made several successful operations against Tipu Sultan in Dindigul and Coimbatore, the latter consented to begin negotiations for peace. Three English commissioners from Madras proceeded to Tipu's camp before Mangalore; but they were delayed by various contrivances for several weeks in the course of their passage across Mysore, till the time of Mangalore's starvation into surrender (January 1784).*

The cost of the Mysore war drained the Company's treasuries in all the three presidencies and pressure was consequently put on the Nawab. The relations between the Nawab and Macartney which were of a most complicated character and the subsequent transactions that he had with his successors Archibald Campbell and others are detailed in a subsequent section. The appended note exhibits the general grounds of disagreement between the Nawab and Macartney. Chockappa, in a letter to Sir Robert Palk of September 1784, says that Lord Macartney and the Nawab did not agree at all in any respect, but that his Lordship was very honest and did not receive any present or allowance from anybody, but had a long dispute with the Governor-General and Council of Bengal over the Nawabi affairs.

The Nawab complained bitterly of Macartney, declaring that he had brought utter ruin upon all the affairs of his

On arriving at their destination the Commissioners found three gibbets erected opposite their respective tents. They were loaded with contumely; but at length, on the 11th March, 1784, the Treaty of Mangalore was signed, which provided for the release of captives and mutual restitution of conquests. The survivors of the prisoners at Seringapatam and other places, to the number of about 1,150 British and 3,000 sepoys, were restored." (*Palk Manuscripts, Introduction*).

employers. "Large sums from the Carnatic revenues have, he asserts, been dissipated, for particulars of which Sir Robert Palk is referred to James Macpherson, who had become Walajah's agent in England on the nomination of his cousin John Macpherson to the Supreme Council. The Nawab has a special grievance about the transfer of certain territory to the French. The recent treaty between England and France provided that the village lands of Villenour and Bahour should be ceded to Pondicherry. Walajah unwillingly assented, but is aggrieved that the actual transfer was made by the Governor without any recognition of the Nawab's ownership. Macartney, he says, claimed sovereign rights, but even Bussy, an enemy, declined to accept the Governor's contention."

PART II — B.

RULE OF NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI

WALAJAH (1749-95)—*Continued*

HIS LATER CAREER

HIS SUCCESSORS (1795-1855),

*I. Muhammad Ali and the English**First Phase of Their Relations*

Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah, under whom the British first employed their political influence and in alliance with whom they were able to destroy French influence and rivalry and to establish their own dominance in South India, died only in 1795. By the Treaty of Paris (1763) that ended the Seven Years' War, the Nawab had been assured of his "entire possession of the Carnatic." Sir John Macpherson who later succeeded, for a time, Warren Hastings in the Governor-Generalship, was appointed by the Nawab as his Agent and commissioned to go to England to seek King George's protection as against the Company, which was charged by the latter with having kept from him knowledge of the nature of the guarantee secured to him by the Treaty of Paris¹. In 1768 Macpherson approached the English Premier on the matter and was successful in getting a favourable hearing. Sir John Lindsay was then sent by the Home Government to Madras in the double capacity of Naval Commander-in-Chief and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Arcot. King George III's letter to the Nawab Walajah which was countersigned by Lord Chatham and entrusted to Lindsay, assured the Nawab of his royal protection and friendly assistance and empowered Lindsay to demand a full account of the Company's transactions with the Nawab since the Treaty of Paris. The Madras Council angrily resisted Lindsay's demands; while the Nawab told

(1) The Nawab had been mentioned as an ally of Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris; but he was kept in ignorance of the passage relating to his "entire possession of the Carnatic." "The managers of the affairs of the Company at home as well as their servants abroad had industriously concealed from that prince the nature and import of that article for several years Though that prince had obtained at length, some knowledge of the nature of the guarantee, which secured to him the possession of the Carnatic, he had found it almost impossible to avail himself of that knowledge." Sir John Macpherson, 1799.

him that "he was still afraid to avail himself of the protection of the Crown of England against men who might continue to possess that power under the vigour of which he had already so much suffered."

The Directors had, in the meantime, appointed their own Commissioners to inquire into the matter and protested the reasonableness of their attitude and their desire not to countenance any depreciation or humiliation of the Nawab's dignity and power². The ship which carried the Directors' Commissioners foundered at sea; and nothing more was heard of their instructions. The wide gulf that divided the Directors' protestations from their real attitude is seen in the following quotation taken from their letter, dated 10th April 1770, to the Madras Council:—"As to what relates to the Nawab and the conduct which you are to hold in the present parts of India, a great deal must be left to your decision on the spot. You have certainly more knowledge than we, of coming at the true knowledge of the causes, the origin and the tendency of disputes as on a sudden arise among the powers of India, as of relations of interest in which we stand to them."

In his second letter to the Nawab, dated March 1771. His Majesty King George III was pleased to express his confidence in the Company and his desire to connect them inseparably with that Prince. The Madras Council resented this royal interference which was productive of great embarrassment to itself. Sir Robert Harland, the Commander of the Royal Squadron of ships to the East,

2) In their instructions to the Commissioners, dated 15th September, 1769, the Directors themselves enjoined them "to provide effectually, for the honour and security of their faithful ally, Mohammed Ali, Nawab of Arcot." They added: "When we reflect on the long experience we have had of Mohammed Ali's faithful attachment to the English Company, we are surprised at the idea entertained by the Governor and Council, in their letters of the 8th March and 21st June 1768, to reduce him to a mere nominal Nawab. The sanction of the Treaty of Paris by which treaty public faith became the guarantee of the Nawab's title, will be of little use to him, if notorious infringements of the rights and powers usually inherent in and dependent on such title, should be by us countenanced and permitted to take place. More especially as, perhaps, we might thereby involve ourselves in the very disagreeable necessity of answering at some future period, for the infraction of a public treaty for the consequence thereof." A copy of these instructions was shown to the King, protesting the Company's reasonableness and answering that the charge was baseless that they were unjust or unfair to the Nawab. "The Company naturally felt it would be most impolitic not to deprecate the royal disfavour when fair words to its Indian dependent was its only cost."

who was entrusted by the King with plenipotentiary powers, told them that "he was to represent, in the freest manner, to the Governor and the Council at Madras any complaints . . . which in his judgment shall be well founded that may be made by the Nawab of Arcot." Moreover, the Nawab wrote to King George, at Harland's instance, and got a much-prized reply, in the royal holograph, dated 7th April 1772. These, however, could not strength the Nawab in his attitude to the Madras Government which followed its own course unperturbed³.

The Nawab had been quickly reduced by the political circumstances of the times into a helpless dependant of the Company which had to provide always a military force for the defence of his dominions and consequently charged the Nawab with the cost of its maintenance. The result of this relation was that, after a few years, the Nawab came to know that he had bought the security of the throne too dear. His incapacity to pay promptly and punctually his dues to the Company, was worsened by his extravagant habits and his readiness to borrow money from whatever source it was offered. He became more and more steeped in debt both to the Company and to private creditors; and to both he made over large slices of his dominions as securities for his liabilities; while his bonds soon became a marketable commodity, freely bought and sold, "the discount on them falling or rising as the prospects of the Nawab's debts being liquidated became more or less favourable." A variety of persons, both European and Indian, official and non-official, became interested in the question of his debts which exercised a demoralising influence on the whole of the Madras society and mani-

(3) Harland's differences with the Madras Government became very acute; and he finally departed, on the outbreak of the monsoon in 1772, for Bombay, without having either offered to the Governor, or received from him, the courtesies usual on such occasions. Harland was even more intemperate than his predecessor; and according to Mill, he created "rather more animosity in his opponents."

Regarding the expedition against Tanjore, Muhammad Ali called upon the Madras Government, "with unusual force and boldness of importunity, to make war upon the Raja; as the honour of his Government was concerned in chastising a refractory dependant; and the honour of the Company's Government was concerned in supporting a faithful ally. Sir John Lindsay vehemently urged the same conclusions, not without reproaches, that the Presidency were betraying the Nawab; and violating their duty, by even deferring the assistance which he required." (Mill—Book V., Ch. IV.,: p. 64 of Vol. IV, 1858 ed.).

fested itself in “ The vicious system of the management of the whole districts by money-lending creditors.”

Nawab Muhammad Ali naturally made much of the fraternal correspondence that he maintained with King George III. His protagonist, Burhanu'd-din, writing in A.H. 1195, thus says: “ The union and friendship between Hazrat Ala (Muhammad Ali) and the English is maintained till to-day. The fame of this union pervades throughout the provinces in the continent like the spirit in the body. For the two Padshahs of Islam (Sultan of Turkey) and of England, (King George III) had sent letters of friendship and union with the title of ‘brother’ to Hazrat Ala and with the following contents:—“As long as the authority of England continues in our descendants and the administration of Hazrat Ala in the Carnatic is firm, generation after generation, the friendship and union will be permanent and firm between the two powers (England and the Carnatic). This will continue so long as the chain of descent on both sides is kept unbroken.” The narrative stresses the contents of covenants and treaties along with inestimable presents and adds: “Though Governors of Chennapatnam (Madras) like Lord Pigot and Lord Macartney sometimes behaved towards Hazrat Ala, contrary to the courtesy and unity, negating the ancient rights, yet the right thinkers, knowers of truth about the Nawab’s activities both open and hidden, the subtle seers of disputes in all its details, viz.: the most elegant people in the capital of England, the sardars of the Padshah (King George III), the wise men in the Parliament and the Directorate of the Company ordered what was right and correct and did not approve of the actions of the said two Lords and others⁴.”

-
- (4) “Once at the open assembly in Chennapatnam, General Coote, the sardar, disputed with Lord Macartney thus:—“It is not the manner of the wise to wound the feelings of a benefactor. As far as possible, there must be consideration for him (Hazrat Ala).” Lord Macartney replied:—“On the face of justice we have got right over him, for without our support, it is impossible for him to maintain his rule.” Coote retorted:—“Myself and General (Stringer) Lawrence have been in this country for a long time. We have perfect knowledge of these disputes from the very beginning. I have heard much from General Lawrence and others. We know much more of the past realities than you.....Though our people help him in all affairs, yet we have found suitable wages and presents to the extent of our labour and realised the advantages of such a help. But his kindness to our people especially in three difficulties is such as cannot be repaid: (1) at the time when M. Dupleix attacked Devanampatnam

A letter from General J. Smith to Robert Orme, dated 12th October 1770, and another dated 29th January—6th February 1771, give us the information that Sir John Lindsay's arrival had caused much confusion in the Madras Council, and that the Nawab, encouraged by Lindsay, behaved as if he were independent of the Council and was openly on bad terms with Governor Du Pre. The Governor had a bitter opinion of the Nawab, of whom he wrote to Orme thus:—"Nevertheless he, (Lindsay) protects the most virtuous Nabob, than whom I believe no Devil has a blacker heart, and under that sanction our measures are thwarted and what the consequence may be God knows." Du Pre's complaint was later on to be reiterated by Macartney and others among his successors. The Nawab himself has been painted in much brighter and more pleasing relief. As early as 1754 Orme embodied his opinion of the Nawab in a paper that he drew up at the request of Lord Holderness, entitled "Reflections on the disputes subsisting between the Companies of France and England". This is his estimate of the Nawab's character: "The Nabob Mahomed Ally Cawn is a man of very moderate talents, of less resolution, and of no application. The officers of his court and the dependants which entered the Province with his father, Anoroodecawn, are the only friends to his government. The war has drained him of his treasure, and his Ministers have not conciliated to him the affection of his people." In another letter, dated Madras, November 17th, 1757, when the Nawab's position in relation to the English had deteriorated and Orme had to condemn the diplomatic dealings of the Nawab, he thus summed up his character: "In my private character, I pity no man on Earth so sincerely as I do this Nabob. He has cunning but no sense—cunning to make shifts, not

(Fort St. David) after subjugating Chennapatnam (Madras) in 1746-47; (2) at the time when Nawab Nizam-ud-daula Nasir Jang expelled the English army from the place of Tiruvati, nay, more than that, the said Nawab had commissioned Abdul Nabi Khan and Himmat Bahadur Khan, the Sardars of Cuddapah and Kurnool, to capture Chennapatnam in 1750; and (3) at the time when M. Lally, after capturing the fort of Devanampatnam, marched on to storm the Fort of Chennapatnam in 1758. Thus, his help and support on these three occasions is the reason for the establishment of the English nation to-day in this country of Hindustan. But for this help, the French, instead of our people, would be all-powerful in the affairs of this country." "When those in the assembly listened to this speech by that sardar (Coote) of old age, Lord Macartney and others dispersed without giving assent to it." (*The Tusak-i-Walajahi*, tr. by S. M. H. Nainar, Part I—pp. 124-5.

sense nor courage to form a plan. He wants to spend like a Nabob at a time when he should withdraw his splendour to assume it some years hence with certainty. Still he is a Prince, and these avulsions from his State tear his pride to pieces. He is an object of compassion⁵."

Major Dow gives a most gratifying picture of the Nawab in the first edition of his work 'Hindustan' (1770, Vol. II, p. 397). He wrote thus: "Mahomed Ali's manner attaches the stranger to him, and commands the friend. The first rarely sees him without feeling an immediate interest in his welfare; and the latter has never been known to desert him. Calm, affable and full of dignity, he has improved the elevated passions of the Asiatic with what is amiable in the character of the European. The duplicity of the East is lost in the good heart of Mahomed Ali. He is possessed of ambition, without any of those vices which too frequently attend that passion; and his policy is never unworthy of the magnanimity of a virtuous Prince. 'A great man', says Mahomed Ali, 'may conceal his sentiments, but never ought to deceive. It was my fortune to place the way of rectitude before me in my youth, and I never deviated into the paths of deception. I met the British with that openness which they love; and it is my

(5) *Orme Mss. O. V.*, 28—(10).

The Madras Council, writing to the Directors on the 4th July 1775, thus explain his sense of growing dissatisfaction with the English authorities in India. "So early as 1763, his Mind was tintured with jealousies, and though he had, in consideration of past services, promised a Jaghire to the Company, he was unwilling to grant it and wanted to clog it with conditions of future Services. This Mr. Pigot objected to, and at length it was granted unconditionally. From that time he had recovered Tinnevely and Madura which had revolted, been rendered Master of Warriorpollam and the adjacent Pollygaries, of Ongole, of the Marawar Countries and lastly of Tanjore; and every accession of power has added to his Vanity and Ambition, and he now looks down upon the Company, who have so long so generously supported him, as a Power which is and ought to be subordinate to him."

"The Nabob is sedulous and free from many of the vices of his Countrymen, but he has the usual characteristics of the natives of this country. He is suspicious, vain and ambitious; and not being of a resolute or active mind, he has frequently been misled by those who have had the art to raise his jealousy of the Company, or who have flattered his vanity, or raised in his mind ideas of conquest or future greatness. These marks can be traced through every part of his connection with the Company, but particularly of late years; and judging from the influence which his second son (Amiru'l Umara) has had with him, contrary to the advice of his principal men, we think that the various changes of fortune... has brought a upon him sooner..."

honour, as well as security, to be the ally of a nation composed of princes.' This was his declaration at the conclusion of the late war, when he was put in peaceable possession of the Carnatic; and these were his sentiments when, at the head of his father's army, he rejected the offers of France, and saved the very being of the Company by raising the siege of Fort St. David."

In the III edition of his *History*, Dow added that "the greatest encomium upon his character is his being able to have struggled, with success, during the space of eighteen years, against the avaricious and revengeful passions of the Europeans without losing his dominions, or forfeiting his faith to the British nation." That historian also adds that the cursory mention made of Muhammad Ali in the first edition of his book was a great defect, as that prince was so well known and so much esteemed in Europe. Also the picture of the Nawab that he presented now was due to a person who had a perfect view of the original⁵."

(5) It was alleged that the anonymous author of a pamphlet—*A short Memorial of Services to His Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic etc.* (1767)—suspected to have been John Macpherson—got the notice and portrait of Walajah in Dow's *History of Hindustan* (2nd ed. 1770).

II—The Nawab's Debts and the Arcot Interest in Parliament and in British Politics

The Nawab took up his residence at Madras some years after the fall of Pondicherry and built for himself a palace amidst spacious grounds to the south of Fort St. George. Being a man of extravagant tastes and of improvident generosity, he became more and more steeped in debt, both to the Company and to private creditors, the bulk of whom were from the ranks of the English merchants and officials of the Presidency. To both these classes of creditors he made over large tracts of his possessions as security for his debts; and his bonds soon came to be freely bought and sold in England as well as in India. A numerous class of speculators,—Indian and European, official and non-official—became involved in these transactions over the Nawab's bonds which exercised a most demoralizing influence on Madras society and on the Company and Parliament in London, while influential classes found it to their interest to support and extend the vicious system of the management of whole districts by creditors having ostensible claims on the Nawabi.

One result of the Nawab's exorbitant claims on Tanjore—which was regarded his main security—was that the Madras Council would not pay any heed to the recommendations of Governor Lord Pigot for the restoration of the rights of the dispossessed Raja of that kingdom and, in the sequel, brought about the arrest and imprisonment of the Governor himself (1776);—a most unfortunate episode in the greatly chequered and discreditable record of the Southern Presidency in the last decades of the 18th century. The scandal of the Nawab of Arcot's debts continued to hang like a black cloud over the Madras horizon for a number of years, even after the good Nawab's death, as the same state of things continued under his son and successor, Nawab Umdatul-Umara (1795-1801).

One of the prime factors that brought about the Nawab's perpetual financial worries was the unceasing demands of the Company for money on military and political grounds. After Lally's siege of Madras was raised,

Muhammad Ali paid for the cost of its defence, "because it was the residence of his friends." After Coote's capture of Pondicherry, he was asked to pay for its siege on the ground that it was the residence of his enemies. The Nawab agreed to pay, but wanted the stores of Pondicherry to be given over to him. But the Court of Directors sent orders to cancel the sum thus credited. Later, Pigot wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore, in January 1762, that "it will always give me great concern to be obliged to spill human blood or forcibly dispossess any prince of his country; but rebels must be punished, if they will not hear reason." To the Nawab, he wrote in May;—"I consider the Rajah of Tanjore as a sovereign prince; it is a custom when two States disagree, to call in a third to judge between them. I offered myself as such and therefore the treaty must be conducted by me. I act as mediator; the affair cannot, according to custom, be discussed in your durbār." The resultant treaty was dictated by Governor Pigot; and when the Nawab refused to subscribe, "Pigot seized his *chop* and with his own hand in the Nawab's presence affixed the stamp to the deed." (Beckles Willson's *Ledger and Sword*: Vol. II. pp. 165-6). When a present of four lakhs was made by the Tanjore Rajah, the Directors claimed it for the Company, for its interposition and guarantee of the treaty.

Before resigning the Governorship of Madras (October 1763) Pigot had induced the Nawab to issue unconditional *sanads* to the Company, granting it territories worth annually 14 lakhs of rupees. Pigot declared that the "Company do not take anything from you; but they are the givers and you are a receiver."

When Pigot left for Europe, he consented to become the Nawab's agent in England at an annual salary of 12,000 pagodas. The Nawab had been mentioned as an ally of Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris; but, as has been noted above, he was kept in ignorance of the passage relating to his "entire possession of the Carnatic⁶."

It is profitable here that we know something of the engagements entered into between the Nawab and the Eng-

(6) J. Macpherson, see *supra* Note 1.

lish⁷. The Nawab was established in recognized possession both of the powers of the *Nazim* and of those of the *Diwan* of the Carnatic subah and the Company first held the "station of dependence "possessing their privileges through his sufferance and owing obedience to his throne." (Mill's *History of British India*, Vol. IV. (1848) p. 64).

As early as December 1765, the Company were forced, on account of the Nawab's impotence, to protect his domi-

- (7) Article II of the Treaty of Paris recognised Salabat Jang as the Subahdar of the Deccan and Muhammad Ali as the Nawab of the Carnatic. In 1763, the Nawab conferred on the English, districts yielding an annual revenue of upwards of 4½ lakhs of pagodas, for which they had obtained a *farman* from the Emperor of Delhi. In the grants given to the English on the 16th October 1763, of lands yielding over 366,000 pagodas, there were many excepted villages. The Nawab ordered, on the 29th October 1763, the inclusion of these excepted villages, with his own endorsement:—"In consideration of the true friendship of the English East India Company and their remaining always in alliance with me, let a *sanad* for the whole *jaghire* without any exception be made out." (Aitchison: *Treaties Engagements etc., Madras and Ceylon* (1909 ed.) Vol. X; p. 26). In 1765 the Great Moghal confirmed the Nawab's grants to the Company in the Carnatic. In 1781, the Nawab made several requests to the Governor-General in Council to which the latter replied: "The rights and authority which the Nawab possesses over his country, his children, his family, his servants and subjects in all the political and domestic administration of his country we will maintain and support." A *sanad* was made out by the Nawab, dated 2nd December, 1781, for the transfer the revenues of the Carnatic and the power of appointing renters and amildars, to the Governor, Lord Macarteny. One-sixth of the revenue was to be paid to the Nawab and the balance was to be placed to his credit with the Company.

In June 1785, a preliminary treaty was concluded with the Nawab, by which the latter consented to pay 16 lakhs of pagodas per annum to the Company who were to be answerable to his private creditors also, the sum to include current charges and territorial security being given for punctual payment.

According to the Treaty of 1787, it was agreed that the Nawab should pay the sum of 9 lakhs for protection in times of peace, besides 12 lakhs for his debts. In times of war, the contracting parties should each pay 4½ of their revenues; and in case of failure by the Nawab, certain districts should be assigned as security. The Nawab also relinquished his right of having direct political relations with other Indian States. The Court of Directors altered the sum for the payment for protection in times of peace from 9 to 11 lakhs of pagodas, being 10½ lakhs as the sum proportioned to the revenues and ½ lakh of pagodas paid as tribute by the Raja of Tanjore. The Nawab agreed to this alteration after some demur. The matter has been detailed below.

In 1790, it was resolved by the English to take the direct management of the Carnatic, while the war with Mysore lasted. A new treaty was entered into in 1792, according to which the Nawab was to pay 9 lakhs of pagodas yearly; the Carnatic was to be garrisoned by British troops; the British should collect the tributes of the poligars on behalf of the Nawab; the assignment for his debts should be reduced; and in the event of war, the British should take the entire management of the country. The relations of Nawab Umdat-ul-Umara with the British power, are treated in a separate section.

nions, to constrain him to transfer to them the defence of the country and to allow them a proportion of his revenues sufficient for the maintenance of the protecting forces⁸.

The Nawab had, even by 1769, accumulated a large amount of debts. The Directors had already interested themselves in the reduction of the pressure of the debt and reduced to 10 per cent all the interest bonds of his private creditors. There was some justifiable ground for the Nawab's finances becoming severely strained. He had to pay 7 lakhs of pagodas annually towards the maintenance of the Company's troops and over 3½ lakhs as rent for the *Jaghire* district and Poonamalle, the *Jaghire* having been farmed out by the Nawab from the English to whom he had earlier granted it. His administration was inefficient and neglectful. He paid his creditors by a species of assignments called *tankas* which entitled their holders to the revenue of their districts and to draw it immediately from the Collectors. He found his power diminished and his revenues absorbed; and he regarded the conduct of the Madras Presidency as being highly unjust to him. The latter in turn accused the Nawab of concealing the amounts of the monies which he obtained and of diminishing the wealth of the country by his misgovernment. "The band of Englishmen, and others, who surrounded the Nabob, for the purpose of preying upon him, wished of course to see all powers in his hands, that they might prey the more

-
- (8) Once having the military power the English were able to do what they pleased over the Nawab. The resolution of maintaining this absolute power was thus clearly expressed in the letter of the Court of Directors, to the Presidency or Madras, dated 24th December, 1765. "The Nabob has hitherto desired, at least acquiesced with seeming approbation, that garrisons of our troops should be placed in his forts: it is not improbable that after a time he may wish to have his protectors removed. Should such an event happen, it may require some address to avoid giving him disgust, and at the same time a degree of firmness to persist in your present plan: but persist you must: for we establish it as a fundamental point, that the Company's influence and real power in the province cannot be any way so effectually maintained, as by keeping the principal forts in our hands." See First Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Appendix No. 23. "By being in possession of most of his strong places, the troops being officered by the Company, and the garrisons perfectly under their orders, the Company have it in their power to give law to the Carnatic. Without the concurrence of the Presidency he can do nothing; they are arbiters of peace and war; and even if one of his own tributaries refuse the *peshcush*, the payment of which they had guaranteed, without them he cannot call them to an account." Letter from Sir John Lindsay, to the President and Council of Madras, 11th June, 1771; Rous: Appendix, p. 368.

abundantly. They filled every place with their outcries against every restraint which was placed upon him: and, in particular, had endeavoured, and with great success, to disseminate an opinion in England, that he was an oppressed and ill-treated prince, while the servants of the Company were his plunderers and tyrants."

Sir John Lindsay, the King's Commissioner, who landed at Madras towards the end of 1770, claimed the right of executing, without the permission or even the knowledge of the Company, Article XI of the Treaty of Paris above referred to. It included the power of taking part in all the disputes between the Nawab and the Company's servants, as Muhammad Ali was in that article placed upon the footing of an ally with the King of Great Britain and was entitled, consequently, to all the protection due to an ally. Lindsay arrived at Madras with a prejudice against the President and Council and fell at once into all the views of the Nawab and the men who surrounded him; and the result was that the correspondence between Lindsay and the Presidency degenerated into bitterness and animosity on both sides. Lindsay asked for a full account of all the transactions of the Presidency with the Nawab. The latter only contrived to convince the Commissioner of the justice and wisdom of his own views; and the result was the King's Commissioner widened the difference and misunderstanding between the "partnership sovereigns of the Carnatic". Sir Robert Harland who succeeded Lindsay, took up, when he arrived at Madras in September 1771, the same attitude as his predecessor; and he was, perhaps, a little more intemperate in his language and created more animosity among his opponents.

The Government of Madras should have refrained from all discussions with the Commissioners until they had received definite instructions from their masters in England; and they should not have recognised powers inconsistent with those which the Court of Directors had informed them as having been granted to the Commissioners. The Nawab grew to be positively truculent on several occasions. Then came the vexed question of the Nawab's claims on the Tanjore Raj which had such a miserable end.

The question of the debts of the Nawab continued to engage the prominent attention of the Company, both in India and in England, and also that of the English public and Government. In 1778, the Madras Council wrote to the Directors that the Nawab had declared in the previous December a dividend of 18 per cent to his creditors and that he had contracted fresh debts to a very large amount. They also said that they had resolved that the debt consolidated by the Nawab was not in any respect whatever under the auspices or the protection of the Madras Government. The private debts were then grouped under three heads: (1) The Consolidated Debt of 1767, for which John Pybus, John Call, and James Bourchier were trustees, stood originally at 22 lakhs of pagodas, but it had in part been paid off; (2) the Cavalry Loan of 1769 consisted of 4 lakhs advanced by James Taylor, Andrew Majendie, and James Call for the satisfaction of arrears of pay of the Nawab's troops; and (3) the Consolidated Debt of 1777, which Rumbold placed at 63 lakhs, though it was afterwards stated to be only 35 lakhs, of pagodas."

The debts of the Nawab of Arcot very curiously but inevitably produced political complications. Burke, in his speech of the 28th February 1785, thus surmised that the debt of 1777 had grown up in the following manner:—"The Nawab, ever in arrear with his dues to the Company, is pressed for payment. He applies for money to a financier like Benfield. Notes of hand are given him, which are accepted at the Treasury. The Nawab grants the lender a *tanka* or assignment of the revenue of a specified district and until the revenue comes in, pays two to three per cent. per month for the accommodation. By the connivance of the Governor as Cashkeeper, the lender's notes are not presented until the revenue payment is made. By this plan the lender receives usurious interest on a capital sum which he never disbursed. It may be asked why the Nawab did not avoid the grant of interest by deferring his payments to the Company until his revenue was realized. The answer is that a large indebtedness favoured his ambitious schemes, since it prompted the Company to aid him in the conquest of fresh territory, like Tanjore, providing additional revenue. He was prepared, however, to embark on warlike schemes on his own account."

All this is clear from a study of the bills proposed in Parliament for the reform of the Company's administra-

tion. A powerful interest known as the Arcot Interest, mostly composed of the creditors and agents of the Nawab had come to exercise a potent influence on the politics both of the Company and of Parliament. Many retired Anglo-Indian *Nabobs* bought votes in the Court of the East India Proprietors, swayed the opinions and patronage of the Directors and played a very prominent, and in many respects undesirable, part in the intrigues of the Courts of Proprietors and Directors and of the House of Commons. The demands of the Arcot creditors and the influence of the Arcot Interest came to exercise a powerful sway on the attitude and fortunes of the Ministry itself, even from the seventies. In 1781 Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, got from the Nawab the entire administration of the Carnatic revenues for the duration of the war with Haidar Ali. But subsequently the Nawab was persuaded by several of his favourite creditors, including the notorious Paul Benfield, to appeal to Warren Hastings, who was not well disposed towards the Madras Government, in order to have the assignment cancelled. Hastings was anxious to retain the support of the Arcot Interest in Parliament and ordered Macartney to cancel the assignment made. But when he met with a blunt refusal from the latter, he appealed to the Directors and to his friend Lawrence Sullivan, who was "the Uncrowned King of Leadenhall" and who headed the party of the Hastings Interest in London. Atkinson, another log-rolling politician, was approached by Sullivan; Atkinson was the accredited agent of Benfield and was in close cooperation with James Macpherson who was also the Nawab's agent. The crisis came about in 1783, when Fox's Bills for the Better Government of India were defeated, largely by the machinations of the different groups of the India interests. Pitt took office as Prime Minister and pledged himself to introduce a better India Bill as soon as it should be possible (December 1783). Atkinson, who was Pitt's agent, now undertook to manage the Arcot Interest and other Indian interests and to secure their support for the new Ministry. Atkinson was well known as the London agent for Paul Benfield, who was the most influential and the most notorious of the creditors of the Nawab. Not only was he in close association with James Macpherson, the Nawab's accredited agent in England, but he actually embodied in his own person all the power of the Arcot Interest. When Pitt's India Bill was

violently opposed by Fox and North, he joined forces with Sullivan. It was through him that a majority of the Directors were induced to support Pitt's Ministry and were reconciled to his first India Bill. Both he and Sullivan managed the elections to the Court of Directors, and when the House of Commons was dissolved by Pitt, he assured the latter that he would obtain a majority for him in the ensuing elections with the help of the India interests. The belief was widespread that Pitt had been carried into office on the shoulders of the Indian interests, and that having been safely provided now with a majority by the same interests, he could ride securely; and Burke openly made the accusation in Parliament that, through the agency of Atkinson, Pitt had received a good volume of support from the creditors of the Nawab of Arcot. According to him, the East Indians 'have united themselves into one great and, in my opinion, formidable club which though now quiet, may be brought into action with considerable unanimity and force.' In the House there were definitely 14 members of the Arcot Interest, of whom 11 were openly pledged to the support of Pitt.

Atkinson, in association with Sullivan, and with James Macpherson, began a very bad piece of intrigue. He wanted to bring about the annulment of the assignment of the Carnatic revenues to the Company; and Sullivan promised to support him in the claim for the liquidation of the Nawab's private debts, on the definite condition that Atkinson should join forces with him to get the assignment cancelled. The creditors were vociferous and their numbers had become greatly augmented by the forging and the circulation of a large quantity of fictitious bonds. All of them demanded sums which were held to a large extent to "be both doubtful in origin and exaggerated in amount." The Nawab, whose only object was to play the creditors against the Company and to gain back the assignment he had made, deliberately admitted the justice of all the creditors' demands. In fact, he virtually became a party acting openly in collusion with the creditors. James Macpherson⁹ now wanted to get from Pitt and Dundas an assurance that all the Nawab's debts in their entirety, *i.e.*, including those of the private creditors, would be assured of

(9) He was the Nawab's agent in England and along with Atkinson, deserted Fox and North for Pitt.

an early and effective liquidation. But the scandal was so strong concerning the Nawab's private debts that Pitt's India Act had to copy, from Dundas's abortive bill and the previous Bills of Fox, the provision that the Directors should investigate the justice of the claims of the Nawab's creditors and should thereafter arrange to create a fund for the discharge of such portions of them as should be, after proper scrutiny, declared to be valid and just. When this draft provision of Pitt's Bill was submitted by Dundas to the Directors for previous opinion, the Court, acting under the influence of Atkinson and Sullivan, immediately took strong objection to its inclusion and resolved that "as the Nawab himself continues to declare that all his debts are just, to inquire into the ground of his debts appears therefore wholly useless." They insisted that the proposed clause should be omitted altogether from the Bill; but Pitt would not do so, as he was afraid that such an omission would give just cause for Burke and Fox to suspect that the Arcot creditors were being unduly favoured, as they had been openly on the side of the Ministry.

As James Mill remarks, a strong conviction was impressed upon the English public of the evil resulting from the Nawab of Arcot's Debts. This opinion was accompanied by a consciousness "of the fraudulent methods by which they had been contracted; and of the mischievous purposes which the Nabob pursued, by acknowledging debts, where nothing had been received, and nothing but a dangerous co-operation was expected in return; that, in every one of the schemes which the late reformers had proposed for the government of India, a provision had been included, for an adjustment of those enormous and suspicious contracts." In the Bill of Dundas it was proposed that the Governor-General and Council should ascertain the origin, nature and amount of the "just debts" of the Nawab and take measures for discharging them. A similar provision was contained in Mr. Fox's Bill which declared it to be unlawful for any servant of the Company to have any money transaction with any protected or native prince.

Pitt's Act was definite about this; and the provision included in it for investigation by the Directors of the legitimacy and justice of the Nawab's debts had to be implemented. The process of implementing it begot such a se-

ence of scandal and intrigue that it deserves to be detailed at length¹⁰. This account given below is taken from an article contributed by the author to the *New Review*, No. 98, Vol. XVII, entitled 'The Arcot Interest and parliament (1783-85)'.

The Directors were now strongly canvassed by the Nawab's agents to recommend an unconditional payment to all the creditors. Atkinson even went to the extent of pleading, not only that this recommendation should be carried out, but also that the assignment of the Carnatic revenues which had been made to the Company should be cancelled simultaneously. A curious hitch now occurred. Sullivan who had previously allied himself with Atkinson, now deserted him because of a private grudge that the latter had not supported him in the recent contest for election to the Chair (of the Court of Directors). Nathaniel Smith, the Chairman of the Court of Directors, had long been hostile to the Arcot Interest; he now cleverly declared that the Company's claims on the Nawab ought to receive the first consideration. But since this proposal would carry weight with no important party, he next made an insidious proposal for the annulment of the assignment, secured by Lord Macartney, but opposed by Hastings, and thus got over the support of the Hastings Interest in the Direction. Having accomplished this first move, he next succeeded in getting approved a despatch which ordered an inquiry by the Madras Government into the justice of the Arcot Debts, and the sanction of payment only of such portions of them as could be proved to be legitimate and real. As this despatch also called into question the activities of Benfield in India and of Macpherson in London, it received the support of Sullivan and the Hastings Interest.

The Board of Control, which just began to function consequent on the passing of Pitt's Act, was called upon to consider the Directors' draft despatch. After Call and Barker had pleaded before them in support of the credi-

(10) In 1782 John Call, Richard Smith and Sir Robert Barker had been appointed as the Agents of the Arcot creditors in England; and now Call, who was the most aggressive of the three, put great pressure on Pitt and Dundas to recognise as valid all the claims of all the creditors of the Nawab. Call had been openly elected to Parliament as a supporter of Pitt who showed such a marked partiality for him as to create him a Baronet some years later; while Dundas, in order not to displease him, had taken 'the unusual and improper step of showing the preliminary draft of the India Bill and of discussing the Arcot clause with him.'

tors' recommendations, they decided that all the Nawab's claims were just and that definite funds should be appropriated for their payment in entirety. The despatch, as thus altered, directed the repayment of the Arcot debts at the rate of £480,000 a year, extending over a period of twenty years and divided the claims into three categories, viz., the Consolidated Loan of 1767, the Cavalry Loan of 1777; and the Consolidated Loan of 1777—practically adopting the same division as had been suggested by Call to Pitt and Dundas prior the passing of Pitt's Act, before the Arcot question had come under official cognizance.

The Directors, to whom the altered despatch was referred, would not agree to the suggestion of the Board of Control that all classes of claims should be paid; and while recognising the validity of the first two categories of the claims, they demanded an inquiry into those coming under the third category, which they held, had been contracted in defiance of their express orders and in which Benfield and Call's brother, James Call, had contrived to secure a major beneficiary share. The total amount of this Consolidated Loan of 1777 was estimated at over 2½ millions sterling. The Agents of the Nawab's creditors had themselves informed the Directors that the whole of this loan was 'not entitled to that direct interference from the Company which we have urged on behalf of the other two'. Later on, Burke revealed the fact that Benfield alone would gain an annuity of £35,520, according to the Board of Control's recommendation. Mr. Dundas who practically functioned as the effective head of the Board, hoped, however, that the Directors would yield to the Board's suggestion to pay the creditors in full. But Sullivan saw to it that the majority in the Court stood firm in their rejection of the Board's proposals. Though Call and Macpherson wrote strongly to Dundas urging him to reject summarily the modifications of the Court of Directors, Dundas either could not, or would not take up a strong stand. In this most discreditable bargain, Macpherson thus defended the right of the Board of Control to reject the Court's opinion¹¹.

In these circumstances, Dundas had to write his answer in a very hesitating way. He assured the Directors

(11) I presume to suggest that no *express* should be given... to any class of those debts which the Nawab has already acknowledged ... to be just The late Act has left the Directors too much at large Bodies of men must ... be commanded by authority or swayed by influence. In plain terms, the powers of your Board must

that he agreed with them, that the origin of the Consolidated Loan of 1777 was obscure, but argued that it was in no way expedient for the political and financial interests of the Madras Presidency 'to keep the subject longer afloat'; and in any case, as the Directors themselves had previously stated that the Nawab had recognised all his debts as just, a decision to that effect might be approved. As thus modified, the Despatch was sent to India. But Selivan had gamed his point; he had brought the scandal of the Arcot debts, particularly the Loan of 1777, into glaring public notice and given a handle to Fox and Burke to beat the Ministry with. The opposition therefore moved early in 1785 for papers on the Arcot debts. But the resolution was rejected, after a nasty discussion, in a division of 164 to 69 votes. Burke openly accused the Ministers, in a magnificent speech, of having successfully conducted negotiations through Atkinson with the Arcot Interest and secured their political and other support at the last general election; he further declared that this resolution of the Board of Control to pay off the last loan was nothing more and nothing less than the stipulated reward for that support. Dundas could not make any effective reply to Burke's charges¹².

be extended, or that closeting be renewed which has been always found necessary for carrying forward business with any decency of precision, in the India House. (*Vide* his letter to Dundas, dated October 13, 1784).

- (12) The most astonishing fact in the whole transaction was that some one (the crafty Sullivan was generally suspected to be the person) had given all the papers to Debrett, the printer, who promptly published them. In the sequel it came to be known that the Cabinet itself was not unanimous in supporting Pitt and Dundas in this measure. Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor, and Viscount Sydney had strongly opposed the indiscriminate payment of all the debts, while Cornwallis, the Governor-General-Designate, condemned the whole measure as an unjust decision. Dundas himself, in his later years, referred to this payment as a matter which he could not help sanctioning. Sydney wrote to Pitt that he was concerned that the latter should have been a party to this discreditable business.

Here is the view of a high authority on the whole question:

"The evidence afforded by the Board's handling of this Arcot question supports the view that Pitt, through the agency of Dundas, Atkinson, Macpherson and Call, had received political support from the Arcot Interest in the general election, and that Dundas had in return promised to procure a settlement of the creditors' claims on the Nawab without preliminary investigation. In November 1783, for example, there were some 14 Arcot creditors sitting in Parliament, of whom 11 were supporting Fox and only 2 supporting Pitt. Between April and July 1784, at least 14 Arcot creditors were returned to Parliament, 7 of them being new members; of these 14, 11 supported Pitt and only 3 opposed him. The letters of Dundas, Cornwallis and Sydney also led one to adopt the view that external influence was brought to bear on the Board of Control to order the complete settlement of the debts. Only the unexpected *volte face* of Sullivan

III.—The Sequel of the Nawab's Debts.

The whole question of the Arcot debts was not at an end with these measures, as their effect was only to increase the evil that they intended to remove. The unchecked increase of the Nawab's debts which went on gaily through the rest of the period of rule of Nawab Muhammad Ali and the reign of his successor Umdatul-Umara (1795-1801) continued to exercise a most sinister influence on the politics and the purity of the Madras administration itself.

Lord Macartney estimated in his time the public debt of the Nawab of Arcot at 30 lakhs of pagodas, and his private liabilities at 70 lakhs of pagodas. This was in the years 1781-85. When the Carnatic was annexed in 1801 private claims alone were preferred to the amount of nearly 30½ millions of pounds sterling for debts incurred by the Nawab, since Macartney reported. This time the bonds or bills of the Nawab which had been freely bought and sold in the market, came under the scrutiny of two commissions which respectively sat at Madras and at London with the result that claims amounting to nearly 28 millions sterling were thrown out as being fraudulent and false.

To anticipate our narrative in this respect:—Nawab Muhammad Ali had become very extravagant with age and persisted in incurring an enormous and ever growing amount of debts, both to the Company and to private creditors to whom he made over large districts as securities. His bonds and notes were freely bought and sold in the market; and the discount on them fluctuated with the fluctuations in his financial expectations. A number of speculating persons, both European and Indian, became interested in his debts; and their growing influence intensified the vicious system by which speculating creditors farmed out the taxes of large districts much in the manner of the Roman tax-farmers.

After Nawab Wallajah's death in 1795, his son and successor, Umdatul-Umara perpetuated the vicious system. When he died in 1801, his successor was compelled to give over his entire dominion to the English; and in return, the Government of the Presidency undertook to ar-

and the majority of the Directors had brought the question to public notice. (C. H. Philips: *The East India Company 1784-1834*, p. 40). notice." (C. H. Philips: *The East India Company 1784-1834*; p. 40).

range for the liquidation of the Carnatic Debts and to set aside a sum of about 12 lakhs of rupees annually for the purpose. A deed to this effect was signed between the Company and the creditors of the Nawab. Three Commissioners were appointed in London to adjudicate on all claims arising in Britain, while three other men chosen from the Bengal Service were asked to investigate the claims in India and to report to the Commissioners in London.

This was in 1807. Soon there came to circulate in the Presidency large quantities of forged bonds purporting to have been issued by the late Nawabs. A Committee presided over by the Advocate-General reported, in this matter, that the forged bonds were in circulation to a great extent and they were supported by forged entries in the account-books of the Carnatic Durbar. It was also added that Raya Reddi Row, the Sheristadar of the Nawab, had contrived to introduce into the Nawab's books these forged entries; and on the other hand, it was claimed that the allegation was made against him in order to secure his removal from office. A notorious Madras Dubash, Avadhnam Paupiah, was an active party in the intrigue against Raya Reddi Row and was further found to be concerned in the forgery of a Carnatic bond for 46,000 pagodas. Government sanctioned the prosecution of Paupiah for forgery, while the Commissioners took up for investigation a bond put forward by Raya Reddi Row. Paupiah denounced this bond as a forgery; but he could not prove his case; and the Commissioners recommended that he should be proceeded against for conspiracy, and his witnesses should be prosecuted for perjury. Paupiah had influential supporters among the Europeans of the Presidency, like Mr. Abbott and Mr. Thomas Parry, Free Merchant, who had taken service under the Nawab some years previously, 'nominally as the captain of his troops and whom Government some years back had resolved to deport to Great Britain by virtue of an old order of the Directors against him. Now Paupiah and his supporters lodged a charge of forgery against Raya Reddi Row; and a friendly Justice of the Peace committed Reddi Row and his abetting brother for trial before the Supreme Court on an alleged forged bond which was under investigation by the Commissioners.

In the trial that ensued Reddi Row was found guilty by the jury; and the two witnesses of Paupiah against whom the Commissioners had recommended a prosecution for perjury were acquitted. Fresh prosecutions were instituted by Paupiah against Reddi Row and Mr. Battley, Secretary to the Nawab. Thus Paupiah and his party won all along the line. They now sent a protest defending their action, to the Governor-General himself and held that the Government Commissioners should not proceed with any further investigation of the bonds connected with the Carnatic debts. But a number of leading firms of Madras assured the Government of their faith in the Commissioners and urged that the forged bonds should be eliminated from circulation as early as possible.

But Abbott and Parry went one step further and threatened even the Commissioners with criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court. After this very extraordinary and almost defiant step, the Government of Sir George Barlow (1807-13) was forced to take decisive action against them. Roebuck was removed from his official appointments in Madras and transferred to Vizagapatam. Maitland was dismissed from his office of Justice of the Peace. It was himself acting as Justice of the Peace that had committed Reddi Row and his brother for trial before the Supreme Court. Thomas Parry was peremptorily ordered to be prepared to be deported to England. Parry's biographer, Mr. Hodgson, (now Sir G. H.) says that one important feature of that merchant's busy life was his sturdy defiance of Government, first in 1800 on the occasion of his first threatened deportment and again in 1809 when he was caught up in the vortex of the scandals of the Carnatic Debts, in the final solution of which, he played "a very leading and courageous part, fighting undauntedly against deeply entrenched and powerful forces." Once again, Parry contrived to escape from the clutches of Government, which was unable to enforce its order of deportation. But his claim on the Carnatic Debts derived from Paupiah was disallowed.

After these vigorous measures and with the death of Paupiah in the beginning of 1809, the Commissioners became free to pursue their investigations. Their further proceedings were lighted up by the fact that Reddi Row himself was guilty of bad faith. This discovery led to the

man's suicide. Both Reddi Row and Avadhanam Paupiah¹³ had been instrumental in the circulation of forged bonds, though many reputable firms and persons discovered that the bonds which they held were bad. When the Commissioners finished their task, out of a total value of 30 millions sterling, only £2,500,000 could be decreed in favour of the claimants. The Government of Sir George Barlow was greatly discredited on account of these scandals which were rendered worse by the errors of judgement of the Commissioners.

Up to February 12, 1821, the Commissioners in England disallowed claims to the extent of 26½ millions pounds out of a total of about 29 millions. They found most of Paupiah's bonds to be forgeries or to have been previously fully satisfied. But his creditors contrived to obtain awards on some of his bonds for over £125,000. Similarly all the bonds of Reddi Row including that for 38,500 pagodas in respect of which he was convicted, were found to be either forgeries or notes without any consideration and the heirs of his estate obtained only £441 on account of arrears of pay due to his brother Ananda Rao.

-
- (13) Paupiah was at first a Gumasta to the anchorage accountant (or Kanakku Pillai) under the sea-customs officer of Madras. He subsequently became the Dubash to the two powerful brothers Holland. In 1789, John Holland being the Acting Governor and Edward Holland third Member of Council and President of the Board of Revenue, Paupiah transacted all the Indian business of the Governor; and he was even allowed to be present at the "Governor's Consultations". He was later implicated in a conspiracy against J. Haliburton who was disliked by the Hollonds and persecuted by them. After the resignation and dismissal of the Hollonds in February 1790 and the appointment of General Medows as Governor, Haliburton was reinstated as Member of the Board of Revenue and a Committee of Inquiry sat to inquire into the plot against him. Haliburton was completely exonerated; and he preferred a charge of conspiracy against Paupiah and three of his accomplices. He was tried at the quarter sessions of July, 1792 and sentenced to imprisonment for three years and a fine of £ 2,000 and also to the pillory, though the last punishment was remitted. The second phase of the official career of Paupiah was connected with the Nawab of Arcot's Debts scandal. Historical echoes of Paupiah and the Hollonds are held to be embodied in Sir Walter Scott's novel, 'The Surgeon's Daughter'. Scott was related to Haliburton and perhaps read a copy of the pamphlet entitled 'The Trial of Avadhanum Paupiah' published by Haliburton in 1793' (See C. J. Fawcett's article on "The Two Hollonds of Madras and their Dubash" in the *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. V, 1927. (2) *The Forged Bonds of the Nawab of the Carnatic*. *Ibid* Vol. VI, 1927. (3) P. R. Krishnaswami in the *Hindu*. Madras, of 21-6-1918 on 'Paupiah, the Brahmin Dubash' and in the *Calcutta Review* for October 1919). For a full treatment of the Carnatic Debts; see Carnatic Parliamentary papers 1807 *et seq* and Reports of the Commissioners 1807-21; also Sir Alexander Cardew: *The White Munity*, Appendix B, 'The Question of the Carnatic Debts'.

IV.—The Nawab and the Madras Government (1781-90) His Relations with Macartney and Campbell.

The Nawab, in spite of his weakness, had become very ambitious. His dispute with the Rajah of Tanjore was of long standing and brought about, in the end, the disgraceful episode connected with the English occupation of Tanjore for the Nawab's benefit and the incidents leading to Governor Pigot's arrest by his own Council. (See Mill's *History of British India*, Vol. IV, pp. 92-139). In the operations connected with the Second Mysore War, Lord Macartney, who was appointed in the place of the inefficient Governor Rumbold and his *sub protem* successor, Whitehill, found the Carnatic overrun by Haidar Ali's troops, the city of Madras in the throes of a famine and the treasury of the Presidency practically empty. The Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Tanjore could render no aid; their territories were overrun by the enemy; the supply from the Northern Circars was inadequate; and bills on England were forbidden. The capture of the Dutch settlements afforded some relief, but the Governor was driven ultimately to the necessity of drawing bills on England. Sir Eyre Coote claimed the right to conduct the war with Haidar Ali, free from the control of the Madras Government, on the ground that he was the Commander-in-Chief in India and a Member of the Supreme Council. Macartney gave the General a free hand, but would not admit the justice or propriety of his claim; and Coote complained to Hastings of gross interference with his powers. Coote's victory at Porto Novo in June-July 1781 and at Polilore brought no corresponding advantages; and at the close of that campaign Haidar Ali was still in possession of the Carnatic. Coote suffered from want of provisions and transport and though he relieved the fortress of Vellore, Braithwaite was defeated and taken prisoner at Kumbakonam, Cuddalore fell into the hands of Tipu and his French allies, and Haidar's troops could harrass St. Thomas Mount and San Thome (April-May 1782). In September Coote sailed for Bengal, Sir Hector Munro had already left for England and the command devolved on General Stewart. In December 1782 Haidar died of a carbuncle, in the district of North Arcot. Coote returned to Madras in April 1783, only to die. Stewart who was operating against Cuddalore was recalled to Madras. To-

wards the end of June 1783, Macartney heard that the preliminaries of peace had been signed with France and Holland. He proposed to the French General Bussy and Admiral Suffrein an immediate stoppage of hostilities. Towards the end of July the British got back Cuddalore and the French Pondicherry.

During all these years of war Lord Macartney pursued the view that the Supreme Government of Calcutta had always been exceeding the limits of their authority by undue interference in the internal affairs of the Madras Government. He was very jealous of any encroachment on his own jurisdiction. Warren Hastings wrote to him in very complimentary terms at first, assuring him of a free hand in shaping and pursuing his own policy; but he finally advised that the treaty, concluded with the Nawab in December 1781, for the transfer of the revenues of Carnatic and the power of appointing renters and amildars to the Madras Governor, should be scrupulously respected. This treaty stipulated that one-sixth of the Carnatic revenues was to be paid to the Nawab and the balance was to be placed to his credit with the Company.

The circumstances that brought about this treaty were as follows:—The Nawab had been perceiving the frequent changes in the policy and attitude of the Madras Government in recent years; and he now decided to approach Hastings with a view to make a permanent arrangement with the Supreme Government. He sent his Diwan, Saiyid Asim Khan, along with Richard Sullivan, offering the assignment of the whole of his revenues to the Company during the continuance of the Mysore war and reserving only one-sixth for his own expenses: and in return he desired that he was to be recognised as the legitimate hereditary sovereign of the Carnatic in full possession of authority over his dominions, his family and servants. An agreement was concluded on these terms between the Supreme Government and the Nawab on the 2nd April 1781¹⁴.

Mr. Sullivan was appointed to reside at the court of the Nawab to represent the Company's Government, and

(14) (Letters Nos. 115-118 from the Nawab of Arcot and to him; pp. 42-45. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Imperial Record Department, Vol. VI, 1781-85).

given proper credentials. Lord Macartney did not like that the Nawab should have any direct contact and communication with the Supreme Government; and he tried his best to get the engagement cancelled. The representations of the Madras Governor were successful and Sullivan was directed to advise the Nawab to come to an understanding with the Madras Council; and, by an agreement dated the 2nd December 1781, as noted above, the Nawab assigned all his revenues to the Company for a period of five years and was to receive one-sixth of the actual collections for his own expenses, while the Governor was to have full control over the collection and administration of the revenue and was empowered to appoint even the renters, and the Nawab was merely to confirm them. Within a few months after this new agreement, trouble arose over the appointment of the Amildar of Nellore. The Governor's nominee, Venkat Rao, was not approved by the Nawab, but was appointed by the Governor on his own authority and without the Nawab's *sanad*, as required by the treaty. There were also differences over the manner of collection and disbursement of the revenue and the conduct of the settlement work. The Nawab complained, as early as March 1782, that his expenses had been stopped, that he could not pay his soldiers and officers and sepoys, that he himself and his family were confined to the town of Madras as if they were prisoners, that the Governor had dismissed his old and tried officers and generally trampled upon his rights in a very insulting manner. In a letter from Asim Khan, dated Nov. 25, 1781, we read that Lord Macartney had done "much worse than even Hyder could do" and he had stopped even the allowance of oil and lamps in the mosques and the daily pittance allowed to the holy men and that he was bad enough to seize a quantity of rice that the Nawab had purchased and even to auction his coach and horse, and that in reply to the Nawab's representations, the Governor contemptuously desired him to leave the Carnatic and follow his *wakil* to Bengal¹⁵.

(15) A letter from the Nawab to the Supreme Government, received on April 10, 1782 reveals one imagined motive of Macartney's hostility to him. It says: "From the day, he (the Nawab) received the Governor General's treaty and the Resident in his darbar, he has drawn upon him the extreme displeasure of the Governor. The latter had repeatedly told the Nawab that he himself had ruined his affairs by publicly receiving the treaty and the Resident. If he had not done so, the Governor would have continued to promote his welfare". (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. VI, p. 156).

The Nawab now proposed that he himself might take over the entire charge of the revenue collection and promised, even as early as April 1782, that he would pay the estimated revenue and in addition an increase of one-third over the previous receipts, and also provide securities of reliable bankers for the regular payment of the revenue instalments into the Company's treasury. The Nawab also complained that all his enemies found favour with the Governor and were in his confidence, like Muthukrishna, the Dubash of Lord Pigot and William Ross, the Translator of the Tanjore Correspondence. The Nawab addressed a letter of bitter remonstrance to Macartney and his Council, on the 18th of April 1782, thus:—"Notwithstanding all this, notwithstanding the Faith of the King and Parliament of Great Britain and of the Company being pledged to me for the preservation of my rights; notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Macartney verbally and by writing, even by stipulations in his own agreement wherein the appointment of renters is left to him, but the confirmation to me; notwithstanding all these concurrent circumstances, sufficient, as I imagined, for my own and for my family's security, I now find myself at once reduced to nothing; my rights and authority trampled under foot; my family, subjects and servants taught to look up to a Company's Governor whose residence can be but temporary, instead of to their own lawful prince; and the means wrested from me of affording a voluntary and a friendly assistance, and of giving at least some degree of hope and satisfaction to my numerous and distressed creditors.... What can I say more".

A few months later, the Supreme Government observed that "His Highness the Nabob has thought proper to address two letters to the several members of the Board full of invective against the Right Hon'ble the President, and reviling his conduct towards his Highness in the most indecent language." When the Governor inquired whether it would be convenient for the Nawab to receive him and his Council for the presentation of a letter received from the Company, the Nawab declined the invitation with these words¹⁶.

(16)* "After having suffered from your Lordship so long and so unremittingly every mark of insult and contempt, I could readily have dispensed with any pretended assurances of respect at this particular

Warren Hastings was convinced of the justice of the Nawab's complaints and in his letter of January 18, 1783, admitted that the Nawab was the first Prince of the Indian Empire, who united with the Company and the British nation and adhered to his friendship at all times and at every hardship and thus secured repeated assurances of protection and support from the King of Great Britain, the English Company and the Supreme Government; and it was just and necessary to protect the Nawab's dignity and honour as far as practicable. He directed the Madras Government to immediately relinquish the management of the Nawab's country and return to him such parts of it as had been saved from Haidar Ali's depredations. One of the clauses of the Treaty of Salbai was that the Peshwa should call upon Haidar Ali to restore to the English and the Nawab of Arcot all the territories he had taken from them.

The relations between Hastings and Macartney grew more strained and were marked by conflicts and bickerings between the Councils of Calcutta and Madras. Writing on April 28, the Nawab informed Hastings that Macartney did not approve of the latter's proposals and was still withholding his country and government from him. Macartney wrote to the Company that the surrender of the assignment back to the Nawab would only mean the handing over of the revenues of the Carnatic into the hands of Amiru'l-Umara the second and favourite son of the Nawab and of Paul Benfield, and that the Governor-General and Council had repeated, in their letter of 15th of August, their ruinous proposals of the 13th January 1783. (Despatch of the Madras Council, 30th September 1783). After some hesitation the Company passed proceedings, dated

crisis; nor did I expect, after four pressing applications, to receive any letter from your Lordship till you had answered mine relative to the restitution of my Government and country pursuant to the positive orders of the Supreme Government of Bengal. At the same time, I conceive that your Lordship's distress at being deprived of the opportunity of paying your personal respects must either be calculated to take effect in the Meridian of England, as you must be conscious of your want of common decency in wilfully neglecting for so long past even the form of enquiry and condolence at the death of my nearest relations, or must wish to give another proof of your ceaseless indisposition in presenting, with an ironical sneer, a letter from my friends the Company, to the positive contents of which you have acted in direct and flagrant opposition."

(Public Consultations, Fort St. George, 25th April 1783).

9th December 1784, resolving to relinquish the assignment "from motives of moderation and attachment to the Nabob". Macartney resigned his post as a consequence.

The Directors accepted the Nawab's offer of an annual contribution of 12 lakhs of pagodas and detailed the lines on which it should be applied towards the gradual extinction of his debts. They approved, as indisputably just, the claims relating to the Consolidated Debt of 1767 and the Cavalry Loan, and regarded the Consolidated Debt of 1777 as 'expedient though not obligatory'. They further ordered that all accounts should be made up to the end of 1784 and interests thereon should be charged at specified rates, ranging from 6 to 12 per cent. Nawab Walajah hoped to secure the succession to his second and favourite son Amiru'l-Umara; but he predeceased his father by nearly seven years. When the Third Mysore War broke out, new arrangements had to be entered into with the Nawab, regarding his administration. When Sir Archibald Campbell arrived at Madras as Governor (April 1786) he found that the Carnatic revenues had been already restored to the Nawab. The expense of the peace establishment of the army was 21 lakhs of pagodas and the Governor proposed that the Nawab, the English Presidency and the Rajah of Tanjore should contribute towards this expenditure in proportion to their gross revenues; and the Nawab was to give $10\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas. But he pleaded inability to sustain such a burden; and Governor Campbell reduced his share to 9 lakhs.

In a new treaty which the Nawab signed on 24th February 1787, he consented to pay 9 lakhs of pagodas to the Madras Government and 12 lakhs to his creditors. In times of war however, he should contribute $4\frac{1}{5}$ th of his revenues, after deducting from their computation jaghir amounts for the maintenance of his family. In case of failure or delay certain securities were taken, by which the Government might appoint receivers to take over the payments from the Nawab's amildars directly. In time of war Government might appoint inspectors of accounts to examine the receipts of the districts; and, on failure of payment, they might appoint receivers to take the collections from the amildars for the whole country. Governor Campbell claimed a high degree of credit for this arrange-

ment and declared that the power of the purse and that of the sword were secured completely to the Company, without lessening the consequence of the Nawab. The arrangement added 5 lakhs of pagodas to the annual receipts of the Presidency. Campbell was highly pleased with the Nawab for making the grant of 9 lakhs, though he thought that the proportion for the defence of the Carnatic in peace time would not exceed 4 lakhs, and it would give a net gain of 5 lakhs of pagodas.

The Governor was so carried away by the Nawab's complaisance that he declared :—"I have narrowly watched the Nabob's conduct and sentiments since my arrival in this country, and I am ready to declare, that I do not think it possible that any Prince or person on earth can be more sincerely attached to the prosperity of the Honourable Company than his Highness, or that any one has a higher claim to their favour and liberality." The Court of Directors expressed a wish that the diminution of the Nawab's annual subsidy had been effected rather in the payments exacted for the creditors than with reference to the annual subsidy for the contingents. They also said that grave injustice had been done to the Rajah of Tanjore and undue favour shown to the Nawab in one particular, because the Rajah's annual tribute to the Nawab had not been deducted from the estimate of the Rajah's revenues and added to the revenues of the Nawab. Therefore they concluded that a burden of 50,000 pagodas had been laid upon the Rajah and removed from the shoulders of the Nawab. They ordered that $10\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas should still be demanded from the Nawab as annual subsidy, together with 50,000 pagodas, wrongfully charged to the Rajah of Tanjore. Therefore the regular payment from the Nawab was fixed at 11 lakhs of pagodas; but, in consideration of his difficulties, a lesser amount would be accepted for a few years.

The Nawab's payments had fallen into some arrears even before these new arrangements of the Directors could be communicated to him; and answering to the importunities of Governor John Hollond (February 1789—February 1790), the Nawab complained in his usual manner thus: "The treaty that was entered into, in the government of Sir Archibald Campbell, I was induced to accede to in

the fullest hopes that I should obtain possession of Tanjore. I have exerted myself beyond my ability, and exercised every kind of hardship and oppression over the royts, in collecting money to pay the Company; though in doing this I suffer all those pangs which a father feels when he is obliged to oppress and injure his own sons."

V.—The Closing Years of the Nawabs's Rule (1790–90).

It was only during the Governorship of General Medows (1790–92) that the Nawab's consent to the new burdens could be obtained. The Nawab lodged an accusation against the Governor of Madras and sent a letter privately to the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, through a subaltern in the Company's Army. Lord Cornwallis disapproved of this method of transmission, but directed the grounds of the accusation to be examined by a Committee. He urged upon the Nawab that the Madras Government should be the only regular and proper channel of communication between His Highness and the Supreme Council.

After the war with Tipu Sultan broke out, the Madras Government urged in September 1790 that it should be permitted to take the entire dominion of the Nawab under its management, "as affording the only means by which the resources to be derived from them could be realized and the fidelity and attachment of the poligars and tributaries secured, which is of the utmost importance to the successful operations of the war." Instead of 9 lakhs which the Nawab found it impossible to pay in peace time, 4½ths of his whole revenues were payable during war time. The securities for compelling such payment in war-time under the arrangement of Governor Campbell were, in the opinion of the Madras Government, even less efficient than those to be used in times of peace. Lord Cornwallis lost no time in agreeing to the assumption of the government of the Nawab, but recommended that the acquiescence of His Highness should, if possible, be obtained beforehand. We learn from the letter of the Madras Council to Calcutta, dated 7th June 1790, that the most vehement opposition which it was within the power of the Nawab to make was displayed on this occasion, and that he would never make a voluntary assignment of his country under any circumstances. The Supreme Government ordered, on the 21st of June, that effectual measures should be taken to put the Company into immediate possession of His Highness's revenues and country. Tanjore was included in this new arrangement.

Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Directors that he was impelled to the resolution of assuming the revenues of the

Carnatic "by the strongest considerations of humanity, justice and public necessity, and that the British would be able to conciliate and attach to themselves the Southern Poligars who were ripe for revolt." He attributed, in this Despatch, the real cause of all the mischief to the ease with which European adventurers and servants of the Company had been engaging in unjustifiable and usurious transactions with the Nawab. He added that means should be devised to avoid a repetition of these evils and that he could not venture to propose any plan with the certainty of success "unless the Nawab could be induced by a large annual revenue to surrender the management of his country for a long term of years to the Company¹⁷."

General Medows now adopted, in their entirety, the regulations drawn up by Lord Macartney for the taking over of the Carnatic revenues. His arrangements were approved of by the Directors, who contrasted in their letter of approval, this measure "justified upon its own merits," with similar measures adopted at the beginning of the second war with Mysore when the appropriation by the British of the whole of the Carnatic revenues did not afford any relief to the Company's finance in the prosecution of the war and also when it was only after the Carnatic was absolutely made over by a deed of assignment in December 1781, did the English receive any money at all. (The Court of Director's letter to Fort St. George, dated 6th May 1791).

The Nawab's orders to the amildars, consequent on the new arrangement were certainly not calculated to promote cooperation with the British Government; but his

(17) Prof. Wilson has thus commented upon this expression of opinion:

"Although it is no doubt true that the cause of the Nabob of Arcot was not unfrequently advocated from motives of self-interest, yet it is unjust to ascribe his defence in every case, to want of virtue in his defenders. Many persons of integrity were at all times ready to take part with him, in consideration of what they conscientiously believed to be his hereditary rights, and his attachment to the English. They were not well apprized of his real situation, and regarded the control which the Madras Government sought to maintain, as usurpation and insult. They believed also in his having considerable power, which he might exercise to the disadvantage of the British, and they therefore questioned the policy of exciting his displeasure. These considerations, operated even with superior minds in his behalf, and procured him unpaid friends and partisans both in India and in England."

(p. 369: Footnote 1 of Mill and Wilson: *History of British India*: Vol. V, 1848).

aim was not successful because they were not supported by the superior powers as in the time of Lord Macartney. There was, however, as Mill points out, inherent flaw in the professions of the English that they would retain the government of the country only during the period of the war and give it up to the Nawab at its end. This profession made the Nawab's officials very insincere towards the English, because at the end of the war the Nawab would favour those who should have acted agreeably to his inclinations and oppress those who had conformed to the inclinations of the English. The collections of the Company were thus far below the amount to which a permanent arrangement could have brought them¹⁸.

The aged Nawab died, in his 75th year, on the morning of Tuesday at about 7 o'clock, the 29th of Rabi'ul-Awwal, in the year 1210 A.H. (13th October, 1795 A.D.) On the last day of August he suffered from an injury sustained from a fall which brought on fever and pus. Seeing that his end was near, he asked that his son, Umdat-u'l-Umara might send his corpse to *Baytulla*, the sacred house at Makka and bury it underneath the steps of the *holy Ka'aba*. If that were not possible, it might be interred near the tomb of Hazrat Nathar Wali Sahib at Nattharnagar; and if even that should not be possible at present, it might be buried for the time under the roof of Hazrat Dastgir Sahib Sahe at Mylapore. He advised his son thus:— "It is necessary for my son that he should carry on correspondence with the English King and the authorities of the Company and cultivate friendship with them so that they may be pleased with him; not even a tri-

(18) Mill thus exposes the canting hypocrisy of the English professions:

"Hypocrisy was the cause which produced the difficulties resulting to the English from their connection with the Nabob. They desired to hold him up to the world, as an independent Prince, their ally, when it was necessary they should act as his lord and master. If they succeeded in persuading no other person that he was an independent Prince, they succeeded in persuading himself. And very naturally, on every occasion he opposed the most strenuous resistance to every scheme of theirs, which had the appearance of invading his authority. If the defence of the country rested with the English; and if they found that to govern it through the agency of the Nabob deprived them of its resources, and above all inflicted the most grievous oppression upon the inhabitants; results, the whole of which might have been easily foreseen, without waiting for the bitter fruits of a long experience; they ought from the beginning, if the real substance, not the false colours of the case, are taken for the ground of our decision, to have made the Nabob in appearance, what he had always been in reality, a pensioner of the Company."

History of British India; BK. VI. ch. 3—Vol. V—pp. 373—4.).

filing error should be allowed to come in between. He should not countenance any deed which is not acceptable to them, for, this would give strength to his authority. He should pay into the treasury of the Fort at Madras the stipulated amount of *qist* as done at present in accordance with the agreement without any excuse or dispute. He should not allow even an inch of land under his authority to come into the possession of others except by way of *jagirs*." (*Sources of the History of the Nawabs of the Carnatic* Vol. III, *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz* (First Part) by Muhammad Karim—Translated by S. M. H. Naimar. p. 41).

We have already given above the sketch of the Nawab from the pen of Col. Alexander Dow in 1770, which was probably inspired by Macpherson. Dr. Ives thus describes him, in his book 'A Voyage from England to India', as he met the Nawab at Fort St. David personally in 1755; "The Nawab was between thirty and forty years of age and of middle stature. His complexion was much lighter than that of the common Indian. His dress was entirely white, and consisted of a long robe or vestment which reached down to his heels. His turban was also white and quite plain. In short he had no other marks of distinction about him than that of a truly majestic countenance tempered with a great deal of pleasantness and good nature."

On his death, the *Madras Gazette* of the day, which was started at the beginning of 1795 and which can be regarded as being the second earliest of the Madras newspapers, pronounced the following eulogium, in its issue of the 18th of October 1795;—"His Highness the Nabob Walajah was the firm and sincere Friend and the faithful and zealous ally of the English nation, to which he was strongly attached by esteem and affection. He shared in all the fortunes of the English in this country, and always considered their interest and his own as one and the same; he was mild and affectionate towards his subjects; . . . polite and amiable in his manners; and no man better understood the art of conciliating men's minds than His Highness."

There are several portraits extant of the Nawab. There is a mezzotint by Dickson published in 1771 after a painting by Ward, which was formerly the property of

Lord Pigot and which depicts Muhammad Ali at the age of about 38 as he was probably seen by Dr. Ives. This mezzotint is now preserved in the British Museum. Later portraits of the Nawab painted by George Willison at Madras about 1774, are preserved at the India Office and the Government House at Calcutta. A picture of the Nawab in Company with Major Stringer Lawrence hangs on the walls of the Banqueting Hall, Madras. In return to the replicas of the pictures of King George III and Queen Charlotte, which were presented to the Nawab through the Court of Directors, along with a live lion, in 1768, the Nawab appears to have sent a picture of himself, probably painted by Kettle in 1770. The receipt of this picture is mentioned in the King's autograph letter to the Nawab, dated 19th March 1771. This picture is not, however, in the Royal Collection at present. Probably it was the picture exhibited at the Society of Artists in 1771 and described as a portrait by Kettle of Muhammad Ali Khan with his five sons. The well-known canvas representing Nawab Walajah and General Lawrence might have been painted about 1802, possibly by George Chinnery. The figure of Lawrence is after Sir Joshua Reynolds and that of the Nawab is after George Willison; both walk side by side in the open on the island of Srirangam. The scene perhaps referred to the surrender of the French under Law, in 1752, symbolised by the soldiers filing through the gateway of the *gopuram* on the left. The Nawab, however, is depicted as he might have appeared in the seventies, more than twenty years after the event.

In 1765 the Mughal Emperor bestowed on the Nawab the title of Walajah. He was twice called on by the King to perform the function of investiture with the insignia of the Order of the Bath, first for Sir John Lindsay and then for Sir Hector Munro. On each occasion, that is, both in 1771 and 1779, the investiture was held at the Chepauk Palace of the Nawab with great splendour.

The Chepauk Palace which the Nawab built to the south of Fort St. George on the southern bank of the Cooum was probably constructed in 1768. The Nawab had been sheltered for some time within Fort St. George, previous to and on the occasion of Lally's siege of Madras. Governor Pigot offered him ground within the Fort; and

the Nawab writing from Madura to Governor Palk, in May 1764, asked that the building of which he had laid the first brick with great pomp should not be further delayed, in its construction. The Nawab also requested that additional ground within the Fort might be made over to him, with a *sanad* for the same. Governor Palk prepared a grant for an area of upwards of 18,000 square yards. This was in May 1765. In the next year the Nawab had to write again urging that the Governor who laid the first brick again for the second time with his own hand and appointed Engineer Call to carry on the construction, might be pleased to appoint Mr. Benfield, who originally drew the plan of the Palace, since Call would be returning to Europe shortly. The Governor assented to the choice of Benfield. But the Directors gave only a qualified approval to the Nawab's scheme of a palace within the Fort¹⁹.

Consequent on this Despatch, the Madras Council apparently dropped the project; but the proposal has continued to remain in the popular mind, symbolised by the name of Palace Street, given to the road lying west of Choultry Gate Street and Charles Street in the new portion of the Fort.

The Nawab then turned his attention to Chepauk, where he had acquired some house property by the sea shore, with a sandy space on its north and east. He applied, in the beginning of 1768, to Government for a grant of this site under the Company's seal and for the appointment of the Government Engineer to mark it out for him. The Nawab thus appears to have lived in Chepauk from 1767. The Palace itself was built in 1768, probably by a British officer, as stated by Lord Valentia, who was received at the Palace in 1804. The structure consisted of two blocks. The southern one was of two floors and called the Kalas Mahal, so called from its small dome, and the north-

(19) In their Despatch from England, dated 4th March 1767, they say:

"The Nabob's earnest desire to build a Palace in the Fort for the reception of himself and family in case of a reverse of fortune implies a confidence in our future support. We wish to have such ideas strengthened and encouraged, and upon that principle we approve of the grant you made him of a piece of ground to build on. We hope, at the same time, you have well revolved in your minds of all the consequences of such a step, and that, if you saw, or at any time hereafter shall perceive any inconvenience likely to arise, you did, or will whenever they occur take proper and timely measure to obviate them."

ern portion which is of one floor contained the Humayun Mahal and the Diwan Khana. The central tower, now dominating the entire group of buildings, was added later in the end of the 19th century, sometime after the British took possession of the Palace²⁰.

Nawab Walajah's name is remembered in Madras by its association with the title of a bastion and gate of Fort St. George, with the name of the adjacent bridge leading from the Fort to the Island grounds, by the name of the road skirting Government House grounds, and also by the name of Walajahbagh given to a garden-house near the Spur Tank. Walajahbad, or Dandaiseevaram, near Conjeevaram, on the banks of the Palar, was named also after the Nawab, who had recently got the title of Walajah. It became a military cantonment in 1786; and though it was unhealthy, it continued to be the headquarters of an active battalion and of the establishment of drummer-boys, till about 1860. It was a centre of hand-weaving industry and noted for its chintz.

Three years after his demise, the remains of the Nawab were transferred to Trichinopoly and were interred in the Mosque of Shah Nattharwali, the famous saint, ironically enough, by the side of the headless corpse of his rival Chanda Sahib.

- (20) The walled compound of the enclosure extended from the river Cooum in the north, to Pycroft's road in the south and westwards to Bell's Road. The main entrance was towards the west at the end of the present Walajah Road and was a massive triple-arched gateway with guard rooms above the gateway and a place of arms immediately within it. All the space between the palace and the eastern enclosure wall by the sea shore was occupied by domestic apartments. Towards the west there were sepoy barracks, elephant lines and slave-lines. The saluting battery was near the site of the Senate House. Outside the compound there was a mosque.

Lord Valentia has given an appreciative notice of the Diwan Khana which was used as the Durbar Hall and which was extremely handsome, of large dimensions and divided by pillars. It seems there was a proposal to add another storey to the northern portion of the palace. Altogether the enclosure extended 1,130 yards southward from the river bar and 500 yards along its bank and covered an area of 117 acres.

In 1855 when the Nawabi became extinct, the palace property was placed in the hands of a Receiver for the settlement of the Nawab's debts. The land and buildings were sold by public auction and fell to Government for 5½ lakhs of rupees; while the arms and historical pictures were taken over at a valuation. The compound walls and out houses were dismantled; the palace itself was utilised for the offices of the P.W. Department and of the Board of Revenue; and the Court of Justice (Mahakama) was utilised as the Principal's residence, first of the Engineering and now of the Presidency, Colleges.

VI—Nawab Umdatul Umara Bahadur, Walajah II.

(1795-1801).

The new Nawab was crowned on the third day after his father's death (the 2nd of Rabi-uth-Thani, Friday, 1210 A.H., 16th October 1795) in a full durbar at the palace. He took his seat on the Walajahi *maṣnad* and received nazars. The Governor, Lord Hobart, found fault with the Nawab, even at the very beginning of his rule, for not having been informed of the demise of his father. He complained that he could not, in the circumstances, have sent the Company's troops to accompany the funeral procession, and remarked that the coronation should not have been hastened and he should also have been present at the Durbar. The Nawab replied that in his sorrow and grief, he could not send word to the Governor who should have expressed sympathy with him and that he ascended the throne of his father in accordance "with the usual practice. . . . there was no necessity to inform that Sahib about this". (p. 52, *Sources of the History of the Nawabs of the Carnatic*, III, *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz* (I part) by Muhammad Karim—Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar). Muhammad Karim, the author of the *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz*, which gives a detailed account of the rule of this Nawab, tells us that on the second day after the coronation, the son of the Governor again came for a conference to discuss matters of *qists* (payments) and the desirability of the Nawab making over certain taluks to the Company instead. The Nawab became grave and gloomy on account of this firm demand.

Hobart displayed as undesirable haste in beginning negotiations with the new Nawab for a revision of the financial arrangements made in 1792. Sir John Shore, the Governor-General, had authorised Lord Hobart to propose to the new Nawab, on his accession, the assignment of the entire revenues of his kingdom to the Company. Hobart apprehended the influence of European usurers on the Nawab's resolution and began immediately to negotiate, without the consent of the Governor-General, for the sur-

render of the district of Tinnevely²¹. Hobart is charged with having addressed the Nawab "in terms at once offensive to his deceased father and menacing to himself; by pressing upon him unreasonably the immediate payment of a debt due to the Company and other claims real or disputable . . . by threatening compulsory measures." The Nawab thus declared to his adherents:—"By the grace of Allah, I succeeded to the throne of my father. It is not even a week since my coronation day, and I am bothered by unnecessary anxiety. Allah, exalted be He, is the Protector and the King of Kings." Hobart, however, pressed his demand, which he conceived to be fully justified by the likely inability of the Nawab to fulfil his engagements to the Company. In the short space of 8 days the negotiations of Hobart with the Nawab broke down unsuccessfully and the latter contrived to hold his ground. Hobart now appealed to Sir John Shore who acquiesced in his proposition, though it fell far short of his own. But he condemned the Madras Governor's conduct during this transaction, though he appreciated the motive and the zeal which had prompted it. Shore wrote that Hobart's conduct was calculated to incense rather than conciliate the Nawab. He said that this demand was "repugnant to the Treaty of 1792, by which the Nabob's rights were guaranteed—as, in respect to some of the demands pressed on the Nabob, unjustifiable—and as, in fact, involving a breach of faith." And though he expressed doubts whether the negotiation could have been possibly so managed as to secure the Nawab's consent, he maintained that "the magnitude of an advantage could not warrant the prosecution of it by improper means." Lord Hobart "warmly vindicated the course he had pursued, on the grounds already intimated; and sought further justification of his stand by making an appeal to the Court of Directors." But the Governor-General was firm in his opinion. He wrote to Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, on January 12, 1796, that "the conduct of Lord Hobart towards the new Nawab in my opinion is most unjustifiable, violent, and indefensible upon every principle." He disapproved the principle adopted by Hobart, that of forcing the Nawab into an acquiescence by indirect means of coercion, as "such a

(21) Hobart's Minute in Council of the 24th of October 1795; he held that the Nawab had infringed the treaty of 1792 and liberated the English from obligations

principle, if it were to become a motive of action, would soon suggest to the Country powers that convenience was the measure of our good faith." Shore further added that he did not care to write to Hobart his own views privately, as he was precluded "by the intemperance of language displayed by him." He added the following words:—"The character of the Nabob, as represented to me by those who have studied it personally, is a compound of good-nature, vanity, weakness, and obstinacy. He is accessible by flattery; and although he wants exertion, he is not deficient in abilities, when compelled to the use of them, nor discernment. The conduct which I should have recommended to Lord Hobart, if he had asked my private opinion, and which was suggested in our public instructions, was, persuasion and conciliation. Attention from a man of his Lordship's rank and situation would have flattered his vanity; a liberal acknowledgment of rights established by treaty would have disarmed suspicion; and address might have conciliated or seduced his acquiescence, beyond the power of retractation. His Lordship might have reflected, that the weakest and most timid will resist compulsion, and that the language of intimidation should never be used without the power to enforce it. I know the wishes of the Company in this business, and I feel all the importance of establishing their authority effectively in the Carnatic: but the inflexibility is now so aggravated, that I have no hopes of success with him; . . . I freely confess to you my embarrassment, in deciding between him and his Lordship." (*Life of Lord Teignmouth* by his son, Vol. I, 1843, pp. 359-60).²²

The Nawab had long enjoyed with the Madras Government a good opinion for his character and for his appreciation of the British connection. As early as 1775, in a letter that the Madras Council wrote to the Company on the 4th of July, when there was a fear that the Nawab might try to alter the succession in favour of his second son, Amiru'l-Umara, whom he had entrusted with much power, we read the following account of Umdatul-Umara and of their preference of him:

(22) The bitterness was increased, according to Mill (Vol. VI. p. 67) by the difference in rank between Shore and Hobart and the old jealousy between the heads of the two Presidencies.

“His eldest son, Umdatul-Umrah, is a young Lord of Capacity, and the adversities he has suffered have had the good effect of rendering him moderate and affable. He is learned, and the favourite of the people. He has the justest sense of the connection between the Carnatic and the Company, and that the Lord of this country ought, in a certain degree, to depend upon the British nation for the support and protection of the Company.

“It is a principle in the Moorish religion that the father is master of the family and has the disposal of his estate; and on this plan it appears to us that the Nabob has been seduced to entertain notions of altering the succession. Permit us to point out to you our reasons for thinking that in the present case he has no such right.”

“The phirmaun of the Mogul in 1765 obtained by Lord Clive, and accompanied by titles which the Nabob still uses, was in 1766 proclaimed, at his desire, in the presence of the Governor and Council of this Place, of the principal inhabitants and of all his Sardars. By such acceptance he acknowledged the right of the Mogul to make the grant that expressly fixes the succession after his death in Umdatul-Umrah, his eldest son, and their heirs for ever.”

The Directors had replied to this letter that they should secure a *just and lineal* succession to the children of the Nawab, according to the “ phirmaun from the Emperor Shaw Allum and the treaty of 1768 between the Company, the Subah of the Deccan and the Nabob.” This was very vague. Only the premature death of Amiru'l-Umara saved a difficult situation.

The new Nawab strove hard to get a letter from King George III, confirming his own government and sent many letters to England to that effect. Muhammad Karim naively remarks that the Nawab employed Shaykhs to perform incantations and pious men to offer prayers for success in this endeavour. He was interested in alchemy, visited his laboratory daily, and once a week engaged himself in alchemy experiments. Every day he took his seat in open durbar from 8 to 11 o'clock and listened to petitions and representations. He checked the detailed accounts of the daily allowance of Rs. 1,000 sanctioned for his palace and spent the early hours of the night in writing or reading

and composing verses. He built a new palace, the Fatah-Chawki, at Madras and indulged in numerous picnics and excursions.

At last, in December 1796, Lord Hobart sent word to the Nawab informing him of the arrival of a letter and presents to him from England. He was glad to take delivery of the letter from the Prince of Wales who was then Regent for his father, King George III, and held a grand durbar on the 23rd of December, 1796 when Lord Hobart presented the gifts with great ceremony in the *Walajahi Daru'l-Amara* in the Chepauk Palace. The Persian translation of the letter was read by the Mir Munshi, Rai Khub Chand Bahadur, after the Governor had decorated the Nawab with the sword and the medallion sent by the Regent and the English letter itself had been read. The ceremony ended with a salute of guns and the gift of a portrait of the Prince Regent which was hung in the *Diwan Khana*; and the Nawab was glad that by the kindness of his affectionate brother, he got a letter confirming his title.

With reference to the comparatively close correspondence maintained between the British Royal Court and the Nawab's durbar, Lord Mornington, later the Marquess Wellesley, had to write to Mr. Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, on the 5th of March 1800, to this effect: "His Highness is surrounded by European advisers of the most dangerous and profligate character, whose interests are deeply involved in the perpetuation of the abuses of his Government, and who (amongst other means of perverting his Councils) labour to inspire him with the notion of a distinction of interests and powers between the Royal Government and that constituted by Act of Parliament for the administration of the British Empire in India. In all his conversations and correspondence, he studiously distinguishes his Majesty's Government from that of the Court of Directors; uniformly treating the latter with disrespect, and even with ridicule and contempt. In my last conversation with his Highness, he plainly declared to me that he considered his Majesty to be his father, friend, ally, and protector, but that the Court of Directors desired to "obtain his country anyhow"²³

(23) • (*The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley*, K. G. Edited by Montgomery Martin, Vol. II, pp. 240-41).

Regarding the quarrel over the Carnatic issue between Shore and Hobart, the Company was very much depressed and Dundas felt both alarmed and tired. Both Shore and Hobart differed from each other radically in character and policy. Hobart was known to be wilful, dictatorial and to be a man of strong convictions, while Shore had few personal opinions and was cautious and suave. Hobart was "impatiently awaiting his eventual succession to the Governor-Generalship, and worked himself quickly into a frenzy." His letters to Dundas "indicting Shore and demanding his dismissal, passed the bound of reason and decency." Shore applied for the nomination of a successor to him; and Dundas was already convinced that Hobart "whose mind was evidently unbalanced, was in any case unfit to succeed to that position." Dundas made the offer to Lord Cornwallis again, who accepted it, for the time being. The Board of Control investigated the recent policy of Hobart and his Government; and Dundas, partly on the suggestion of Mornington, one of his Assistant Commissioners then, resolved to recall Hobart from Madras. Pitt approached Mornington and offered him the Governorship of Madras, with the reversion of the Governor-Generalship; and the latter agreed to be the Madras Governor, only if Cornwallis should be the Governor-General. Pitt declared that if Cornwallis did not go to India, Mornington should himself become the Governor-General; and as shortly afterwards, Cornwallis refused to proceed to India on some specific ground, Mornington succeeded to the reversion. In July, 1797, the Governorship of Madras was offered to Earl Bathurst; and on his refusal, the second Lord Clive was appointed to the post.

Dundas was busy with these questions till the autumn of 1797. With regard to the Carnatic question, the Court of Directors issued a Despatch to Madras on the 18th of October, 1797, informing that they had requested Mornington to make a short stay at Fort St. George on his way to Calcutta, and to endeavour to prevail on the Nawab to agree to a modification of the treaty of 1792. Though Hobart had been recalled mainly because of the harsh methods which he suggested for the attainment of the modifications, the Directors expressed themselves in this Despatch that they wished that the endeavours of Hobart had proved successful. They however said they were

anxious to maintain their credit with the country powers and would not authorise the new Governor-General "to exert other powers than those of persuasion to induce the Nabob to form a new arrangement"²⁴. Lord Mornington, writing to the Home authorities from Calcutta, shortly after his arrival, under date 4th July 1798, declared that his negotiations with the Nawab at Madras where he spent a few days were fruitless and he found "His Highness so completely indisposed to that arrangement, as to preclude all hopes of obtaining his consent to it at present"²⁵. In 1799, when the Governor-General was again at Madras to supervise the operations of the Mysore War, he proposed, in a long, argumentative letter of the 24th April, covering 62 paragraphs, that the Nawab should cede to the Company in undivided sovereignty those territories which were already mortgaged for the payment of his subsidy, in which case he would be exempted from the operation of the clause, which subjected him to the assumption of the country. The Governor-General further offered to the Nawab to make over to him, in liquidation of his debt to the Company, certain sums which were hitherto in dispute between them to the amount of over 230,000 pagodas.

The Nawab, in his reply to the above demand of the Governor-General, dated 13th May, wrote that the main reason for this suggestion had lapsed, because Seringapatam had been taken and the war with Tipu was at an end. He would take his stand upon the treaty of 1792, which was "so just that no change in it could be made without the loss

(24) On this Mill caustically remarks: "It is sufficiently remarkable to hear ministers and directors conjunctly declaring, that 'the principle of an exact observance of treaties' still remained to 'be honourably established', at the time of Lord Cornwallis's administration. It was the desire of credit with the country powers, that now constituted the motive to its observance. But if the Company when weak disregarded such credit with the country powers, they had much less reason now to dread any inconvenience from want of it. Besides the question is, whether the country powers ever gave them or gave anybody, credit for a faith, of which they can so little form a conception as that of regarding a treaty any longer than is agreeable to his interest to do so. (*History of British India*—Vol. IV p. 302).

(25) Mornington came to Madras with letters from Cornwallis, the Prince of Wales and H. M. King George III to the Nawab. In the letter of Cornwallis, we find these plain words:—"I have frequently heard you (the Nawab) confess that no European ever came to Chepauk House, but with an intention to take your father's money; and you gave me...to believe that when you succeeded to the sovereignty of the country, you would endeavour to secure yourself from attempts of a similar nature. (*Wellesley Despatches: Martin*)—Vol. I. p. 36.

of some mutual advantage." The Nawab declared further that he was prepared to make any sacrifice rather than consent to any alteration of the treaty even in a single letter. Out of respect and love for his honoured father by whom the treaty was framed to which he had pledged a sacred regard, he could not allow any alteration. Finally, he pleaded that the treaty had a trial of more than 7 years and had been found satisfactory in every particular; and he, for his own part, had fulfilled every condition stipulated in it. He added that this satisfactory fulfilment of a treaty was "unprecedented in any country or age."

Meanwhile, the Directors, in a Despatch, dated London, 5th June 1799, wrote that as the Nawab was in the practice of raising moneys annually by assignments of the revenues of those districts which constituted the security for the payment of the Company's subsidy and as this practice was "unquestionably contrary to the letter and subversive of the spirit of the treaty," measures should be immediately taken for getting possession of the whole or any part of the assigned districts, so that the Company might not lose the only security for any failure of the Nawab to discharge his subsidy²⁵. The Nawab had distinctly stated, in his letter to the Governor-General of the 13th May, denying this allegation. "I do most unequivocally assure your Lordship, on the word and faith of a sovereign, that not one foot of the districts set apart by the treaty of 1792 have been, or are, in any manner or way, directly or indirectly, assigned by me, or with my knowledge, to any individual whatsoever; and, having made this solemn and unreserved declaration I would hope that I need not urge more."

The Directors' order for the assumption of the assigned districts was repeated to the Governor-General, in a Despatch dated 18th June 1799; and they authorised that, in the event of a war with Tipu, (the news of which had not yet reached them) the dominions of the Nawab and of the Rajah of Tanjore which would naturally come under the Company's management, should not be relinquished without special orders from them. The Governor-General had reported to them that as the Mysore campaign was

(26) Dundas had, however, expressed himself to the Governor-General, in March, that "consistently with our treaty obligations—we cannot at present materially ameliorate his (Nawab's) government,"

very short and as the assumption of Tanjore and the Carnatic in that crisis would have produced not added resources, but only a partial failure of even the normal revenues, he had deemed it inexpedient to assume the management of those dominions. The Madras Government wrote to the Directors, in April 1800, that "no security sufficiently extensive and efficient, for the British interest in the Carnatic can be derived from the Treaty of 1792; and no divided power, however modified, can possibly avert the utter ruin of that devoted country:" Thus Calcutta, Madras and London were busy preparing for the total confiscation of the Nawab's dominions.

General Harris had an interview with Nawab Um-datu'l-Umara after he reached Madras from the victorious campaign of Seringapatam and paid a courtesy visit to the palace of the Nawab, who congratulated him on the victory. But Muhammad Karim reveals to us the real mind of the Nawab in his narrative²⁷.

The Nawab had also an interview with Mir Alam Bahadur, the Minister of Nizam Ali Khan, who was present when Seringapatam was taken by the English. The Nawab was anxious that the etiquette observed in the Carnatic durbar should be punctiliously observed and the details should in no way lean to the ceremonies prevalent in the Asaf Jahi durbar, as he should not in any way appear to be dependent on Hyderabad. He declared that his government was the equal of any other government in India, "for we are distinguished from others by the mansab; i.e., Wizarat-i-Subadar of the Subah of the Carnatic." (p.136 of *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz* (First Part) by Muhammad Karim, Translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar).

(27) "The Nawab presented General Harris with *pandan*, *itrdan*, *gulab-pash* and bade him farewell. Then the Nawab spoke as follows to Bahram Jung Bahadur with a tear-stained face: 'It is a pity, a thousand pities, that a powerful Muslim ruler, (Tipu), a source of strength and power to the followers of the religion of Muhammad, (peace be on Him) has departed from this impermanent world to the everlasting abode 'Verily we are for Allah and to Allah we return'. The ten *hun-kurk* I gave you in the presence of General Harris for the purpose of purchasing and distributing sugar, was to show ostensibly my joy. But my real intention was that the amount should be distributed to *faqirs* and *miskins* in the name of that Sultan Shahid for the benefit of his soul' " *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz*, by Muhammad Karim translated by Dr. S. M. H. Nainar, pp. 134-5).

The Nawab was an amiable, but weak-minded man ; he was a good scholar and devoted to books. He composed a *diwan*, or anthology of poems, in the usual conventional style. He was very much under the influence of his sister, Budhi Begam, known as Nawab Sultanu'-Nisa Begam, and seems even to have promised her, at least made her believe, that he would nominate her son, Raisu'l-Umara Bahadur, as his successor on the musnud. But as Dr. S.M.H. Nainar says, (*vide* page *viii* of Introduction to his English translation of *Sawanihat-i-Mumtaz* of Muhammad Karim which was compiled in 1833 A.D.) "the matter is doubtful and will, in all probability never be cleared up." Towards the end of his rule when the Nawab had nominated his son, Taju'l-Umara Bahadur, as his successor, his sister grew hostile to him and openly showed her anger in very many small matters, which are narrated at length by Muhammad Karim. The lady tried hard by her intrigues, to prevent the recognition of Taju'l-Umara Bahadur as the heir by the family. The Nawab knew that his own throne was tottering before the British determination to confiscate the dominions ; he had narrowly escaped an attempt of assassination ; and he thus described the situation regarding the succession to the throne. "I intend my son for the throne ; Sayfu'l-Mulk intends that the throne is for him ; my senior sister has in mind that her son is meant for the throne after me : and the *Frangs* (English) are waiting for their opportunity. But it shall be as the Supreme Ruler wills." Sayfu'l-Mulk, otherwise known as Muhammad Anwar, was the third son of Nawab Muhammad Ali Walajah.

Taju'l-Umara was on one occasion honoured by the Nawab on a visit to Frangi-Konda (St. Thomas' Mount) with some special mark of distinction, in preference to the other princes of the family. This was regarded by many as an indication of the Nawab's wish that he should succeed to the throne. Of course, in the beginning, the Nawab did not openly declare the right of succession for Taju'l-Umara. Soon afterwards, he got ill of a boil and had to undergo several operations. In spite of good medical treatment, he grew worse ; and when the illness took a serious turn the Nawab invited Col. Barrett, whom he had appointed, at the beginning of his rule, to the office of Diwan and in whom he reposed great confidence, and several of

his chief nobles and at their suggestion wrote in his own hand a wassiyat-namah (last will or testament) in favour of Tajū'l-Umara, as his successor. The will was witnessed by Salar Jung Bahadur and Taqi Ali Khan and sealed with the *Muhr-i-Khass*, (i.e., private signet or ring.)²⁸ It was then entrusted to Tajū'l-Umara in the presence of Barrett and others. The Nawab's brother, Sayfu'l-Mulk, was put under a special guard. The Nawab's sister got annoyed at this will and was reported to have collected a body of 100 armed men in the house of her son, who himself had entertained some hope of succession. Sayfu'l-Mulk was more cautious; and according to Muhammad Karim, he seems to have advised her not to complain of their brother's action. The Nawab, fearing some tumult or violent proceedings on their part, ordered Barrett to bring in a body of British troops into the palace and gave careful instructions to his own troops not to quarrel with the former. He instructed Tajū'l-Umara to have always in his company his cousin, Azimu'd-Daula, son of Amiru'l-Umara who was suspected possibly of aiming at the succession.

-
- (28) Webbe and Close, the British Commissioners, interviewed Tajū'l-Umara and found the will "to be an authentic instrument, expressing in clear distinct and explicit terms, the will of Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, that his reputed son (Ally Hussain) should succeed him in the possession of all his rights, possessions, property and in the sovereignty of the Carnatic. The will also appointed Mahomed Najeeb Khan, Salar Jang and Tuckia Ally Khan to assist the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah in the administration of his affairs" (report of the interview on the 15th July 1801).

A letter written by Najib Khan and Taqi Ali Khan, on behalf of Tajū'l-Umara, dated 30th July 1801,—one day previous to that fixed for the formal enthronement of his rival, Azimu'd-Daula, encloses two papers attested by the members of the Nawab's family, stressing the right of succession of the son and heir of Umdatul-Umara and the want of right, in every sense, on the part of the son of Amiru'l-Umara. The second of these letters distinctly says that the rights of government and of the country (of the Carnatic) as well as the property of his father were given and bequeathed by the Nawab to his heir and successor who was entitled to the government by the Mussalman law.

Another letter written by Mawlana Abdul Ali, Maliku'l-Ulama, and other learned men, which was forwarded at the same time, says:—"If the father be proprietor of territory, and previously to his death, names his son as his heir, whether he be a legitimate (i.e., from the womb of his proper lawful wife) son or not, such son becomes heir accordingly, .. Thus the inheritance and the right to all matters of right and property belonging to the Nawab Walajah...devolved to the deceased Nawab Omdatu'l-Umara and from the said deceased to Nawab Tajū'l-Umara. Because the deceased Nawab, having appointed his executor, heir and successor, then departed this life, wherefore the proprietor of all these rights is the Nawab Tajū'l-Umara"—(*Country Correspondence 1801—Political Department*).

A few days before his death the Nawab, knowing his end was near, made his confession to Mawlana Abdul Ali Sahib that, though there were some doubts entertained as to his leanings to the Shiah faith, because he had consistently observed the celebrations of the *Muharram*, and because the Ulama suspected the strength of his *Iman*, still he never deviated from the orthodox *Sunni* faith, even for a minute. He desired the Mawlana to be at his bed-side at the last moment and pray for his safe journey to the next world in the same manner as was done for his ancestors²⁹.

The Nawab died in the morning on the 3rd of Rabi-ul-Awwal 1216 A.H., corresponding to July 15, 1801 A.D. His body was removed to Trichinopoly escorted by troops. According to Muhammad Karim, immediately after the despatch of the coffin, (but in reality on the very evening of the day of the Nawab's death) Mr. Webbe, Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, and Col. Mac Neil who was in charge of the troops safeguarding the Chempauk Palace, asked Col. Barrett to send word to Prince Tajul-Umara and to convey to him the condolences of the Governor. The Prince was informed that the Governor, Lord Clive, would interview him on the 3rd day after the burial and he immediately suspected that the interview was for 'a black purpose.' Barrett suggested that the Prince should meet the Governor after the *Fatiha* on the 3rd day and proposed to him that he should be crowned as Nawab, just as Umatul-Umara was crowned after the *Fatiha* on the 3rd day after the death of his father. Salar Jang, suspecting the motives of the English, made a clever suggestion that perhaps the prince might get crowned, even as his father did, without the Governor being informed at all. Now began the discussion over what is known as the Seringapatam. Correspondence which was made the basis of the subsequent action of the English, although the resourceful Governor-General had addressed Lord Clive, as early as March, 1800, suggesting (1) that no obligation arose from the Treaty of 1792 to recognise the succession of any claimant who might be nominated by the reigning Nawab and

(29) "If 'Ulama saw in it reason to suspect the strength of my *iman*, then Allah knows what is what. I never deviated from the right course even for a minute. I make a confession of my faith to you. Allah is my witness. I declare that I follow the religion of my father."

“whose pretensions to the succession may be actually disputed or may appear questionable”; (2) that doubts existed relative to the rank of Taju'l-Umara (whose mother was alleged to be of low origin and to have not been lawfully married to the Nawab) and his succession would injure the rights of Azimu'd-Daula (the son of Amiru'l-Umara); and (3) that neither prince could claim British support under existing treaties and the British should be at liberty to provide for the security of their interests in the Carnatic and the prosperity of the people, by requiring remedies of the existing evils from whomsoever they might raise to the throne.

VII—The Seringapatam Correspondence and the Action of the British Government thereon.

On April 7, 1800, the Governor-General forwarded to Madras certain letters and papers relating to the correspondence of Nawab Muhammad Ali and Umdatul-Umara with Tipu Sultan, which was found among the papers at Seringapatam. The Governor-General asked Lord Clive to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of which the papers appeared to afford "indication as to the exhibition of treachery" on the part of the two Nawabs towards the English. Mill says that the Governor-General himself had prejudged the issue of the inquiry and suggested to Lord Clive to prejudice it in a similar manner, by stating that "the evidence resulting from the whole of these documents has not only confirmed, in the most unquestionable manner, my suspicions of the existence of a secret correspondence between the personages already named, but satisfied my judgment, that its object, on the part of the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdatul-Umara, and especially of the latter, was of the most hostile tendency to the British interests." He asked Lord Clive to proceed immediately to make arrangements preparatory to the actual assumption of the Nawab's administration, "which now appears to have become inevitable", though his wish was to delay the actual assumption till the inquiry should have been completed. The Governor-General frankly added that "while those orders lately conveyed by the Hon'ble Court of Directors relative to the Company's connection with the Nabob, were under my consideration, a combination of fortunate circumstances revealed this correspondence," which afforded "a more plausible reason than they yet possessed to commence the seizure."

The papers thus sent as the basis of inquiry consisted of certain letters between Tipu Sultan and his two vakils, Ghulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, who had accompanied in 1792 the two hostage sons of the Mysore ruler to Madras, a letter from a subsequent wakil of Tipu at Madras, and another held to have been written by Nawab Umdatul-Umara under a fictitious name. In these letters there was not much to prove, which itself is proof that they had not been "fabricated for the purpose of

proving." Tipu's vakils were required to communicate, among other matters, secret intelligence including an account of the defence works of Fort St. George; and they were also furnished with a cipher for carrying on the correspondence. The vakils gave in their letters a description of the deportment of the two Nawabs towards the hostage princes. The Nawab Muhammad Ali had been, according to the evidence of one of the letters, very intimate with Tipu Sultan³⁰.

- (30) The vakils reported in their letter to the Sultan, dated the 16th of Jaffree of the year Schir, 1220 A.D., corresponding to 4th August 1792, that when the Nawab was told that the Sultan addressed him as a prince, "that your Majesty added, - God preserve the Nawaub Walajah, who is a Prince and one of the Leaders of the Faithful, 'the a Pillar of the Faith. - At the term, 'a Pillar of the Faith, 'the Nawaub could not suppress his tears, and said, "I am what I know myself to be." Tell the Sultan, that he is the Pillar of the Faith; and may God preserve him and grant him a long life, since I and all Mussulmen derive support from him for otherwise the state of affairs here is evident - "That which is evident does not require explanation." —and he further added: "You are not acquainted with the state and order of affairs here. Consider me from my heart your well-wisher and sincere friend; and at all times be assured, that in whatever I may be able to effect your benefit either by word or deed, I will not decline my exertions. What I said and wrote to his Lordship upon the subject of making peace, God well knows who was then or is now desirous of it. His Lordship (Cornwallis) however, possessed uncontrolled authority, was a man of wisdom, and listened to the advice of others, and my observations made no impressions upon him.—and had accordingly suggested pacific measures, the expediency of which he urged in a thousand ways; they were so displeased that they went away without partaking of the entertainment, nay, that to their animosity might be attributed the assumption of His Highness's country (in the war of 1790-92). That when the orders were received from the King of England to restore the country, they framed the pretence among themselves that his Highness was too much attached to Tippoo Sultaun; and that the restitution of his Country would consequently be an impolitic measure; but his Lordship maintained his opinion singly, and, disregarding the animosity of all the others against his Highness, delivered to him (His Highness) the country, agreeably to the directions of His Majesty."

Tipu wrote in one of his letters that the Nawab was the chief and principal of the professors of the Islamism. To Umdatul-Umara he made similar professions and was proud of the sincere friendship and cordiality existing between them.

Mill says of these letters that nothing could be extracted from them "but declarations of friendly sentiments in a hyperbolic style." In the letter above quoted there was a fabricated remark of Col. Doveton, which tends to weaken the validity of all their reports. The Persian translator (N. B. Edmonstone) himself says that "if the evidence upon the Nawab's conduct rested solely upon these letters of the Mysore vakils, the proofs might be considered extremely defective and problematical."

However, N. B. Edmonstone says that the first indication of Nawab Walajah's political connection with Tipu appears in a letter dated June 1792, in which the Nawab condemned the late war, "as having been undertaken by the allied powers for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion."

Besides the reports of the vakils, there were the letters of Tipu which did not contain anything more than "a return to the civil expressions of the Nabob; vague declarations of good will couched in a similar style." The key to the cipher found among the records at Seringapatam shows that Nawab Walajah was designated by the term 'friend of mankind'; Tipu Sultan as the 'defender of the Faith', the Marathas as 'despicable', the English as 'new-comers', the Nizam by that of 'nothingness' etc. The cipher was in the handwriting of one of the munshis of Tipu.

A Commission composed of Messrs. Webbe and Close was constituted by the Governor-General to investigate into this affair. Reza Ali, one of the two vakils of Tipu, who was then residing at Vellore, was examined first. Of him the Commissioners say that "we discovered an earnest disposition to develop the truth." They accused Ghulam Ali, the second wakil, who was residing at Seringapatam, of efforts at concealment. Both testified that the expressions of good will made by the Nawab Walajah or his son, in their hearing, were never understood by them as being other than complimentary. Ali Reza said they were much exaggerated, as it was customary with the vakils, "to heighten the expressions of regard which fell from Lord Cornwallis or the Nabob Wallajah for the purpose of gratifying the Sultan." The secret intelligence which the Nawab was said to have conveyed through the vakils was for the preservation of peace between Tipu and the English which was greatly desired by the latter at the time; and Walajah advised Tipu, after having learnt that suspicions were caused by some negotiations between Seringapatam and Poona, to suspend those negotiations at least during the administration of Cornwallis: also having learnt that Pondicherry was about to be attacked by the English, the Nawab advised the Sultan to withdraw his wakil from Pondicherry and to stop his correspondence with the French³¹.

(31) The wakil's report contain only these words regarding these two matters: "What, in the judgment of this well-wisher, now appears expedient is this, in a short time Lordship (Cornwallis) will go to Europe; the Princes, please God, will soon return, and the *kists* are in a course of payment; after his Lordship's departure the liquidation of the *kists* and other points, whatever may be his Highness's (Tipu's) pleasure, will be right and proper; at present it is better to be silent upon everything, because at this time his Highness's honour would at all events be called in question." (*kists*—payments due from Tipu as indemnity).

The lack of civil expressions and sufficient regard in reference to the English, found in the correspondence of the vakils, was probably due to their knowing that such a display of lack of courtesy to them would be agreeable to their master. The designation of "the affair you know" which frequently occurs and of which the English conjectured so many deep laid plans on the part of the two Musulman leaders, was after all known to refer to the subject of a proposed marriage alliance between the Carnatic and the Mysore families. The Nawab's secret meetings with the vakils prior to their departure, his offer to establish a cipher for the purpose of private communication which was not, in any way, utilised by Tipu, the further letters from the later envoys of Tipu, Muhammad Ghiyas and Muhammad Ghaus, in the years 1795—97—all these do not reveal anything more than mere exchange of compliments. There are 21 letters published in the appendix to the declaration of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, dated 31st July 1801. The examination of the witnesses in Vellore and Seringapatam by Messrs Webbe and Close in the month of May 1800 was ordered to be printed by Parliament on the 21st of June among the Carnatic Papers. The Commissioners did not record the evidence of Munshi Habibullah and Diwan Purniah, as their testimony did not establish any fact of consequence. Mill is emphatic that the evidence of the letters and of the subsequent examination of the vakils did not and could not afford any proof at all of any criminal correspondence of the Nawab with Tipu; and he significantly adds these words:—"But the total inability of the English to produce further evidence, with all the records of the Mysore government in their hands, and all the living agents of it within their absolute power, is a proof of the contrary; since it is not creditable that a criminal correspondence should have existed, and not have left more traces of itself."

The Report of the Commissioners was drawn up and

"Although a friendly connexion has long subsisted with the French on the part of the Ahmedy Sircar, yet, considering the circumstances of the times, it is not advisable (that is to maintain an epistolary correspondence with the French); should there by any point of urgency to communicate, there is no objection to do it verbally." (Ahmedy Sircar—Tipu's government).

signed at Seringapatam on the 18th of May, 1800. It was not till over a year after that date, during which period the Governor-General was occupied by other matters, particularly the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, of October 1800, that he wrote a long despatch to Lord Clive, with an enclosure to the Nawab. In the Despatch, he said that the negotiations with the Nizam rendered it politic to postpone the Carnatic question for the time. But the delay enabled him to receive the opinions of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors on the subject of the Seringapatam Correspondence. He learnt with pleasure that these opinions accorded entirely with his own and with those of Lord Clive. He wrote that he confidently inferred from the evidence of the Correspondence and of the subsequent examination of the vakils, "the existence of a criminal correspondence between the Nabob and Tipu"; and he had consequently resolved on the dethronement of the Nawab and the transfer of his sovereignty to the Company. He had also desired Webbe to go to Calcutta and convey to him all the personal knowledge that he had on the subject, and with that additional knowledge he had carefully revised the examination of the evidence. But he would still inake an attempt to persuade the Nawab to acquiesce in the proposed arrangement by the form of treaty; and he asked Lord Clive to let the Nawab know all the proofs of his correspondence with Tipu Sultan in the English possession, and at the same time to offer him the inducement of a generous provision of a sum of three lakhs of pagodas annually for his personal expenses. The Governor-General was convinced of "the criminal purpose, and of the actual endeavours of the late and present Nabob of Arcot to establish an union of interests with the late Tipoo Sultan, incompatible with the existing engagements between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Company, and tending to subvert the British power in the peninsula of India." He was specific in the direction to Lord Clive that, if the Nawab should refuse to acquiesce in the proposal, the Madras Government was to assume the civil and military government of the Carnatic and exercise its full rights and power. If the Nawab should appeal to the Court of Directors against this proposal, because the Secret Committee had already assented to the proposal for the extinction of his sovereignty, the Nawab's petition

should not be admitted and he should not have the right of a formal investigation of his conduct. Thus the Governor-General decided the whole question *ex parte*, "upon the basis of evidence furnished by the English themselves, and examined only by themselves and for themselves and upon which they could put any construction they pleased, without admitting the accused to offer a single article of counter evidence or to sift the evidence brought to condemn him." The argument that Mill puts forward against the English decision, that the Nawab was a sovereign ruler who stood in treaty relations with the British power, is controverted by Wilson, who says that the Nawab had never been a sovereign prince; but the Ministers of the British Crown had most *impolitically and mistakingly* treated him as such. But the history of his relations with the Company furnished a clear refutation of this assumption. Wilson added that the Nawab was nothing more originally than an officer of the Nizam of the Deccan, appointed and removed at his pleasure. It was the English that secured him independence of the Nizam and it was to them that he owed his security. "He was their creature and not their equal." The dispute lay not between two potentates of equal status, but between master and servant, between sovereign and subject. It was the mistake of the English to have perpetuated in their own attitude the pretensions of the Nawab to sovereign rank. In Wilson's opinion, even Wellesley was generous and weak-minded in this respect, because he chose to treat the Nawab, not as a refractory dependent, but as a sovereign prince in alliance with the English. He wrote in his Despatch: "The case requires that we should act as against a state, on the basis of the general law of nations, and that we should employ the power of the British empire in India to demand, and if necessary, to enforce an adequate security for our rights and interests against the machinations of a faithless ally, who has violated the fundamental principles of a public alliance to the extent of placing himself in the light of a public enemy." But even Wilson had to modify his standpoint³² and to plead the expediency of inconsistency.

(32) "This means, it is to be presumed, that a sovereign who is an enemy, and who is too weak to resist, may be deprived of his sovereignty; but even if this doctrine were generally true, which it is not, the public hostility of the Nawab of the Carnatic had not been so decisively manifested as to justify such extreme punishment. The inconsistencies and unsoundness of many of our attempts to vindicate our political measures in India are undeniable. It would have been more honest and honourable to have confined ourselves to

The English Government held at one convenient time that the Nawab was an independent sovereign. On another occasion they were at pains to prove his independence of the Nizam of Hyderabad and to declare that his power was derived directly by a grant of the Mughal Emperor. On a third occasion the Company condemned his attempt at *equal* correspondence with King George III; and now Lord Wellesley conveniently holds up his definite subordination to and dependence on the Company in political status.

To resume our narrative:—Lord Wellesley put forward the high sounding plea of Imperialism, *viz.*; The Company was justified in the interests of the people of the Carnatic in confiscating the administration from the Nawab's hands, because "in proportion as the feelings of millions are of more value than the feelings of an individual" and because even if the English should only retain the administrative and judicial system of the Nawab bad as it was, and work it, the people would suffer less than they would with the system as it would continue to be administered by the Nawab's officials. Likewise, the Company held that in the short period when they enjoyed undivided powers over the Carnatic, 'though their administration had been marked neither by skill nor by success, some efforts had been nobly intended and would have been doubtless followed by more judicious expedients.' Lastly, Mill thus finally puts his coping-stone on the arch of justification of the Company's move to take over the sovereignty. He says:—"Yet I believe it will be found that the Company, during the period of their sovereignty, have done more in behalf of their subjects, have shown more of good will towards them, have shown less of a selfish attachment to mischievous powers lodged in their own hands, have displayed a more generous welcome to schemes of improvement, and are now more willing to adopt improvements, not only than any other sovereign existing in the same period, but than all other sovereigns taken together

the avowal that the maintenance of the British dominion in India was the main-spring of all our policy. It might also have been safely asserted, on this occasion at least, that the interest of the people demanded the separation of the double administration of the affairs of the Carnatic, and an end being put to the misgovernment of the Nabobs of Arcot." (Mill and Wilson: *History of British India*: Vol. VI: footnote on p. 329).

upon the surface of the globe." (Mill's *History of British India*, Vol. VI, p. 331).

When the Governor-General's instructions embodied in this despatch of May 28, 1801, reached Lord Clive, the Nawab Umdatul-Umara was suffering from the illness that was soon to prove fatal. The Governor was generous not to agitate his mind with the communication of the despatch. But he posted, as above noted, an English force at the gates and in the grounds of the Nawab's palace immediately on requisition by Col. Barrett who sent a report that some of the armed peons who accompanied Husamu'l-Mulk Bahadur from Trichinopoly, perhaps at the instigation of Sultanu'Nisa Begam, with ulterior plans of a possible usurpation of power for her son, might create a tumult and effect a revolution in succession³³. The Governor concluded that these peons had been brought to Madras for some evil purpose and anticipated it by occupying the palace himself. He had also suspected that the Nawab had accumulated a considerable treasure which might be attempted to be removed by interested persons. The Nawab himself, according to Muhammad Karim, had consented to Col. Barrett making the requisition for English troops. But a paper of Taju'l Umara to Messrs. Hall and Johnston with the request that they might present their petition for his re-installation on his rightful throne says that the posting of English troops was advised and adopted without any communication either with the Nawab or with his ministers until the very moment of its execution, on the 5th of July 1801. (*18-Papers concerning the late Nabob of the Carnatic*, ordered to be printed on the 21st and 23rd of June 1802).

(33) A similar palace revolution concerning the succession to the *masnad* of Oudh was to occur some years later. See for details Ursula Low: *Fifty Years with John Company* (From the letters of General Sir, John Low, 1822-58) (1936)—Lucknow, 1837—ch. IX. The King's Death and the Begum's Insurrection.—The Padshah Begam attempted to usurp the throne for her favourite, Moona Jan, in supersession of the late King's uncle and heir, Nasiru'd-Daula (July 1837).

**VIII—Taju'l-Umara set aside in favour of Azimu'Daula
and the Annexation of the Carnatic (July 1801)
by the British.**

The Nawab Umdatul-Umara died at about 10 o'clock in the morning, on the 15th of July 1801. At about 2 in the same afternoon, as Taju'l-Umara deposed in his petition, he was informed that Mr. Webbe, Chief Secretary to Government and Col. Barry Close, the Resident of Mysore, who had been commissioned by the Governor to state to the Prince and other members of his family the crimes "which were charged upon the two Nabobs deceased" and to demand their consent for the transfer of the government of the Carnatic to the English, came to the palace for opening negotiations. Taju'l-Umara, attended by the Regents and other officers, met the Commissioners, who immediately inquired as to the disposition which the late Nawab had made of his affairs; he answered that such disposition was clear, short and unequivocal and was contained in a will executed in quadruplicate and sent several days previous to the Nawab's death, to the King of Great Britain, to the Court of Directors and to the Governor-General, and (the last copy entrusted) to the Chief Minister of the Carnatic, who had handed it over to himself at the death of the Nawab. When the Commissioners wanted to see the will, an excuse was made that it should be produced after the three days of customary of mourning should be over. But the Commissioners insisted on its immediate production; and Taju'l-Umara fearing that any delay might create some possible doubts as to the genuineness of the will, gave it into their hands. They examined it with scrupulous care, observing that "His Highness had appointed me to the entire dominion and government of the Carnatic, and with very small exceptions to the possession of all his property; but that in contemplation of my youth had placed me under the guardianship of two noblemen until I should arrive at my 19th year." The Prince replied that he had been conscious of this disposition and it was unnecessary that he should be

consulted further at such an inauspicious moment. He was preparing to depart when the Commissioners desired him to stay for a while; and in the presence of the two Regents, they represented that the letter which they produced from the Governor-General, accused the two late Nawabs of "improper and unjustifiable correspondence" with the Ruler of Mysore, and demanded the surrender of the entire dominions of the Carnatic for a breach of treaty of 1792. After reading this correspondence, the Commissioners declared that the late (deceased) Nawab had forfeited his dominions to the Company by his treacherous action and therefore had no right to dispose of it by will. Yet the Company were inclined to make his young son a very generous offer, *viz.*, a very liberal provision for himself "on condition of his previous surrender of all the dominions which had been nominally willed to him". The Report of Webbe and Close on this conference informs us that the Prince retired after they had examined the will and the conference was held with the two Regents only. The latter repeated that they were ignorant of the "supposed secret intercourse" between the Nawabs and Tipu. They stated that they distinctly understood the object of the Governor-General's declaration and the force of reasoning. They admitted the conclusions drawn from the fact "provided the facts should be true." They insisted that it was reasonable for them to enter into a defence of the late Nawab's conduct in regard to several points raised in the declaration. The Regents urged that as the day was far advanced and as preparations had to be made for removing the Nawab's corpse to Trichinopoly, they wanted to close the conference; and it was decided to continue it in the next evening. The Commissioners, however, warned the Regents that the answer which they gave to the proposition of the Governor-General would determine whether the British Government would acknowledge the claims of Taju'l-Umara to the support of the Company.

On the second day *i.e.*, July 16th, according to Taju'l-Umara's version, the Regents held that they were confirmed in their impression of the rectitude of the late Nawab's conduct in the particulars referred to and that they had found, on a full investigation, not the smallest foundation for the charges and denied any kind of secret correspondence other than through the channel of the British Govern-

ment, between the Nawab and the Ruler of Mysore. They also added that as the matter was not investigated during the life-time of the late Nawab when it might have been fairly and candidly explained and answered, they hoped that the Company did not seriously believe in the supposed correspondence, and therefore they could only conclude that the terms proposed to them at the previous day's conference would be given up, as they were applicable to a situation of things which did not really exist. The Regents next professed their readiness to receive any proposals which might promote a good understanding of both parties to the existing engagements. But as the Commissioners insisted in very peremptory language on their first proposal, the Regents put forward an expedient, *viz.*, the delivery into the hands of the Company, for their entire management and control, of the whole of the Tinnevely and the Madura provinces in the south and of Ongole and Palnad in the north, on condition that the Nawab of the Carnatic should be allowed, in his periodical *kists*, credit for the amount of rent of such districts, agreeably to the schedule No. 2 of the treaty of 1792, being a yearly sum equal to the full amount of the subsidy claimable by the Company under that treaty. The Regents held that the preceding Governors of Madras had desired the possession of Tinnevely and the adjacent countries; and perhaps the present Government had similar views, though in a more extended shape, as might be inferred from the nature of the proposals made.

To this the Commissioners replied that it "would not in any way do:—Nothing short of the demand that had been made could be accepted or considered". In consequence of this refusal, the Regents required further time for consideration and were asked to adjourn the conference to the next day.

The Commissioners' own report on the second day's conference says that the Regents persisted in denying the proofs of the violation of his alliance with the British by the late Nawab, but with a strange inconsistency they proceeded to inquire as to the conditions on which the British proposed to establish an amicable adjustment of their claims on the family of the late Nawab. To their persistence in their first demand, *viz.*, the entire and exclusive administration by the British of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, Najib Khan, one of the Re-

gents, observed in answer that such a proposition would annihilate the very station of the Nawab of the Carnatic and frustrate the professed object of the arrangements, viz., the securing of the Nawab's position.

The Commissioners only repeated their previous stand, viz., the Nawab Umdatul-Umara, having vitiated by his own conduct and consequently annihilated the rights secured to him under the treaty of 1792, left his reputed son in his own condition—"having placed himself in the relation of a public enemy, his reputed son had succeeded to that condition". Only the British Government had suspended the exercise of its rights, and therefore in admitting Tajul-Umara to negotiate upon any terms, they were "actuated by motives of generosity unconnected with any right in the family of Muhammad Ali to resist its demand for security."

In regard to the third day's proceedings (July 17), the Commissioners reported that Najib Khan Salar Jang and Taqi Ali Khan, the Regents, had earlier assembled the whole family and the ministers of the late Nawab for considering the proposition of the British Commissioners; and that the conviction of the assembly was that, notwithstanding the decided terms of the British demand, the Government would still be disposed to accept a modification of the terms required for its security in the Carnatic and they produced the counter project which had been referred to above, as having occurred on the 2nd day of the proceedings, according to the petition of Tajul-Umara³⁴. The Commissioners replied to this

- (34) The counter proposal contained five articles: (1) Tajul-Umara to cede to the Company sovereign authority over the *poligars*; but the Company was to give credit for the full amount of the *poligar peshkash* as against the kist of 9 lakhs of pagodas due from the Nawab. This peshkash amounted to over 2½ lakhs of pagodas. (2) The Company to have the right of collecting revenues etc., from the districts of Tinnevely, Madurai, Ongole and Palnad and the amount of the revenues totalling over 5 lakhs of pagodas, should also be deducted from the kist due to the Company under the treaty of 1792. (3) The balance of the kist and the whole amount of the sum annually due for discharging the debts of the Nawab Wallajah according to their treaty would be paid in ten monthly instalments between September and June. (4) After discharging the above debts the new Nawab would liquidate the Cavalry Loan and the interest thereon, (5) The Nawab will also give the whole of his rights in the Pearl Fishery. Non-payment of kists would continue, as under schedule No. 2 of the treaty of 1792, to be attended by the assumption of such district or districts mentioned in it, in order to equal the amount of the arrears. In Article 3 it was stipulated that the whole contents of this paper should be considered as referring only to the treaty of 1792.

offer that the interpretation which the Regents gave to the will of the late Nawab involved them in a heavy responsibility to his son which the terms of the will itself did not justify, because the only authority conveyed by the will to the Regents was contained in the Persian word, *imdad* which literally meant 'assistance'. The Commissioners also said that the effect of these conferences to be produced on the interests of the Regents and others, could bear no comparison to the effect to be produced on those of Tajul-Umara. Then the Regents replied that the subject of the evidence of the correspondence discovered at Seringapatam had been agitated in the Nawab's durbar for more than 12 months—a contradiction, as the Commissioners remark, in the most direct terms, of the Regents' expressions of surprise when this subject was broached at the first day's conference—and that measure had been taken for justifying the conduct of the late Nawab, that the propositions of the Commissioners had been fully discussed and debated, that they had also considered the character of the authority and responsibility which they had acquired under the will and they were prepared to give a decided answer to the propositions and that the counter proposal contained "finally and unequivocally the only terms on which they could accede to our arrangements of the affairs of the Carnatic by negotiation".

The Regents showed great anxiety when the Commissioners demanded to have a personal assurance from Tajul-Umara, a declaration from his mouth, at a separate and secret conference and to know from him his mind which was to affect all his future prospects; and they overcame the reluctance of the Regents to avoid the proposed interview with the Prince which, they held, was not proper on ground of his youth, his *insufficiency* to conduct a conference, the fears of his mother and the recency of his father's death.

The personal interview of the Commissioners with Tajul-Umara was preceded by a visit of Mr. Fitzgerald, the confidential physician of the late Nawab, to the Prince; and he was asked to tell the latter of the actual existence of the Governor-General's orders and of the determination of Lord Clive to execute those orders. A further day was

allowed for the Prince to make up his mind for the interview and for the decision that he would give directly to the Governor and the Commissioners. The Regents were also apprised of the actual position in which they stood.

On the 19th of July, on the 5th day, the Regents replied to the query of the Commissioners whether they had altered their minds, that they had not done so and "with much apparent composure and resolutoin" declared that they were prepared to meet the consequences "on their own responsibility, under a perfect reliance on the protection of the Company and on its adherence to the existing engagements". Tajū'l-Umara who was then invited to the meeting was informed of the conclusive rejection of the British terms by his Regents; and he was requested to declare whether this rejection was conformable to his sentiments and resolution. And though he first replied that he did not disagree from the opinion of the Khans, the Commissioners insisted that the latter should retire and leave the Prince to speak out his mind himself. As soon as the Regents had retired, the young Prince whispered in a low tone of voice that he had been deceived by them; and so he was taken to the tent of the European commandant of the British troops, to a personal interview with Lord Clive himself who had come there for the purpose. At that interview which was entirely private--the Khans having been ordered to withdraw--Taju'l-Umara stated that the previous conferences had been conducted without his participation, that he did not approve of the termination of the negotiations and that he was ready to conclude an arrangement with the British Government on the basis of the latter's terms. He was anxious to know the conditions of the provision to be made for his personal expenses and the extent of his power over the public treasure of his father, which he considered to be large; and he proposed that a treaty should be prepared on the basis of the vesting of the entire civil and military government of the Carnatic in the Company and stated that he would be ready to execute that instrument, with or without the consent of the Regents, at another separate conference, to be held the next day within the lines of the British troops. The Commissioners say in another place that he was then nearly 18 years of age.

On the 20th of July. when the Commissioners met Tajū'l-Umara, he declared that he could not adopt a line of

conduct inconsistent with the advise of his Regents, and therefore the conference with the Governor was unnecessary. When he was asked whether it was his real mind, he said that though what he now expressed differed entirely from his veivs of the previous day, he had seriously reflected on the whole matter, consulted all the members of his family and after mature consideration, retracted the opinion that he had conveyed to his Lordship, the Governor, the previous day; and he deemed it to be "totally incompatible with his interests and honour to accede to the proposition on the basis of which he had agreed to conclude the treaty". He further said that he had spoken out his mind the previous day from a hasty impression and that his present sentiments were the result of serious reflection, and he was convinced that his present line of conduct should help him to adhere to the intentions of his father and to the real interests of his family. Thereupon he was told by the Commissioners that he was actually within the British encampment, that he need not expect any personal danger or insult and that he would be kept under the protection of the Company's forces and consequently might freely speak out his mind. He was further told that the instructions from the Governor-General were most real and he should not disbelieve in their existence, as he was encouraged to do by interested persons and that he "deceived himself, if he nourished any expectation of securing the interests of his family on any other basis than that of an amicable adjustment, for the alternative choice was either to become the acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic, or be one of many pensioners dependent on the bounty of the Company; that the choice, which he now appeared to have made was so inconsistent with prudence, as to justify our considering him to act under some improper restraint." The Prince answered that Mr. Fitzgerald had spoken to him on the subject and that his resolution was not governed by any distrust relative to the orders of the Governor-General. He was also told that those who held *tankahs* or other claims on the Carnatic revenues were most interested in persuading him to decline the British proposals, because their chances of realising their claims would be completely effaced under the proposed terms and that they were not really working for his own interests. If they had told him that there was a possibility of the measures of the Indian Government being disapproved by the Court of Directors, it was also

equally false, because the orders of the Governor-General were founded on a previous communication with the Directors and also with the British Cabinet. This they urged, because the counter project submitted by the Regents contained manifest proofs of having been translated from a European language, and its clauses excluded the Government in India from administering the funds allotted by the treaty of 1792 towards the liquidation of the Consolidated Debts of Nawab Muhammad Ali.

Taju'l-Umara stuck to his ground, though still pleading that he had assured himself of the favour and protection of the Company; and he showed no change in his mental composure and confidence, even when he was told that his future situation after this declaration of his, would be "that of a private person hostile to the British interest and dependent on the bounty of the Company". The Report says that "a smile of complacency, which appeared on his countenance throughout this discussion denoted an internal satisfaction at the line of conduct he was pursuing". After this Lord Clive ended the conference, and wrote to the Governor-General that he had distinctly explained to the Prince the consequences of his rejection and "discharged what humanity and a sense of the forlorn situation of the young man required of me" (letter of 20th July 1801). Thus Taju'l-Umara was dispossessed of a throne to which by personal right, as he pleaded, as well as by the will of his royal predecessor, he felt he was lawfully and indisputably entitled. He wrote in the paper to be submitted to the Directors, thus, about this fateful conference: "While I was delivering what I had to say, a number of troopers rode around the tent with drawn swords, and an unusual guard of sepoys were posted at the door, who traversed constantly to and fro; and a certain degree of confusion seemed to reign around; I endeavoured, nevertheless, to preserve a coolness and consistency of demeanour so requisite for the occasion, and have to thank Heaven, that my reason and fortitude was not to be shaken by a circumstance calculated to move them, and which from after practices, I am sorry to add, that I cannot but imagine was contrived with that view."

"After I had concluded what I had to answer, his Lordship replied, "that I was extremely badly advised;

that I had sacrificed my best interests to specious appearances, and that I should rue the rejection of his proposal; that it was the very last time that he should address me on the subject, and with a few words of form he departed the tent.'³⁵

On the next day (the 21st July), an attempt was made by the Commissioners to open a negotiation with Prince Azimu'd-Daula; but he was kept under such strict watch by the followers of the late Nawab, that his release from his restrictions had to be effected cautiously because any attempt to effect it by open means appeared liable to the serious objection of precipitating the fate of the young prince. The next day they reported that Najib Khan and Taqi Ali Khan had already performed the ceremony of installing Taju'l-Umara in a private manner on the *masnad* of Arcot and they would instal him as Nawab in a public durbar on the 23rd. Consequently McNeil, the British commander, was directed to take the entire possession of the palace of Chhapauk and to remove all the guards of the late Nawab from their posts. Azimu'd-Daula was released from the house in which he was confined and was gaurded by a party of the Company's troops.

On the 23rd of July, Col. McNeil informed Prince Azimu'd-Daula that he should meet the Governor at an interview and there the Prince stated the injuries he had sustained and deplored the depression of his fortunes. He requested earnestly that his case might be considered and a more comfortable arrangement for his family might be provided in the general rearrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic. The Governor and the Commissioners were satisfied that the Prince's sense of his own immediate interest would incline him to any overtures on the part of the British Government "for reviving in his person the alliance so long subsisting between the Company and his family".

The next day, the Commissioners proceeded to explain to Azimu'd-Daula the actual circumstances in which the Company had acquired new rights over the Carnatic and

(35) The Prince wrote, that he could not sacrifice his own and his family's rights for any supposed benefit to the Company, or any provisional good for himself.

the great reluctance which marked Government, to entirely humiliate the house of Muhammad Ali. The Prince declared that he was ready to afford, in the event of his elevation to the *masnad*, the satisfaction and security which the Company deemed to be necessary for the preservation of its interests in the Carnatic. A treaty was to be drawn up to this effect which was to be discussed with the Prince at the next day's conference.

Accordingly, on July 25, the Commissioners proceeded with the draft of the treaty to discuss its terms with the Prince. He urged, for the sake of his reputation and honour, that special attention be paid to the article for maintaining honourably the families of the Nawabs Walajah and Umdatul-Umara; and it was agreed that it was necessary to furnish the Prince with the most powerful means of attaching the family to his interests by rendering the jaghirs and stipends proposed to be allotted to its members to be dependent on the pleasure of the British Government; and the Prince himself was to make the allotments according to the merits of the individuals concerned, in his opinion. Azimu'd-Daula acknowledged the debts due by his ancestors to the Company, but would not allow himself to be held personally responsible for the amount of these or any other debts.

The Prince signed the Persian draft of the proposed treaty, and a regular instrument containing the twelve articles agreed upon was drawn upon this basis and executed on the day when Azimu'd-Daula was enthroned on the *masnad*, i.e., 31st July. The Commissioners noted "the decorous deportment, moderation and good sense" which the Prince displayed upon his sudden and unexpected elevation and on all the occasions of his meeting them.

The Prince was removed to the Amir-Bagh for safety, while the *Diwan Khana* of the Kalas-mahal was prepared for the coronation ceremony. Azimu'd-Daula was warmly congratulated by Nawab Sayful-Mulk, the surviving brother of Umdatul-Umara, who said that there was absolutely no doubt about the permanence of his rule. But he was afraid of any open manifestation of his consent to his elevation, because of the scandal that would be raised against him by the other members of his family and by the followers of Taju'l-Umara and so excused himself from attendance at the coronation.

On Friday the 31st of July, Azimu'd-Daula was taken in procession from the Amir Bagh to the Chepauk Palace and was seated on the *masnad* of the Carnatic in open *darbar* in the presence of the Governor and all the high officials. The Governor was angry that none of the members of the Nawab's family had turned up to offer *nazar*. Two of them who came after the ceremony to meet the Governor, argued that Tajul-Umara was the legitimate Nawab and ruler of the Carnatic, to which Mr. Webbe replied that the late Nawab did not leave a son by his "khass-mahal", and the statements and letters from the members of the Nawab's family did not establish the parentage of Tajul-Umara; and consequently Azimu'd-Daula a grandson of Nawab Muhammad Ali was seated upon the throne and whoever wanted the friendship of the Company should obey the new Nawab.

Tajul-Umara says in his petition to the Company that during the time when the Governor and the Commissioners were negotiating with Azimu'd-Daula, several representations were made to him through Col. McNeil of the advantages that would be lost to him if he refused to accede to the Government's wishes. But he declined to hear any private proposals and observed that Azimu'd-Daula would receive whatever the Company might be pleased to give him, "for he would be receiving everything when he had nothing in reality to return." He added that several measures were used to spread disaffection and disunion in his family but to no avail. There was only one opinion as to the justice and legality of his succession; and two written instruments were forwarded to the Government maintaining the legitimacy of his right of succession, one embodying the unanimous opinion of the family and the other, the findings of the most learned lawyers. The Regents also addressed a letter to the Governor-in-Council, recapitulating the proceedings of their Conferences with the English Commissioners themselves and professing that they and Tajul-Umara wished to form such an alliance with the Company as might ensure their mutual interest and begging that negotiations might be reopened with them in writing. Government did not send even a reply to this request. Further, on the 29th of July, on hearing that Azimu'd-Daula would be enthroned on the 31st instant following, Tajul-Umara again addressed the Governor and agreed to accept the terms which had been

first offered to him. This was also ignored. This measure Taju'l-Umara reconciled to himself, because though his mind revolted from it, it seemed to be demanded "by the trying exigencies of the moment". He wanted that his petition should be submitted to the British Sovereign and also to the Prince of Wales, to the President of the Board of Control and to the Court of Directors; and lastly, a reference should be made to the House of Commons. Sayfu'l-Mulk, we learn from this paper, also addressed a supplication, perhaps for the reversion of the throne to himself. Messrs. Hall and Johnstone through whom the petition was to be forwarded, were enjoined to add to their patrons the numerous creditors of the two late Nawabs "who are interested in no secondary degree in the success of my application; it being my determined resolution to do them ample justice in the allowances and consolidation of their claims, in the event of my restoration to the dignities of my fathers."

This proves beyond any possibility of doubt the interested collusion of the holders of the Carnatic bonds with Taju'l-Umara³⁶. The disappointed prince was removed to the house of his aunt and thence to the care of his mother. He died shortly afterwards, on the 1st of Dhu'l-hajj (5th April 1802). Lord Clive accepted the recommendations of the new Nawab for the maintenance allowances to the members of his family. But he insisted that he should not keep in service Bahram Jang Bahadur.

His diwan was Maulavi Muhammad Ghaus Khan Bahadur, who was his old teacher. Sultanu'nisa Begam and her son, Raisu'l-Umara Bahadur, were permitted to undertake the Haj pilgrimage. Thus the Nawabi entered on a new phase of its existence.

(36) Taju'l-Umara states in his petition that the only obstacle to his accepting the conditions of the Government was his sense that would have proved "an eternal barrier to the recovery of their respective credits." He added that he disdained to merely stipulate a comfortable revenue for himself and neglect others dependent on him and wound up with saying that he would not make "any compromise which he could not reconcile to the memories of his predecessors and to the opinion of mankind." He expected that the loss of his throne would not be more than temporary; he felt great grief and concern for his temporary loss, but "certainly with less emotion than I should regret a departure from those principles which have been religiously instilled in me." (last paragraph of the petition).

The sequel, in British politics, of the annexation of the Carnatic by the Company should now be noted. Sheridan and Lord Moira threatened to attack the Governor-General in Parliament on this question. But their threat proved abortive. Nevertheless Wellesley's friends, Grenville and Pitt, the Prime Minister, grew anxious on this account (March 1802). Grenville declared: "It is no longer to the India House or to Whitehall that Wellesley can look for protection and support. Both Addington and Castlereagh examined the Carnatic Papers very carefully and finally decided to support Wellesley "but not without misgiving". Addington, writing to Wellesley in September 1802, thus encouraged him: "You will learn from various quarters that an attack on some of your measures, and particularly (and, as I believe, exclusively) on the transactions in the Carnatic, is to be expected very early in the ensuing session; but, though considerable industry has been exerted to excite prejudices, no apprehension ought to be entertained of its ultimate effects. It will be repelled in the House of Lords by the members of Government in that House, by Lord Cornwallis, and, I need not add, by Lord Grenville, who, however, I must say, proposed to me, in the handsomest manner, that we should invent together the course that it would be most advisable to pursue. In the House of Commons, it is equally unnecessary for me to tell you, you will have the cordial and strenuous support of Pitt co-operating with that of Government." (*The Wellesley Papers* by the Editor of the Windham Papers, Vol. I, p. 182).

When Castlereagh wrote to Wellesley after his assumption of the Presidentship of the Board of Control, he confirmed his Carnatic policy, but advised Wellesley that having acquired sufficient territory in India he should end his tenure of office "with as much solidity as his former policy had brilliance"

IX.—The Final Phase; The Rule of the Titular

Nawab (1801—1855).

Nawab Azimu'd-Daula whose rule was very inconsequential, died on the 9th of Shawwal (1234 A.H. = 1819 August 1 A.D.). The treaty of 1801, 31st of July, which was the basis of his rule, contained twelve articles and also a separate and secret article. According to this treaty, all the powers of government were handed over to the English in perpetuity and were totally and for ever renounced by the Nawab. Curiously enough, as Mill remarks, the very first article of the treaty says that Azimu'd-Daula succeeded to "the state and rank, and the dignities dependent thereon of his ancestors," and was formally acknowledged and guaranteed by the Company—language which the English Government in India had very cleverly employed. As provision for the new Nawab, one-fifth part of the net revenues of the Carnatic was pledged. The Company made a suitable maintenance for the rest of the family (*vide*, the Minute of Lord Clive, dated 29th September 1801, relative to the pecuniary provision to be made for the families of the late Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdutu'l-Umarah, etc.) providing amounts to be paid, from the 1st of October 1801, for the families of Nawab Muhammad Ali, Nawab Umdatul-Umara, Abdul Wahab Khan and Mahfuz Khan and for the separate connections of Nawab Abdul Khadar, the nephew of Nawab Muhammad Ali by his legitimate sister, for the officers of the government of Nawab Umdatul-Umara, and for three relations of the Emperor of Delhi pensioned by Nawab Muhammad Ali, the total amounts to be paid yearly coming to 698,473 rupees. The Company also took upon itself the whole of the debts of the previous Nawabs. According to Article 8 of the treaty the Nawab acknowledged the debt of the Cavalry Loan amounting, with interest, to nearly 13¼ lakhs of pagodas and also the registered debt which was being paid up by the Company. The unadjusted debts were referred for decision to the Governor-General in Council. But the payment of these debts was not to cause any diminution from the fifth part of the net revenues payable to the Nawab.

On the same day when the enthronement of Nawab Azimu'd-Daula took place, the Governor of Madras in Council issued a declaration stating all the circumstances leading to the growing alienation between the Nawabs and the English from 1787 and holding that the two Nawabs, Muhammad Ali and his son, had been found "not only deficient in every active duty of the alliance of 1792, but unfaithful to its fundamental principles and untrue to its vital spirit". In the course of 11 paragraphs it was attempted to be proved that the two Nawabs had knowingly violated the stipulations of the treaty for the purpose of establishing a union of interests with Tipu Sultan and thereby placed themselves in the condition of public enemies to the British Government in India. The 'reputed son' of Nawab Umdatul-Umara had consequently merely succeeded to the condition of his father, namely, that of a public enemy. The British Government was, therefore, at liberty to make any arrangements at its own discretion for the security of the Carnatic. But they opened to the 'reputed son' of the late Nawab an amicable means of adjustment, which he obstinately resisted on the ground that he, in doing so, was only obeying the will of his father and the wishes of his family. Therefore Government entered into negotiation with Prince Azimu'd-Daula Bahadur who was the immediate great-grandson, by both his parents, of 'Nawab Anwaru'd-din Khan of blessed memory'; and this Prince, having agreed to the conditions which established in adequate security for the British interests in the Carnatic and at the same time revived the honourable alliance between the Company and his ancestors, he was installed in 'the *subhadari* of the territories of Arcot and of the Carnatic Payenghat'.

In their letters of 15th, 27th and the 31st of July the Madras Government communicated all their proceedings to the Governor-General. Among them, (in one letter marked Official, No. 20—Most Secret—) Lord Clive recommended that a proportion of the private treasure³⁷ of the Nawab of whose existence Azimu'd-Daula acquainted the Governor in their mutual conversations, should be appropriated to the liquidation of the Cavalry Loan, and since there

(37) Mention had been made of this in the conversations between the Regents and the Commissioners.

might be considerable difficulties in the way of the recovery of the treasure which might have been distributed in the interior apartments of the palace or among the females of the Nawab's family, and since its recovery would make the accession of Azimu'd-Daula unwelcome to many branches of his family, he judged it advisable to stipulate with the new Nawab a separate and secret article providing for the eventual discharge of the Cavalry Loan from the treasure as and when it might be discovered. This article was to be kept profoundly secret and not to be published with the general treaty.

The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors was informed in Despatches from the Madras Government (of 3rd of August) and from the Marques of Wellesley, (of the 21st of October) of these transactions. From these we read that from Azimu'd-Daula's compliance Lord Clive was relieved of the supposed difficulties stated in the Governor-General's Despatch in proposing to the new Nawab a modification of the preamble and of the first article of the treaty of the 31st of July 1801; and the effect was that the new Nawab considered the causes of his own elevation to have flowed from the generosity and moderation of the British Government, though the admission of the "hereditary pretensions" of the Nawab made in the preamble and in the first article was done entirely voluntarily on the part of Lord Clive³⁸. The Despatch also made it clear that the allowance made to the Nawab would not amount to more than about 3 lakhs of pagodas in any year. Lord Clive praised Mr. Webbe and Col. Close for their services; and he himself was praised by the Governor-General for the advantageous termination of these arduous negotiations. In particular, Webbe and Close were congratulated for their conduct of the examination of Tippu's vassals.

In the assumption of the government of the Carnatic, Lord Clive notified that by the treaty of 1801, the Company had acquired a full right "to ascertain, determine and establish rights of property, to fix a reasonable assessment upon the several pargunahs and villages of the Carnatic,

(38) The admission of Clive of the Nawab's hereditary pretensions' was productive of much trouble for Dalhousie.

and to secure a fixed and permanent revenue. to establish courts for the due administration of civil and criminal judicature. under such ordinances and regulations as shall from time to time be enacted and published by the Governor-General in Council of Fort St. George." The proclamation further stated that the treaty was unconditional and liable to no change whatever and that the power of fixing and collecting the revenue and of administering civil and criminal justice was vested in the Company alone, "so long as the sun and the moon shall endure". The proclamation further assured the people of the Carnatic of their enjoyment, under public and defined laws, of "every just and ascertained civil right with a free exercise of the religious institutions and domestic usages of their ancestors".

A letter from Lord William Bentinck, the then Governor of Madras, to the Nawab Azimu'd-Daula, dated the 22nd May 1804, thus repeats the Government's professions regarding the status of the Nawab: "Unwilling to degrade the illustrious house of Arcot, the Government was pleased to establish your Highness upon the throne, reserving to itself the administration of the civil and military affairs of the country—a very considerable portion of the revenue was appropriated to the support of the rank and dignity of the Sovereign in his former splendor, as well as the no less princely purposes of extensive charity and benevolence. Upon the same principles of liberality the British Government undertook to provide a maintenance for the families of Walajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah, in the former case the amount and the time of payment have been fixed by Treaty." (p. 5. *Records of Fort St. George: Country Correspondence: Political Department 1804*).

Thus, three years after his installation, when the real objects and original interpretation of the treaty of 1801 should have been fresh in the memory of Government, the then Governor who had succeeded Clive, stressed the hereditary descent of the Nawab's dignity and remarked that the eldest son of Sayfu'l-Mulk, having been at one time next in lineal succession to the Nawab, he felt averse to the diminution of his stipend. The treaty of 1801 had established Nawab Azimu'd-Daula "in the rank, property, and

possessions of his ancestors”: and these words are a sufficient acknowledgement of the hereditary character of his status. All that the treaty took away from the Nawab was the perpetual transfer of the civil and military administration of the Carnatic, which the previous Nawabs had pertinaciously refused to resign, relying on the rights secured to them by the treaty of 1792. Lord Wellesley held that their treachery in the Seringapatam Correspondence, not only proved beyond doubt, but was usable as a cause for exacting, this new condition.

A contrary interpretation denying the Nawab's hereditary and permanent right to his rank and status, under the treaty of 1801, is found in a memorandum on the Government of India under the Marquess Wellesley, said to have been written after the Parliamentary Session of 1806 and to have been completed at the Board of Control and the India House. This memorandum bears a close resemblance in style to that of Wellesley, but is held to have been prepared by his younger brother, Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, for the information of the Ministry and as materials for a Parliamentary defence of his brother. [It is published on pp. 546—86 of Vol. IV of Duke's *Supplementary Despatches*.] In it we have evidence of its having been perhaps scrutinised by Lord Wellesley. It contains the following summary of the Carnatic transaction; and from it we can learn that the status of the new Nawab under the treaty was to be *heritable* by his heirs. The words used in it were: “This Prince having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty was concluded by which the whole of the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company; and the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah, *and his heirs*, were to preserve their title and dignity, and to receive one fifth part of the net revenues of the country.” On pp. 564-65, there is a footnote to this memorandum, which runs as follows: “Unless the revenue exceeded the sum of 25 lacs of star pagodas, in which case, the fifth part of the excess was to be applied to purposes of military defence.” This is supported by Article 1 of the separate explanatory articles annexed to the treaty of July 1801.

Nawab Azimu'd-Daula died on the 3rd of August 1819, leaving several sons, the eldest of whom was the Na-

wab Azam Jah. The Madras Government wrote to the India Government, under date 2nd October 1819, that "it would have been satisfactory to them to have been informed whether the Governor-General in Council considered the treaty concluded with the late Nawab on the 31st July 1801 to have guaranteed the succession to the *musnud* to his family *in the direct and legitimate line of descent to which opinion they themselves had always been inclined* as well from the spirit in which the treaty was concluded, as from the tenor of its professions and also from the terms of the declaration published at the period." They were of the opinion that the new Nawab Azam Jah had virtually become a party to the treaty and he should be called upon to execute a formal instrument recognising its conditions. The Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, was of the opinion that there was no necessity for a new treaty as Azam Jah had become "*ipso facto* a party to the treaty concluded with his father in 1801."

Azam Jah was installed on the *masnad* of the Carnatic only six months after the death of his father, in the beginning of 1820 (February 3rd). According to Col. H. D. Love, the delay was due to the absence from the treaty of 1801 of any "stipulation regarding the succession." Sir Charles Aitchison, a later exponent of the policy of the Government, thus justified the later stand, which was to be taken up by Lord Dalhousie and Lord Harris on the question of the Carnatic succession³⁹.

A letter from Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, dated 17th February 1802, had distinctly acknowledged the sovereignty and even the feudal supremacy of the Nawab in the Carnatic and in its 89th paragraph indicated that His Excellency the Ruler of Travancore was informed that the *peshkash*, *nazzaranas* and *nazars* payable by

(39) He said: "Azam Jah, the son of Azim-ud-dowla, was informed that the treaty of 1801 did not stipulate that the rank and dignity of Nawab of the Carnatic should be hereditary in the family of Azim-ud-dowla; his succession depended on the pleasure of the supreme Government. Azam Jah was, however, recognised; but it was not considered necessary to conclude any new engagement with him." Aitchison; *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, etc.*—Vol. X, p. 5.

His Excellency according to the agreement of December 1766 “for all the latter’s possessions east of the mountains from Vadakara including Shencottah”, should be paid to His Highness the Nabob, according to the ancient usage. In another letter, dated 22nd February 1803, the Madras Government informed the Court of Directors that His Excellency the Ruler of Travancore had paid to His Highness the Nawab as the *Sovereign of the Carnatic* the sum of 2266 pagodas and 15 annas in full discharge of the *pesh-kash* and Cape Comorin *nazarrana* due to His Highness every *fasli*, according to the agreement of Dec. 1766. The great Governor, Sir Thomas Munro, thus interpreted Article 3 of 1801:—“By this the Nawab *does not relinquish his sovereignty*. He merely renews the article of former treaties by which he engaged not to correspond with foreign states without the consent of the Company.

“The fifth part of the revenues is his claim as *Sovereign of the whole Carnatic*.

“He is still *Prince of the Carnatic*, and he is a party to the treaty by which one-fifth part of the revenue is secured to him.

“The present assumption of the country is permanent, but the relative situations of the Company, and the Nawab, are the same as in former cases of assumption. The Nawab is still Prince of the Carnatic, and receives in that capacity one-fifth of the net revenue”⁴⁰.

The Minute of Munro distinctly declared the Nawab’s right to the fifth part of the net revenue of the Carnatic which was secured to him by the fifth article of the treaty of 1801 and held that his right to this payment was “his

(40) Pp. 109-10 of *The Empire in India. Letters from Madras and other places* by E. Bell—Ed. by C. S. Srinivas Chari.

Munro further wrote that “the relative situations of the Nawab and the Company are the same as in former cases of assumption”, and doubted whether the Supreme Court of Madras could legally exercise jurisdiction in the Carnatic, even in case of private property. “Had the Nabob retained the civil administration, it certainly could not have done so, neither could it have done so under a temporary assumption similar to what has occurred at former periods.” (Munro’s Minute in Consultation, dated (15th March 1822).

claim as sovereign of the whole of the Carnatic and was the revenue which remains after providing for the civil and military charges." It further added that the Nawab had a right to object to any measure which by the increase of jaghirs or otherwise might tend to diminish the Nawab's dues.

Major Bell who was an avowed champion of the house of the Nawab Walajah and strove hard to revive the claims of Prince Azim Jah, when the Nawabi was extinguished in 1865, goes so far as to declare that in every transaction conveying grants of territory to the English from the Nawabs during all the years from 1749 to 1801 it was always the Nawab that was the *grantor* and the British that were the *grantees*. Sir John Malcolm prepared a summary, at Calcutta, of the proceedings relating to the Company's assumption of the administration of the Carnatic, from official papers, in 1802 or 1803; he, however, maintained that neither "Ali Hussain, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah, nor Azim-ud-Dowla, the acknowledged son of Amir-ul-Omrah who was the favourite son of Walajah, had a specific claim to the succession from the treaty of 1792 or from being heir to Omdut-ul-Omrah, whose own right was then considered by the Governor-General to be forfeited." The elevation of either of them was to be considered only as a measure of expediency and not of right; and the offer of the throne to either was "unconnected with any admission of his claim or title to the musnud." On this basis it may be held that the raising of Azim-ud-dowla to the throne was a matter concerning only himself and not necessarily continuing the right to his successors.⁴¹

Nawab Azam Jah died on the 13th of November 1825. On the 23rd of December following, Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan, the infant son of the late Nawab, was proclaimed by the Madras Government as the successor to his deceased father; and Prince Azim Jah, the younger brother of the late Nawab, was appointed Regent for the minor ruler. On the 14th of January 1829, the Court of Directors, in a public letter, expressed their approval of certain acts of the Madras Government on the ground that

(41)* *Vide his Abstract Narrative of Proceedings relative to the Settlement of the Carnatic.* Malcolm held that Wellesley had, even earlier than 1800, come to hold that the right of inheritance, if any, belonged to Azimu'd-Dawla.

Prince Azim Jah was the *next heir*'' in case of the Nabob's demise''. In 1843, when Lord Tweeddale was the Governor of Madras, his Government put the name of Prince Azim Jah as the first in the list of persons exempted from judicial process, "in consideration of the position he has lately occupied in communication with the British Government, and that which he holds in relation to his Highness the Nawab, and to *his succession to the musnad*."

Azim Jah was Regent for his nephew till he attained age in 1842. But even after he ceased to be the Regent (Naib-i-Mukhtar), he was treated by the Madras Government with great consideration and regarded both socially and politically as heir presumptive and successor to the masnad. Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan was installed as the ruler of the Carnatic in a grand durbar; and there is a well known painting of the installation ceremony, by Mr. Lewis. The canvas contains a crowd of figures, of which nearly 70 are portraits and shows the arches of the durbar hall. The ceremony took place on the 25th of August 1842 under the auspices of Lord Elphinstone, the Governor. Amongst the figures may be noted Prince Azim Jah, Zahir-ud-Daula, a son of Prince Azim Jah, two brothers of the Prince, the Nawab's chief officers and the high officials of the British Government. A key was prepared for the figures in the portrait, which forms a very interesting subject of study for the student of historical curiosities⁴².

Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan died without issue on the 7th October 1855. Immediately Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, who was then residing at Ootacamund was informed of the event and lost no time in communicating his views and desire to the Government of Lord Harris at Madras. On the 23rd of October, Mr. G. F.^{42a} Edmonstone wrote a letter containing the following observations, among others:

(42) H. D. Love—*A Descriptive List of Pictures in the Government House, Madras* (1903)—pp. 190-91.

(42a) Foreign Secretary to the Government of India (1855-57) and son of N. B. Edmonstone who was Foreign Secretary under Wellesley 1801.

"3. The late Nawab, the Governor General observes, has left no son, so that there is no direct heir to the musnud.

"4. Under these circumstances his Lordship apprehends that the future disposal of the title of Nawab of the Carnatic must be the subject of immediate and grave consideration.

"7. In the meantime, his Lordship assumes, as a matter of course, that, until the question regarding the vacant musnud shall have been considered and decided, the Government of Madras will not recognise any one to represent himself as successor to the late Nawab of the Carnatic."

Lord Harris was, according to John Bruce Norton, a tame follower of the Governor-General, and according to Bell, was "a feeble journeyman in the Dalhousie forge, working under the very eye and rod of the great master himself, to pick the locks and burst the bars of those solemn treaties and engagements which were expressly framed as a protection of the perpetual rights of the weak against the changing interest and policy of the strong"; he recorded his Minute on the subject on the 25th of October; and it became the basis of the subsequent arrangement. It maintained that the Company was not bound by any act or deed to maintain the hereditary succession of the Nawabs of the Carnatic, so long as the family continued to exist. On the death of the Nawab Azim-ud-daula (1819), the Government of Madras had pointed out to the Governor-General that they were not authorised by the treaty of 1801 to acknowledge any successor. Though the throne (*musnad*) had been allowed to descend in regular succession in two instances from father to son—Nawab Azam Jah (1820 to 1825) and Nawab Ghulam Muhammad Ghaus (1825-55),—these acts did not bind the Government to continue it when that succession had failed, as in the present instance, when Ghulam Muhammad Ghaus left no son and there was only his paternal uncle, Prince Azim Jah. On ground of expediency also, Lord Harris objected to the perpetuation of the Nawabship. "The semblance of royalty without any of its power was a mockery of authority which must necessarily be pernicious. It was not merely anomalous, but prejudicial to the community, that a separate authority not amenable to the laws, should be permitted to exist. This pageant, though hitherto harmless, might at any time become a nucleus of sedition and agitation. Moreover, the

habits of life and the course of proceeding of the Nabobs had been morally most injurious and tended to bring high station into disrepute and favoured the accumulation of an idle and dissipated population in the chief city of the Presidency."

The Minute interprets the words "for settling the succession to the Soubadarry of the territories of Arcot," occurring in the end of the Preamble to the Treaty of 1801, as not contemplating any hereditary succession and as referring only to the filling up of the "musnud of the Soubadarry of Arcot having become vacant," with the appointment of Nāwab Azimu'd-Daula to it.

Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire concurrence in the arguments and conclusions of the Madras Governor which were supported by Sir Henry Montgomery, a Member of the Madras Council; and he embodied his views in a minute in which he declared himself emphatically against shadowy rulers and based his opinion on four reasons:—

(1) On the general principle that the semblance of royalty without any of the power is a mockery of authority which must be pernicious;

(2) because though there is virtually no divided rule or co-ordinate authority in the government of the country (for these points were finally settled by the Treaty of 1801) yet some appearance of so baneful a system is still kept up by the continuance of a quasi-royal family and court;

(3) because the legislation of the country being solely in the hands of the Honourable Court, it is not only anomalous, but prejudicial to the community, that a separate authority, not amenable to the laws, should be permitted to exist;

(4) because it is impolitic and unwise to allow a pageant to continue, which, though it has hitherto been politically harmless, may at any time become a nucleus, for sedition and agitation." (Arnold's *Dalhousie's Administration of British India* Vol. II. p. 176).

Lord Harris' desires to prove that Nawab Azim-ud-Daula and his successors, Nawab Azam Jah and Nawab Ghulam Muhammad Ghaus, his son and grandson respectively, were not hereditary princes acknowledged as such in their own right, but only persons of the Carnatic family, to whom the sovereign British power chose to grant certain rights, privileges and allowances, and which therefore, the sovereign power had undoubtedly "the right to rescind at any time". Also, he endeavoured to show that the Treaty of 1801 was merely a personal treaty, that it was not binding on the British Government after the death of Nawab Azim-ud-Daula, though as a matter of *grace and favour*, his son and grandson were allowed to enjoy the title of Nawab of the Carnatic. The treaty of 1801 distinctly states that Nawab Azimu'd-Daula was established by the Company "in the rank, property and possessions of his ancestors, heretofore Nawabs of Carnatic." (Preamble). The first article of the treaty says that the 'right of the Nawab to succeed to the state and rank and dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors heretofore Nawabs of the Carnatic is hereby formally acknowledged and guaranteed by the Company.' The treaty further says that it was executed for the purpose of remedying the defects of all the former engagements and of establishing the connection between the two parties on "a permanent basis of security in all times to come." These are not the terms, as Bell has clearly pointed out, that one would expect to find in "a personal agreement made for one life only." It may be also pointed out in this connection that the English Commissioners, Webbe and Close, in their conferences with Taju'l-Umara's Regents, had reported as to the nature of the new treaty proposed, in the light of the obligations deriving from the previous treaties with the Nawabs:—"We replied to the Khans, that the condition now proposed actually existed in the treaties of 1787 and 1792; and that, although the entire civil and military government of the Carnatic had been transferred under the operation of that condition to the exclusive administration of the Company, no doubt was entertained that the rank and dignity of Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ool-Oomra as the Nabobs of the Carnatic had been preserved; we therefore drew this conclusion, that the rank and dignity of the Nabob of the Carnatic could not be injured by extending the operation of that condition; and that the object of proposing an ami-

cable adjustment, instead of proceeding to exercise the rights acquired by the British Government, was manifestly founded on the desire of preserving to the family the rank, dignities, and splendour of the Nabobs of the Carnatic." Lord Harris discusses, in paragraph 46 of his Despatch, the merely personal nature of the treaty of 1801 and points out the distinction between real and personal treaties as explained by Vattel, the great author of the work on International Law, entitled '*Le Droit de Gens*' published in 1758. Vattel, whom Lord Harris elaborately quotes from, distinguishes between personal treaties which expired with the sovereign who contracted them and real treaties which would bind the State permanently. A personal treaty, according to Vattel, was "one of those conventions concluded between two princes for an affair peculiar to themselves or to their families,"—being more of the nature of family compacts or treaties of dynastic alliance dependent on the continuance of personal friendship and family connection. The wording of the treaty of 1801 can be held easily to indicate a perpetual arrangement; moreover, it is an engagement between the Nawab and the Company; and the Nawab should be treated not as a person by himself, but as only the representative of the Carnatic family; and even if it should be considered as a personal treaty, it would remain as long as the Walajah family existed in any of its branches and the family was not extinct, because the proper heir of Nawab Ghaus Khan was his uncle and former Regent, according to all the principles of the Muhammadan law of succession and inheritance. This is totally opposed to the glib assumption of Lord Harris that the family had become extinct.

To revert to the criticism as to whether the treaty of 1801 was real or personal;—One might quote Hall's dictum in support of the claim of Prince Azim Jah to succeed to the Nawabi in 1855:—"Either a treaty is such that one of the two contracting parties must be supposed to have entered into it with the state as the other party, in which case, it is 'real' and not terminable with the death or change of the sovereign; or else it is such that it must be supposed to have been entered into with the sovereign in his individual capacity, in which case it never affects the state except in so far as the individual who happens to be the sovereign,

is able to use the resources of the state for his private purpose." (W. E. Hall: *A Treatise on International Law*, 5th edition; p. 361).

Sir Edwin Arnold contends that the treaty was not a personal one on the ground that 1/5 of the revenues ought to be ever appropriated to the use of the Nawab. But Sir Charles Jackson says that the wording of the treaty does not include the words 'for ever,' but limits the payment of the revenue to the life-time of the said Nawab, and that it does not confer on him more than a life interest in it⁴³.

The champions of hereditary right lay stress on the the words "in all times to come" found in the preamble and on the second article of the treaty of 1801. These words are interpreted to show that the treaty was not a personal one and contemplated the existence of a hereditary succession. Even Jackson, the apologist of Dalhousie, is constrained to admit that "the framers of the treaty intended it to operate in perpetuity so far as it was expressed, that is, so far as the rights of the Company were concerned, leaving it to be determined by future consideration and events whether the shadowy royalty should be prolonged beyond the life of Azeem-ud-Dowlah.

Lord Harris gives expression to another extraordinary opinion that cannot be justified under the literal terms of the existing treaties as to the relative positions of the Company and the Nawabs, whatever might have been the changing reality. He said that there could be no doubt that the Company was the "dominant power" and the dynasty of Nawab Walajah were in the position of "dependents." The term 'dominant power' could very well explain the material strength and political influence of the Company, but it could not legally mean that the Company could have any pretensions "to exact itself to the position of Suzerain, Lord Paramount or Superior and to degrade the Nawab to the position of a feudatory, vassal or inferior". But the reality of the Nawab's inferior and dependent position cannot be really challenged. The relative

(43) E. Arnold: *The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India*—Vol. II; pp. 176-77; and Jackson: *Vindication of Dalhousie's Indian Administration*—pp. 93-94,

real positions between the two parties were very much as Lord Harris expressed it; indeed they were so even when the treaty of 1801 was concluded. But it may be pleaded that the political relations prevailing between the different powers of India during entire length of the rule of the Company were very anomalous and frequently reversed the actual situation of the different parties⁴⁴.

Therefore, consistent with the Indian political usage of the times, the Nawab was still nominally the sovereign of the Carnatic. Major Bell gives contemporary European analogies also, in support of this view. Thus he quotes the King of Prussia as being the sovereign of Neufchatel which was under a republican government and really formed part of the Swiss Confederacy; and in 1857, after the Peace Congress of Paris and at a Conference of

-
- (44) Madhava Rao Sindhia was the jailor and protector of the shadowy Emperor, Shah Alam, for a number of years. We read in General de Biogne's Memoirs the following significant picture of the position of the Emperor:—Such was the respect for the House of Timur that, although the whole peninsula had been gradually withdrawn from its direct authority, there was not a prince in India who dared call himself "King." Shah Alam was still seated on the throne of the Mughal and all was still done in his name." This was in 1784.

In 1815, after the English had taken possession of Delhi and the protection of the Emperor, we find the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, refusing to visit Delhi because the then occupant of the Palace, Shah Alam's son and successor, would not receive him on an equal footing. Criers still made public notices with the exordium: "The country is the Shah's; the power is the Company's; the people is the God's." (H. G. Keene's *Sindhia otherwise called Madhoji Patel*; p. 143).

The Sindia himself ostentatiously proclaimed at the Peishwa's durbar in 1792, that he was only the hereditary slipper-bearer of the Peishwa whom he now invested, in his capacity as the Emperor's messenger, with the office of Vice-Gerent of the Empire and with its symbolical insignia, after the latter deposited on an empty throne which represented the throne of the Emperor, an offering of 101 gold mohurs. Thus the Peishwa "the hereditary President of a dissolving confederacy, wore the order of the Silver Fish as the Lieutenant of a moribund empire."

The Peishwa himself had long overshadowed the descendants of the house of Shivaji; and by continuing to call himself only as the minister (Pant Pradhan) had all along been the actual master and head. Thus also Mahadji Sindhia "made himself a sovereign by calling himself a servant."

The claims of the Carnatic Nawab to suzerainty over Tanjore etc., were legal and political fictions; only they were kept alive by the Company's support of the Nawabs.

the four neutral Great Powers, it was settled that the King of Prussia was to retain in the title of the Prince of Neufchatel and to receive a million dollars as compensation for his rights. Similarly the Ottoman Sultan was the sovereign of the Danubian Principalities, of Servia and of Egypt; and yet he was by treaty forbidden to interfere in their administration. Similarly also the Queen of England governed the Ionian Islands of which she was not the sovereign. Therefore it was contended that the Nawab had never become a 'dependent' of the Company; and he was bound to the same conditions as his father without the special renewal of the treaty. It was not a question, as Lord Harris contended in paragraphs 13-14 of his Minute, that the Government of Madras were not authorised, by the treaty of 1801 to acknowledge any successor to Azimu'd Daula. No doubt was then entertained (*i.e.* in 1819) either by the Madras or by the Supreme Government as can be seen from the wording of the Despatches that passed between them on that occasion as to the necessity of some member of the Walajah family being acknowledged as the successor of the deceased Nawab. The Madras Government asked for particular instructions as to the "line of descent, the forms and conditions of succession". They merely pointed out that they were not authorised to acknowledge any particular member of the Carnatic family as the unconditional successor. (*The Empire in India* by E. Bell, edited by C. S. Srinivsachari, pp. 99-100).

The then Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings wrote, as has been noted above, that, in his opinion, no new treaty or instrument was required, because Nawab Azam Jah was considered by him "to be *ipso facto* a party to the treaty concluded by his father in 1801". This was in definite reply to the query of the Madras Government, dated 2nd October 1819, whether "the Governor-General in Council held that the treaty of 1801 guaranteed the succession in the direct and legitimate line of descent, to which opinion they themselves had always been inclined as well from the spirit in which the treaty was concluded, as from the tenor of its professions and also from the terms of the declaration published at that period." They did not question the right of descent because the treaty guaranteed the hereditary pretensions of Azimu'd-Daula, but only doubted as to where they should fix the line of succession and not the succession itself.

On the death of Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan in October 1855, according to every principle of law and by virtue of the legal interpretation of solemn treaties, the sovereignty of the Carnatic inhered only in the next heir who came immediately after the deceased Nawab in the line of succession.

It can be justifiably held that when Azimu'd-Daula relinquished to the Company by treaty the civil and military administration of the Carnatic, he still remained its hereditary sovereign and was in his life time repeatedly recognised and proclaimed by the British Government as such. Two generations of rulers had followed him; and the heir of the last Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan, was naturally his uncle Azim Jah, equally by the Muhammadan and by the English laws. Azim Jah was the second son of Azimu'd-Daula and was, after his nephew's death (1855) not only the representative of his father, but also, of his childless nephew; and since, the death of the childless Taju'l-Umara and of Azimu'd-Daula he was the only representative and heir of the rights of Umdatul-Umara; also, he was descended through his father and grandfather in a direct line from Anwaru'd-din Khan.

Other arguments can also be brought forward even from the records of Government to show that it was never contemplated by them before the time of Dalhousie and Harris, that they should set aside the family of the Carnatic either on the ground that the existing holder might be childless and therefore the State might lapse for want of heirs, or on the ground that the Nawabs were mere 'dependents' on the bounty of the Company. As late as December 1847, the Madras Government, in its Minutes of Consultation, quoted the fifth Article of the Treaty of 1801, concerning allowances to some of the ladies of the family of Wallajah, that the Nawab was bound by that treaty to support them. There was the previous implied recognition in 1843, by the Government of Lord Tweeddale, of Prince Azim Jah's likely *succession to the masnad*. It could here be repeated that when in 1819 there was a delay of more than six months in the recognition of the succession of Nawab Azim Jah, it was not the fault of the Madras Government suspecting or denying his right of succession. That Government did not doubt the rights of the family under the treaty of 1801, but doubted whether the late Nawab's son ought to be installed or another member could

be deemed to be the proper successor. In 1855, the throne should descend rightly to the next heir in the family of the deceased Nawab; and that was Prince Azim Jah. The family did not become extinct on the death of the late Nawab without leaving any son, as was contended by Lord Harris, because, according to Muhammadan law, Azim Jah was the next heir.

We shall now deal with some extraneous considerations brought forward by Lords Dalhousie and Harris in justification of their proposal to extinguish the Nawabi. In the first place, they brought up the old bogey of Wellesley's revelation of the alleged treasonable correspondence between Tipu Sultan and Nawabs Walajah and Omdatu'l-Umara. Next, Dalhousie says that both the late Nawab and his family had "disreputably abused the dignity of their position and the large share of public revenue which had been allotted to them." Exception might be taken to the use of the word 'reserved' would have better brought out the true spirit of the provision by treaty. We might also, claim that there was no political relation between the Nawab's private character and the right of his heir to the succession. As Sir Edwin Arnold remarks, though there was no kingdom to acquire in the case of the Carnatic, still "the revenues of the phantom Nawab were very desirable to Government". He further adds: "if the Nawabs were immoral and prodigal, and Azeem Jah especially so," and if immorality and prodigality should be fatal to royal and princely claims in India, "two-thirds, nay, seven-eighths of the *musnuds* and *gadis* within its limits might have been purged by the Marquis without depending upon the sterility of Ranees or the incapacity of Maharajahs."

John Bruce Norton, Advocate-General of Madras, writing in 1857, thus refutes this charge⁴⁵.

Norton holds that if the Nawab had been moderately educated he might have conferred great benefits upon the people of Madras, especially the Mussalman population.

(45) "I have no hesitation in asserting, that, foolish and improvident as the young man was, his conduct had never been of a quality approximating to what would justify such a punishment as this inflicted on him and his heirs. Indeed, we might just as reasonably have refused to allow the heirs of George IV to succeed him on account of his irregular habits and his extravagance." (*The Rebellion in India: How to Prevent Another*) (1857, p. 104).

The charge of the immorality of the Indian princes was then frequently brought forward by Indian administrators and publicists. Several of them like the great writer, J. C. Marshman "whose uninterrupted connection with the *Friend of India* was marked by 'incessant threats and slanders of native states' and who exerted a most powerful influence on Government, rated the value of Indian institutions, social, political and religious, at much less than their true worth. But whatever that might be, it should not have had any weight in deciding on rights of inheritance and on the sacredness of the treaty provisions. Such views found a prominent place in the Minutes of Lord Harris and the Marquis of Dalhousie and the Directors echoed such a view in their Despatch of the 15th of March 1856. The Governor-General reproduced the same view in his parting address⁴⁶. Both Nawabs Azimu'd-Daula and Azam Jah and Prince Azim Jah lived sober and orderly lives, whatever might have been the defects that marked Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan's habits of life. Contemporary opinion in Madras felt that if there had been a Nawab (of the type of Azim Jah) of the Carnatic at the time of the Mutiny, he could have influenced the Mussalman

- (46) In his famous Minute, reviewing his administration of India for over eight years, dated 28th Feby, 1856, Dalhousie put forward, rather repeated his three previous reasons; (1) the treaty of 1801 was personal one; (2) Nawab Muhammad Ghaus Khan left no male heir; and (3) "both he and his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their position and the large share of public revenue which had been allotted to them."

It is the third reason that requires to be refuted here, as it was both groundless and irrelevant. Both Evans Bell and J. B. Norton refuse the statement that the Nawab's life was very bad. Norton says that the Nawab was not worse than many contemporary princes in this. Stipulations as to virtuous conduct and thrift are not usual in treaties.

Here may also be noted Dalhousie's remark in his despatch of 1855, that though allusions might have been made on some previous occasions, by the Madras Government, that if Muhammad Ghaus Khan should have no children, his uncle, Azim Jah, would be allowed to succeed, yet "to indicate an *expectation*, or even an *intention* is not to recognise or even confer a right". The words of the Marquis of Tweeddale "the position that he (Azim Jah) still holds in relation to his Highness the Nabob and to his succession to the *musnud*" conferred 'no right' on Azim Jah and conveyed 'no pledge or promise of succession to him'; and "although they indicated a favourable intention on the part of the Government towards him, the Government has since (1843) had but too much reason to forego all such intentions in favour of himself and of the members of his family". These last words imply a wholesale condemnation of Azim Jah and the other members of the family, because the Nawab lived a life of sensuality.

community of Madras towards orderly and loyal behaviour. Bell goes so far as to say that if there had been no Nawab of the Carnatic at all, one ought to have been created, because such a prince would have been a factor for moderation in times of religious excitement or political trouble among the Mussalmans of Madras. Such a factor for moderation and prudence could have been found easily in Prince Azim Jah, who had always lived a life of respectability.

The Prince put forward, immediately on his nephew's death, an application for the vacant *masnad*. The Madras Government was very polite to him and sympathised greatly with the widow of the late Nawab, Khair-un-nissa Begum Sahiba, but warned the Diwan of the Nawabi not to recognise a successor. Azim Jah contended that, neither at the time of accession of his nephew, nor at any subsequent stage was there any hint or suggestion dropped by the Madras Government that his succession would not be allowed and would be opposed. He was the successor of his nephew and also the heir to him, according to Muhammadan law and custom. Though defeated in his endeavour, Prince Azim Jah obstinately pressed his claims; but we read the Administration Report of the Madras Government for the year 1861-62 declaring that his claim was "finally rejected." But the Prince continued to press it on the attention of the authorities both in India and in London; and Major Bell who was at that time in Madras, as well as men of his way of thinking, advised the Prince not to look upon this decision as final, nor to abandon or compromise those rights which had been secured to the Wallajah family "by four solemn treaties and ratified by the autograph letters of four British Sovereigns:" The then Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, was again and again pressed to confer the title of Nawab on Azim Jah. The Home Government, when Mr. Vernon Smith was President of the Board of Control, had confirmed the decision arrived at by Lords Harris and Dalhousie. Sir Charles was now told by his official advisers, of the Indian Council that if he should grant the request, "he would have reversed the decisions of Lord Clive, Lord Wellesley, Lord Dalhousie and Lord Harris and would have entailed on India the mischief of more royal puppets whose ancestral

names and dynastic traditions made them often the rallying points of disaffection and treason." Sir Algernon West, Private Secretary to Sir Charles Wood and, later, to the Marquis of Ripon, declared that these appeals were founded on "erroneous grounds and inaccurate statements." John Bruce Norton maintained very boldly that the possibility of disaffection and rebellion in Madras in the crisis of 1857 was greatly lessened by the loyal attitude of Prince Azim Jah. Major Bell corroborates the value of the Prince's loyalty and the services that he rendered in keeping at peace and in quiet the Mussalman population of Triplicane where the Nawab's family had long been settled. Bell goes so far as to say that the considerations for the retention of the Nawabship at that epoch were so urgent and insistent that he concludes: - "I am distinctly of opinion that if there had been no Nawab of the Carnatic, we ought to have invented one. A Prince so situated, residing at one of the great centres of our power, with so much to lose and so little to expect from any disturbance, could not be anything but conservative in politics and moderate in religion, and in a time of religious revival or excitement he could be held responsible for the manner in which he made use of his influence."

Sir Charles Wood, while declining to disturb the decision of the Court of Directors, carefully abstained from upholding that decision on its intrinsic merits. Finally, owing to the increasing pressure, he had to raise Prince Azim Jah's allowance to Rs. 150,000 a year and also to consent to recognise his position as that of the "First Nobleman" of the Carnatic. The title of the Prince of Arcot was conferred on Prince Azim Jah and his descendants in 1867, and granted by the Queen's Letter Patent, dated 2nd August 1870; the Prince was given the title of *Amir-i-Arcot* or Prince of Arcot, (with a personal salute of 15 guns) with succession to his four sons and one grand-son who was to be selected by Her Majesty the Queen. The Prince and his successors in title were exempted from the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The titles and honours and the perpetual portion of the pension assigned to the family should be continued only to a representative in the male line of Prince Azim Jah; but the succession was in the first instance to go to the four sons of Azim Jah in such order as he might fix. It is gratifying to note that, recently, the

title of His Highness has been reconferred on the Prince of Arcot⁴⁷.

- (47) In 1867, the Mysore case for the rendition of the assumed administration was settled, because the Derby Government sent out a Despatch through Sir Stafford Northcote, promising the rendition of Mysore on the attainment of age by the Maharajah's adopted son. Then the title of G.C.S.I. was conferred on the Maharajah and the times were very propitious. There was the rumour of a son of the Queen visiting India, and Bell hoped that "when a Prince of our Royal House arrives from England, and having received the homage of Prince Azeem Jah on behalf of his Royal Mother, restores him to the musnud of his ancestors in her name, and by her command."

His Highness Sir Ghulam Muhammad Ali, G.C.S.I., the present Prince of Arcot, is the son of Sir Muhammad Munavar Khan Bahadur, K.C.I.E., who was the Prince of Arcot from 1889 to 1903. He is the premier nobleman of South India; was created G.C.I.E., in 1917; K.C.I.E. in 1909 and His Highness in 1935. The residence of the Prince is Amir Mahal, built for him by Government.

Prince Azim Jah, the first Prince of Arcot, had four sons: Zahir-ud-Daula, who became the second Prince of Arcot and three others, Ahmadullah, Nurullah and Ghulam Mohiud-din Muazzaz-ud-Daula. Azim Jah was succeeded in dignity by Zahir-ud-daula in 1874; the next Prince of Arcot was Ahmadullah Intizam-ul-Mulk (1879-89); and the 4th was Prince Muhammad Munawar Ali, son of Muazzaz-ud-daula who enjoyed the dignity from 1889 to 1903. He was followed by his son Prince Ghulam Muhammad Ali in 1903.

The full title of the Prince of Arcot is His Highness Azim Jah Umdat-ul-Umara, Amir-ul-Umara, Siraj-ul-Umara, Madar-ul-Mulk, Umdat-ul-Mulk, Azim-ud-daula, Asad-ud-daula-al-Ingiliz Zahir-ud-daula, Muhammad Ali Khan, Muhammad Badiullah Khan Bahadur, Zulfikar Jang, Fitrat Jang, Sipha Salar, Prince of Arcot. (Lethbridge's *"The Golden Book of India"*, pp. 346-47, 1893).

Prince Muhammad Munawar was not given the title of His Highness, nor granted a salute. The Present Prince has received the title.

